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There has been a growing literature concerning the role of online technologies in 
fostering collective action in democratic countries (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012, 2013; 
Bimber et al., 2005). However, studies in non-democratic settings have tended to focus on 
high profile but often relatively short-term mobilisations. Longer-term online activism 
and campaigns outside democratic settings have remained relatively under-researched and 
difficult to analyse. This thesis, therefore, seeks to examine some of the existing 
assumptions around collective action, derived largely from experiences in democratic 
countries, by focusing on a country with no tradition of collective activism. It draws on 
Bennett and Segerberg’s (2013) framework of connective action logic, to analyse two 
case studies from Saudi Arabia:the Women’s Right to Drive Campaign (October 26th 
campaign), and the Teachers’ Rights campaign.  
In particular, this study examines the role of the Internet in three areas: (a) mobilising 
support for campaigns; (b) shaping the organisational structure of collective action; and (c) 
challenging the systemic environment. In order to address these issues, the thesis draws 
on two types of data: firstly, extensive interviews with campaigners and international 
journalists and secondly, social network analysis.  
Final results indicate that Internet technologies have help to create a new space, allowing 
social campaigners to express themselves without significant disruption and to achieve 
some of their goals, although the social and political context plays an equally important 
role in shaping campaigns as technology does. It has also proved a useful tool for 
countering media hostility and negative coverage. The Internet did not affect the 
organisational structure of either of these campaigns, which still followed a hierarchal 
structure even though some started as ‘connective action’.  
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1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis aims to explore the increasing role that Internet technology is playing in social 
activism in Saudi Arabia, which in terms of its political system, is considered to be a non-
democratic (ND henceforth) nation. More specifically, it focuses on examining the Internet’s 
role in three principal areas: mobilising popular support for campaigns; shaping the 
organisational structure of collective action and the reshaping of the systemic political 
environment.  
 
This introductory chapter maps out the key areas and concerns dealt with in this thesis, 
situating them within the overall framework of this study. The chapter begins by describing 
the rationale for, and the significance of, the research. It will then present the research aims 
and the specific questions which it seeks to address, indicating how these fit within the 
theoretical and conceptual framework of the thesis. Finally, it concludes by outlining the 
research design and methodology used in this study. 
 
1.1. Rationale for the Study 
In 1999, at the start of my undergraduate studies at Imam Mohammad bin Saud Islamic 
University, I remember reading in the newspaper that the Internet had become available for 
public use in Saudi Arabia. I went to one of the few Internet cafés in the city. I was asked to 
provide a copy of my national identity card, and to fill in a form stating my purpose for using 
the Internet. I had come, not simply to explore this new technology, but to visit one particular 
discussion forum. I was amazed by the ease with which people engaged in online discussions 
and the subjects they chatted about; even more so by the numbers of readers for whatever 
was posted. Anonymous individuals were talking freely about different issues, including 
government ministers and the political system; all topics that I had never seen in the Saudi 
press.  
I started to notice that Saudi citizens were using the Internet for discussion to a greater extent 
than for any other purpose. Discussion forums started to boom throughout the country (Sait et 
al., 2007; Al Nashmi et al., 2010). People paid to subscribe to some, whilst in others, there 
was a black market in usernames. Forums covered diverse issues, from politics to hobbies.  
The sudden growth of a social phenomenon of this kind raises many different questions, but 
16 
 
research has tended to focus on the Internet as a media platform, rather than as a 
communication tool. In Saudi Arabia in particular, scholars were interested in the emergence 
of online newspapers and how news organisations would adapt to these new technologies 
(Alaskar & Alhmoud, 2002; AlShehri & Gunter 2002; Alzaid 2009), perhaps due to the 
sensitivity of this subject with regards to  freedom of  expression. Outside the Kingdom itself, 
Internet scholars with an academic interest in Saudi Arabia, tended to focus on political 
oppositions like Fandy (1999) and  Alahmed (2014). 
As an academic and a journalist therefore, I felt that there was a knowledge gap which 
concerned our understanding of the impact that new communication technologies might have 
on a society that had existed for a long period of time with a restricted public sphere and a 
closely controlled media system. In particular, there was a need to explore how the Internet 
might influence the emergence and growth of social activism in a ‘closed society’, as Saudi 
Arabia is commonly referred to. This was the original idea which inspired the research for 
this thesis.  
1.2. Significance of the Study  
Unsurprisingly, in the pre-Internet era, a great deal of the research on social movements and 
campaigns was concentrated in democratic countries. This was perhaps only to be expected 
given that this type of activism had originated in that context as part of more general 
concerns relating to the freedom of speech and political participation since the 1960s onwards 
(Diani, 1992). In contrast, those studies conducted in the ND context had tended to focus on 
much larger scale campaigns, in particular, radical change movements such as the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979 (Mowlana, 1979; Kurzman, 1996).  
When researchers started to look at the role being played by the Internet, they also initially 
focused on campaigns in the democratic context, most notably anti-globalisation and anti-war 
movements (Van Aelst & Walgraave, 2004; Clark & Themudo, 2006; Stein, 2009; Della 
Porta & Mosca, 2005), as well as the two contrasting scales of local and global campaigns 
(Pickerill, 2001; McFarlane, 2006; Borge-Holthoefer et al., 2011; Micó & Casero-Ripollés, 
2013; Gillan & Pickerill, 2008). The focus on ND countries has again tended to concentrate 
on large-scale, dramatic activism, including Iran’s Green Revolution during 2009 and the 
events of the Arab Spring in 2011 (Burns & Eltham 2009; Eltantawy & Wiest 2011; Khamis 
& Vaughn 2011; Starbird & Palen 2012). However, there is also a growing body of literature 
about using the Internet as a space and a tool in ND countries, especially following the Green 
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Revolution in Iran, the Arab Spring and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, (see for example 
Howard et al., 2011; Cannistraro, 2011; Al-Rawi, 2014; Ahy, 2014; Bruns et al., 2014; 
Anderson, 2011; Goldstein, 2007; Aday et al., 2010; Wojcieszak & Smith, 2014).  
Perhaps inevitably, the vast majority of research on ND countries focused on the use of the 
Internet for instigating major political change, studying Internet campaigns that were 
specifically aimed at challenging and/or changing existing political systems. It is noticeable 
that researchers tended to ignore Internet use by activists working on smaller-scale, social 
justice campaigns. These were not aimed at overthrowing political regimes but rather at 
groups wishing to claim the rights which they believed were due to them as citizens, within 
the existing political system, by making use of the Internet and the degree of freedom which 
it provided.  
Studies in this field have tended to ignore this practice in ND countries, as by definition, it 
cannot exist in such political systems. Activism, or collective action, may not be part of 
political participation in ND countries, as it is in democratic countries where such activity is 
legal and part of the political deliberation. In some cases, this may have been the result of 
certain preconceived ideas held by researchers from democratic countries, and the sensitivity 
of the subject for the researchers from ND countries. For example, Kalathil and Boas (2003), 
ignore the use of the Internet by citizens of the Emirates and Saudi Arabia for political 
discussions. Instead, they repeat the usual assumptions about the governments of those states, 
their vast wealth and the role of tradition and religion in social culture. Ironically, however, 
they do mention the use of cassettes by certain groups to deliver political material in 2003, 
whilst at the same time, clearly stating, “There has been no use of the Internet for political 
participation” (Kalathil & Boas, 2003:117). They appear to have been totally unaware of the 
fact that online forums for political participation were already flourishing at that time, the 
best example being www.alsaha.com, which started in 1997, even before the Internet was 
officially launched in Saudi Arabia. The scholars who studied Alsaha.com at that time, for 
example, Thomas (2003) and Weimann (2004), only focused on the possibilities of cyber-
terrorism. Moreover, the study by Kalathil and Boas (2003), like some others, was based only 
on data from international organisations and news articles, as their list of references 
demonstrates. This also highlights some of the methodological difficulties for researchers, 
especially non-Arabic speaking western researchers, in gathering accurate data. Philip 
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Howard, who wrote extensively about the Internet and politics with specific reference to 
Islam and Middle East agreed: 
Politically, the Internet is an important object of inquiry, and many of the existing 
approaches to such inquiry have been biased by the tendency to be more 
interested in Islamic fundamentalism than civil society, (2011:33).   
In other cases, research has covered cyberactivism in a very superficial way, such as the 
article by Chaudhry (2014), whose analysis of the hashtag #Women2Drive, aimed to answer 
the question, “Can Twitter usage promote social progress in Saudi Arabia?” His analysis of 
data from the hashtag makes it clear that his approach is not methodological and the quotes 
used are taken only from individuals who post in English (rather than the native Arabic 
language), to make it easier for the Canadian-based researcher to study this subject. In doing 
so however, some of the contextual and cultural understanding is lost. Furthermore, the 
contextual information provided about Saudi Arabia often seems inaccurate or misunderstood 
in many cases. For example, Chaudhry argues that Saudi Muslim scholars ban women from 
driving because it, “Requires women to unveil themselves, and this often uncovers certain 
shameful parts of the body” (2014: 953). Yet this is not the actual fatwa originally issued by 
the clerics (which can be found online). Similarly, he quotes a so-called Saudi psychologist 
as commenting that, “Women who drive are putting themselves at risk of negatively 
impacting their ovaries and pelvis” (Chaudhry, 2014:953). This same quote has been repeated 
on numerous news websites, despite the fact that the ‘authoritative source’ in question has no 
qualifications in psychology and is certainly not qualified to give medical opinions on 
gynaecological matters. 
This kind of misunderstanding of activism in Saudi Arabia is not limited to individual 
researchers only, but can even be found at major Internet research institutions, such as the 
Berkman Centre for Internet and Society at the University of Harvard. A search for 
information regarding events or publications about Saudi Arabia on the Berkman website 
shows that the focus is on filtering systems in Saudi Arabia, religious uses of the Internet in 
Saudi Arabia or the democratising role of the Internet in ND countries. 
Such studies show the inevitable need to research the uses of the Internet beyond the 
stereotypical assumptions about such contexts in order to understand the role of the Internet 
in political participation and in social activism in particular. It is true that political 
participation in Saudi Arabia is very limited and collective actions are restricted in the 
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country, but that does not mean it is not there. According to the work of Schumpeter (1943), 
the opportunity for people to vote is just one third of democracy, whilst the other two-thirds 
are about the existence of political rights and freedom of expression, as well as the freedom 
of association (Schumpeter, 1994).   
Hence, this research intends to provide an in-depth study of the online activism from civil 
society and political participation aspects, as the Internet can provide citizens in such 
countries with opportunities to participate in online activism where it is often hard or 
impossible to do so in the offline space.       
1.3. Research Objectives and Questions 
The research questions for this study arose from reviewing the literature on activism and on 
cyberactivism in particular. In a country such as Saudi Arabia, where the freedom of 
expression is limited and activism is restricted by law, the Internet could potentially have a 
key role to play in supporting activism within the state. This research therefore, aims to 
achieve three objectives when studying cyberactivism in Saudi Arabia. These aims are:   
•To examine the impact of Internet technologies on social campaigning in a non- 
democratic context. 
•To analyse the development of cyberactivism in Saudi Arabia in terms of issues 
relating to mobilisation, organisation, communication and relations with the existing 
political and media systems. 
• To establish what the Saudi case can add to our understanding of the notion of 
cyberactivism and social protest in the digital age.  
These overarching issues have been distilled into three areas in particular: (1) The 
mobilisation of support for campaigns; (2) The shaping of the organisational structure of 
collective action;  (3) The role of the systemic environment for online social justice 
campaigns. 
The first area focuses on the individuals who are the base of activism. Mobilisation of 
individuals is essential for collective action as it aims to engage members of the 
public/citizens to participate in the required actions. More specifically, the first research 
questions focus on mobilisation at the individual level:      
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What role do Internet tools play in connecting and mobilising activists and how does 
this contact originate?  
Mobilising citizens can then create a network or organisation for communicational and 
organisational purposes. There are different types of networks and organisations in collective 
action, and arguably the Internet has influenced the organisational structure of collective 
action. In this case, the research question aims to discover whether the Internet lends itself to 
grassroots/participatory self-organising campaigns or not. Specifically, then, the question is:  
 
What sort of models of collective action are facilitated by the Internet? 
Clearly, collective action must work, and interact with, and in, different contexts. The 
systemic environment may influence and be influenced by activism, as the campaigns aim to 
achieve their goals within these contexts. This being the case, the question here is:      
How does Internet campaigning challenge the systemic environment and vice versa? 
Therefore, these research questions cover three different levels of activism: the individual; 
the organisational and the systemic which includes the political, social, and religious 
environments. Addressing all three levels will help to multi-dimensional view of 
cyberactivism in Saudi Arabia. The research will answer these questions by studying social 
campaigns in Saudi Arabia, although it could be argued that these campaigns could also be 
considered to have a ‘political’ dimension, in the broader sense of the word. This study, 
therefore, defines social campaigns as those that aim to demand rights which are considered 
necessary for full participation in the life of a society. In this case, this does not include full 
political rights, such as the right to participate in the establishment or administration of a 
government. This definition is based on the ‘Compass-Manual for Human Rights Education 
with Young People’ by Brander et al. (2012).  
In terms of its key theoretical framework, this study draws inspiration from Bennett and 
Segerberg’s ‘Logic of Connective Action’ (2013), a choice which is fully discussed in the 
following chapter. The LoCA framework which emerged from empirical studies that 
analysed campaigns from around the globe in different contexts, is the most recent 





1.4. Original Contribution made by this Research  
By taking insights from the literature on digital protest and collective action, which has 
largely focused on democracies, and applying these to a Saudi context, which is considered to 
be a non-democratic country, this study helps to fill in the previously identified gaps in 
knowledge. In-depth data collected in the field is used to advance our understanding of the 
role of the Internet in supporting social cyberactivism in Saudi Arabia. Currently, just a 
handful of studies (Fandy, 1999; Karolak, 2013; Alahmed, 2014; Al-Saggaf & Simmons, 
2014; Yuce et al., 2014) have focused on the Saudi context in term of cyberactivism, with 
little consideration of social activism, and some of these have failed to fully understand the 
context as a result of methodological shortcomings or cultural barriers, as previously 
discussed.    
The present study thus makes an important contribution in the field of cyberactivism by 
analysing its growth and development in Saudi Arabia, with particular reference to questions 
concerning mobilisation, organisation and their relationship with political, social and media 
systems. In more specific terms, the original contribution of this research can be 
demonstrated in three main areas: empirical, theoretical and methodological.  
Empirically, the research conducted here provides new and original data from a country 
which has thus far received little serious consideration and indicates that the Internet has 
created a relatively free virtual public space where active citizens can campaign. The study 
highlights that Internet-based social activism in Saudi Arabia is involved in a growing 
number of campaigns, attracting a new generation of individuals who have never previously 
engaged with activism, but who have found, in the Internet, an alternative space in which to 
demand their rights. Using the Internet for activism in this ND country has empowered 
citizens who wish to demand their rights within the current political system.  
For Saudi women in particular, the Internet has offered the opportunity of an enhanced 
presence in a male-dominated community, giving them the space to participate and voice 
their opinions with the same force as their male counterparts, without disrupting traditions 
and customs in a country which holds these in high esteem. By using the Internet, 
campaigners are able to engage with conventional media and influence its coverage of social 
campaigns. The research indicates that self-censorship and intentionally vague legislation are 
that main threats facing cyberactivists in Saudi Arabia, rather than government-sponsored, 
technological restrictions. Moreover, in general terms, the state appears to have partially 
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benefited from the cyberactivism focused on social issues, since this helps to limit activism 
on the Internet, making it easier for the government to monitor this and respond to it.  
The research provides a theoretical contribution to a number of areas of cyberactivism studies 
and to conceptualising the potential role of the Internet in democratisation. Despite the fact 
that a number of scholars have claimed that the Internet is responsible for decentralising 
campaigns (see Chapter Two), this study reveals that citizens need to be socialised by 
hierarchical, collective action before moving to decentralising campaigns, but in the Saudi 
context, this socialisation cannot happen without the Internet. The current findings add to a 
growing body of literature concerning the potential role of the Internet in democratisation and 
it argues that the Internet has different implications for different ND countries.  
Finally, the research also provides insights into the methodological challenges posed by 
conducting research on activism in a ND context. It illustrates that researching cyberactivism 
in a ND context requires an in-depth understanding of the context since cyberactivism as a 
phenomenon cannot be segregated from its social context. Furthermore, this phenomenon is 
better studied by using interviews as a tool for data collection. Using online content studies 
only may not provide a full understanding of the phenomenon due to the Internet censorship 
in these countries (see chapter 5).     
1.5. Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into three main parts. 
Part one (Chapters two-four), contextualises this research, discussing the existing literature 
on cyberactivism in addition to establishing the framework and methodology for the thesis.  
Chapter two covers two main issues, beginning with the philosophical basis of the role which 
technology plays within society, as well as establishing the theoretical framework for the 
thesis which draws on Bennett and Segerberg’s ‘Logic of Connective Action’ (2013).  
Chapter three focuses more specifically on providing an overview of the Internet’s role in ND 
countries, examining the implications of its uses in the context of activism, mobilisation and 
organisational structures. It also explores issues relating to contextual and wider, systemic 
research questions, including how ND governments respond to the Internet.  
Chapter four examines the operationalisation of the research, presenting the research 
methodology and detailing research procedures, including data collection and data analysis 
methods. It also acknowledges the limitations of the research, highlighting the problems 
posed by data collection and the sensitivity of researching activism in a ND context.  
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The second part of the study (Chapters five-eight) focuses on the Saudi Arabian context. 
Chapter five and six analyse the political, social media and technological environment in 
Saudi Arabia, and how regulation constructs the systemic environment of activism in the 
country. These chapters also shed light on the different meanings of activism in the Saudi 
context, tracing the history of pre-Internet activism and charting the general rise of the 
Internet and its specific role in cyberactivism, as well as describing attempts by the state to 
control its political and social influence, including blocking, monitoring and censorship. 
Chapters seven and eight present the analysis of two detailed case studies of online social 
activism in Saudi Arabia. The first of these is the so-called ‘October 26th Campaign’ which 
supports Saudi women’s right to drive. Drawing on interviews with activists and journalists, 
together with analysis of two Twitter hashtags, this chapter shows how technologies are used 
to mobilise and organise activists and supporters. It also demonstrates how activists can use 
the Internet to challenge the Saudi authorities. The second case study examines the teachers' 
rights campaign which started in 2007 and are recognised as one of the first online campaigns 
conducted in Saudi Arabia. Findings in this chapter are based on interviews conducted in 2013 
with core activists in the teachers’ campaign as well as analysis of an online discussion forum 
during the period 2009-2015.  
Finally, the third part of the thesis reflects on the research findings and presents the research 
conclusions. Chapter Nine discusses the key findings of this research in the light of the 
literature critically examined in the earlier chapters of the thesis. It also summarises the 
theoretical contribution of the thesis and concludes by recommending areas for future research. 
Chapter Ten sheds light on the general empirical findings, and theoretical implications of the 




2. CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUALISING ACTIVISM IN THE INTERNET 
ERA 
2.1. Introduction   
Before examining the role of Internet technologies in social campaigning in a non-democratic 
(ND) context, it is necessary to discuss the relationship between technology and social 
phenomena in general, as well as to consider the actual role of the Internet in political 
participation and activism in particular. 
Hence, this chapter focuses on three main topics. First, it examines the links between 
technology and social phenomena and whether it is exogenous or not. It has been argued that 
technology can influence social phenomena but humans have the power to control this 
influence. Second, it reviews the relevant literature concerning the role of the Internet in 
facilitating activism, particularly mobilisation and organisation of activism. More specifically, 
it argues that the Internet has positively influenced mobilisation since Internet activism can 
help campaigners to reach wider audiences than was previously possible. Moreover, it can 
also deepen their levels of engagement with campaigns by more actively involving them. 
Thirdly, the chapter will conclude by establishing a theoretical framework for this thesis 
which is inspired by Bennett and Segerberg’s ‘Logic of Connective Action’ (2012;2013). 
They claim that the Internet and new technologies have created a new logic of collective 
action which makes it possible to campaign on the basis of shared goals without formal 
organisations and with little or no co-ordination. Effectively, the means of communication 
has become the organisation. This conceptual framework will then be used to analyse the role 
which the Internet plays in activism in the later case study chapters (see Chapters 7 and 8). 
 
2.2. The Internet: Between Technological Determinism and Social Constructivism 
Studying social action within a technological environment raises a longstanding 
philosophical question concerning whether humans are driven and directed by the technology, 
or whether they themselves control that technology, meaning that it is ‘socially constructed’ 
(Misa, 1988). Scholars are broadly divided into two camps regarding this philosophical 
question and can be categorised as either technological determinists or social constructivists. 
 
In general terms, technological determinists view technology as the main controller or driver 
of social phenomena (Misa, 1988) and also consider that technology develops separately 
from social phenomena. They also believe that technology creates social change which is 
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beyond human control (Smith & Marx, 1994; MacKenzie & Wajcman 1985, cited in Misa, 
1988; Heilbroner, 1967). It is important to note here that technological determinism cannot be 
considered to be a single theory; rather it is a range of theories which share a similar 
philosophical outlook (Williams, 1974, cited in Barnes, 2000). Smith (1994:38), defines 
technological determinism as, “The belief that social progress is driven by technological 
innovation, which in turn, follows an ‘inevitable’ course.” McLuhan (1967), famously shared 
the same view, as reflected in his much-quoted phrase, “The medium is the message.” 
Explaining his view within the framework of the new media technology of the 1960s, he 
argued: 
The medium, or process, of our time - electric technology - is reshaping and 
restructuring patterns of social interdependence and every aspect of our personal 
life. It is forcing us to reconsider and re-evaluate practically every thought, every 
action, and every institution formerly taken for granted, (McLuhan & Fiore, 1967, 
cited in Larson & Sung, 2009).   
Importantly, the technological determinist approach can be said to range from ‘Hard’ to ‘Soft’ 
determinism. Hard determinism argues that social phenomena are simply the result of 
technology (Bimber, 1990:341). By contrast, soft determinism claims that technology 
facilitates social change or action (Finnegan, 1988:38). MacKay (1992), gives an example of 
this when he points out that, “A new device merely opens a door; it does not compel one to 
enter. Technologies facilitate, they do not determine” (cited in Baillette & Kimble, 2008). 
Similarly, he notes, “Technology […] shapes the structure of the battle but not every outcome” 
(Pool, 1983:251). Thus, technology provides the opportunity for social phenomena to be 
introduced or to occur, but it does not necessarily create the social phenomena themselves.  
According to Raymond Williams (1974), social constructivism offers the opposing view to 
technological determinism (cited in Yearley, 2008). It is an overarching philosophy 
consisting of different theories which include: Social Construction of Technology (Pinch & 
Bijker, 1984); Critical Theory of Technology (Feenberg, 1991). Doolittle and Hicks (2003), 
claim that technology and its effects are not an exogenous agent since technology is created 
and shaped by human power and is, “Social through and through” (Herrera, 2003:592). It is 
socially constructed in the same way as the economy or power. The social constructivist 
approach to technology argues that the success of technology depends on how it is exploited 
by social groups who can use it to promote their cause. Technological constructivists tend to 
assume human agency, and not technology, has the upper hand in producing social 
phenomena. Human action is the context wherein technology can develop and work (Bijker 
et al., 1993). In short, technology is just another tool used by humans.  
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Social Construction of Technology (SCOT), shares the same basis as social constructivism 
but focuses on the social group as a way of analysing and understanding social phenomena 
and their relationship with technology.  
Pinch and Bijker (1984), key theorists of SCOT, outlined four main components of social 
constructivism. The first is ‘Interpretive Flexibility’ which means that technology is an open 
process that can produce different patterns of social action, which may vary depending on a 
group’s usage. The second component is the social group. Pinch and Bijker argue that, “All 
members of a certain social group share the same set of meanings, attached to a specific 
artefact” (Pinch & Bijker, 1984:30) but they may have different interpretations of the same 
technology or machine. Thus, the same set of artefacts may take on different meanings, 
depending on the groups within that society and according to group assumptions. The third 
component is ‘Stabilisation’. Pinch and Bijker claim that artefacts are socially developed. In 
other words, in its final version, a machine will be developed to fulfil the needs of different 
social groups. Artefacts in societies develop over time until they reach a stabilisation phase, 
at which point they will also be socially constructed. The fourth component is the wider 
socio-cultural and political context and Pinch and Bijker argue that artefacts develop through 
interaction with other social actors in the environment. In other words, there is a need, “To 
relate the content of a technological artefact to the wider socio-political milieu” (Pinch & 
Bijker, 1984:46). 
Importantly, the literature stresses that the Internet does not have only one symmetrical 
structure whereby every act obtains the same result (Carty, 2010). These results depend on 
various systematic inputs, including the national context and the aims of the action. Crediting 
technology, or the Internet, with responsibility for activism is to make the Internet into a 
fetish of collective action (Gerbaudo, 2012). Geographical location and different cultures 
must be considered when discussing the role of the Internet in activism (Gerbaudo, 2012) 
since, as Bennett (2003:146) noted, uses of the Internet, “Depend heavily on social context.” 
Similarly, Castells (2001:50) observed that, “The Internet is a particularly malleable 
technology, susceptible to being deeply modified by its social practice, and leading to a 
whole range of potential social outcomes.” 
In short, technology cannot be an exogenous agent that differs from other agents such as the 
economy or politics. Technology is simply a tool like any other that can be used for social 
action. Moreover, social activism existed long before the Internet. Nevertheless, it should be 
borne in mind that using a particular type of technology will undoubtedly influence and shape 
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the form of social action and the Internet has changed the ways and means of organising and 
mobilising groups, as we shall see below.  
That is said, the two approaches, technological determinism and social constructivism alone 
might not help to understand the role of technology in the social life. This research therefore 
adopts the affordance concept to understand the interaction between the technology and 
social phenomena. Scholars such as (Hutchby, 2001a & 2001b; Kavada, 2012) argue that 
particularly with the Internet, platforms help in the development of such communicative 
phenomena, platforms do not determine them. Both scholars suggest that the concept of 
affordances which stemmed from Gibson (1979 cited in Hutchby 2001a) can be useful to 
help understand the interaction between the technology and humans. Affordances in this 
context can be defined as “the action possibilities manifest (and possibly latent) in a 
technology. Affordances have scope, which interacts closely with their limits.”  (Ahy 
2014:16). According to Hutchby (2001b) not all technologies have the same affordances, 
different machines and objects have different affordances. The concept of affordance could 
be considered to be a ‘third way’ between technological determinism and social 
constructivism. In this approach “technologies can be understood as artifacts which may be 
both shaped by and shaping of the practices humans use in the interaction with, around and 
through them” (Hutchby 2001b:444). As such, Kavada (2012: 35) argues that the: 
 
the material or design characteristics of social media platforms enable and constrain their 
use by different actors. However, these affordances also depend on the skills, goals, and 
culture of their users who may employ platforms in ways that were not expected or 
intended by their designers. 
 
Hutchby (2001b: 444) similarly claims that this third approach “opens the way for new 
analyses of how technological artefacts became important elements in the patterns of 
ordinary human conduct”. 
2.3. Activism Terminologies 
There are myriad terms which encompass aspects of the kind of collective action and 
activism which are dealt with in this thesis, including grassroots campaigns, social 
movements and single-issue campaigns. Diani, for example, has acknowledged the difficulty 
in defining collective action and prefers to refer to the overarching concept of ‘social 
movement’. He states that:  
Social and political phenomena as heterogeneous as revolutions, religious sects, 
political organisations, single-issue campaigns are all, on occasion, defined as social 
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movements, (1992: 2).  
Charles Tilly agrees that, “The most persistent problem we will face in analysing collective 
action is its lack of sharp edges” (Tilly, 1978:11).Thus, exploring some definitions of these 
terms is a useful step in pinpointing what is meant by online collective action.  
One of the shortest definitions of the term ‘movements’ is offered by Blumer, who described 
this as a, “Collective enterprise” (Blumer, 1969:99, cited in Crossley, 2002:03), whilst Tilly 
characterises social movement as, “An invented institution.” which he stresses, “Could 
disappear or mutate into some quite different form of politics.” (1978:14). In this definition, 
Tilly views social movement as either being short-lived, ceasing to exist when it has served 
its purpose or transforming into an entity which becomes part of a more established political 
process. Eyerman and Jamison (1991: 4, cited in Crossley, 2002:04) also stress the possibly 
ephemeral nature of social movements, describing them as, “Temporary public spaces, […] 
moments of collective creation that provide societies with ideas, identities, and even ideals.” 
This is a definition which is similar to that used for collective action or activism.  
Tilly (1978), identifies three components of social movements, namely: programme, identity 
and standing, whereas Della Porta and Diani (2006), argue that they typically share four 
characteristics: 1. They are informal networks; 2. They are based on shared beliefs and 
solidarity; 3. They mobilise conflictual issues;  4. They frequently use a range of forms of 
protest.  
It could be argued that all these definitions of the term ‘social movement’ are also applicable 
to activism or collective action dealt with here. However, in the Saudi context the use of such 
terms built largely on Western experiences of collective action are more problematic. Saudi 
Arabia has little or no tradition of the type social movement or protest campaigns seen in 
Western democracies. Moreover, there are also sensitivities in using the terms themselves 
caused the restrictions imposed on activism by the authorities (see Chapter 5). Indeed, some 
of the activists interviewed here disavowed terms such as protest or movement and certainly 
wanted to avoid any overt political implications to their activities. 
In light of such issues, and the difficulties using social movement language in the Saudi 
context, the study has adopted the arguably more neutral term “campaign”.  This is more 
limited in terms of focus, time-frame, aims and audiences compared to social movement 
activity (Gajewska & Niesyto, 2009). Baringhorst (2009:10), for example, defines a 
campaign as: 
“a series of communicative activities undertaken to achieve predefined goals and 
objectives regarding a defined target audience in a set time period with a given 
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amount of resources” (Baringhorst, 2009:10) 
Others, such as Rottger (2006), whilst agreeing that with time and theme limitation have 
suggested that campaigns also encompass communicative strategies which have “staged 
theatrical elements… and strive for the generation of public attention” ( Rottger (2006) cited 
in Gajewska & Niesyto, 2009). Whilst not all-inclusive, both these definitions do underline 
key elements of the case studies here. Notably, the Teachers Rights campaign (see chapter 7) 
which at the outset had clear target audience and predefined goals whilst the Women driving 
campaign could be seen as using theatrical staged activities (see chapter 8).  Whilst the term 
campaign has been used to define the case studies, the research was also interested to detect 
whether (and how) the campaigns were evolving perhaps into something more permanent or 
widespread in the Internet era perhaps akin to the expectations of the social movement 
lifecycle model discussed below (see pp.43-44.)  
 
 
2.4. Activism in the Internet Era  
Since the emergence of the Internet, activists have used it extensively to achieve their goals 
relating to various issues in different political systems. Various examples can be used to 
illustrate this. These include the Zapatista Army of National Liberation in Mexico (Ghobadi 
& Clegg, 2015), the transnational Global Justice Movement which was born in Seattle  (Van 
Laer & Van Aelst, 2010), the Green Revolution in Iran (Etling et al., 2010) and the April 6th  
Youth Movement in Egypt (Saleh, 2012). During the last decade, many online campaigns 
have been examined as the focus of academic studies in this area. 
This raises the issues of how the use of the Internet by activists could change the nature of 
activism and in which ways post-Internet activism differs from pre-Internet activism. Uses of 
the Internet, as a new pattern of communication, have influenced societies in general. 
Lievrouw (2013:12), points to:  
The seeming presence of new media everywhere, all the time, which affects 
everyone in societies where they are used, whether or not every individual uses 
them directly.  
Scholars, including Bach and Stark (2004), Van Laer and Van Aelst (2010), Carty (2010), 
Bimber et al. (2010), Theocharis (2011) and Chen et al. (2015), have argued that this effect 
also extends to activism as well. The impact of the Internet on activism has been related to 
three principle reasons: interactivity (Theocharis, 2011; Oser et al., 2012; Land, 2009), the 
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need to reduce the costs associated with activism, and the desire to empower individuals. As 
Earl and Kimport (2011), explain:     
The Web has two primary affordances of relevance to a study of online protest: 
sharply reduced costs for creating, organizing, and participating in protest; and 
the ability to aggregate people’s individual actions into broader collective actions 
without requiring participants to be co-present in time and space (and sometimes 
also allowing solo organisers to create and run movements). (Earl & Kimport, 
2011:10)  
Generally speaking, scholars who explore the overall impact of computer-mediated 
communication on collective action have shown that there are a number of uses for the 
Internet in mobilising collective action. For instance, the Internet can be used to help 
disseminate the message of activists (Margolis & Resnick, 2000), facilitate communication 
among campaigners (Caiani & Wagemann, 2009; Aday et al., 2010; Laer, 2010), and with 
local and international audiences (Tarrow, 2005; Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011; Gillan & Pickerill, 
2008; Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Glenn, 2015). Moreover, the Internet also helps activists 
by providing ready access to information required, thus creating a more knowledgeable 
activist class (Myers, 1994; Smeltzer, 2012; Kurniawan & Rye, 2013). It can also help 
activists to recruit new members or supporters more easily (Margolis & Resnick, 2000; 
Gunitsky, 2015). Finally, it acts as a forum for developing agendas for political action (Nip, 
2004; Dahlgren, 2005; Tang & Huhe, 2013).  
Summarising these types of uses, Castells (2012), has identified eight key characteristics of 
collective action in the wake of the development of the Internet: 
• Online, collective action networks can take multiple forms of connection, online and 
offline, local and international and so on. 
• Movements are both local and global at the same time. 
• Movements are largely spontaneous in their origin and have usually been triggered by a 
single expression of indignation. 
• Movements are viral. Similar movements can be seen everywhere. When a campaign 
emerges in one country, a similar campaign can be seen in another country.   
• Decisions concerning online collective action are taken without leaders, not because of 
the lack of leaders but because online activists do not want a leader. 
• Movements are highly self-reflective; online activists describe themselves as a movement 




• Movements are rarely programmatic, except when they focus on one clear, single issue. 
• Movements aim at changing the values of society (Castells, 2012:221-228).  
However, many ‘traditional’, pre-Internet activist movements share some of the 
characteristics of their Internet-based counterparts highlighted here by Castells. For example, 
it is obvious that such movements take multiple forms in order to conduct actions. Moreover, 
some traditional social movements are often the result of spontaneous reactions and are not 
programmatic. They are often loosely structured, and all these movements aim to change 
society, as Turner explains, “All definitions of social movement reflect the notion that social 
movements are intrinsically related to social change.” (Turner, 2013, n.p.). 
Nevertheless, the Internet has arguably had a more specific influence on the mobilisation and 
organisation of collective action. The impact of the Internet on both these areas takes 
different forms. Before considering the nature of these influences, it is necessary to examine 
exactly what is meant by these two terms, distinguishing between them by making use of 
Tilly’s (1978) definitions. He defines mobilisation as a, “Process by which a group acquires 
collective control over the resources needed for action.” (Tilly, 1978:07). These might 
include, “Labour, power, goods, weapons, votes, and any number of other things, just so long 
as they are usable in acting on shared interests.” (Tilly, 1978:07). Organisation, on the other 
hand, refers to an, “Aspect of a group’s structure which most directly affects its capacity to 
act on its interests.” (Tilly, 1978:07).  
Drawing on Tilly’s definition, the following sections will consider the impact of the Internet 
on mobilisation. This includes the role of the Internet in widening and deepening activism 
mobilisation. This will be followed by a discussion on the erosion of the organisation as a 
result of Internet use.  
 
2.4.1. The Internet’s role in mobilisation 
 Tilly’s definition of mobilisation highlights a number of issues relating to the process of 
mobilisation in activism. However, many scholars are sceptical about the Internet’s role in 
mobilisation or political participation1 on the grounds that online activities may not lead to 
offline participation. Bimber (1998;1999;2001), for example, claims that increasing 
communication capacity has not significantly affected levels of political engagement since 
the 1950s. For example, he suggests that, “Internet access is not predictive of voting or other 
                                                
1 Sidney and Norman (1987), define political participation as consisting of four activities, namely: voting, 
campaign activity, contacting officials, and collective activities. 
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forms of political participation.” (Bimber, 2001:61). However, he agrees later that the 
Internet has changed the informational environment for individuals and can help to accelerate 
the process of group formation and action. Yet the key problem relating to low levels of 
interest in political participation, as Bimber sees it, is that it is, “Limited by the willingness 
and capacity of humans to engage in a complex political life.” (Bimber, 1998).  
Similarly, a meta-analysis carried out by Boulianne (2009), found that the Internet does not 
inevitably reinforce political participation, rather it, “Does not establish that these effects are 
substantial.” (Boulianne, 2009:205). For example, this study found that while a number of 
threads in a discussion on an online forum debated the need for protest, “None of these 
discussions moved beyond a discursive level of civic engagement.” (Byrne, 2007:319). That 
means the Internet has not reinforced or encouraged political participation.   
On the other hand, research reviewing the data on the role of the Internet in encouraging 
voting, (Bimber et al., 2014:33) in  three British Elections (2001, 2005, and 2010), concluded 
that, “Internet use for political information increased the likelihood of voting among those 
less interested and reinforced this inclination among the more interested.” This result 
contradicts the earlier argument by Bimber (2001), as shown earlier.    
Rainie et al.'s (2012:03) findings from the U.S., based on authoritative Pew Research studies, 
also point to the fact that information gleaned from the Internet enhances political 
participation, as 25% of social media users said the Internet makes them more active in 
regards to a political issue after discussing it online or reading posts about it on websites. In 
addition, 16% of the sample stated they had changed their views about a political issue after 
online interaction or reading the opinions of others on the topic, and only 9% of those 
surveyed said they had become less involved in a political issue as a result of online 
discussions or website posts.  
Further studies from a range of countries found similar positive findings regarding the 
relationship between the Internet and political participation. For example, Holt et al., (2013), 
note that during the Swedish national elections in 2010, there is evidence that frequent social 
media use among young citizens motivated political participation. Similarly, a study of young 
people in Hong Kong also confirms that exposure to political information on Facebook made 
them more likely to participate in political activities, (Tang & Lee, 2013).  
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However, most studies depend largely on measuring one variable when studying the role of 
the Internet in political participation. The aforementioned studies, which are mostly 
quantitative, measure Internet use or exposure and then link this with levels of offline 
political participation. Moreover, the majority of these studies focus on young people only. 
There are other factors which should also be measured when studying the role of the Internet 
in offline activities, including demographic and socio-economic variables, which are 
crucially associated with political activities. In contrast, Scherman et al.'s (2015) study on the 
role of social media in student and environmental protests in Chile, has measured five further 
variables that might influence the participation. The study, which revealed a positive 
relationship between the use of social media and participation in movements, measured the 
following variables: (1) uses of media, online and traditional, this includes   consumption 
hours; (2) students’ presence on social media; (3) students’ values and ideology; (4) political 
and social variables, like trust in institutions; (5) socio-economic and socio-demographic 
variables, (Scherman et al., 2015). 
In practical terms, when the Internet is used by activists to support collective action, it can 
influence two specific aspects of mobilisation. Firstly, it can widen participation, helping 
campaigns to reach broader audiences than traditional mass media. Secondly, it can deepen 
participation, by improving the level of engagement/the quality of participation of the 
targeted audience, taking it to a higher level of activism.   
2.4.1.1. Widening participation 
 Reducing the cost of communication, empowering individuals and interactivity features have 
all improved the communications which are vital for the mobilisation of collective action 
(Kiss & Rosa-García, 2011), particularly among existing sympathisers (Diani, 2000). This 
allows for the targeting of wider audiences than was possible using traditional tools. Scholars 
such as Steinberg (2015), emphasise that online political participation can engage more 
people because the socio-economic factors traditionally associated with offline political 
participation (such as education and/or income), are not strongly linked with online 
participation. This means the number of participants is broader and includes those who have 
not previously participated.  Norris (2000), observes:     
The strongest claims of mobilisation theories are that Net activism represents a 
distinctive type of political participation [...] By sharply reducing the barriers to 
civic engagement, levelling some of the financial hurdles, and widening the 
opportunities for political debate, for dissemination of information, and for group 
interaction, it is said that the Net may reduce social inequalities in public life, 
(Norris, 2000:121).  
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However, it could be argued that Internet skills may simply replace the socio-economic 
boundaries which have traditionally prevented people from offline participation. In reply, 
Oser et al. (2012), argue that:  
 
Even without universal prevalence of Internet access and use, these mechanisms 
[lowering the cost of participation, interactivity, increasing population of Internet 
users] have been identified as potential supporting factors for the political 
mobilisation of previously disengaged and disadvantaged populations, (Oser et al., 
2012:92).  
Thus, the Internet has the potential to increase and diversify political engagement, as 
concluded by Lusoli and Ward (2004). Feenberg and Friesen (2012), have also emphasised 
that: 
Politics is no longer the exclusive affair of traditionally, constituted political 
groups debating the traditional issues. The range of issues and groups is 
constantly widening in the most unpredictable ways, (Feenberg & Friesen, 
2012:16).  
Clearly, one way in which the Internet can widen participation is by providing activists with 
the ability to address people, regardless of the geographic boundaries involved (Gillan & 
Pickerill, 2008; Bennett & Segerberg, 2012;2013). Scholars such as McLaughlin (2003) and 
Tarrow (2005), have highlighted the fact that the Internet allows activists to engage with 
international audiences as well as like-minded activists at a national and local level. Tarrow 
(2005), argues that the Internet facilitates contact with what he called, ‘Transnational 
Activists’, a term he uses to refer to, “People and groups who are rooted in specific national 
contexts, but who engage in contentious political activities that involve them in transnational 
networks of contacts and conflict.” (Tarrow, 2005:29). This means that, “Activists in remote 
areas can easily imitate the actions organised elsewhere and join the movement by setting up 
their own actions.” (Kavada, 2014:358).  
One of the most recent examples of successful, transnational activism began in August 2015, 
when an Icelandic journalist, Gissur Simonarson, saw a photograph of a distressed man, 
selling cheap pens and carrying his daughter on his shoulder. This was widely circulated on 
social media. Simonarson created a Twitter account ‘@Buy_Pens’ and a hashtag ‘#BuyPens’ 
to ask for people’s help to try and trace the man in order to help him. A few hours later, 
Simonarson announced that the man and his daughter had been located. He then launched a 
crowd-funding campaign to raise 5,000 dollars to help the pen seller, Abdul Halim Attar, a 
Palestinian refugee from Yarmouk in Syria who had fled to Beirut. Within 24 hours, 
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campaigners had managed to collect over 70,000 dollars from 2,445 people in various 
countries (Gunter, 2015; Simonarson, 2015). This example illustrates how the Internet can be 
used to mobilise action on an international scale to campaign on an issue in one country. 
Although the pen seller was in Lebanon, the campaign initiator was in Norway, and the 
campaigners who found the man were in Lebanon, they were able to target a global audience 
to reach their goals.  
In a similar fashion, activists are able to address and link to citizens who are living abroad to 
maintain ties concerning homeland issues (Hiller & Franz, 2004). The Taiwanese ‘Sun 
Flower’ movement, investigated by Chen et al. (2015), is a good example of this type of 
cross-national mobilisation. Their study showed that the Internet helps to mobilise Taiwanese 
citizens in diaspora, leading them to both participate online through discussion and act offline 
in demonstrations. 
Both these cases illustrate that by using the Internet campaigners can attract a wider audience, 
even beyond national borders, mobilising them by using messages which the activists 
themselves have formulated, greatly reducing the need for intervention by traditional 




Widening without traditional media 
 It is clear that before the advent of the Internet, collective action relied on mass media to 
mobilise individuals. In theory, activists can use mass media to engage people by providing 
them with information, since in modern societies, citizens have tended to depend on the 
media for news (Rubin & Windahl, 1986; Castells, 2009). However, commercial 
advertisements and low-cost content have reduced the space for news, even in mainstream 
media (Bennett, 2003; Koopmans, 2004). Moreover, there is often a negative relationship 
between activists and mainstream media, as the interaction between them can sometimes 
create a conflict of interest1 (Gamson & Wolfseld, 1993). According to Koopmans (2004), 
this conflict of interest means that negative coverage is ‘pre-determined’ and social 
                                                
1 A number of theorists have addressed the issue of the conflict of interest between media and society. For 
example in their work Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy Of The Mass Media Herman and 
Chomsky (2010), identify five boundaries which can prevent media from doing its job, one of which is that 
media cannot cover some stories because they conflict with the interests of advertisers. 
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movements are often denied mainstream media access or representation at critical moments 
in their development (Andrews & Caren, 2010). 
Generally speaking, movements need the news media for three major purposes. Firstly, for 
mobilisation, since movements can recruit more people by using media effectively. Secondly, 
for validation, as media coverage can legitimise movements and reassure the audience about 
them, by publishing or broadcasting news about them. Thirdly, scope enlargement; 
movements can use the media to gain momentum and help activists to reach their goals 
(Gamson & Wolfseld, 1993). 
The Internet gives activists an alternative medium to achieve these ends. They can deliver 
their messages widely for mobilisation purposes and for providing information, explaining 
themselves directly, not only to their targeted audience, but also to the general public, 
international audiences and interested parties. In this way, activists can avoid the frustration 
caused by previously negative media coverage and/or mass media ‘tampering’ with coverage 
of their activities, stories and news (Brunsting & Postmes, 2002; Theocharis, 2011; Kavada, 
2010; McCaughey & Ayers, 2013; Scherman et al., 2015).  
However, some researchers, such as Gibson and Kelly (2000, cited in Bennett, 2004) and 
Micó and Casero-Ripollés (2014), argue that traditional media is still crucial to activism as it 
provides visibility, as well as helping to widen participation, since relying on the Internet 
alone may not be sufficient.  
Other studies such as that by Theocharis (2011) have highlighted the important role that 
traditional media can play in attracting more people to campaigns. Significantly, Chadwick 
(2013) and Papacharissi (2015) assert that there is a strong relationship between the new and 
traditional media and society in general.  
According to Chadwick (2013) a hybrid media system is emerging and this author 
emphasises that new technology, and the novel forms of media in particular, have the power 
to re-arrange all the relationships which previously existed. Social, economic, political, 
spatial and temporal relationships have all been changed, offering the opportunity to ‘flatten 
out’ the old normative situation. What was a pyramid topped by social elites, speaking via 
media elites, dictating to the public, becomes an open field for engagement (Chadwick, 2013).  
Similarly, Papacharissi (2015) argues that newer media gives the public and marginalised 
voices the feeling and experience that they are part of society. Papacharissi argues that digital 
media links people in politics and the mainstream media. Notably, she argues that:  
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Twitter serves as a platform for complex emotional expression, facilitating the 
emergence of a discussion that integrates facts, thoughts and sentiments, with 
threads originating in new media and old. (2015:133).   
 
Validation might also still be needed in some countries because assumptions about the 
credibility of the Internet as an information source may differ from one culture to another. 
For example, a study by Choi et al. (2015) on media credibility across news platforms in the 
United States and South Korea, among American and South Korean college students, found 
that TV and newspapers are still judged to be more credible than radio stations, online news 
websites or mobile devices.  
Activists can now interact with mainstream media in ways that were not possible without the 
Internet, targeting them with information about campaigns which they are running. Bennett 
(2003:33), highlights the example of how an online social campaign, being conducted against 
the Nike Corporation, due to its record of poor labour practices in its factories, managed to 
get its message from the, “Remote spheres of micro media (e.g. email) […] to mass media.” 
and succeeded in changing Nike’s image from positive to negative in leading US newspapers. 
Given the advertising revenue that Nike brings to the US press, it is unlikely that newspapers 
would have covered this story, without the Internet. Bennett explains this change in the 
media’s attitude towards Nike in the following terms, “The distributed property of the Web 
makes it difficult for news organisations to close the gates on tempting stories that 
competitors will be tempted to report if they don’t.” (Bennett, 2003:34). Steinhardt (2015), 
has argued that even in China, along with other factors, the Internet has helped activists to get 
their news into the traditional media; an achievement which would not have been previously 
possible.  
2.4.1.2.  Deepening and improving levels of activist engagement 
 Some researchers, such as Van Laer and Van Aelst (2010) and Gladwell (2010), have argued 
that Slacktivism1 has little real effect on demands or change. Gladwell (2010), for example, 
claims that activism via social media is not the same as real-life activism, observing that 
Slacktivists tend to participate only in low commitment ‘easy activism’, such as signing e-
petitions, rather than engaging fully in high intensity, collective activities, thus weakening 
group ties. In the worst case scenario, their activity may actually be damaging to a cause, and 
                                                
1 Slacktivism can be defined as, “Low-risk, low-cost activity via social media, whose purpose is to raise 





may promote a more superficial understanding of what are often extremely complex issues. 
Glenn agrees, maintaining that cyberactivism is largely about making people feel good 
without them actually having to do anything; the term ‘Slacktivism’ refers to the, 
“Disconnect between awareness and action through the use of social media.” (Glenn, 
2015:81). 
However, Lee and Hsieh's (2013:07) findings suggest a more subtle distinction:  
When the subsequent action is closely related to Slacktivism, people are 
motivated to remain consistent. But when the subsequent action is ambiguous or 
less related to Slacktivism, people will increase or decrease their likelihood and 
intensity based on their previous choice about  Slacktivism, (Lee &Hsieh, 2013: 
07).  
Both advocates and opponents have ignored an important point that should be taken into 
account when discussing online participation and the role of the Internet in political activities. 
For, essentially, both sides tend to judge the Internet’s efficiency on the basis of the offline 
activities which it creates.  
In the case of Slacktivism, they directly compare online and offline activities, with Gladwell 
(2010), for example, noting that:  
Facebook is a tool for efficiently managing your acquaintances, for keeping up 
with the people you would not otherwise be able to stay in touch with. That’s 
why you can have a thousand ‘friends’ on Facebook, as you never could in real 
life, (Gladwell, 2010:03).  
It is clear that Gladwell considers Facebook to be a ‘tool’ only and ignoring it can also be a 
virtual public sphere for political participation. He directly compares Facebook acquaintances 
with real life acquaintances. Online acquaintance requirements are far easier than offline 
acquaintances. The easiness of action does not necessarily mean ineffectiveness. An online 
sit-in is far easier than an offline sit-in1, but it does not mean it is not effective. Advocates of 
cyberactivism try to validate the Internet’s potential in terms of its influence in offline 
political spheres, such as participation in demonstrations or voting and so forth.  
It is important to see the Internet as a virtual public sphere for activism and campaigning in 
its own right, not by judging its effectiveness in terms of political participation on the basis of 
offline results. Online activism on the Internet should be considered as an activity in its own 
right without linking it with offline activities. It could equally be argued that one 
                                                
1 Technically, ‘online sit-ins’ mean participants accessing a website at the same time, multiple times, which 
results in creating disruption of the target website. 
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demonstration, as a single act, will not serve to bring about political change; rather it will 
serve to make people feel good, precisely what Glenn (2015), argued is the problem with 
Slacktivism.  
What has been described, somewhat disparagingly, as Slacktivism, can actually be a means 
of deepening political participation and mobilisation. According to Theocharis (2011), 
evidence of this can be found in the fact that the interactivity feature of the Internet has 
influenced mobilisation and enhanced political communication in general. Similarly, Land 
(2009:232), has emphasised that, “Interactivity is critical in allowing people to become more 
deeply involved in the advocacy effort.” Interactivity means that targeted audiences are not 
passive audiences, as was the case with pre-Internet audiences. The Internet allows them to 
become active since it offers them the ability to respond to any content they receive in a 
number of ways. ‘Like’, ‘Friend’, ‘Retweet’ and other Slacktivism actions on social media, 
show that the targeted audience not only received the message sent by campaigners, but also 
responded to the message in a digital form of political participation. 
 
With regards to deepening activism, the Internet also makes issues more visible, even for 
those who are not interested in politics. Kaufhold et al. (2010), have argued that in the digital 
age, political communication has become part of users’ daily lives. Permanent exposure to 
political content can encourage people to engage with discussions in an informal way. The 
visibility and repetition of online political discussion gives users confidence to express 
themselves, and encourages them to seek further information which is more easily available 
online than elsewhere (Ostman, 2012). This searching for news may lead to users, 
“Exploit[ing] digital tools to engage in communicative activities when they use online news.” 
as stated by Lee (2015:86). 
Furthermore, it has been noted that the ‘personalised politics’ of the digital age mean that 
citizens are seeking, “More flexible associations with causes, ideas and political 
organisations.” which, as Bennett and Segerberg (2013:05) explain, also deepens campaign 
mobilisation. Two specific points can be highlighted. First, citizens express themselves in a 
very personal way via online communication tools, such as social media, when engaged with 
any collective action. Once citizens start taking part in discussions, it means they are already 
taking extra steps towards political participation and becoming more than just a targeted 
audience. This is clearly visible in the second aspect of ‘personalised politics’ because when 
a personalised action is circulated on the Internet, it mobilises other people as it travels 
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rapidly across social networks (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). Thus, the mobilisation task is 
handed to the targeted audience itself on the Internet, making mobilisation a personal, not an 
organisational, task which further deepens participation.  
Low-cost forms of participation facilitated by the Internet mean that new campaigners and 
small organisations, as well as individuals, can enter the field of online activism to protest or 
campaign for their rights (Ward et al., 2003; Schussman & Earl, 2004). The high cost of 
traditional activism, which typically includes financial outlay and manpower costs, may 
prevent citizens from protesting or campaigning, as they may not have sufficient resources to 
mobilise and take action. The Internet theoretically allows activists to protest and campaign, 
regardless of their resources.  
Similarly, the Internet also reduces the cost of organisation, as the online environment 
reduces the need for face-to-face meetings for two reasons (Choi & Park, 2013; Sandoval-
Almazan & Gil-Garcia, 2014). Firstly, by meeting online, distributing tasks and roles can be 
conducted virtually, and activists have no need to travel, or find places for meeting. Secondly, 
and more radically, the Internet has reduced the need for the entire notion of ‘organisation’ 
since cyberactivism does not require hierarchical organisations (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). 
In self-organised or decentralised campaigns for example, there are no organisational costs as 
activists simply share the same goals (see section 2.5 below). 
Many scholars have also addressed the notion of using the Internet to empower individuals 
and small organisations in different ways (see, for example, Bennett, 1998; Redden, 2001; 
Bennett, 2003; Bennett & Segerberg, 2012;2013; Dalton, 2008; Kligler-Vilenchik & Thorson, 
2015). Using the Internet, individuals can communicate and interact on a one-to-one basis 
(using email, for example), on a one-to-many basis (using social networking, for example), or 
use many-to-many web-based communication (Redden 2001; Lysenko 2011). As Wellman 
(2011:27) notes, “The Internet is helping each person to become a communication and 
information switchboard, between persons, networks, and institutions.” 
Clearly, the Internet has replaced many of the pre-Internet tools used for campaigning and 
political participation in general but, more importantly, it also helps to improve these aspects 
of activism in terms of both quantity and quality, by widening and deepening mobilisation. 





2.4.2. Collective Action in the Internet Era: New Organisational Patterns   
 
As previously discussed, use of the Internet has influenced collective action in a number of 
ways through changing patterns of communication. More specifically, as a number of 
scholars have acknowledged, this new communication tool has influenced the organisational 
structure of collective action (see, for example, Diani, 2000; Castells, 2009; Castells, 2012; 
Van Dijk, 2012; Benkler, 2006; Van De Donk et al., 2004; Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; 
Bennett, 2003; Chadwick, 2007; Norris, 2002; Shirky, 2008; Bimber, 2003).  
Castells (2012), asserts that the central change in online collective action represents a power 
shift from hierarchical organisations to more flexible networks. Other scholars have 
attempted to distinguish the exact nature of the difference between traditional, collective 
action groups and those of Cyberactivism, the latter being motivated by shared goals and 
interests rather than organisational incentives (Earl & Kimport, 2011). The consensus 
amongst researchers is that groups and collective action are not necessarily the bedrock of 
Internet activism. Rather, the actions of individuals have become as important as those taken 
collectively and Internet era activists now have no great need to work in groups to achieve 
their goals (Tarrow, 2005; Land, 2009; Chadwick, 2007; Norris, 2002; Bennet,t 2003; 
Herrera, 2003; Milan & Hintz, 2013; Castells, 2012). 
According to Gonzales-Bailon (2014), digital technologies have made political engagement 
more decentralised, changing the nature of grass-roots, political operations. Collective action 
has begun to acquire more flexible characteristics. This is clearly reflected in the 
categorisations of pre- and post-Internet era activism proposed by various researchers: 
individualistic versus collectivistic action (Potts et al., 2014); normative versus non-
normative (Postmes & Brunsting, 2002); connective versus collective (Bennett & Segerberg, 
2012); collective versus collective individualism (Hirzalla & Zoonen, 2010); ‘networked 
individualism’ (Wellman, 2002); finally, ‘liquid organising’ (Gerbaudo, 2012). Writing at the 
start of the new millennium, Wellman presciently predicted that: 
Easily usable communication networks will support a shift from place-based to 
person-based and role-based communities. This will be a shift from living as 
groups in ‘little boxes’ to living as individuals in networked societies, (Wellman, 
2000:n.p).  
 
This description alludes to how the power of collective action has shifted in the Internet era 
from organisations to individuals. Critical action now concerns individuals more than 
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organisations or hierarchical structures. 
Hunter (n.p.), stressed the globalising aspect of Internet activism when he referred to a 
‘Networked Army’ consisting of, “A collection of communities and individuals who are 
united on the basis of ideology, not geography. They are held together by public 
communications.” (cited in Bennett, 2003). Others, such as Shirky (2008), have focused on 
the fact that online collective action groups consist of individuals drawn to associate and 
bond with those who share similar ideas or ideologies. This ‘homophily’ can be clearly 
demonstrated in the case of otherwise, diverse individuals converging to campaign on a 
single issue about which they all have strong convictions.  
Overall, there is widespread agreement that the Internet has increased the importance of the 
role of individuals in activism, whilst at the same time, eroding that of groups or 
organisations. However, this does not preclude the importance of organisations in collective 
action. When activists use the Internet, the link between individuals in collective action is not 
necessarily membership of a hierarchical organisation. Participants might not know each 
other personally, or have a leader, but they share the same goals. 
Consequently, Bennett and Segerberg (2013:28), argue that the introduction of new 
communications technology forced a rethinking of the shape and concept of collective action. 
They claim that, in the age of the Internet, the logic of collective action has changed since, 
“Strong organisational control or the symbolic construction of a united ‘we’ is no longer 
required.” They argue that new communication technologies have helped to alter the 
dynamics of connective action, meaning that the focus has been shifted, “From networks as 
conditions or pathways to participation to networks as organisational units.” (Bennett & 
Segerberg, 2013: 44). The authors suggest that, in the new communication technologies era, 
organisation has become more of an umbrella title for campaigns. People can work with a 
campaign without any sort of membership or a recognised leader.  
Benkler (2006), has made a similar point, referring to the shift from the importance of the 
collective mind-set, or external factors, to interpersonal motivation, when individuals are the 
bedrock for activism, not the organisation. Earl (2011:147), went so far as to pose the 
question of whether innovative uses of Internet-enabled technologies would do away with the 
need for collective organising altogether. 
In terms of the impact of the Internet on organisational or institutional structures, Chadwick 
(2007), noted that, when established groups use the Internet, this creates a form of 
‘organisational hybridity’. He argues that the Internet is blurring the boundaries between 
groups which have traditionally been distinct entities, such as political parties, social 
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movements and interest groups. Nowadays, this sort of organisation would not be able to 
form without the Internet: 
…because the technologies set up complex interactions between the online and 
offline environment and the organisational flexibility required for fast ‘repertoire 
switching’ within a single campaign or from one campaign to the next, 
(Chadwick 2007:284).  
 
There is broad agreement that, whilst the Internet may have reduced the need for some of the 
traditional forms of collective action, activists do still continue working together in groups in 
cyberspace, even if they operate from geographically different places. A number of studies of 
online campaigns have demonstrated that organisations, in the traditional sense, can still play 
important roles. For example, Micó and Casero-Ripollés (2014), concluded that, during the 
immensely popular 15-M campaign in Spain,1 some features of a traditional organisation 
were in evidence, even though the campaign relied on the Internet for structure and 
mobilisation in both the online and offline spheres. Bennett and Segerberg (2013), also 
identified a number of campaigns that use the Internet as an organisational milieu without the 
direct engagement of individuals. Though there is no contradiction between these two 
concepts, some campaigns could be described as loosely structured, whereby a pre-existing 
organisation facilitates individuals to campaign individually as the following section will 
discuss.      
 
2.4.2.1. Lifecycle of social movements  
  
Before shedding light on collective action on the Internet and characteristic changes in 
activism, it is important to gain an overview of the lifecycle of social movements on the 
Internet, in order to understand the general context of such activism. Scholars such as Blumer 
(1969), Mauss (1975) Macionis (2008), and Tilly (1978) have all suggested that social 
movements usually go through four life stages (Della Porta & Diani, 2006; Macionis, 2008) 
(1) Emergence ‘social ferment’ 
(2) Coalescence ‘popular excitement’ 
(3) Bureaucratisation ‘formalisation’ 
(4) Decline ‘institutionalisation’ 
                                                
1The 15-M movement or ‘Indignants Movement’, is a Spanish movement aimed at promoting, “More 
participatory democracy, the regeneration of the political system and counteracting the dominance of the banks 
and the large financial institutions.” (Castells, 2012, cited in Micó & Casero-Ripollés, 2013). 
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Scholars state  in the issue that during the first stage there is little or no organisation within a 
social movement. Participants act individually, showing their negative attitudes towards 
issues that will later become the goal of the movement. Some also act in small groups to raise 
awareness about the issue which they are concerned about (Macionis 2008). During the 
second stage, movements have their goals defined and start acting more collectively, 
participating in demonstrations with a leadership, and may engage with other similar 
collectives to gain more resources (Della Porta & Diani, 2006; Macionis, 2008). During the 
formalisation stage movements create a formal organisation, becoming more bureaucratic and 
relying on capable staff more than charismatic leaders (Della Porta & Diani, 2006; Macionis, 
2008). The fourth stage is the institutionalisation wherein a movement becomes an organic 
part of society and “crystallises into a professional structure” (Della Porta & Diani, 
2006:150).  
Other scholars such as Miller (1983) argue that becoming a part of society is one of the five 
evolutionary end points for a movement. He shows that social movements may also end if 
participants have met their goals, or due to organisational failures. Social movements can also 
decline when a leader is co-opted by money or power within existing systems. Lastly social 
movements can also go into decline as a result of repression by officials or the state (Miller, 
1983, cited in Macionis, 2008).    
 
 
Figure 1: Stages in the Life of Social Movements (Source Macionis 2008:555) 
 
 
2.4.2.2. From Collective to Connective Action 
 
Much of the research concerning online activism does not develop explicit theories or models 
which could be used to help us to gain a clearer understanding of online activism or activism 
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in the age of the Internet as a whole. Furthermore, long-standing theories related to social 
movements such as Resource Mobilisation or New Social Movements, will not necessarily 
help to explain activism phenomena, due to the nature of the assumptions upon which they 
are based. For example, empowering individuals and reducing group power, or eradicating 
the vertical structure of groups, were not considered in pre-Internet theories. This crucial 
feature of the Internet has had a significant influence on online collective action, as discussed 
above. 
However, one recent large-scale comparative study does offer a potential comprehensive 
framework for the research here. The ‘Logic of Connective Action’ (LoCA), proposed by 
Bennett and Segerberg (2012;2013), provides a useful, comprehensive, theoretical platform 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, the LoCA framework was developed on the basis of 
empirical studies which analysed large-scale campaigns, focusing on various topics in several 
different countries and contexts. This helped to create a framework based on a wide, cultural 
and economic spectrum and a broad age range. Secondly, the framework also reflects ideas 
from the ‘traditional movements’ literature, adopting some of its theoretical assumptions and 
elements and embedding these either in the logic of the framework or in the typology, as will 
be explained below.  
Another key point about the LoCA framework is that it does not distinguish between online 
and offline activism, on the grounds that both connective and collective action, involve using 
the Internet but in a different dynamic. The framework also covers various aspects of 
activism including organisational and mobilisation elements, together with the context in 
which the activism takes place. A further important factor in its favour is that the framework 
was devised comparatively recently and is based on experience from the recent social media 
era. Moreover, the framework takes into consideration the power of individuals but does not 
ignore the presence of traditional or vertical organisations on the Internet.  
With specific reference to the case of Saudi Arabia, there is no tradition of activism. In 
addition, there are still relatively few political and social campaigns and activism, as a 
practice, remains very restricted (see Chapter Five for further discussion). This means it 
might not be possible to identify a traditional form of activism for which the Internet has 
been used as a tool. Thus LoCA is deemed to be more appropriate to the Saudi context than 
other theories as it has identified some types of activism that do not require organisation.  
The main concept of connective action is based on understanding how the Internet can be 
used to help individuals to participate in activism without organisation. People who act share 
common goals without the need for vertical organisational structure. The act of 
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communication becomes the act of organisation. According to LoCA, people create 
organisations by personal actions. So, for example, when individuals share their personal 
stories or Internet postings about an issue, this act becomes the act of organisation; thus, they 
are organised as a result of taking action rather than being organised before taking action (see 
also Earl & Kimport, 2011). Hence, Bennett and Segerberg claim that:  
Communication is often much more than a means of exchanging information and 
forming impression, or an instrument for sending updates and instructions to 
followers. Communication routines can, under some conditions, create patterned 
relationship among people that lend organisation and structure to many aspects of 
social life, (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012: 08).  
In this regard, Bennett and Segerberg show in their LoCA model that this logic also relates to 
countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, not simply Western democracies. It can be noted that 
these Arab Spring countries and other involved in the Arab Spring have been mentioned side-
by-side with movements in democratic countries. This is seen in the opening chapter of The 
Logic of Connective Action in which the authors state: 
Whether we look at PPF, the Arab Spring, the indignados, or Occupy, we note 
surprising success in the communication of simple political messages directly to 
outside publics using common digital technologies such as Facebook or Twitter, 
along with a rich array of custom media platforms” (Bennett & Segerberg 
2013:25).    
Moreover, one could argue that there are some parallels between Saudi society and post-
industrial societies or late-Modern societies, where there are so-called lifestyle politics or 
issues of contemporary lifestyle participation (see Bennett et al. 2011; Bennett 2003; Bennett 
& Segerberg 2013; Kavada 2014).  
 
Bennett and Segerberg (2013) argue that changes relating to globalization have altered many 
of the structures of modern society that used to bind individuals together. Institutions such as 
the church, political parties or trade unions, as well as broader concepts such as class 
identification, family traditions and career paths have all been affected. Although these 
institutions have been decoupled from the individual’s desire to experience common interests 
and share political concerns, the impetus to participate remains. This has led to the adoption 
of more personalised forms of politics related to lifestyle and social networks. Such 
participation allows space for “difference and individuality”, as Kavada points out 
(2014:357). 
 
To some degree, this is also applicable in the Saudi context. Al-Rasheed suggests that 
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globalization and new communication technologies have similarly influenced Saudi society 
(Al-Rasheed, 2010). Although young Saudis are not normally politicized, they constitute the 
majority of the population, with 67% of Saudis being less than 30 years old (National 
Information Centre 2014). Mai Yamani argues that “incoherent criticisms of government, 
corruption and double standards are slowly forming into a call not for revolt, but for more 
autonomy to pursue the goals that their education and experiences have led them to expect” 
(Yamani 2000:48). It can be seen that the issues discussed on the Internet are challenging 
traditional norms such as religious institutions, and fuelling discussion and campaigning in 
daily life. Issues such as housing, salaries, and women’s right to drive all have a strong 
presence on the Internet. 
The authors further argue that collective and connective logics are distinct logics of action 
and involve differences in: (a) What draws people to feel they should be part of a particular 
movement; (b) What issues matter to people who are part of the debate; (c) How people 
decide what issues matter most and then convince others; (d) Roles for communication 
mechanisms (i.e. Facebook being used to organise events on a given day, Twitter being better 
for broadcasting). Social media certainly allows for more rapid dissemination of views than 
conventional tools, (Bennett &Segerberg, 2013: 45).  
 
Bennett and Segerberg (2012), emphasise that their framework complements Olson’s classic 
study, ‘The Logic of Collective Action’, in which the author claims:  
Unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is 
coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common 
interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common 
or group interests, (Olson, 1965:02).  
 
According to Bennett and Segerberg (2012: 42), their framework helps to identify, “Which 
actor uses what organisational logic, and how the positions of these differently organised 
blocks in the larger protest ecology affect the coherence, stability and impact of the action.” 
In short, it is an attempt to set up a comprehensive explanation of protest and campaigning 
activity in the Internet era, rather than being driven by the technology itself.   
Four major topics provide key building blocks to the LoCA, namely: multiple logics of action; 
personalisation of action; communication as organisation; power in different forms of 





Multiple logics of action 
There are multiple logics for action on the Internet. Traditional collective action is based on 
the organisation; connective action organises while it communicates, meaning the 
communication is the organisation. Bennett and Segerberg argue that the collective action 
typology (what they call ‘Organisationally Brokered Networks’) perceived as ‘modern’ 
collective action, (which was based on the idea of organising groups of people beneath one 
banner), is being replaced by connective action. The traditional type of organisation required 
a leadership, material resources and commitment, whereas the new social media enables 
solely the latter (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013).   
The collective action logic emerged in modern societies before the Internet. According to the 
authors, it uses the Internet as a tool, or a means of supporting its action and the movement. 
The authors argue that ‘Organisationally Brokered Networks’ use the Internet mainly as a 
tool for mobilising and managing participation, “Rather than inviting personalised 
interpretations of problems and actions.” (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012: 46). 
Connective action, on the other hand, emerged on the Internet itself. As noted above, the 
main characteristic of this logic is that it uses communication as organisation, employing, 
“Broadly inclusive, easily personalised action frames as a basis for technology-assisted 
networking.” (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013:02). This connective action depends on technology 
as an organisation, is enabled by social media and can result in political activity without the 
pre-requisites common to collective action, such as prior membership of the group. 
Connective action, (i.e. joining together under the banner of a hashtag such as 
#BlackLivesMatter), does not require a hierarchical structure or leadership (i.e. people with a 
particular manifesto or tasks to get others to follow), material resources (i.e. signs, meeting 
halls or such like) or commitment (i.e. rallies on a given day). This new type of protest uses 
social media to draw people in, to become a part of the protest without the same kind of 
commitment that ‘traditional’ collective action required. In this way, connective action can 
create a larger and more dispersed, political movement which is very difficult to pin down or 
fight against, and which can grow to be much larger due to the lower entry costs. 
 
The personalisation of action 
 Bennett and Segerberg (2012;2013) suggest that, in the digital age, collective actions are 
more personal than collective. Individuals can participate politically on the Internet in a very 
personal way by, for example, sharing their own stories and photographs, and demonstrating 
their solidarity as individuals, not linked to any group or movement. The Internet functions as 
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a tool, allowing individuals to interact and act individually to achieve shared, common goals. 
This personalisation of action is conducted in both of the logics of action: connective and 
collective.  
The authors claim that personalised action frames make it easier for individuals to connect to 
a cause, as they can offer a level of support appropriate to their own time and resources. 
Collective action required participants to adhere to a group agenda, which modern activists 
appear reluctant to do (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012:197). Personalised actions bring an added 
value to collective logic as they strengthen the network. Moreover, they spread faster than 
collective actions on the Internet, as they pass social obstacles easily, from one-to-one in 
many cases, or from friend-to-friend on social media. Collective action, in contrast, needs 
more ‘cultural production’ as it needs to understand society to produce a message which can 
reach everyone. However, participating in a personal way does not mean that participation is 
any less serious (despite this being framed by some as Slacktivism); it is, in contrast, a deeper 
form of participation when people express themselves politically as part of their lifestyle 
(Bennett & Segerberg, 2013).  
 
Power in different forms of networked organisation 
 Bennett and Segerberg are keen to stress that collective and connective action, in both 
typologies, have different strengths. They also argue that no form of networked organisation 
has more power than any other type of networked organisation. The key question is: how 
does power operate within different kinds of connective action networks? (Bennett & 
Segerberg, 2013:149.) 
 
Communication as organisation 
 As alluded to previously, the advent of digital media has altered organisations since the 
Internet has created new patterns of communication (see section 2.3). Bennett and Segerberg 
(2013), suggest that communication via the Internet has evolved, from discussion forums to 
Twitter and Facebook, and political action networks have evolved with it. Ease of access and 
the variability of involvement have changed the way we connect, socially and politically, and 
this technology has become the, ‘Agent of connection action’, (Bennett & Segerberg, 
2013:196). They argue that the ubiquity of social media and the ease of connection in modern 
society, allow people to find common ground with a remarkably large number of others.  
In another work Bennett et al., (2014b: 234) developed an analytical framework illustrating 
how organisation is produced in digital media through what they call  production packages. 
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These are where “crowds create organisation through packaging these elemental peer-
production mechanisms [production, curation, and dynamic integration] to achieve various 
kinds of work” (Bennett et al., 2014b:232). These peer-production mechanisms will be 
discussed in the following section.   
The scholars argue that “the centrality of media platforms as organisational hubs, along with 
the roles of individuals in activating their own social networks, results in dynamic 
organisations in which crowds (with various degrees of cohesion) allocate resources, respond 
to external events, and display transitional changes over time” (Bennett & Segerberg, 
2013:13). In this context the authors minimise the collective identity in these crowd-enabled 
networks. They claim that “connective action networks are typically far more individualised 
and technologically organised sets of processes that result in action without the requirement 
of collective identity framing or the levels of organisational resources necessary to respond 
effectively to opportunities” (Bennett & Segerberg 2013:32). Yet, this claim has been 
challenged by a number of scholars who argue that collective identity is still playing a key 
role in online activism, which will also be discussed further in this chapter.  
 
Peer production in large-scale networked protests: 
Theorists argue that in the large-scale networked protests there is what they call a package of 
peer-production processes. Such processes are essential for a “coherent organisation ”. 
Importantly “focusing on the production package highlights the action going into the 
organising structure rather than the structural properties of the network per se” (Bennett et al. 
2014b:240). As in the case of the wave of protests in the Arab Spring, and the US Occupy 
movement, there are enormous numbers of networks in the crowds. Production mechanisms, 
according to the theorists, “serve as stitching mechanisms that connect different networks 
into a coherent organisation ” (Bennett et al. 2014b: 234). For example, the Occupy 
movement included a number of different actors such as Anonymous, as well as participants 
in local camps, and protestors. 
The elemental peer-production mechanisms include Production, Curation, and Dynamic 
Integration and according to theorists, these stitch the different actors into a “coherent 
organisation”. Scholars suggest that understanding the new forms of media and how they are 
being used is essential in order to comprehend the emergence of crowd-enabled networks. 
The technology itself, smart phones, websites and apps, are what enables the organising. 
Production, creation and dynamic integration explain how the crowds involved in large-scale 
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protests create, organise and sustain their networks without identifiable leaders, and, hence, 
an organisation emerges. 
Before shedding the light on the production packages suggested by theorists, it is important to 
distinguish between ‘organisation’ or what they call ‘coherent organisation’ and ‘organising’ 
in this context. Bennett et al. 2014b argue that  non-bureaucratic organisation can come in a 
variety of forms, ranging from networks to virtual organisations. Networks consist of 
interdependent actors working together towards a common goal, while the virtual kind is 
born from modern technology, in which distributed actors can collaborate via private or 
public electronic means. 
These organisations share certain common facets with their bureaucratic cousins, namely 
resource mobilisation, responsiveness to external conditions and long-term adaptation, 
change or decline. Resource mobilisation relates to their ability to create, position and utilise 
the materials (either physical or symbolic) needed in collective action. Responsiveness is 
their capacity to react to threats and opportunities, and in doing so learn best how to deal with 
them and future situations. Hence over the long term, these non-bureaucratic organizations 
can re-arrange their internal assets to respond to growth or decline in both resources and 
public support (Bennett et al., 2014b). 
These components of organisation can be found in several types of organisation and different 
kinds of logics (collective and connective).  
Organising, or the organising process, can also be found in any sort of campaign, regardless 
the logic as well. However, the flowing production packages suggested by Bennett et al. 
(2014b) are an organisational process leading to what they call a coherent organisation.       
 
Production: This mechanism includes creating and sharing, or “publicising”, different 
content within the crowd networks on different Internet platforms such as Twitter, 
Livestream, blogs, and news websites. The creation of content does not require high degrees 
of originality or tailoring for a wider audience. In this marketplace of ideas a natural 
evolutionary process takes place, where good ideas are taken up and bad ones are passed over. 
From this process resources are formed which can include symbolic themes, shared identities 
and directions for future activity. 
 
Curation: This category is related to Production in that it continues the evolutionary process 
by sorting and maintaining the assets generated by the crowd. A negotiation process occurs as 
content is selected and preserved by archiving on sites such as Reddit, or in cloud storage 
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facilities, such as Sound Cloud or YouTube. This creates a shared pool of assets and this 
collection naturally creates and evolves according to the norms and boundaries of those user 
communities. 
 
Theorists (Bennett et al. 2014b) have asserted that when faced with the vast signal-to-noise 
ratio of unfettered content creation, the crowd is forced to sort and distribute this information 
so that particularly important and timely information can be shared while it is most relevant. 
In this way, the information does not spread “virally”, but rather the work of those creating 
and sharing determines what is timely and what is unhelpful, or counterproductive, which can 
include spam and trolls. 
 
Dynamic integration covers the role of links, metadata, hashtags and cross-platforming. 
These enable content to be transferred between individuals, across platforms, networks and 
technologies. This way multi-centred movements can connect and share content, allowing 
ideas to flow across the layers. 
As a digital platform Twitter plays a role in these stitching mechanisms and is a good 
example of how the complexity arises. A tweet can be considered to be a unit of production, 
and can contain several sub-elements, such as the content itself, links, hashtags, mentions, as 
well as other components that could be used for any of the three mechanisms. Moreover, and 
in common with other peer-produced materials, an individual’s contribution may not fit 
easily into one of the mechanisms, nor may it appear significant at the time, but may emerge 
as timely and relevant later on. Bennett et al argue that: 
Without production, there is little substance in the network, and what there is will 
not be significantly co-produced among the crowd; without curation the network 
will be saturated with noise; without the micro-level connections of dynamic 
integration, groups and networks will scatter or become significantly dependent 
on key bridging actors. The indicators will differ across contexts, but the presence 
of the basic processes, along with routinized patterns of use, helps shape the 
degree to which large-scale crowd-enabled networks attain organisation (Bennett 
et al. 2014b:253). 
Three typologies of collective action on the Internet 
Based on the four main topics, the authors identified three typologies of collective action on 
the Internet, each of which possesses different characteristics. The authors stress that this 
tripartite typology is a useful means of understanding the different dynamics of networked 
activism in the Internet era. They emphasise that the way political activity is organised has 
changed and the tripartite typology they suggest attempts to visualise the new action 
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networks which have arisen as a result of the Internet. Social media is intertwined within all 
three models but it is utilised with differing degrees of central organisation.  
The three typologies are: Crowd-enabled Networks or Self-organising Networks; 





• Little or no formal 
organisational coordination of 
action.  
 
•Large-scale personal access to 
multi layered social 
technologies. 
 
• Communication content 
centres on emergent inclusive 
personal action frames.  
 
• Personal expression shared 
over social networks.  
 
•Crowd networks may shun 





 Organisationally Enabled 
Networks  
 
• Loose organisational 
coordination of action.  
• Organisations provide social 
technology outlays-both custom 
and commercial  
•Communication content centres 
on organisationally generated 
inclusive personal action frames  
• Some organisational moderation 
of personal expression through 
social networks. 
 • Organisations in the 
background in loosely linked 




Organisationally Brokered Networks  
 
•Strong organisational coordination of 
action. 
• Social technologies used by 
organisations to mange participation 
and coordinate goals. 
•Communication content centres on 
collective action frames.  
•Organisational management of social 
networks- more emphasis on 
Interpersonal networks to build 
relationships for collective action.  
•Organisations in the foreground as 
coalitions with differences bridged 




Figure 2: The Elements of Connective and Collective Action Models (Bennett & 
Segerberg, 2013: 47) 
 
Crowd-enabled networks1 
 This type of connective action can be defined as, “Dense, fine-grained networks of 
individuals in which digital media platforms are the most visible and integrative 
organisational mechanisms.” (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013:13). A self-organised network is 
organised by a crowd, not an organisation, and is a highly decentralised action, meaning there 
is no leadership or formalised organisation. According to Bennett and Segerberg, crowd-
enabled networks are densely layered through complex networks of networks. However, 
although these clearly layered networks involve several platforms and message types, they 
are not structured and are less deliberately constructed, having no distinct characteristics. 
Generally, there is little or no co-ordination of action and this type of network is primarily 
technology-enabled; its activities respond to external factors, such as police raids or positive 
recognition from politicians or celebrities. 
                                                
1 Crowd-enabled networks and self-organised networks refer to the same typology by authors but in different 
publications (2012;2013).  
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Crowd-enabled networks rely on personalised action. This means, actions are taken through 
individuals separately, but sharing a meme, for example. Generally, people in connective 
action do not usually act by taking part in collective action, such as demonstrations; instead 
each individual can take action and share this online. For example, someone might film him 
or herself wearing a T-shirt with the campaign meme in a shopping mall. Moreover, this type 
of connective action tends to avoid engaging with formal organisations or firms. Crowds 
mobilise and organise resources including communications and technology development, 
event co-ordination, and information sharing, as well as fund raising.    
 
Organisationally enabled networks 
 If ‘Crowd-enabled Networks’ and ‘Organisationally Brokered Networks’ could be described 
as extreme forms of networks, ‘Organisationally Enabled Networks’ are moderate in their 
characteristics compared to the other two forms of action. ‘Organisationally Enabled 
Networks’ are ‘hybrid’ networks, combining conventional collective action and digital 
networked connective action, which are loosely organised either by links or by actions. 
Personalised action is distinguishable in this type of connective action but at the same time, 
participants are less wary of involvement with other groups or organisations. The main 
characteristic of this type of network is that, “Conventional organisations operate in the 
background of protest and issue advocacy networks to enable large-scale personalised 
engagement.” (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013:45). In other words, organisations still hold sway 
in this form of action and have a degree of control over individuals but those same 
individuals have some control of the content; it is they who produce the final message and 
action by the organisation.  
The hybrid ‘Organisationally Enabled Network’ combines centrally organised ideas and 
goals with an array of personalised access points (action frames) for those who wish to 
participate (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). It is important to note that, in this type of 
connective action, the uses of digital media and interactivity offer people a great deal of 
choice in terms of the level of commitment with which they want to engage in the action. 
Individuals in this type of network are enabled to find ways to engage with issues either 
online or offline with which they feel personally comfortable. Moreover, this type of 
connective action usually receives official recognition as well as positive media coverage. 
Organisations remain invisible even though they are responsible for organising collective 
action. This ‘invisibility’ gives an impression that people are witnessing organised crowd 




One of the best examples of this type of connective action is the British campaign ‘Put 
People First’ (PPF). The campaign, which launched in 2009, defines itself as a, “Coalition of 
development charities, trade unions, faith groups, environmentalists and other organisations, 
formed in response to calls for a fair, sustainable route out of recession.” (Put People First, 
n.d.). According to Bennett and Segerberg (2013), this campaign provided a rich interactive 
environment for people to learn about issues, giving them information about actions in which 
they could participate  and encouraging them to participate at different levels. For example, 
all their websites featured a box asking people to write a message to G20. Although the 
campaign identified itself as a coalition of organisations, campaign activities were clearly 
personalised, including personal stories on social media, website photos and so forth. 
 
 
Organisationally brokered networks 
 The final type of collective network covers the traditional type of activism using the Internet 
as a means to an end. In this type, the Internet technology does not change the dynamics of 
activism or the links between supporters; it serves simply as another tool, such as leaflets. 
According to Bennett and Segerberg’s typology, an ‘Organisationally Brokered Network’ is a 
large-scale, centralised network, originally formed without the Internet. Members and support 
come from different movements/organisations to support a single goal, while the 
communication content is centred on collective action frames. Often therefore, 
‘Organisationally Brokered Networks’ tend to be movements and groups which originated in 
the pre-Internet era and which have simply grafted technology onto their activities and 
organisational structures, such as trade unions, political parties and standard pressure groups.  
 
Problematising LOCA: Some Critical Considerations 
 
As we noted at the outset of the chapter, LoCA offers a series of advantages when examining 
Internet age protest activity. Not least its attempt to develop a coherent theoretical approach 
married to a diversity of empirical studies, Nevertheless, Bennett and Segerberg’s framework 
has been increasingly critiqued in from variety of quarters. The central criticisms tends to 
focus on three broad areas: the general approach; the concepts deployed especially notions of 
the collective and personal (in particular, how new and distinctive they are) and the restricted 




Approach: Technological determinism again? 
Arguably, the broadest central criticism is that LoCA, in its overall approach, risks falling 
into the old trap of technological determinism in a new guise. In this context, Gerbaudo for 
instance, has criticised the tendency of scholars such as Bennett et al  (2014b), and also 
Castells earlier work (n.d), for pursuing an analysis of social movements, which considers 
technology to be the only cause or means of uniting individuals, while still viewing it as an 
independent variable, when other variables (for example, organisational practices, objectives 
and tactics) rely on it (Gerbaudo, 2014). Gerbaudo asserts that there is a need to go beyond 
what he called ‘methodological individualism’ without digging into ‘micro- operations’ in 
technical networks which can be seen in the LoCA.  
 
 
Concepts: The importance of identity in constructing the “We” 
Thorny conceptual and definitional problems also abound mostly notably around the concept 
of collective identity and the mechanisms for generating this. In essence, LoCA has been 
criticised for downplaying shared collective identity underestimating the role of organisation 
and collective structures in generating collective glue for movements and campaigns. Such 
criticisms have their roots earlier theoretical social movement debates around the importance 
of material capabilities/limitations and organisational structures within movements  
(McCarthy and Zald 1977) versus cultural processes and collective identity  (Melucci, 1996). 
 
Contrary to LoCA, a range of studies have recently argued that digital media platforms play a 
crucial role in the process of identity construction, but this has been marginalised and 
neglected in favour networks.. They argue that collective identity, a phenomenon originating 
from and fostered by social media, needs to be involved in any research concerning digital 
activists. Consequently, networks are not a substitute for collective identity but rather are 
complementary to it (See Bakardjieva, 2015; McDonald, 2015; Milan, 2015; Treré, 2015; 
Kavada, 2015; Coretti & Pica, 2015; Gerbaudo & Treré, 2015; Monterde et al., 2015; 
Gerbaudo, 2015). Some, such as Monterde et al. (2015), warn that “abandoning the concept 
of collective identity would be a mistake, as it has generated rich insights into the ‘cultural 
and emotional dynamics of mobilisation’” (Flesher Fominaya, 2010:401 cited in Monterde et 
al., 2015:932).   
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Whilst most of this recent empirical research on campaigning, protest and movements 
acknowledges the loose, decentralised structures of digital protest, it still sees the strength in 
collective platforms. Hence, Kavada for instance, argues that “despite the emphasis on the 
role of social media in loosening and individualising collective action, such platforms are 
important in the process of creating the collective” (2015:884). She goes on to emphasise the 
necessity of collective identity in digital protest, noting that even if we accept that recent 
movements are more loosely structured than those of the past, these movements still need to 
develop their self-understanding as distinct collectives with their own agency (Kavada 
2015:883). Her research found that using social media platforms benefited the movement as 
it “blurs the boundaries” between inside and outside the movement, which complies with the 
movement’s value as a call for direct participation.  
Similarly, Gerbaudo and Trere (2015: 866), argue that  
disregard of collective identity and connected communicative processes 
constitutes a major obstacle in the understanding of contemporary protest 
movements, since it obscures the symbolic and cultural aspects inherent in social 
media activism and in protest communications more generally.  
Gerbaudo’s (2015), further empirical work on social media avatar photos in the 2011 protest 
waves in Egypt, Spain and the US, argues that avatar photos which may appear to be “trivial 
acts” are actually a new form of collective identity in social media. Gerbaudo shows that such 
practices “are a demonstration of the fact that collective identity continues to exist in the 
contemporary web, despite the high levels of individualisation and fragmentation of online 
interactions” (Gerbaudo 2015: 920). The scholar stresses that “the use of protest avatars 
testifies to the fact that protest movements in a digital era are still compelled by the need to 
construct a ‘we’ that people can adhere to” (Gerbaudo 2015: 926).  
Replying to Gerbaudo’s concerns about ‘the collective’ Bennett et al (2015) stress that the 
solidarity and ‘We’ in connective action logic differs from conventional collective action. 
Memes such as ‘We Are the 99%’ have a shared expression but are also highly personalised, 
allowing such memes to be shared widely despite the cultural and social barriers that may 
prevent sharing within a conventional movement. Connective action in their work does not 
“preclude common identifications or inhibit acting collectively. Rather, it signals the 
presence of alternate perceptions, motives, and forms of action” (Bennett et al. 2014a:273). 
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In this context, they stress that studying post-bureaucratic mobilisations should highlight the 
sharp distinction between the individual and the collective. This suggests that ‘We’ can be 
formed in many different ways, and just as there are different ways for political participation, 
so there are many mechanisms and roots for collective action.  
 
Methodology: Extending the focus? 
A third set of criticisms has centred on the, often limited, methods of studying social 
movement and protest activity in the era of social media. LoCA has sometimes been viewed 
as concentrating too closely on social media platforms especially Twitter to the detriment of 
other key platforms or centres of activity. Della Porta (2014), in her critique, suggests that 
there is still a need to study traditional media such as leaflets and posters. Furthermore, she 
emphasises that further studies need to concentrate more on understanding in which 
circumstances actors adopt particular repertoires of communications and what shapes the 
decision making behind this. Della Porta also points out the importance of triangulating this 
type of research with other qualitative methods such as ethnographic work since such 
methods would help researchers to explore and understand the relationship between the 
means of communication and the different steps in the mobilisation process.  
 
Similarly, David Karpf echoes some of the ideas of Della Porta (2014), commenting that 
public data collected from Twitter may not reflect the communication among the crowd since 
“many important elements that may be crucial to understanding the development of the 
networks are never digitally recorded or archived for public consumption” (2014: 237). His 
own research demonstrates that many online or offline activities taking place are hidden in 
what he referred to as “network backchannels”. These backchannels such as mailing lists, 
Google groups or face-to-face meetings cannot be traced online as they leave no public 
record. They allow members to create their own private spaces, leading inevitably to in-
groups and out-groups. Karpf argues that such backchannels form an essential part of behind-
the-scenes curation and dynamic integration, but they make no appearance in the vast dataset 
used by Bennett et al. According to Karpf, therefore in monitoring protest and movement 
activity in the Internet era it is not to concentrate on particular platforms or publically 
available big data.  Tracing and understanding backchannels requires adopting qualitative 
methods such as ethnography and interviews. This approach is underlined in Kavada’s (2015) 
research on the Occupy Movement uses a qualitative approach which involves interviewing 
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activists and analysing digital media content, along with documents belonging to the 
movement. She argues that this approach revelead how Occupy campaigners in different 
locations created a sense of collective action organising, instead of the connective action 
logic as proposed by Bennett and Segerberg (2013).  
In response, Bennett et al. acknowledge the importance of different qualitative 
methodological approaches such as ethnography and interviewing. They also agree that 
assessing network backchannels is of clear significance. Indeed, they argue that the LoCA 
study does not ignore events and platforms outside Twitter but social and traditional media, 
organisational sites, resource bunkers, together with face-to-face and mediated action are all 
considered and that his had helped reveals the importance variables such as the physical 
location, the contribution of individuals, and network actors not simply social media 
technology. That said, they stress that with the different approaches that can be used, the 
most important question to be addressed is “how does it all play into the internal workings of 
the crowd-enabled network?” (Bennett et al. 2014a: 274) since focusing on details of these 
parts of organisations may reduce the mobilisation to segregated foci instead of viewing it as 
one large organisation. Bennett et al. 2014a argue that their work on Twitter shows the bigger 
picture of the organisation, i.e. they encircled the public protest they were trying to study. 
The patterns demonstrated by the links are revealing in terms of how and when various 
elements come into play during the protests. The model they used shows how the information 
is connected through the networks, stitching together sites, resources and actors, and it is this 
which allows researchers to gain a broader understanding of the protest ecology.  
Part of the purpose of the study here is of course to contextualise and test some of the 
criticisms raised above. In relation to the approach adopted, it explicitly seeks to understand 
the importance of the Saudi social and political context for campaign activity not simply the 
technological environment. Moreover, both the case studies that follow in Chapters Seven 
and Eight reveal the importance of considering a range technological platforms as well the 
backchannels referred to here. Thus methodologically, the study follows Della Porta’s advice 
in triangulated both social media data, the role of traditional media and interviews with 








2.5. Conclusion  
The purpose of this chapter was to provide a detailed discussion on the mobilisation and 
organisation which form the theoretical base of this research. Firstly, it discussed the key 
philosophical approaches to the role which technology plays in relation to social phenomena. 
Secondly, it identified the principal debates about the features of the Internet which have 
transformed aspects of activism, with specific reference to mobilisation and organisation. 
Thirdly, it has presented a detailed description of Bennett and Segerberg’s typology which 
serves as the basis of the theoretical framework for this study.  
The first part of this chapter examined the role played by technology in creating social 
phenomena, noting the arguments for the two main philosophical approaches, namely, 
technological determinism and social constructivism. It was suggested that technological 
determinism, in its extreme form, is not a useful means of understanding cyberactivism as a 
social phenomenon in various political contexts. It also argued that changes to collective 
action behaviour, prompted by the use of the Internet, demonstrate that it is not possible to 
ignore the influence of technology on social phenomena.  
It was noted that Internet use by activists has led to practical changes being made to activism 
as a social phenomenon, in terms of mobilisation and organisation. This technology has 
reduced the cost of communication and empowered individuals at the expense of vertical 
organisations. It has widened and deepened levels of political participation, making this a part 
of citizens’ daily lives, allowing them to engage where, when and how they wish. The 
Internet has also minimised the need for organisations to launch, lead or co-ordinate 
campaigns, with individuals taking responsibility for social actions to a degree which was 
previously impossible.          
Bennett and Segerberg’s LoCA, a comprehensive theoretical framework which reflects the 
new forms of cyberactivism, was presented and explained. It was argued that this framework 
will be a useful means of understanding the impact of Internet technologies on social 
campaigning in the ND context because it make it possible to understand collective action 
without there being a clear organisational structure.   
These three topics form the foundation for the discussion of the specific role of the Internet in 
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activism in ND states like Saudi Arabia. As noted in the discussion of social constructivism, 
the role of the Internet cannot be considered without first addressing the systemic 
environment wherein activism takes place and the following chapter will focus on the role 
which the Internet plays in ND countries, where it provides not only the tools for activism, 
but also a new space for activism. 
62 
 




The free flow of information is inherently compatible with our political system 
and values. The Communist states, in contrast, fear this information revolution, 
perhaps, even more than they fear Western military strength. We all remember 
the power of the Ayatollah’s message disseminated on tape cassettes in Iran; what 
could have a more profound impact in the Soviet bloc than similar cassettes, 
outside radio broadcasting, direct broadcast satellites or photocopying machines? 
Totalitarian societies face a dilemma: either they try to stifle these technologies 
and thereby fall further behind in the new industrial revolution, or else they 
permit these technologies and see their totalitarian control inevitably eroded. In 
fact, they do not have a choice because they will never entirely be able to block 
the tide of technological advance.  
George Shultz, US Secretary of State, (1985:716)  
 
3.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter addressed the literature concerning the first and second research 
questions on mobilisation and organisation in particular. This chapter focuses on the 
questions relating to the third area of the thesis; the contextual and systemic environment. 
The aim is to understand the role of broader social, cultural and political factors in shaping 
cyberactivism. As noted in the introduction, much of the focus of existing research on 
Internet activism is premised on the western, liberal, democratic experience. Given that the 
case studies here relate to the Saudi Arabian experience, the chapter focuses more 
specifically on the role of the Internet in non-democratic (ND) contexts. It is argued that the 
Internet helps to promote certain features of democracy, including freedom of speech, in 
opening up an alternative public sphere, as well as creating a space for new types of media. 
All of these online features are used to support activism in ND systems which strictly control 
this within the non-virtual space. Given the overarching role of the Internet in ND contexts, 
this chapter will also discuss the challenges it presents to ND regimes and their attempts to 
control Internet usage. Exploring citizens’ use of various Internet features and the responses 
which this elicits from authoritarian regimes will serve to highlight both the advantages of the 




3.2. Democratisation and the Internet  
It has been argued that the growth of the Internet has created the potential for (virtual) public 
spheres, similar to the original Habermasian concept, (Poster, 1997; Bennett, 2004; Dahlgren, 
2005; Benkler, 2006; Papacharissi, 2009; Castells, 2009; Ruiz et al., 2011). Habermas 
(1991:176), looked at the public sphere (pre-Internet) as it is, “Made up of private people 
gathered together as a public and articulating the needs of society with the state.” 
Scholars have noted that people’s use of the Internet for creating alternative political spaces 
can be compared to seventeenth-century coffee houses or the nineteenth- and twentieth-
century press, which were used by the public to share their ideas and discuss social issues. 
Thus, Benkler (2006:213), observes:  
The easy possibility of communicating effectively into the public sphere allows 
individuals to reorient themselves from passive readers and listeners to potential 
speakers and participants in a conversation.  
In doing so, he recognises interactivity as the feature of the Internet which makes it a public 
sphere, arguing, “The network allows all citizens to change their relationship to the public 
sphere.” Fung et al. (2013), stress that such a development may have even more impact 
outside established democracies: 
In ND [non-democratic] societies, then, the digitized public sphere will be 
dramatically more democratic in terms of who speaks and what they say than the 
public sphere without the Internet as long as it is difficult for authoritarians to 
control content on the Internet. 
Users no longer need to be simply consumers or passive spectators (as with traditional media) 
but can become creators and primary subjects. Some have even suggested that authoritarian 
regimes have lost much of their control over the public sphere following the emergence of the 
Internet (Tufekci, 2015), since simply controlling traditional media and civil society 
institutions is no longer sufficient in order to control the public sphere in the Internet era. To 
put it simply, authoritarian regimes cannot rule with an iron fist if they do not have absolute 
control over the public sphere. To do so, they now need to control the Internet in order to 
hold sway over the virtual public sphere.   
At this broad level, then, it can be claimed that, “The Internet democratises.” (Benkler, 
2006:272). Like the public sphere, the Internet facilitates the process of democratisation, 
giving people the ability to create a democratic, online atmosphere in ND countries.  
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Democracy, as a concept, does not only mean the right to elect the political leadership or the 
right to vote, “But it is also about reconfiguring relations of power in order to open spaces for 
pluralism, diversity and inclusiveness.” (Pratt, 2005:86).  
However, democracy and democratisation as a political process have different definitions. 
Tilly (2000) argues that the working definitions of democracy can be divided into three 
categories, all of which share some overlap. These are substantive criteria, which deals with 
human experiences and social relations; constitutional criteria, which refers to the legal 
mechanisms underlying elections and referenda; and political process, which covers the 
actual cut-and-thrust of party politics (Tilly 2000). 
He also defined democratisation as a “movement toward broad and equal citizenship, bound 
to the consultation of its citizens, which protects those citizens from arbitrary state action” 
(Tilly 2000:01). Both terms’ definitions and meanings are related to elements other than 
those covered by “substantive criteria”. In this context Balkin (2004) emphsises that “the 
forces of democratisation operate not only through regular elections, but through changes in 
institutions, practices, customs, mannerisms, speech, and dress” (Balkin 2004:33).  
Historically, there has been a close correlation between economic growth, including 
technological development and democratisation. Huntington (1991), pointed to the global 
economic growth of the 1960s as one of five major factors which contributed to what he 
called, the ‘third-wave transitions to democracy’. Weaver’s study of traditional media in 137 
countries over 16 years, including ND states such as China, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and 
Morocco, found that the, “Growth of mass communications is important to the growth of 
participant forms of government and to greater freedom of expression”  (1977:169). As a 
media and communication tool, the Internet can also play a similar, or even greater role in 
this kind of democratisation. The Internet’s interactivity could increase this role, not only in 
ND countries, but also in reinforcing political engagement and participation in democratic 
countries, (see Chapter Two).   
Many scholars (Rheingold, 1993; Chase & Mulvenon, 2002; Best & Wade, 2009; Diamond, 
2010; Howard, 2011; Khazaeli and Stockemer, 2013; Shirky, 2008 and 2011) have 
acknowledged the role of the Internet in promoting some basic principles of democracy. 
Specifically, Khazaeli and Stockemer (2013), found a positive relationship between high 
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rates of Internet penetration1 and the quality of political institutions, on the grounds that the 
Internet can create a space for political expression and provide citizens with information. 
Philip Howard also clearly states that: 
Democracy—and democratisation—can no longer be effectively studied without 
some attention paid to the role of digital information technologies. Not only does 
the character of this infrastructure have an impact on the opportunity structures 
for political change and the range of possible outcomes, but the technologies 
themselves support new forums for political discussion and are themselves 
politicized media, (2011:132). 
Similarly, McNair (2006:162) claims that, “There is clearly a correlation between the 
evolution of NICTs [New Information and Communication Technologies] and the decline of 
authoritarianism across the world.” whilst Miazhevich (2015:434) notes, “In semi-
authoritarian states, the Internet can potentially offer an alternative space outside the 
restricted political public sphere.” 
Papacharissi (2009:244), emphasises the contribution that the Internet has made more 
generally to political engagement, asserting that:  
Online protest, expressing political opinion on blogs, viewing or posting content 
on YouTube, or posting a comment in an online discussion group represents an 
expression of dissent with a public agenda, determined by mainstream media and 
political actors.  
She then further claims that actions of this type made by the public mean that: 
[The] citizen engages and is enabled politically through a private media 
environment located within the individual’s personal and private space. Whereas 
in the truest iterations of democracy, the citizen was enabled through the public 
sphere, in contemporary democracy, the citizen acts politically from a private 
sphere of reflection, expression, and behaviour, (Papacharissi, 2009:244).  
Tang and Huhe (2013), argue that such optimistic views about the Internet’s role in ND 
countries are essentially built on three tenets. The first of these is the belief that the Internet 
facilitates access to information and challenges control of information, imposed by 
authoritarian regimes. The Internet makes it easier for citizens to express their views about 
corruption and social injustice because it allows them to do so anonymously and in a fast, 
low-cost environment, (see Chapter Two). The second core tenet involves the ease with 
which digital technologies allow political movements to challenge an existing regime through 
                                                
1 Internet penetration rates refer to, “The relationship between the number of Internet users in each country and 
its demographic data.” (Dictionary Search).  
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cyberactivism, by organising actions, mobilising people and obtaining information. The third 
and final tenet is that by facilitating the free flow of information, creating an alternative 
environment for social interaction and deliberation, and acting as a means of communication 
between activists, the Internet can foster civil societies that have often previously been absent 
or nascent.  
In the following sections, therefore, we discuss in more detail, the impact of the Internet on 
ND societies with respect to these three aspects: freedom of expression; online media; and 
cyberactivism.  
3.2.1. Freedom of expression 
 Reports from international organisations like ‘Reporters without Borders’, continually 
highlight the lack of freedom of expression in ND countries. Balkin (2004), however, claims 
that two of the key characteristics of the Internet, its interactivity and appropriative nature, 
might possibly offer a means of providing this freedom of speech. As we saw in Chapter Two, 
by using the Internet, individuals from different backgrounds are able to interact with each 
other, sharing ideas and thoughts. In this way, citizens build a cultural resource which leads 
to appropriate behaviour, where dissenters share or criticise what they dislike in order to 
encourage cultural innovation within a society (Balkin, 2004). Clearly, the Internet offers this 
interactive and appropriative environment in various ways via blogs, online comments on 
news and social media, for example. 
By providing an alternative means of expression and interaction with others, the Internet 
allows citizens to express themselves without the need for traditional mass media. 
Theoretically, this means of expression can be free from the control of the authorities. 
Internet users can share their views and ideas directly with large numbers of individuals at 
little cost, with no need for traditional media, using only the Internet (Balkin, 2004). This 
process of deliberation amongst citizens can be considered as a phase in the process of 
democratisation.  
In the ND state setting, the freedom of speech provided by the Internet has influenced 
societies and consequently, national politics to a certain degree, as exemplified by the case of 
China (Herol and Marolt, 2011; Shirk, 2011; Yang, 2013; Sautede, 2013). Yang (2013), for 
example, argues that online expression there reaffirmed people’s values by means of what 
could be called a ‘recursive process’ in which those communities which value openness, 
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solidarity and justice find their way to the Internet via other users. Therefore, the more people 
see these values, the more they are reaffirmed.  
This relatively free environment encourages greater numbers of citizens to use it for the 
purpose of political participation, as is the case in democratic countries (Bolsover et al., 
2013; Bimber, 2003; Al Nashmi et al., 2010). Citizens in democratic countries have other 
means of expressing themselves, including public demonstrations and the traditional media. 
In contrast, in those ND countries where the citizenry has limited or no means of expressing 
opinions publically, the Internet has become a lifeline and the principle means of expression.  
In addition, online freedom of speech can influence authoritarian governments when people 
have this outlet to express themselves. In reference to China, Qiang (2011), stated:  
We are starting to see new compromise, negotiation, and rule-changing 
behaviours in the regime’s response to this challenge, indicating the possibility of 
more open and accountable governance with greater citizen participation, (Qiang, 
2011:60).  
As Qiang argues, the Internet is not simply about freedom of expression. More importantly, 
this freedom of expression has the power to influence political systems to some degree and 
make them enact changes in their behaviour in response to citizens’ claims and criticism.  
The fact that the Internet offers a relatively open environment for freedom of expression has 
led to it being used in numerous ways, all of which potentially contribute to the 
democratisation process in ND countries. In order to consider the literature on the role of the 
Internet in ND countries, the following sections will examine the ‘blogosphere’, social media, 
citizen journalism and online journalism. It is argued that these outlets form the axis of 
cyberactivism, since they are used for mobilisation and organisation as elucidated in Chapter 
Two. 
3.2.2. New Media Outlets  
The alternative public sphere and freedom of expression, as well as the technology itself, can 
be said to have created a new type of media outlet including blogs, social networks, 
Indymedia, citizen journalism and new media organisations. This section examines how these 
outlets relate to the practice of cyberactivism.   
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3.2.3. Blogs and social networks 
 Blogs and social networks give citizens free access to upload and share their views with the 
public, with little or no interference from the authorities. They provide people in ND 
countries with what might be their only means of expressing themselves freely. In its annual 
report, The Internet Enemies 2010, Reporters without Borders shows that bloggers are more 
active in countries with ND regimes, (The Internet Enemies, 2010).  
In this context, Iran makes an interesting case study in relation to the power and spread of 
blogging. The authoritarian situation in the government and the media led to an explosion in 
the number of Iranian blogs on the Internet. In 2005, Golkar found that half of the Persian 
language on the Internet was found in Iranian blogs. Moreover, other studies have ranked 
Iran as second, fourth or seventh in the number of blogs worldwide, (Kelly & Etling, 2008), 
depending on the criteria and ranking systems used. In 2008, the number of blogs in Iran was 
estimated at 700,000, and at least 100,000 were still active,(Chiesa, 2008). Different points of 
view and various ideologies not represented in the traditional media in Iran can be found in 
this blogging community. Kelly’s study (2008) suggested that there are at least four distinct 
sectors of the Iranian blogosphere, namely: secular/reformist; conservative/religious; Persian 
poetry and literature; mixed networks. Whilst it is understandable that the Iranian regime and 
its traditional media would prefer to represent all Iranians as conservative supporters of 
theocracy, the state’s bloggers have shown that this is clearly not the case, (Golkar, 2005).  
In another example from the former Soviet bloc countries, Kulikova and Perlmutter (2007), 
found that during the revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, bloggers played a crucial role in 
supporting citizens with information, comments, analysis and alternative interpretations of 
media stories.  
Interestingly, while these examples exemplify the importance of blogging in ND societies, it 
is worth noting that blogging activities and corresponding academic studies of blogging have 
been declining since 2010. This can perhaps be explained by the rise in popularity of social 
media such as YouTube, where vloggers can express themselves visually rather than in 
writing. In addition, Twitter can also be viewed as a form of micro-blogging, with individuals 
sharing their ideas in just 140 characters, as can Facebook, ( Rainie, cited in Kopytoff, 2011) 
Internet discussion forums also played a similar role to that of blogging, serving as a place for 
free expression and political debate. It has been suggested that one of the most distinctive 
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features of online forums was their ability to, “Generate focused and meaningful interaction.” 
(Hamilton & Feenberg, 2012:55). One of the earliest examples of an online forum being used 
as an open space for public discussion in an authoritarian regime occurred in Indonesia; it is 
almost certain that online discussion forums existed there in the 1990’s when the country was 
under President Suharto’s rule,(Marcus, 1998; Sen and Hill, 2007; Lim, 2009). In addition to 
a number of other factors, the Internet can be said to have contributed to the fall of Suharto’s 
dictatorship in 1998, mainly by helping citizens to communicate and share their thoughts 
about political issues in a free space, avoiding the media controlled by Suharto’s regime.     
In some Arab countries, online forums are largely used for political discussion. According to 
Al Nashmi et al. (2010), Arabs regard the Internet mainly as a political discussion platform. 
They observed that:  
Almost every news event in 2006 – from the many conflicts and wars in the 
Middle East to the Republican loss of a majority in the US Congress – was 
discussed. Arab Internet users were not shy or reluctant to engage in any sort of 
political debate, (Al Nashmi et al., 2010:731).  
This research highlights the role of the Internet in opening up a space for political 
discussions, which relates not only to issues within the region but also to political news from 
all over the world.   
3.2.4. New types of journalism 
 Mass communication can play a vital role as a democratising agent and a watchdog over 
public authorities (Lichtenberg, 1990; McNair, 2006), but the role of the media differs from 
one political system to another. Perhaps the best description of the role of media within 
different political systems can still be found in Siebert et al.’s ‘Four Theories of the Press: 
The Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility, and Soviet Communist Concepts of 
What the Press Should Be and Do’, (1956). They noted that in authoritarian regimes, the 
media are generally privately owned, but ‘guided’ by the state which effectively decides on 
the degree of freedom that they are given within its system. So the state itself sets the limits 
of media freedom. This theory can still be applied to countries in the Arab world in particular, 
(Al-Ghazzi 2014).  
The Internet has clearly created a space for media through citizen journalism and by allowing 
new news organisations to be formed online. The following two sections will address both 
these types of outlets.   
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3.2.5. Citizen journalism and indymedia 
 Individual citizens, or groups of citizens, now have the opportunity to practise journalism to 
professional journalistic standards, and some studies suggest that this kind of ‘amateur’ 
journalism is now able to compete with mainstream, traditional journalism, (Goode 2009). 
The literature refers to journalistic practice by non-professionally trained individuals by a 
number of different terms, but mainly it is dubbed ‘Citizen Journalism’, (Kern and Nam, 
2009; Kaufhold et al., 2010; Ali and Fahmy, 2013; Al-Ghazzi, 2014; Gillespie, 2013), 
although others refer to this trend as ‘Participatory Journalism’, (Moyo, 2011; Karlsson et al., 
2015). 
Both these terms are used to refer to the, “Range of web-based practices, whereby, ‘ordinary’ 
users engage in journalistic practices.” (Goode, 2009:1293). Goode argues that, “Certain 
characteristics of citizen journalism appear to present interesting possibilities for a 
reinvigorated public culture.” (2009:1292).  
Regardless of the differences in terminology, it is clear that authors focus on two specific 
characteristics: ‘journalistic practices’ and ‘made by ordinary people’, emphasising how the 
Internet allows citizens to essentially form their own media outlet. In citizen journalism, 
people do not simply express themselves but use similar practices to those found in 
traditional newsrooms, (Weiss 2015): reporting news, investigating issues and filming events. 
Citizens, using the power of journalism, can help independent media converge with the 
contemporary, monopolised media environment within different political systems.  
The most explicit example of this practice is the Salam Pax blog,1 the diary-like accounts of 
daily life in Baghdad during the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, published by an Iraqi 
architect. The blog became a source for international journalists who wanted to know what 
was going on in Iraq under Saddam Hussein’s regime. The blogger later became a columnist 
for The Guardian and went on to publish a book containing the blog entries, (McNair, 2009). 
Similarly, the Egyptian blogger, Wael Abbas, started collecting and publishing videos 
showing police brutality in Egypt, (Saleh, 2012). Such blogs can be said to be practising 
journalism more than simply expressing personal views. 
Some researchers have argued that the practice of citizen journalism has influenced the 
agenda of the traditional media, (Goode, 2009; Ahy, 2014;Castells, 2007), which is now 
                                                
1 Salam Pax is available at: http://salampax.wordpress.com and http://dear_raed.blogspot.co.uk.  
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incorporating some citizen journalism practices into its own news coverage. ‘Guardian 
Witness’ for example, is a platform belonging to The Guardian newspaper which allows 
people to write news stories or send in photographs relating to events in the news. This 
allows citizen journalists in areas of political unrest, a space to post their thoughts in 
traditional media. At the same time, it means that The Guardian can provide reports from 
conflict zones without sending its own reporters, rather, using coverage from citizen 
journalists instead. Without the Internet, citizens in Syria would find it hard to show the scale 
of destruction caused by the war between the authoritarian regime and the rebels, (Al-Ghazzi, 
2014).  
A number of studies have addressed the role played by citizen journalists in reporting the 
conflict in those countries involved in the Arab Spring and the Iranian uprising in 2009, 
including those by Wojcieszak and Smith (2014), Ali and Fahmy (2013), Ahy (2014) and Al-
Ghazzi (2014). The use of the Internet by citizen journalists has made borders more 
permeable. This may make it harder for regimes to control the flow of information 
internationally. Internet and citizen journalism in particular, provide a window on countries 
where journalists from the conventional media cannot get access to conflict and closed areas.  
Additionally, the Internet not only allows citizens to practise journalism as individuals but 
also allows ordinary people to group together as news-gathering organisations by means of 
the so-called ‘Indymedia’. This online practice has been more clearly defined by Pickard 
(2006) as, “An interactive news website, a global network and a radically democratic 
organization.” (Pickard, 2006:317). Indymedia.org, which was the first of its kind, was 
established on 27th October, 1999 by, “Various independent and alternative media 
organizations and activists in 1999, for the purpose of providing grassroots coverage of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) protests in Seattle.” (Indymedia n.d.). They define their 
websites as: 
[A] network of collectively run media outlets for the creation of radical, accurate, 
and passionate tellings of the truth. We work out of a love and inspiration for 
people who continue to work for a better world, despite corporate media’s 
distortions and unwillingness to cover the  efforts to free humanity, (Indymedia 
n.d.). 
Chapter One touched on the limitations of the news flow, noting that the Internet allows 
campaigners to use the Internet as media. Indymedia websites across the world became the 
voice of activism. Chapter Two also highlighted the problematic relationship between 
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conventional media and activists. Activists can now avoid this problematic relationship by 
using Indymedia and other online outlets.     
Independent news websites currently enjoy high rates of credibility among citizens and, in 
some cases, higher credibility than their traditional counterparts, (Bosch, 2010; Chung and 
Nah, 2013). Furthermore, independent news websites are free from the commercial interests 
of advertisers, (Platon and Deuze, 2003) and from the political pressures exerted over 
traditional media.  
Bowman and Willis's (2003) description of participatory journalism summarises the role 
which this can play in democratisation in the following terms:  
The act of a citizen, or group of citizens, playing an active role in the process of 
collecting, reporting, analysing and disseminating news and information. The 
intent of this participation is to provide the independent, reliable, accurate, wide-
ranging and relevant information that a democracy requires […] Participatory 
journalism is a bottom-up, emergent phenomenon in which there is little or no 
editorial oversight or formal journalistic work-flow dictating the decisions of a 
staff. Instead, it is the result of many simultaneous, distributed conversations that 
either blossom or quickly atrophy in the Web’s social network, (Bowman and 
Willis, 2003). 
In the broadest sense, the importance of citizen journalism is to allow ordinary people to tell 
their stories and present their views to the world without the limitations imposed by 
traditional media and authoritarian regimes.  
3.2.6. New media organisations 
 The digital revolution also made it easier for people to establish their own media 
organisations online, without a great need for licensing and state permission. In many ND 
countries, media organisations are subject to complicated terms and conditions when 
publishing information. It also means adhering to the power of the authorities which may 
withdraw a license for any reason at any time, as in the Saudi case documented by AlEnizi, 
(2003).   
Today, there are a number of independent news organisations online. Some Pan-Arab and 
Chinese news websites such as Altagreer1, Arabi212 and the China Digital Times3, are all 
based online only and provide a good illustration of free, online news websites. No 
                                                
1 Altagreer is available at: http://altagreer.com.  
2 Arabia21 is available at: http://arabi21.com 
3 China Digital Times is available at: http://chinadigitaltimes.net 
73 
 
information is provided about website ownership nor editorial staff and they have no physical 
address. Furthermore, with some exceptions, sources and data collection are mainly online 
and sources are usually unnamed. Both the Arab and Chinese examples use English language 
news websites for newsgathering. The voices of Chinese citizens are translated into English 
to be accessible to a wider audience. The China Digital Times declares that one of its aims is 
to attempt to reveal, “The hidden mechanisms of state censorship by collecting and 
translating filtered keywords, propaganda directives and official rhetoric.”(China Digital 
Times n.d.).   
3.3. Cyberactivism 
Thus far, we have shown the Internet creates a potential public sphere and provides relatively 
higher levels of freedom of expression in ND countries compared to the level of freedom of 
expression afforded by the conventional media.  
The Internet has provided activists with a considerable number of tools which they can use to 
promote their mobilisational and organisational demands. It can make a real difference in the 
ND context, by speeding up the distribution of information to allow mobilisation to take 
place and by cutting the costs of mass communication for activists. In addition, it can offer 
freedom of expression, as mentioned in the previous sections. It is argued here that, if the 
Internet can act as a useful facilitator of activism in democratic countries, it can be used to 
create a space, or totally new environment, for activism in ND countries.  
Aouragh and Alexander (2011), have emphasised that it is important to distinguish between 
the use of the Internet as a tool and the role of the Internet as a space for activism, (Aouragh 
& Alexander 2011). The notion of activism contradicts the principles of many ND regimes. 
Subsequently, any type of offline activism, such as demonstrations or strikes, are often 
against the law in ND countries, or are suppressed by the authorities on the grounds they 
represent a threat to civil order. One of the most striking examples of the Internet’s role in 
activism in ND states is the Egyptian case during the Arab Spring. A large and growing body 
of literature has investigated Internet activism during the Arab Spring in general, and the 
Egyptian case in particular, (Aouragh & Alexander 2011); Lynch, 2011; Rane &Salem, 2012). 
Although not all scholars agree upon the exact causes of the uprising, or what role, if any, the 
Internet actually played, all these studies regarded the Internet as having played a role in the 
mobilisation and organisation of popular protest.  
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The Day of Rage, January 25th, 2011, was generally considered to be the catalyst for the 
Egyptian revolution. Importantly, the precursors to the revolution started as early as 2004, 
with Egyptians feeling, “Fed up with the degree of corruption, dictatorship, economic distress 
and humiliation they had been suffering for a long time.” (Khamis and Vaughn, 2011: n.p). A 
number of both online and offline activities contributed to the Day of Rage. There was a 
growth in digital political activities (Howard et al., 2011), with  the appearance of Facebook 
pages for the April 6th  Youth Movement in 2008, (Tufekci and Wilson, 2012; Röder & 
Rinke, 2011) and the launch of Kullena Khaled Said, (We are all Khaled Said) in 2010, 
(Aouragh & Alexander, 2011; Etling et al., 2010; Sandoval-Almazan & Gil-Garcia, 2014; 
Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011; Hirst, 2012). The Egyptian Movement for Change, Kefaya 
(Enough), was also involved in offline and online activities between 2004 and 2008, (Salah 
Fahmi, 2009; Mellor, 2007; Howard et al., 2011). There was also evidence of blogging and 
citizen journalist activities.  
Some scholars argue that the roots of the Arab Spring, including the Egyptian revolution, 
date back to pre-2004 and that it was the result of corruption, a dictatorial regime and related 
domestic issues, but certainly there had been a: 
Decades-long history of social and political protest in Egypt, starting with the 
mobilizations in solidarity with the Second Intifada, and the U.S. (and British) 
invasion of Iraq, which led to huge protests expressing anger at leaders seen as 
the local lackeys of the U.S. and Israel, (Aouragh & Alexander, 2011:1346).  
The causes of the Egyptian revolution highlight the need to examine the influence of 
systemic environment on Internet uses for activism.  
Generally, the literature shows that the Internet played a number of significant roles in the 
Egyptian revolution. It shaped political debates by providing people with information that 
could not be obtained elsewhere, as well as opening up a free space for discussion. Both of 
these elements, provided by different Internet platforms, allowed citizens from different 
demographic groups to participate in political debates in light of information provided by 
activists online, (Salah Fahmi, 2009; Howard et al., 2011; Khamis & Vaughn, 2011; Aouragh 
& Alexander, 2011).  
Secondly, the Internet fostered solidarity among the Egyptian protesters. For instance, the 
Internet was used to obtain legal assistance for those who were arrested by the police, (Ishani, 
2011). When it was shut down by the Egyptian government for five days, activists collected 
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information about the uprising and then contacted other Egyptians abroad to tweet and post 
on behalf of activists in the country who could not participate online, (Aouragh and 
Alexander, 2011). In addition, the Internet gave activists a chance to address the entire world 
and engage with like-minded activists. For example, activists had training with the Kenyan 
NGO, Ushahidi, to learn how to capture footage and report videos online, (Ishani, 2011). 
Moreover, even those Egyptian citizens who did not use the Internet themselves were 
influenced by those who did, and so participated in the demonstrations, (Iskander, 2011, cited 
in Khamis and Vaughn, 2011); the classic, indirect effect or two-step flow of communication. 
Furthermore, existing Internet features gave activists an alternative media outlet. Using 
Facebook pages, protesters used to update followers with the latest news as well as the 
locations of demonstrations. Photographs and videos of tortured citizens were also uploaded 
to address the international media, (Salah Fahmi, 2009; Röder and Rinke, 2011; Hofheinz, 
2011).  
The Egyptian case provides a particularly good example of the role played by the Internet in 
a ND country. It shows that Internet users were able to create a space where they could 
circulate information and air opinions which could not have been circulated or aired by any 
other means, giving them an alternative, relatively free media. Information and discussion in 
the alternative media led to mobilisation and organisation for action against the political 
system. This demonstrates that the Internet can help activists and ordinary people to 
participate in politics in both online and offline activities. Through these activities, the 
Internet fostered solidarity among the participants which ultimately led to a political change, 
with Mubarak stepping down and a new president being elected.1 
3.4. Cultural Shaping of Communication  
 
While the previous sections addressed the role of the Internet in democratisation and how it 
facilitates activism in a ND context, it is important to state that the Internet is still limited by 
governments and other social factors, which in turn shape the activists’ communications. 
That means the participant’s beliefs and social attitudes still play a crucial role in shaping the 
communication culture and the use of the Internet. This can be seen in both democratic and 
                                                
1 After the so-called January 25th Revolution, the then President, Mohammad Hosni Mubarak, stepped down 
and handed power over to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces on February 11th 2011. On June 24th 2012 
Mohammad Morsi was declared the winner of the presidential election. However, on July 3rd 2013 the Minister 
of Defence, General Abdel Fattah El-Sis, overthrew Morsi and became Egypt’s new president.  
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ND contexts, and, hence, scholars have addressed the issue using various approaches and in 
different terms. These include communication culture (Kavada, 2013), cultures of 
participation (Porta & Mattoni, 2012), framing (Karagiannis, 2009), and media perception 
(Mattoni, 2013). Kavada stresses that  
The Internet is only one component of a movement’s communication ecology, so 
the cultures underlying a movement’s Internet use are linked to those driving its 
communication practices in other media and forms of communication, including 
face-to-face contact (Kavada 2013:77).  
According to Kavada the concept of communication cultures refers to the influences that 
shape activists’ engagement within the protest ecology. These include the boundaries and 
taboos regarding what should be discussed, and how that discussion can progress. The culture 
also relates to the infrastructure, both in terms of hardware and apps, as well as meeting 
places and offline discussion. For example, Karagiannis (2009) who considered Hizballah 
(Party of God) to be a social movement with an armed wing, indicates that the members of 
this movement prefer mosques for face-to-face interaction when meeting potential 
participants. Mosques in this case are a part of Hizballah’s cultural space, and the members’ 
ideology and culture is strongly linked with this space, which may not be used for face-to-
face meetings by other movements with a different culture.    
Put simply, ‘communication cultures’ refers to the framework governing communication with 
others. It involves who talks to whom, what can be discussed, and how, in addition to what 
content can be produced. It also relates to activists’ attitudes to the consumption of other 
media. 
Organisations are formed socially from a web of ongoing discussions that sets the “reality” 
for those involved. It is then through these conversations that definitions, meanings and 
direction can be established? The production and consumption of media, group 
communications, along with the topics, frames and discourses, all merge to represent the 
communication culture of a movement (Mann 2015).  
Porta and Mattoni (2012) identify three dimensions in activists’ media practices, namely, 
collectiveness, openness and possession, demonstrating how these are used to help categorise 
cultures and participation therein. 
The first of these dimensions, degree of collectiveness, focuses on the creation of alternative 
media outlets and technological infrastructures, and activists are either involved in “the 
collective production of alternative media outlets” or “individual participation in the creation 




The second dimension, degree of openness, relates to in content creation, and (Della Porta & 
Mattoni, 2012) argue that in activists’ media practices “there are those alternative media 
outlets that are easily accessible and, as such, can be considered open to a variety of 
contributions. At the other of the axis, there are those alternative media outlets that tend to 
revolve around a small, closely knit group of activists” (Della Porta & Mattoni, 2012).  
The third axis, the degree of possession, covers the media or technological infrastructure, and 
they suggest that at one end of this dimension “there are individual activists or activist groups 
that use media outlets not situated in the social movement milieu” whilst at the other “there 
are individual activists and activist groups that decide to employ alternative media outlets and 
technological infrastructures that could be positioned within social movement milieu”.  
With regards to the strategic, organising and decision-making culture of participants in 
movements, Kavada argues that this is “underlined by specific ideations, values and beliefs”. 
Strategic culture “concerns the understandings that pervade the efforts of social movements 
to transform society” (Kavada 2013:79) and involves their view of social transformation, 
their type of politics, and their forms of mobilisation. Organising cultures refers to the 
“beliefs that drive social movements’ preferences for specific organising methods and 
structures” (Kavada 2013:79). This involves the degree of formality, degree of centralisation, 
degree of hierarchy, degree of professionalisation, and leadership and lines of control, which 
is similar to the dimensions outlined above.  
In this context, Hara and Shachaf's (2008) study of peace movement websites in two different 
countries found that culture is a major influencer on organisational strategy, specifically in 
regards to leadership. In one country the peace movements “used leaders with political or 
military credentials, which provided credibility for the organisation’s existence and its 
activities” (Hara & Shachaf 2008:60). In the other country, websites were used to forge 
leaderless resistance, which refers to a “technique for fighting an incumbent government 
using self-organising clandestine cells” (Garfinkel, 2003 cited in Hara & Shachaf 2008:60).  
 
3.5. State Responses to the Internet  
Despite all the research concerning the important role of the Internet in modern social life and 
in the ND context in particular, a number of researchers, including Morozov (2012; 2013), 
Bueno de Mesquita (2005) and Gladwell (2010), believe that the Internet’s potential and its 
role in political and social change has been over-exaggerated. Morozov argues in his book, 
The Net Delusion, that: 
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Much of the present excitement about the Internet, particularly the high hopes 
that are pinned on it in terms of opening up closed societies, stems from such 
selective and, at times, incorrect readings of history, rewritten to glorify the 
genius of Ronald Reagan and minimize the role of structural conditions and the 
inherent contradictions of the Soviet system, (2012: xii).  
Morozov categorises scholars as cyber-utopianists, Internet-centrists and cyber-realists and 
believes that the first two of these groups hold mistaken views about the potential of the 
Internet. He explains that:  
While cyber-utopianism stipulates what has to be done, Internet-centrism 
stipulates how it should be done. Internet-centrists like to answer every question 
about democratic change by first reframing it in terms of the Internet rather than 
the context in which that change is to occur, (2012: 214), 
 
According to Morozov, the reason for this lies in the fact that they are: 
Oblivious to the highly political nature of technology and like to come up with 
strategies that assume that the logic of the Internet which in most cases, they are 
the only ones to perceive, will shape every environment that it penetrates rather 
than vice-versa, (2012: xvi). 
 
Hence, Morozov suggests the ideal way to approach the Internet is as a ‘cyber-realist’, which 
means not searching for technological solutions to problems that are political in nature and 
not pretending that such solutions are even possible, (Morozov, 2012: 529-49).  
In essence, Morozov is criticising the philosophy of technological determinism (see Chapter 
Two), as well as underlining the importance of the systemic environment in shaping the use 
of technology. However, he states clearly that, “The Internet does matter, but we simply 
don’t know how it matters.” (2012:711), indicating that he has no clear answers concerning 
the exact nature of the Internet’s role in social and political change. Morozov is far from 
being alone in his scepticism. Rod and Weidmann (2015), for example, also have their 
concerns about the role of the Internet. Far from being uncontrollable, they argue that 
governments and companies still attempt to minimise any Internet democratising influences 
through a variety of means from technological to social controls. Similarly, Kalathil and Boas 
(2003:05), describe optimistic studies about the Internet’s role in democratisation as, 
“Impressionistic and anecdotal, falling prey to the pitfalls of the conventional wisdom.” They 
argue that the Internet often empowered regimes against citizens and armed such 
governments with a new tool to suppress citizens, who have little or no power to use this 
technology in their favour.  
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Generally, Gunitsky (2015:02), presents four mechanisms: counter-mobilisation; discourse 
framing; preference divulgence; elite co-ordination. These support the notion that the Internet 
is, in fact, a tool of regime entrenchment rather than democratisation. 
With respect to the first mechanism, Gunitsky (2015), argues that, despite the fact that social 
media in particular, is used to campaign against autocratic regimes, the regime’s own 
supporters use counter-campaigns to bolster their legitimacy, (2.5.6). The second mechanism, 
‘discourse framing’, involves using the Internet to frame nationalist discourse as would be the 
case with traditional media but doing this by using ordinary people who may benefit from the 
regime such as military, business elites and people motivated by patriotism. It is thus similar 
to propaganda in conventional media but takes on a more personalised form. The third 
mechanism is the ‘preference divulgence’ of public grievances. In autocratic regimes, the 
complaints and reports of local corruption made by people online via the Internet can act as a 
feedback tool for rulers, helping them in two ways. On the one hand, rulers can respond to 
some of these complaints to show that they are receptive to people’s concerns. At the same 
time, this helps rulers to gain more information about the effectiveness of local elites (the 
fourth mechanism). In a similar way,  the Internet expert who was based in Beijing clearly 
stated, “Since China never had mechanisms to accurately detect and reflect public opinion, 
blogs and BBS have become an effective route to form and communicate such public 
opinions of the society.” (Yong, 2005, cited in Qiang, 2011).  
In this context, (King et al., 2013), analysed nearly 1400 different social media services in 
China and found that the Chinese Government allowed  some kind of freedom of expression. 
For example, criticism of leaders, or of the state, is more likely not to be censored or removed. 
The research indicates that the censorship programme’s aim is to reduce the content that calls 
for collective action. Researchers stated, “Chinese people are individually free but 
collectively in chains.” (King et al., 2013). 
What should be noted here is that while the optimists’ view acknowledges the power of 
regimes over the Internet, the pessimists’ view seems to deny citizens the power to oppose 
regimes using the Internet. This way of assessing the role of the Internet in democratisation 
leads to an identical debate about the role of technology in social phenomena and about who 
has control, as discussed in Chapter Two. Moreover, it seems that this way of understanding 
the role of the Internet in democratisation is illogical for two reasons. First, it considers 
democracy as a homogenous bloc, meaning that it is viewed merely as having the right to 
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elect one’s government whilst, in reality, as later discussion will demonstrate, democracy is 
much more than this. Secondly, it equates democracy, which is a political process, with the 
Internet, which is technology. In other words, democracy is a complex, political process; it 
cannot be measured by specific outcomes such as the presence of a democratic ‘electoral 
system’ and it cannot happen overnight. 
The Internet serves as a battlefield between governments and citizens, regardless of their 
respective goals for using the Internet. There is no absolute victory. Clearly, the use of the 
Internet by citizens has turned this into an alternative public space and it can be to be more 
conducive to their needs than that of governments which are better served by the ‘offline’ 
public sphere.  
Eid (2008), emphasises that the meaning of ‘democratisation’ in the Arab world does not 
have the same meaning as in the West, since leadership exchanges between political parties, 
“Have not yet taken root anywhere in the Arab world.” (Eid 2008:47). He stressed that even 
though there is no fully democratic system amongst the Arab nations, a number of them have 
experienced a degree of political liberalism.   
Likewise, Howard (2011), agrees that authoritarian regimes may have some elements of 
democracy but may not be a ‘full democracy’. He states: 
Democratic outcomes can take several forms. If a country is somewhat 
authoritarian, it can experience a democratic transition where there are marked 
improvements in regime transparency over a relatively short period of time, 
(Howard, 2011:189).  
Importantly, citizens’ use of the Internet does not provide them with the absolute power to 
change the whole political system; however, by using it, they can improve some of its aspects 
which may lead to democratisation, such as providing an open space for discussion and 
encouraging online political participation. 
Both Howard and Eid agree that, even in those cases where there is no ‘full’ democracy, 
there is at least evidence of some steps being taken towards liberalisation and 
democratisation. This indicates that the Internet may not help people to enact a full 
democratic transition, but it may, at least, establish some elements within these authoritarian 
regimes. In short, the Internet’s role in democracy is not a zero-sum game but is a new 
battleground for democratic rights. 
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3.5.1. The dictator’s dilemma 
 As we have seen, whilst the Internet can threaten authoritarian regimes politically, in the 
international business world, technology is becoming indispensable for economic 
development. Consequently, some commentators have referred to the so-called Dictator’s 
Dilemma, (Kedzie 1997). This can be summarised as follows:   
The dictator may be stuck with a stark choice between securing the rewards of 
either the invisible hand or the iron fist, market success or social control. The 
mutual exclusivity of the options pivots on information and communication 
media. These guide the hand yet weaken the fist, (Kedzie, 1997:n.p).     
According to Kedzie, dictatorial regimes find themselves between a rock and a hard place: 
either they lose the opportunity for economic growth or they lose control over the public 
sphere. This mutual exclusivity leads to weakening the dictator’s control and operates in 
favour of citizens. However, Saleh (2012:482), argues that Kedzie has merely simplified 
the stance of authoritarian regimes, as regimes can both benefit from the Internet and be 
negatively affected by it simultaneously. Shirky (2011), prefers to use Briggs’ description 
of the ‘conservative dilemma’, since the Internet presents a problem, “Not only to 
autocrats but also to democratic governments and to religious and business leaders.” 
(Shirky, 2011:36).  
Similarly, Diamond emphasises that: 
Democrats and autocrats now compete to master these technologies [the Internet]. 
Ultimately, however, not just technology but political organization and strategy 
and deep-rooted normative, social, and economic forces will determine who 
‘wins’ the race, (2010:70).  
Nevertheless, the weakening of authoritarian regimes by the Internet is by no means 
inevitable. In Cuba, for example, Boas (2000), concluded that, despite the development of 
information and communication technologies, the Internet has not challenged the political 
system. The same was true in Singapore because the government had, “Staunched much 
of the Internet’s potential as a medium for political expression.” (Kalathil and Shanthi 
and Boas, 2003:97). Boas goes on to explain:  
The introduction of the Internet in any authoritarian country may present a new 
set of challenges to the regime, but its actual impact will be mediated by 
intervening social factors among them, the way that the government chooses to 
regulate the technology. Authoritarian regimes will base their approach to the 
Internet, and specific regulation strategy, on the combination of threats and 
benefits that they perceive from the medium, (Boas 2000:65).  
Boas’ argument, as mentioned above, seems to be still valid since these authoritarian 
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regimes have strategies to deal with the threat posed by the Internet through using 
tools such as counter-campaigns and online propaganda to minimise its impact.        
Yet, neither Morozov’s negative view, which underestimates the role of the Internet, 
nor those of others, which exaggerate the Internet’s positive impact on 
democratisation and challenging political systems, are fully accurate. As Boas 
observed, the Internet presents challenges for both ND and democratic regimes alike. 
Indeed, research indicates that almost all governments have introduced policies to 
confront various Internet threats in the form of terrorism, pornography, theft of 
intellectual property and the like.  
3.5.1.1. Surveillance and censorship 
 Globally, the dilemma posed by the Internet has produced a range of different strategies and 
policies. Some countries monitor and take online action, whilst others only censor the 
Internet, taking offline action when judged necessary. The following section will examine 
different types of practices and policies which have emerged to lessen the impact of the 
Dictator’s Dilemma. 
There are a growing number of organisations and research institutions which have developed 
more accurate methodologies for analysing Internet freedom and government practices to 
limit this. One of these is the ‘OpenNet Initiative’, whose aim is to, “Investigate, expose and 
analyse Internet filtering and surveillance practices in a credible and non-partisan fashion.” 
(OpenNet, n.d). Two other organisations: ‘Freedom House’ (Freedom on the Net) and 
‘Reporters without Borders’ (Enemies of the Internet), also publish reports using their own 
methodologies to measure and study freedom of expression on the Internet and government 
responses to citizen practices. Such reports and methodologies provide more nuanced ways of 
looking at Internet analysis than the traditional soft and hard approach.  
The OpenNet Initiative appears to have the most clearly explained methodology for 
measuring and identifying government methods to tackle Internet threats. It identifies four 
forms of Internet censorship: technical blocking, search result removals, take-down and 
induced self-censorship. The methodology which it uses is helpful in gaining a nuanced 
understanding of the differences between censorship and surveillance practices in democratic 
countries. Tables 3.1 and 3.2, produced by OpenNet, show the filtering profiles for one ND 




Table 1: Internet Censorship by the Iranian Authorities 
 
Note. Retrieved from: OpenNet, 2009 
 
 
























Table 3: Internet Censorship Measurement according to OpenNet 
Filtering type Definition  
Selective filtering: Narrowly targeted filtering that 
blocks a small number of specific 
sites across a few categories or 
filtering that targets a single category 
or issue 
Pervasive filtering Filtering that is characterized by both 
its depth — a blocking regime that 
blocks a large portion of the targeted 
content in a given category — and its 
breadth — a blocking regime that 
includes filtering in several categories 
in a given theme 
Substantial filtering Narrowly targeted filtering that 
blocks a small number of specific 
sites across a few categories or 
filtering that targets a single category 
or issue 
Suspected filtering Connectivity abnormalities are 
present that suggest the presence of 
filtering, although diagnostic work 
was unable to confirm conclusively 
that inaccessible Web sites are the 
result of deliberate tampering. 
 
Note. Retrieved from: OpenNet, 2010 
 
Examples from two different countries, Jordan and China, will serve to clarify the difference 
between selective and pervasive filtering. The former country employs selective filtering of 
political content on the Internet, meaning that the only political website that Jordan blocks is 
arabtimes.com because this is judged unacceptable on the grounds that it criticizes Arab 
leaders (opennet). Thus, Jordan does not block all political websites or all political websites 
targetting audiences in the Arab world. China, on the other hand, employs pervasive filtering 
which entails targets as many political websites as possible across a wide range of categories 
including "foreign and international" news websites (opennet). Moreover, according to 
Opennet, China censors content considered to include "sensitive keywords", enabling it to 
conduct filtering in both depth and breadth (Opennet). In other words, it tries to censor all 
political content regardless of the source if the content is not judged to match the Chinese 
government's ideology. These examples from Jordan and China illustrate how selective and 





Iran practises pervasive filtering on all issues, apart from conflict and security issues; in these 
cases, substantial filtering was noted. In the case of Italy, there is no evidence that the 
government filters any areas other than selective filtering of socially related issues such as 
gambling sites. ‘No evidence of filtering’ means that the government may filter but there is 
no firm evidence of this so far.  
3.5.1.2. Technical blocking 
 This form of blocking is the most common type of censorship, involving IP blocking, DNS 
tampering and URL blocking, using a proxy, and blocking specific keywords. This type of 
censorship has, over time, become less effective, due to the high cost of the blocking services, 
(Oh and Aukerman, 2013). It could be argued that cost might not be an issue when it comes 
to blocking but that technical blocking has become less effective. This may be because there 
are alternatives which can be used by activists and users to bypass the blocking, such as 
Virtual Private Networks (VPN), (Odagiri et al., 2014). China is one of the main countries 
which regularly blocks keywords. For example, every year on June 4th, the anniversary of the 
Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, the Chinese authorities block words related to this event 
such as ‘June 4th’, ‘Wang Weilin’, and ‘martial law’, (Ng, 2014). However, Internet users can 
also avoid words being blocked when searching or discussing issues by crafting alternative 
words to replace those which are likely to be blocked and censored, (Boelinger, 2010). 
Search Result Removals and Take-down. In some countries, Internet companies such as 
Google co-operate with state authorities to remove certain search engine results. Google 
explains its position thus: 
We regularly receive requests from courts and government agencies around the 
world to remove information from Google products. Sometimes we receive court 
orders that don’t compel Google to take any action. Instead, they are submitted by 
an individual as support for a removal request. We closely review these requests 
to determine if content should be removed because it violates a law or our 
product policies, (Google n.d.).  
Between 2009 and 2013, Google received 3015 requests from different countries to 
remove information but claimed that not all these were accepted or compatible with its 
guidelines. In its Transparency Report, Google gave some examples of requests which 
were accepted and those which were not, (Google n.d.). It could be argued that Google 
has its own opinion of what constitutes freedom of expression which is not related to the 
nature of the political system operating in a particular country. For example, when a 
government contacts Google requesting the removal of content for whatever reason, it 
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might choose not to comply with this request as it has its own definitions regarding what 
it considers to be legally acceptable. 
The following table of companies is transparent (Table 4) concerning government 
requests for data removal disclosing those which have been received on a regular basis, 
(Google n.d.). These reports indicate that governments have varied motives for requesting 
data removal. 
 
Table 4: Companies that offer transparent reports about governments’ 
requests 
Pinterest Cheezburger Comcast 
Korea the Internet Transparency Report Cloudflare  Aol 
Wickr Cyberghost Telstra 
Wikimedia Foundation Daum Kakao Tumblr 
Wordpress Kickstarter Dropbox 
Leaseweb Rogers At&T 
Linkedin Snapchat Apple 
Lookout Sonic.Net Twitter 
Microsoft Spideroak Sasktel  
Credo Mobile Teksavvy Verizon 
Vodafone Teliasonera Telus 
Time Warner Cable Yahoo! Facebook 
University Of California, Berkeley Deutsche 
Telekom 
 
Note. Retrieved from: Google n.d  
This list includes the most popular content websites which regularly receive requests from 
various governments asking for the removal of content which they deem to be harmful or a 
threat to national security.   
In addition, governments do ask hosts1 to disable websites that they believe should be 
removed. This could be the result of a court order or for national security purposes, for 
                                                
1 A host is a computer with a Web server that serves the pages for one or more Web sites. A host can 
also be the company that provides that service, which is known as hosting, (Search Networking). 
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example, if a website publishes content that the government considers to pose a threat of 
some kind. This means that both large corporations and small hosting companies, like those 
on the list above, can be asked to remove content.    
 
3.5.1.3. Self-censorship 
 Self-censorship1 is a fundamental aspect of the forms of Internet censorship in ND countries, 
although it is worth remembering that it is not a new practice. It has long been employed, 
especially by journalists and media organizations. Journalists in ND countries understand 
what can be published and what cannot and are aware of the consequences of misjudging this. 
Self-censorship can be the result of social pressure or pressure from political or religious 
authorities, (Hayes et al., 2006; Aceto and Pescapé, 2015). Governments can employ various 
means of encouraging self-censorship on the Internet. They can create legal grey areas, 
meaning that individuals must attempt to negotiate a fine line between what is 
acceptable/permitted and what is not. They can also arrest citizens for online participation if 
they wish to send a clear message to cyber-dissidents that government surveillance exists 
online, even if in reality, it is unlikely that everyone is under surveillance.  
Consequently, this means individuals often impose a form of self-censorship when they go 
online, (George, 1998; Rod and Weidmann, 2015; Ghobadi and Clegg, 2015). One likely 
outcome of this is to limit the freedom of expression provided by the Internet environment, 
thus making it more similar to the controlled, traditional media in ND countries. This practice 
therefore, can be viewed as the principal threat to the Internet’s democratising role, and 
specifically to the creation of the virtual public sphere, (Rahimi, 2003).  
It has been argued that online anonymity could be used to protect freedom of expression and 
prevent citizens from self-censorship, (Postmes and Brunsting, 2002; Clark and Themudo, 
2006) but, as Morozov (2012) argued, governments can still track and arrest people. 
Furthermore, some countries, notably China and South Korea, have introduced a so-called 
‘real name policy’, which requires people to register on social media with their real names 
(Kern and Nam, 2009). Fu et al., (2013), examined the influence of this policy on posts by 
Chinese users, comparing the nature of their posts before and after the policy. They found 
                                                
1 Self-censorship is best described as a form of censorship practised in person, “In order to avoid trouble or 
sanctions from state officials, striking controversy, offending an audience, initiating lawsuits or other 
problematic consequences.” (Oran's Dictionary of Law). 
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that this policy reduced users’ online activities, as well as causing them to refrain from 
writing about politically sensitive issues. Similarly, in South Korea, Cho et al. (2012), found 
that the policy reduced online posts in the short term, as well as making users more cautious 
in their behaviour.  
 
3.5.1.4. Beyond Censorship and Surveillance 
 Censorship and surveillance by regimes aim to prevent Internet use which challenges or 
poses a threat to government agendas, be they political or social. However, censorship and 
surveillance may not be sufficient to achieve this. For example, Internet users may not need 
to employ self-censorship if they can simply use alternative identities. As noted above, 
various tools can be used to prevent website blocking. Research suggests that recently, 
governments have started to use different methods to patrol Internet usage by citizens and 
activists groups, (Ng, 2013; Elliott, 2014).  
Regimes are now using Internet applications to track government opposition or activists by 
using the same applications as they themselves use and collecting data about them. Social 
media, such as Facebook and Twitter, consistently release news about governments asking 
Twitter for users’ private information, (BBC, 2015), whilst the US government is one of 
several which monitors those who appear to be using applications which guarantee 
anonymity, (Thomson 2014). 
In addition, governments are now launching what could be called counter-campaigns using 
social media in order to engage individuals in the same way that cyber-activists do. These 
counter-campaigns take many forms, use different tactics and have been undertaken by 
governments in countries including China (Ng, 2013), Russia (Elliott, 2014) and the United 
Kingdom (Greenwald, 2014). Verkamp and Gupta (2013), describe how state counter-
campaigns can spam a popular Twitter hashtag, or other social media, which is being used by 
citizens against the regime, thus drowning voices of protest. For example, different user 
names can be employed to bombard the hashtag with other content intensively so people can 
barely read the original content posted by citizens. Verkamp and Gupta’s study shows this 
practice is commonly used by Syrian, Russian and Mexican regimes. Other researchers have 
referred to the Wu Mao Dang, or ‘50 Cent Party’ in China, the name given to Internet users 
who are supposedly paid by the Chinese regime for each Internet post which is presented 
online as being from an ordinary individual supporting the regime’s views, (Deibert and 
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Rohozinski, 2010; Feng and Guo, 2013).  
Other countries, most frequently Russia, Syria and North Korea, use hackers to gain access to 
opposition websites and user accounts on social media. For example, a group known as the 
‘Iranian Cyber Army’ hacked the Twitter accounts of the political opposition in 2009 as well 
as taking down some websites and posting messages on these hacked websites, (Deibert and 
Rohozinski, 2010; Giles and Marks, 2012; Hesseldahl, 2015). 
In some countries, the authorities try to decrease network performance in order to make it 
harder for people to log in, thus lowering the possibility of reading unwanted material or 
participating in activism. For instance, in preparation for the presidential election in Iran in 
2013, the government started gradually reducing the Internet speed to stop the flow of 
information on the Internet, (Iran Daily Brief, 2013).   
Overall, censorship and monitoring are not the only tools that governments can use to reduce 
Internet threats to their political systems. Internet control by regimes can involve physical 
action such as arresting individuals, blocking websites or making online access more difficult 
or it can take more proactive forms such as counter-campaigning and propaganda. These 
methods will no doubt change over time as individuals develop new forms of online activity 
and the Internet itself evolves.      
 
3.6. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to assess the uses of the Internet for political purposes in the 
democratisation process, examining how it can be used to create an alternative public sphere 
for citizens in ND countries. It considered, in particular, the extent to which the Internet acts 
as a force for democratisation, by helping citizens in general, and activists in particular, to 
express their views relatively openly in this virtual public sphere. This chapter has 
highlighted the importance of the Internet as one of the best tools for facilitating political and 
social change, despite the best attempts by regimes to impose censorship on citizens and 
place restrictions on its accessibility.  
However, like any other space or medium used for activism, the Internet has its own 
disadvantages. Governments may exercise a degree of control over it, but it is certainly not 
completely under their control. Larry Diamond concludes that: 
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In the end, technology is merely a tool, open to both noble and nefarious purposes. 
Just as radio and TV could be vehicles of information pluralism and rational 
debate, so they could also be commandeered by totalitarian regimes for fanatical 
mobilization and total state control […] Yet to the extent that innovative citizens 
can improve and better use these tools, they can bring authoritarianism down — 
as in several cases they have, (2010:71). 
It is clear that, despite the obstacles that regimes put in place to limit the possibilities offered 
by the Internet, it still presents great opportunities for activists in ND settings to campaign 
and gain their rights. 
Previous research has underlined that studying the context is vital in terms of addressing the 
role of technology. It also shows that technology is part of social phenomena and is not an 
exogenous agent as technological determinists have claimed. This means that it is important 
to focus on the socio-political context of the country where the cyberactivism is based, even 
if this takes place virtually, as this may present different threats and opportunities. Activists 
themselves remain part of this socio-political context and they must still operate within this 
system, even if their ultimate aim is to destroy it. Thus, the following chapter will focus on 
the socio-political system of Saudi Arabia, since any action which activists take there will be 




4. CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Previous chapters of this thesis addressed the research questions, objectives, and the 
theoretical framework for this study, as well as reviewing the existing literature on the role of 
the Internet in activism in general and in ND countries in particular. The aim of this chapter, 
however, is to shed light on three key issues. Firstly, it presents the research philosophy, 
research strategy and research rationale which form the basis for the case study research to 
follow. Secondly, it details the research methodology which was used for this study, 
including the data collection instruments, the sampling methods, interview procedure, social 
network analysis and the measures taken to ensure credibility of this study. Thirdly, it 
considers the research limitations imposed, and problems created, by working in a ND 
context. Addressing these three issues will establish the methodological framework which 
underpins this study. 
 
4.2. Research Philosophy 
 
In broad terms, it is possible to speak of two major Western philosophies which have 
informed approaches to the research. Traditionally, there has been a split between the Natural 
and the Social Sciences in terms of research paradigms. Researchers may choose to adopt a 
positivist or interpretivist perspective when conducting research but this decision is based on 
their philosophy regarding the acquisition of knowledge itself. Thus, these ‘basic beliefs’ 
need to be considered before conducting research (Guba & Lincoln, 1994).  
Positivism can be defined as, “A philosophy of science that rejects metaphysical speculation 
in favour of systematic observation using the human senses.” (Blaikie, 2004:837). It could 
also be defined as, “A doctrine that maintains that the study of the human or social world 
should be organised according to the same principles as the study of the physical or natural 
world.” (Ritzer, 2004:571).  
Positivists believe that knowledge is based on observation and that a distinction must be 
made between values and facts. They argue that values should be excluded when studying 
and inquiring objectively and that hypotheses derived from scientific theories must be 
tested empirically (Stace, 1944). Positivists also distinguish between theory and 
observation, in that theory is based on the researcher’s imagination, while hypotheses are 
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derived from theory and tested by means of observation (Ivory, 2006). Moreover, 
positivists argue that knowledge develops, “Inductively through generalising from the 
accumulation of verified facts.” (Ivory, 2006:781), and that the research methods of the 
Natural Sciences can be utilised to study the Social Sciences because both of them share 
the same goal. Positivism believes that, “The higher the level to which a theory can be 
abstracted, the better it is.” (Ivory, 2006:781).  
In contrast, interpretivists believe that the, “Subject matter of the Social Sciences—people 
and their institutions—is fundamentally different from that of the Natural Sciences.” and that 
consequently, “The study of the social world […] requires a different logic of research 
procedure.” (Bryman & Bell, 2007:17). Interpretivists, “Assume that people create and 
associate their own subjective and intersubjective meanings as they interact with the world 
around them.” and thus researchers who take an interpretivist approach, “Attempt to 
understand phenomena through accessing the meanings participants assign to them.” 
(Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991:05). Interpretivism can be defined as a way of studying society 
that is different from the way of studying natural phenomena and which seeks to understand 
social phenomena. It can also be used to study immeasurable disciplines, such as metaphysics, 
since it considers that personal experience is also a way of knowing which can be described 
as subjective. It rejects the idea that there is more than one single external reality, positing 
instead that reality is relative and multiple. For this reason, it has been argued that the 
findings from interpretivist studies cannot be generalised because human experiences are 
different (Carson et al., 2001). 
Generally, interpretivism focuses on contextualised meaning and believes that, “Reality is 
socially constructed, filled with multiple meanings and interpretations, and that emotions are 
involved.” (Mathison, 2004:210). Therefore, interpretivists view the goal of theorising as, 
“Providing an understanding of direct lived experience instead of abstract generalisations.” 
(Mathison, 2004:210). 
This study seeks to understand cyberactivism phenomena, primarily from the personal 
perspective of the activists who are involved in this, aiming to identify how the Internet is 
used in activism, tracing the uses and implications of cyberactivism, as well as exploring the 
particular obstacles which cyberactivists face. Thus, a positivist approach has not been 
adopted for this research since it is judged that this would limit the researcher’s ability to 
fully understand the range of social phenomena and related issues which this involves.  
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An interpretivist philosophy is the most suitable approach to adopt in cyberactivism research 
since, in its broadest sense, cyberactivism is concerned with how people interact with other 
human beings and with technology. Interpretivism, “Suggests a way of knowing that springs 
from personal experience and maintains a relatively narrow, locally situated focus.” 
(Bursztyn, 2006:382). Studying cyberactivism in Saudi Arabia involves analysing various 
kinds of personal experiences of social activists interacting with technology and people. This 
Saudi-based experience may differ from the experience of cyberactivism elsewhere, since it 
is influenced by different contextual factors and variables, such as the political system, 
legislation, cultural traditions, as well as the technological environment.     
The methodology adopted is ultimately related to the ontological approach of the chosen 
research paradigm. Ontology has been defined as a, “Branch of metaphysics that considers 
the nature of being, the philosophical investigation of being.” (Littlejohn & Foess, 2009:695). 
In other words, it is the, “Science of what is, of the kinds and structures of objects, properties, 
events, processes and relations in every area of reality.” (Smith, 2003:155). Different 
ontologies produce various views on human nature, such as realism, nominalism and social 
constructionism which posit that reality is constructed and created by individuals and groups. 
Social Constructivist believe that humans develop their own ways of perceiving reality and 
that this does not emerge from nature; consequently, they believe that it is not possible to 
speak of one single global reality. This also means that reality can differ from one society to 
another and, hence, that what may hold true in one society may not be the case elsewhere. 
Thus, Constructivist argue that any social research should study how people create their own 
reality by interacting with their environment and with other individuals. This reality may 
change as a result of shifts in belief or understanding due to interaction amongst individuals 
or between individuals and their environment (Recker, 2005). Interpretivism is usually 
associated with constructionism since both approaches believe that there are multiple realities 
and that reality is socially constructed.  
It is argued in this thesis that studying activists as objects to which is it possible to apply a 
universal law, will not help understand their motives for using the Internet to deliver their 
messages and achieve their goals. When studying social activists, therefore, it is important to 
understand the obstacles that they face as well as the effect of other communities on their 
activities, strategies and goals. Thus, the interaction between the researcher and the research 




4.3. Research Strategy: A Case Study Approach 
It is important to emphasise that the case study is not the method; it is just the object of study 
(Stake, 1995). A case study can be defined in various ways, however. It can be defined as, 
“An empirical study that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and with its real-
life context.” (Yin, 2013:18). Bromley (1990), defined the case study as, “A systematic 
inquiry into an event or a set of related events which aims to describe and explain the 
phenomenon of interest.” (Bromley, 1990:302). A case study is thus a unit of investigation. 
This could be a group, country, community, etc., and the aim is to understand a real life 
phenomenon. Scholars note that there is no minimum or maximum limit for a case study 
(Henn et al., 2010). When using a case study for research, there are a number of methods 
which can be used to collect data including observation, interviews, and/or document review 
(David & Sutton, 2004; Yin, 2013). 
The case study has been chosen for this research because it, “Comprises an all-encompassing 
method—covering the logic of design, data collection techniques, and specific approaches to 
data analysis.” (Yin, 2013:16). It can help to provide in-depth understanding of complex 
social phenomenon by using the rich data gathered from the case (Flyvbjerg, 2004).  
 
4.4. Case Study Selection  
As explained in Chapter Six, there are many online campaigns in Saudi Arabia, and it would 
clearly be impossible to study all of these, so the decision was made to focus on social 
campaigns. Scholars, such as Darke et al. (1998) and Seawright and Gerring (2008), have 
acknowledged the difficulty of choosing a case study as a sample;  Yin (2013) argues it is 
important that selected cases reflect characteristics and problems identified in the underlying 
theoretical propositions or conceptual framework. Two campaigns were therefore chosen as 
case studies for this thesis. One is the Women Driving Campaign (October 26th), which 
focuses on getting the current ban on women driving in Saudi Arabia lifted. This campaign 
has its roots in 1990 and is dominated by female activists. The other is the teachers’ rights 
campaign, which have four main demands (detailed in Chapter Eight). This campaign was 
started on the Internet in 2007 and run by predominately male activists.   
There were three main reasons for choosing these specific campaigns. Firstly, it was possible 
to gain access to the activists involved in both these campaigns. Not all online campaigns 
could be accessed by the researcher, as there are no links leading to them, and campaigners 
do not respond to formal correspondence. Even if campaigns are based online and are visible 
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there, it is often not possible to contact them via the Internet, as will be discussed in section 
4.11.   
Secondly, there was a level of personal risk involved in contacting campaigns. For example, 
there are some online campaigns that deal with security issues, such as those dealing with 
prisoners who have been accused of terrorism but have not been tried (see Chapter Six). It 
was judged unsafe for the researcher to try to contact these. It is also impossible to reach 
them without personal contacts as they use the Internet anonymously such as the e3teqal 
(Arresting) campaign (Matthiesen, 2013; Alahmed, 2014; Lacroix, 2014). Contact with 
campaigns of this kind would be unsafe since the researcher would face questions from Saudi 
authorities if any of the interviewees had been arrested or questioned.   
Thirdly, the choice was also determined by the characteristics of the campaign. The women 
driving campaign, has its origins in ‘offline’ activism and it also has international dimensions, 
engaging with a number of international media and human rights’ organisations. The teachers’ 
campaign is recognised as being one of the first online campaigns in the Kingdom, and a 
number of other online campaigns had been inspired by their activities. The campaign also 
engages with large numbers of Saudi teachers, with forum statistics revealing that more than 
half of those in the teaching profession were registered in one of the teachers’ forums. The 
teachers’ campaign has also been involved in taking legal action against the Ministry of 
Education in the Saudi Administrative Court. 
Both the women driving campaigns and the teachers’ campaigns fit within the theoretical 
framework adopted for this research. Both can be considered to be large-scale campaigns in 
terms of the number of people who are actively involved in them and follow them. Moreover, 
the Internet has been used by both these campaigns which have also organised actions. 
Finally, organisationally these exist on different levels, and their messages are distributed 
online.  
 
4.5. Research Reasoning  
The research reasoning can be defined as, “[A] method of coming to conclusions by the use 
of logical argument.”(Walliman, 2005:09). Broadly, there are two logics that can be used to 
reach a conclusion when conducting research: deductive and inductive. Each has different 
aims when dealing with research data. Deductive research aims to test an existing theory or 
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model by using new data. Conversely, inductive research aims to generate a theoretical 
concept and model by observing the newly collected data (Bhattacherjee, 2012). The data in 
the inductive approach generates a concept, while it is testing a concept in the deductive 
approach.  
The inductive perspective is the most appropriate logic when taking an interpretivist 
approach to studying a social phenomenon. As Thomas (2006:238), notes:  
[The] primary purpose of the inductive approach is to allow research findings to 
emerge from the frequent, dominant, or significant themes inherent in raw data, 
without the restraints imposed by structured methodologies.  
It is clear that the inductive approach gives the researcher flexibility when dealing with data 
and develops better understanding of the phenomenon studied as there are no predominant 
assumptions, and the observation leads to theory building. 
4.6. Research Methodology 
It is, of course, imperative for researchers to select the most suitable research approach in 
order to fully understand the phenomena being investigated and choose an appropriate means 
of gathering the data required. Two factors influence the choice of the research approach; 
firstly, the philosophical and ontological approach adopted by the research and, secondly, 
existing studies in the same field.   
Concerning the first factor, a constructivist interpretivist approach to studying social 
phenomena implies the use of a qualitative methodology as the most appropriate means of 
accomplishing the research goals. It has been argued that bias or subjectivity may occur due 
to the nature of qualitative research and there is no such thing as a fixed research procedure 
and analysis that can be followed (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Wimmer &Dominick, 2006).  
Concerning the second factor, previous studies in the same field can offer the researcher new 
insights into research methodologies which can be used to better understand the phenomenon 
under investigation. However, researchers need to evaluate the usefulness and 
appropriateness of a methodology which has been previously used by evaluating the findings 
of the study and assessing whether these succeeded in fully addressing the research questions. 
Consequently, researchers can avoid using methodologies that failed to achieve the research 
goals in similar studies.  
Previous studies on cyberactivism have nearly all tended to utilise qualitative approaches 
including Atkinson and Dougherty (2006); Reber and Kim (2006); Gillan and Pickerill 
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(2008); Tufekci and Wilson (2012); and Micó and Casero-Ripollés (2013). Others, such as 
Ošljak (2014) and Karlsson et al. (2015), used a mixed method approach. The nature of the 
qualitative approach, which seeks, “Answers to questions by examining various social 
settings and the individuals who inhabit these settings.” (Berg, 2004:08), may make this the 
most suitable approach for studying cyberactivism in general and for examining the ways in 
which activists use technology to achieve their goals and connect with others via the Internet 
in particular.   
4.6.1. Qualitative approach  
 It is difficult to find a comprehensive or commonly accepted definition of this approach both 
because it is a broad concept and because attempting to impose a narrow definition on this 
approach may limit it as a technique (Berg, 2004). This being the case, researchers have tried 
to define this approach from different perspectives. Denzin and Lincoln (2005), suggested 
that qualitative research is, “Multi method in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic 
approach to its subject matter.” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005:2).   
Qualitative methodology is well suited to studying cyberactivism phenomena since it allows 
researchers to study these in their natural settings (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Johnson also 
notes that qualitative research, “Probes for deeper understanding rather than examining 
surface features.” (1995:4). Moreover, as stated previously, multiple realities, “Are socially 
constructed by human beings in their expressive and interpretive practices.” (Lindlof & 
Taylor, 2010:11). Thus, it is appropriate to use a qualitative approach in order to explore 
realities among cyberactivists regarding social phenomena in Saudi society and to learn more 
about the ‘social realities’ of those engaged in cyberactivism.  
Beside the qualitative approach, this research also adopting Social Network Analysis (SNA) 
method which is often perceived as a quantitative method due to its formalized approach and 
extensive use of statistical analysis. Nevertheless, SNA incorporates a qualitative aspect as 
well (Borgatti et al. 2013; Crossley et al. 2015). First of all, a very common framework 
employed in SNA is the case study with researchers selecting a community, an organisation, 
or a social group to study and analyse the patterns of the connectivity there. Second, the data 
for the SNA are quite often collected from observations, in-depth interviews, diaries, and 
other qualitative data collection methods. Third, the very nature of the analysis allows 
researchers to see the qualitative nature of the interactions between actors (strong or weak 
ties, multiple links, friends or foes).  
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This thesis employs SNA to inform the qualitative case studies looking at Twitter and online 
forum communication. A quantitative analysis of the frequency of interactions between 
online users allows conclusions to be drawn about the nature of such communication.  
The quantitative SNA in this research inform the other data that been collected qualitatively. 
Chapters 7 and 8 will show that SNA is a useful means of gaining the bigger picture of both 
campaigns. SNA will be used to help identify the actors in the campaigns and these can then 
be analysed as texts, images, or videos to understand the content and the context of the data 
circulated online and its sequences, and will be combined with interview data that been 
collected by the researcher.  
 
4.7. Research Methods  
The aim, when selecting research methods, is to choose those which are the most suitable 
means of collecting data to help answer the research questions and achieve research goals 
(Clarke & Dawson, 1999). However, a number of factors affect the choice of data collection 
methods, such as the research philosophy, research resources (including time, money and 
technology needed) and the needs of the research itself (Bell, 2005). Looking at these factors, 
two main data collection methods have been adopted to carry out this research: semi-
structured interviews and social network analysis (SNA). The following two sections will 
address both the tools and the sampling methods in detail.       
4.7.1. Interviews 
 An interview can be simply defined as a, “Conversation with a purpose.” (Berg, 2004:101). 
It is one of the commonest and most powerful tools used to understand social phenomena, 
particularly in the cyberactivism field. Many scholars have used interviews to conduct 
research on cyberactivism including Dimond and Dye (2013); Micó and Casero-Ripollés 
(2013); Aouragh & Alexander (2011) and Garcia and Trere (2014). Interviews can help to, 
“Elicit depth of information from relatively few people.” (Guion et al., 2011). In 
cyberactivism research, where most action takes place online, the main actors are the activists 
themselves, who are using the Internet as a technology to achieve their goals. So interviewing 
those activists can prove helpful in understanding the viewpoint of the participants, and 
getting them to explain how they perceive the Internet uses of activism in Saudi Arabia, 
where freedom of speech is limited. Focusing on the online activities, rather than the creators 
of these activities may not help us to understand activism in the Saudi context, due to a 
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number of factors as discussed in Chapters Five and Six, including self-censorship, 
monitoring and blocking. The online space by itself may not reflect the actual use of the 
Internet by Saudi activists. Thus, interviews with activists could be seen as the most suitable 
tool in this field.  
Three fundamental types of qualitative interviews are generally pursued in research: (1) 
formal/structured; (2) Unstructured/informal/non-directive; (3) semi-standardised/ semi-
structured (Gilbert 2001; Berg 2004). The first of these, structured interviews, are usually 
considered to be a quick and easy means of clarifying information, or obtaining very specific 
information. This sort of interview is not always helpful for gaining an in-depth 
understanding, as it gives limited participant responses (Gill et al., 2008). Conversely, an 
unstructured interview is an open interview without any predetermined questions or answers 
(Minichiello, 1991). This type of interview is arguably not the most efficient way of 
researching specific questions, since interviews may produce a large quantity of data without 
answering the research questions.  
The third basic type of research interview is the semi-structured interview that has features of 
both structured and unstructured interviews. It has, “Some degree of predetermined order but 
still ensures flexibility in the way issues are addressed by the informant.” (Dunn, 2010:80). 
This thesis uses semi-structured, in-depth interviews to collect data in order to allow the 
researcher to cover the important areas by controlling the interview while providing 
interviewees with opportunities to express themselves and suggest some ideas and thoughts 
from their own perspectives (Desai & Potter, 2006; Willis, 2004). Moreover, the in-depth 
interview allows the researcher, “To grasp and articulate the multiple views of, perspectives 
on, and meanings of some activity, event, place, or cultural object.” (Johnson, 2012:106). 
After carefully considering the research questions and aims, as well as the literature, a written 
interview guide (see Appendices B) was prepared to ensure that the maximum information 
was gained from the interviewees (Given, 2008; Wengraf, 2001). Moreover, a pilot interview 
was conducted to ensure that the interview guide would be helpful in future interviews. 
Some 16 cyberactivists were interviewed independently in recorded face-to-face interviews, 
and a further three were interviewed over the phone without being recorded as they requested. 
Interviews were conducted in five different cities in Saudi Arabia namely, Riyadh, Jeddah, 
Makkah, Buridyah and Alahssa. The sampling procedures and related ethical issues are 
discussed in the following sections. The duration of the interviews ranged from 35 minutes to 
three and half hours. A total of 19 hours and 9 minutes of semi-structured interviews were 
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recorded with activists.  
In addition to these case study interviews, two interviews, one by e-mail and the other by 
phone, were conducted with journalists from traditional international media to clarify some 
points relating to the October 26th campaign. Also, one interview was conducted with an 
activist from the Man Divan campaign as a pilot study. This activist’s answers were linked 
with the teachers’ campaign (Chapter Eight). The Man Divan campaign ‘copycatted’ the 
teachers’ campaign, and one of the teachers worked closely with it. A further two interviews 
were held with businessmen involved in audiocassette distribution and production in Saudi 
Arabia to find out further information about the tools used by Saudi activists prior to the 
arrival of the Internet. In total, therefore, some 24 interviews were conducted for the purposes 
of this study. 
Even so, scholars have raised a number of issues about the use of interviews in qualitative 
methodology. (Gomm 2008; Patton 2001) argue that in some types of interviews, particularly 
in the ‘interview guide approach’ some important issues might be accidentally forgotten, and 
rewording questions might cause interviewees to provide different responses, thus reducing 
the comparability of responses. To solve the problem (Gomm 2008:161) suggests that the 
interviewer should “frame questions in terms which are likely to be understood by 
respondents”.  
Interviewers can also affect the results of interviews as well. Gomm, 2008 and Denscombe, 
2007 claim that interviewer characteristics such as gender, age, and accent can influence 
interviewee responses. To address this aspect, Denscombe, 2007 suggests that interviewers 
should not become a hostile or upset interviewees, and stay neutral and non-committal on any 
claims they make. It could be argued that interviews could also be affected by the so-called 
‘Hawthorne effect’ meaning that people may behave differently if they know that they are 
participating in an experiment or are being observed (Gomm 2008; Denscombe 2007). This 
effect can occur when interviewees are enthusiastic or want a specific outcome (Gomm 2008). 
However, this effect is not limited to interviews alone, but it can occur in focus groups, 





4.7.1.1. Interview sample 
 Sampling refers to the, “Selection of a sub-set of a population for inclusion in a study.” 
(Daniel, 2011:01). Clearly, studying the entire research population of Saudi cyberactivists is 
impossible for several reasons. For example, not all activists wish to be interviewed, mainly 
due to issues of trust (see section 4.11). Thus, the researcher needs to choose a sample which 
is representative of the larger research population. However, the type of sampling used in 
qualitative research differs from that used in quantitative research since, “In qualitative 
methods, sample units are deliberately selected to reflect particular features of groups within 
the sample population.” (Ritchie et al., 2003:81). Moreover, the sample does not need to be 
statistically representative. Given that this research is using qualitative methods as part of the 
interpretative constructionist approach, the aim of this research is not to produce 
generalisable results but to understand the social phenomenon of Saudi cyberactivism in 
depth. Marshall (1996), has emphasised that the aim of the qualitative approach is to improve 
the understanding of complex human issues rather than to generalise the results.  
The research population was limited to Saudi cyberactivists who are involved in social 
campaigns. The term ‘social campaign’ was defined in Chapter One as, “A campaign that 
aims to demand rights that are considered necessary for full participation in the life of 
society.”  
Snowball sampling was used to gain access to the interviewees, due to the sensitivity of the 
subject of activism in Saudi Arabia. This sampling method, “Consists of identifying 
respondents who are then used to refer other respondents to researchers.” (Atkinson & Flint, 
2001). Snowball sampling was also a useful means of countering researcher subjectivity 
when choosing participants, since suggestions for interviewees come from participants 
themselves. However, the first link in both campaigns was established through friends in 
common, after several months of searching. The researcher had to find links with activists 
through friends and colleagues, a time-consuming process.       
Whilst the interview numbers in this study are not necessarily large, they encompass virtually 
all the core activists in both campaigns. In the women’s driving campaigns the core activists 
are those who are members of the campaign’s WhatsAapp main group which included some 
45 activists, both male and female. In the teachers’ campaign, the core activists are those who 
have a designated role, for example, member of the Supervisory Committee as indicated in 
chapter Eight. The two journalists interviewed include one from an international news agency 
covering Gulf news and the second from an international news organisation based in the UK. 
Both have covered the women driving campaign on more than one occasion. Similarly, the 
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two businessmen in the audiotape industry are well known entrepreneurs, one of them being 
amongst the first to establish such a business in Saudi Arabia.            
 
4.7.1.2.  Interviews transcribing and translation 
As noted earlier in section 4.7.1, most of the interviews were recorded. After recording the 
interviews, all audio files were coded to replace interviewees’ names and ensure anonymity. 
In this context date of interviews did not reported because of the confidentiality agreement 
with all of the interviewee. Moreover, for the British journalist and others, there was an 
implicit agreement, where the researcher guaranteed the interviewees’ confidentiality. Further 
more, when the research started looking for journalists to be interviewed, some rejected 
because as they said their institution will not allow them, this put an obligation on the 
researcher to not reveal the name of the journalist as this might harm him/her.     
 Businessmen in the audiotape industry were coded as C plus a number. Women driving 
campaign activists were allotted codes starting with W whilst teacher campaigners’ codes 
started with T. Journalists and Man Divan campaign interviewees are simply described by 
their titles.  
The second step was to transcribe the audio files. Apart from the longest interview, all 
interviews were fully transcribed, amounting to some 138 pages of transcript. As the 
interviews were conducted in an Arabic-speaking country, 23 of the 24 interviews were 
carried out in Arabic, although many of the activists can also speak English. However, there 
were two main reasons for conducting interviews in Arabic. First, Arabic is the first language 
for 23 of the interviewees and conducting the interviews in Arabic allowed them to express 
themselves more fluently. Second, conducting interviews in two different languages can 
make the coding and analysis process more complex. However translating 138 pages would 
be a costly process (in terms of both time and money). Thus, transcribed interviews were 
coded in the original language and only quotes that were chosen for inclusion in the main text 
were translated into English by the researcher himself. The coding process is explained below 
in section 4.8. 
4.7.1.3.  Social network analysis 
The second tool that been used in this thesis for data collection is quantitative social network 
analysis (SNA). This can be defined as, “The study of social relations between a set of actors 
(people, organisations, ideas and events).” (Desikan et al., 2013:483). SNA is not limited to 
Internet-based social networks. A number of studies used SNA before the emergence of the 
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Internet (McCulloch et al., 2013) but it has gained popularity with the advent of the Internet 
because of the ease of data gathering and analysis this presents.  
Quantitative SNA is used in this research to inform the other data that has been collected 
qualitatively. Chapters 7 and 8 will show that SNA provides a more complete image of both 
campaigns, helping to identify the actors in the campaigns which then will be analysed in 
terms of their text, image, and video output in order to understand the content and the context 
of the data circulated online and its sequences. This data will be combined with the interview 
data that was collected.  
Data was collected from different platforms, as activists in each campaign specified their 
preferred campaign platform. Cyberactivists leading the women driving campaign considered 
Twitter to be the main application they used on the Internet whilst those involved in the 
teachers’ campaign considered online forums as their main application for engaging with 
people. For the teachers’ campaign, the data was extracted from the sub-forum in the teachers’ 
forum which focuses only on the campaign. The teachers’ campaign has one big discussion 
forum covering a number of issues, not necessarily relating to their campaign, but also about 
other cultural and social issues. This sub-forum can be found at www.ksa-
teachers.com/forums/f5. For the women driving campaign, data was gathered from both of 
the hashtags used by the campaign, namely #oct26driving in English and an Arabic hashtag 
ااكتوبر٢۲٦قيیاددةة #.  
Two sets of Twitter data in the form of Internet segments were collected for the hashtags 
#oct26driving for English (N=246) and Arabic (N=250). The language of the hashtag was 
used to differentiate these segments.  
The time frame for the data collection was October 2013 to February 2014 as it proved 
difficult to collect more data for campaign activities on Twitter. This was an important time 
frame as it covers the period of the campaign launch. This data was used to help the 
researcher to understand the online network when the campaign was originally launched 
online. Whilst Karpf (2014) thought that the data set used by L. Bennett et al. 2014 was 
impressive, he also criticized them for not including data from the period July to October 
2011, when the Occupy movement was formulated and launched. L. Bennett et al. 2014 
began collecting data in mid-October 2011, about three months after the movement has been 
launched. The data collected for the women driving campaign could reflect the campaign 
launch activities on Twitter for the two hashtags which are considered to be campaign 
hashtags as seen in the campaign’s account bio on Twitter.  
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More specifically, the Twitter analysis contains the 78 unique accounts with 76 ties, 132 
Retweets in Arabic, 118 original Tweets in Arabic, 109 original English account with 120 
ties, 65 Retweets in English, and 183 original Tweets in English.  
The rich data from the teachers’ campaign added extra value to the SNA results because it 
helped to make it possible to trace the development of the structure of the teachers’ campaign 
over time. Data from the women driving campaign revealed differences in the connections 
between participants in that campaign, according to the language which they used which 
generated two different spaces or communities (see Chapter Seven). 
Three pieces of computer software were used to carry out the SNA. The first was Microsoft 
Excel, which was used to enter and code data. The second was NodeXL which helped to 
retrieve and analyse the Twitter data. The third software was R Package, which was used to 
visualise the data. The algorithm to plot it is called “layout Kamada Kawai”. This algorithm 
plots central nodes closer the centre of the picture. NodeXL and R package were used for two 
main reasons. Firstly, both are open-source software, which means they are free to use on any 
computer without any need for purchase. Secondly, both programmes are fully supported by 
the academic community and are widely used among researchers. Scholars such as Choi and 
Park (2013); Howard et al. (2011); Park et al. (2015); Ackland and O’Neil (2011), have used 
either one, or similar of these software packages for similar purposes. The SNA in Chapters 
Seven and Eight will provide the in-depth data analysis for each campaign.  
There are, however, some limitations on the SNA in both case studies. For the women 
driving campaign, extracting all the tweets for both hashtags was not affordable as the cost 
starts from £1250 per hashtag paid to specialised companies. Originally, the necessary data 
from the hashtags was obtainable for free or at a low cost. However, this is no longer possible 
since as of mid-2014, data must now be purchased from either Twitter or companies who 
work with them. This is because Twitter placed restrictions on use of their API1 by the public 
during the course of the research. Some of the software used for SNA can extract data, but it 
is hard to provide the network data which is needed to link between Twitter users as Twitter 
keeps cutting the connection between the software and Twitter servers, sometimes every 15 
minutes. Thus, the researcher extracted about 500 tweets manually from both hashtags, as 
well as retweets and replies. However, this small sample allows for more in-depth 
investigation which involves identifying the individual and organisational accounts and the 
                                                
1 API is an Application Program Interface, although it is sometimes referred to as an Application Programming 
Interface. This is a set of commands, functions, and protocols which programmers can use when building 
software for a specific operating system. The API allows programmers to use pre-defined functions to interact 
with the operating system, instead of writing them from scratch. (Source: www.techterms.com/definition/api)  
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type of relation between them in addition to analysing the nature of the content of those 
accounts that have more connections.          
For the teachers’ campaign, it was necessary to download the whole forum first, and then 
access the campaign’s sub-forum which consisted of about 10 GB of available data. 
According to some online experts1 the data needed for SNA is less than 2GB. The analysis 
software used cannot extract the data directly from the forum, meaning that specific data 
needed to be extracted in order to analyse the social network of the campaign. This process, 
called data formatting or data cleaning, proved to be the most difficult step in the SNA. All of 
the professional commercial companies which were contacted said this process was long and 
laborious and not worth doing. However, Dr. Andrew Young from the School of Computing, 
Science and Engineering at University of Salford, succeeded in extracting the necessary data 
from 2009 onwards; unfortunately data for the first 16 months (prior to 2009) of the forum 
could not be extracted from the raw data.  
The main strength of the data use in this thesis is that it is what is called behavioural data. In 
other words the real activities of individuals are observed, instead of asking them about their 
behaviour. Often, retrospective surveys are biased due to the limitations of human memory 
and accuracy (Borgatti et al. 2013). However, this becomes more an issue for interviews that 
rely on the subjective opinions of surveyed individuals who may have forgotten some 
information or chose to hide this.  
One of the main limitations of SNA Twitter and online forum data is that they do not provide 
information about the socio-demographic characteristics of the individuals which have 
produced these. It is also argued by some scholars such as (Karpf 2014) that SNA might not 
reflect what he called backchannels of communication, where there is no public trace of 
participants’ activities. The interviews in this research indicate some backchannels in both 
campaigns which might not be traceable using SNA. In the teachers’ campaign, for example, 
campaigners use a private sub-forum for internal communication which cannot be traced 
using the SNA. Similarly, in the women driving campaign interviews indicate that core 
campaigners use WhatsApp for their internal communication. Needless to say that 




                                                
1 The researcher consulted some experts online as well as some companies such as http://www.tmt.co.uk.   
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4.8. Data Analysis Method  
Choosing the data analysis method is subject to the adopted research philosophy, research 
reasoning logic, and the research aims and needs. Section 4.5 showed that this research 
adopted the induction reasoning logic, “Which allows research findings to emerge from the 
frequent, dominant, or significant themes inherent in raw data, without the restraints imposed 
by structured methodologies.”(Thomas, 2006: 238). However, there are a number of methods 
which can then be chosen when analysing data. Broadly, it may be noted that researchers 
assessing data analysis agree about the similarities between various inductive data analysis 
approaches (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Generally, researchers either address data analysis using 
specific methods, such as Thematic Analysis (Braun & Clarke 2006), Conversation Analysis 
(Psathas, 1995), Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (Harper & Thompson, 2011) or 
Grounded Theory (Eaves, 2001). Alternatively, they discuss the data analysis as a process 
such as Marshall and Rossman (2015), who suggest a seven-step approach to a qualitative 
data analysis. 
This thesis adopts Thematic Analysis as a method for the data analysis, for two main reasons. 
First, this is consistent with the research philosophy and reasoning logic set out above. 
Second, it suits the data collection methods and can help provide the answers to the research 
questions from the collected data. Using inductive data analysis methods means that the 
themes are driven by the collected data. In the research conducted here, the method used 
cannot be purely inductive. Describing the method used as inductive means that it extracts the 
themes only from the collected data. This pattern of inductive methods is rarely found in 
research (Kuckartz, 2014) because the aim of research is to answer the research questions, so 
there are usually some themes already in the researcher’s mind when data analysis starts. 
Thematic Analysis can be defined as a, “Method for identifying, analysing and reporting 
patterns (themes) within data. It minimally organises and describes [the] data set in (rich) 
detail.” (Braun & Clarke, 2006:79). Braun and Clarke argue that there are a number of 
advantages to thematic analysis (2006:97). Firstly, it is flexible and easy to learn and practise. 
Moreover, it can easily be used to demonstrate results to an educated public. It is also a useful 
method for participatory research paradigms and can help to summarise large quantities of 
data by demonstrating their key features. Furthermore, it can serve to highlight the 
similarities and differences in the data set, and finally, it can help the researcher to generate 
unanticipated insights from the collected data.  
In this study the six phases of thematic analysis suggested by Braun and Clarke (2006:97) 




Table 5: Phases of Thematic Analysis 
 
No. Phase  Description of the phase  
1 Familiarising 
yourself with your 
data  
Transcribing data (if necessary), reading and re-reading the 
data, noting initial ideas down with your data. 
2 Generating initial 
codes 
Coding interesting features of the data in a systematic fashion 
across the entire data set, collating data relevant to each code. 
3 Searching for 
themes 
Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all the data 
relevant to each potential theme. 
4 Reviewing themes Checking if the themes work in relation to the coded extracts 
(Level 1) and the entire data set (Level 2), generating a 
thematic ‘map’ of the analysis. 
5 Defining and 
naming themes 
Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each theme, and the 
overall story analysis tells, generating clear definitions and 
names for each theme 
6 Producing the 
report 
The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of vivid, 
compelling extract examples, final analysis of selected extracts, 
relating back of the analysis to the research question and 
literature, producing a scholarly report of the analysis. 
 
Note. (Braun & Clarke, 2006)  
4.8.1. Phase 1: Familiarisation with data 
 In this phase, the researcher has to transcribe verbal data in order to make it more accessible. 
After transcribing verbal data, this phase requires more reading and note taking. The aim of 
this phase is to find latent or semantic themes. The researcher’s personal experience showed 
that this phase is important for getting to know interviewee thoughts and main claims in more 
detail to build a bigger image. Importantly, as Braun and Clarke (2006) note:  
At this phase, one of the reasons why qualitative research tends to use far smaller 
samples than, for example, questionnaire research will become apparent as the 
reading and re-reading of data is time-consuming. It is, therefore, tempting to skip 
over this phase, or be selective. We would strongly advise against this, as this 





It is also important to note that data analysis in this research started by using NVivo software 
which is used for qualitative analysis, coding and categorising. The software was useful for 
highlighting and taking notes, but unfortunately when it came to grouping the quotes and 
building the initial themes, there were a number of issues with Arabic text. More specifically, 
when copying quotes within the software, these appeared disjointed and could not be read, so 
the researcher had to switch and work manually. 
 
4.8.2. Phase 2: Generating initial codes 
 Once the researcher became more familiar with the data, and notes had been taken, coding 
began, which means identifying, “The most basic segment, or element, of the raw data or 
information that can be assessed in a meaningful way regarding the phenomenon.” (Boyatzis, 
1998: 63, cited in Braun & Clarke, 2006). The coding process is important for building 
themes. In other words, codes are the elements or components of themes. The aim here is to 
code regardless of whether codes or ideas seem contradictory (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In this 
phase, a number of codes were generated for both campaigns. After reading the transcribed 
interviews many times, there was some basic information which referred to a specific aspect, 
for example, the demographic information, relating to age, sex, and educational level of each 
of these participants which was given a code. However, it was noted during the coding 
process that some codes were applicable to both campaigns whilst others were not, which 
highlights the variation in the chosen case studies. 
 
4.8.3. Phase 3: Searching for themes 
 By this stage, the researcher has coded all the data and starts grouping or combining some 
codes together to build themes and sub-themes. Using the previous example regarding 
demographic information, all the information concerning age, sex, education and related 
information created a sub-theme in the mobilisation aspect. In this thesis, the researcher first 
combined all codes relating to mobilisation in one group, organisation in a second group, and 
the systemic environment in a third group. Each of these represents a main research question 




4.8.4. Phase 4: Reviewing themes 
 This is the phase of nominating themes. Braun and Clarke (2006) explain:  
During this phase, it will become evident that some candidate themes are not 
really themes (e.g., if there are not enough data to support them, or the data are 
too diverse), while others might collapse into each other (e.g., two apparently 
separate themes might form one theme). Other themes might need to be broken 
down into separate themes, (2006:91).  
In this study, a number of themes were moved from one area to others during this phase and 
some were merged, producing sub-themes. This phase ended with the emergence of bigger 
and more definitive themes compared to the previous phase. For example, the relationship 
between traditional media and the October 26th campaign was all in the mobilisation aspect, 
as the activists used the Internet to target the media. However, after a number of drafts, the 
researcher found that activists have targeted media, but there were issues related to media 
which were more than just mobilising issues. Consequently, findings about media needed to 
be split into two different sections.   
 
4.8.5. Phase 5: Defining and naming themes 
 This phase could also be called ‘define and refine’ (Braun & Clarke, 2006) and entails, 
“Identifying the ‘essence’ of what each theme is about (as well as the themes overall), and 
determining what aspect of the data each theme captures.” (Braun & Clarke, 2006:92). This 
last phase before reporting considers three aspects: thematic content and how coherent is it; 
the collected data and how it was used; the relation between whole themes in general. Doing 
this helps to pull the themes into shape and produce the larger picture.  
 
4.8.6. Phase 6: Producing the report 
 Once themes have been identified and linked to each other, the reporting phase demonstrates 
the results of the collected data through thematic analysis which means going beyond mere 
description of the data, to make links with the literature and research questions.   
 
4.9. Credibility of the Research Findings 
According to Saunders et al. (2007), research gains credibility when attention is paid to 
reliability and validity. Bloor and Wood (2006:147), define reliability as, “The extent to 
which research produces the same results when replicated.” whilst validity is, “The extent to 
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which the research produces an accurate version of the world.” (Bloor & Wood, 2006:147). 
There is no doubt that reliability and validity are important concepts when considering the 
quality of a piece of research. Quantitative methods based on a positivist epistemology use 
statistical tools to measure reliability and validity, including measurements like root, mean, 
square, error, Spearman’s Rank and Pearson’s correlation (Ahlqvist, 2009), and these tools 
can be applied to wider subjects and situations in science (Winter, 2000).  
However, considering Bloor and Wood’s (2006) definitions, three procedures have been 
taken to ensure the reliability and validity of the research and the credibility of the research 
undertaken here.         
Firstly, multiple methods of data collection were used and more than one data collection 
instrument was employed, including in-depth semi-structured interviews and SNA. Maykut 
and Morehouse (1994:134), argue that using multiple methods for data collection is one 
means of enhancing research credibility as it, “Increases the likelihood that the phenomenon 
of interest is being understood from various points of view and ways of knowing.” Secondly, 
every step in the research methodology is explained in detail and a clear rationale provided in 
each case (see section 4.8 of this chapter). Thirdly, interviewees’ thoughts and ideas are 
quoted directly, “To enable the reader to see and judge how interpretations are made from the 
data.” (Bloor & Wood, 2006:149).  
4.10. Research Ethics  
The following processes were undertaken to ensure that the research project followed ethical 
principles, paying close attention to the guidelines contained in the Statement of Ethical 
Practice produced by the British Sociological Association (BSA 2002):  
Institutional Review Boards: The study has been approved by the University of Salford 
Research Governance and Ethics Committee which considered the following issues in 
relation to this study: research focus; objectives and strategy; rationale for the research; data 
protection; recruitment of subjects and their involvement in the research; consent form.  
Anonymity, privacy and confidentiality: All information collected was stored on password-
protected university computers with access limited only to the researcher, along with all 
collected data for this research. All participants’ real names were replaced by codes 
immediately after transcribing the interviews. Furthermore, participants themselves chose the 
place for the interviews. The women driving campaign interviewees were coded as W 
followed by a different number for each interviewee, whilst teachers interviewed were coded 
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as T, again with a different number for each interviewee. This procedure was used to ensure 
the safety of interviewees and to fulfil their requests.       
Informed consent: Participants were asked to read and sign a consent form and data sheet to 
indicate their willingness to be interviewed and recorded. It was made clear that the content 
of interviews would be used for academic purposes only. Moreover, interviewees were 
informed of their right to withdraw at any stage of the research by request to the researcher 
during the interviews or after the interviews, without any negative consequences associated 
with their withdrawal (see appendices A). 
 
4.11. Research Limitations  
As Chapter Five explains, activism in Saudi Arabia is viewed as being risky due to the 
political and social restrictions imposed by the government and society. Moreover, apart from 
work about the religious dissent in Saudi Arabia (Lacroix, 2011), researchers have not used 
interviews to understand collective action in Saudi Arabia, despite the fact that most western 
studies about collective action normally use interviews as the best method to understand the 
phenomenon. For example, (Yuce et al., 2014) used only SNA to conduct a study about the 
women driving campaign in Saudi Arabia. Similarly, Al-Saggaf and Simmons (2014), used 
online data to conduct their research about social media and political participation in the 
country. Other research did not even use a clear method to research activism in Saudi Arabia 
(Chaudhry, 2014). Thus it can be argued that this study currently provides one of the most in-
depth pieces of research on cyberactivism in Saudi Arabia. 
Nevertheless it is worth noting that studying activism in Saudi Arabia is almost as 
problematic a task as conducting the activism itself. Those who are practising cyberactivism 
publicly do not want to be labelled as having links to specific activist groups. To put it simply, 
cyberactivists do not want to show that they are part of any organisation or collective action. 
For this reason, it proved difficult to interview Saudi cyberactivists. Firstly, it took several 
months of searching for connections with cyberactivists to convince them to take part in the 
interviews for the sake of the research. Many did not respond to correspondence by e-mail, 
SMS and phone calls. Some of them refused to take part in this study giving several excuses. 
This was expected due to the sensitivity of the subject; one campaign activist had just been 
released from prison. Cyberactivists from one campaign replied to the researcher thinking he 
was a journalist, not an academic researcher. This was the result of the fact that some years 
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previously, the researcher contacted this campaigner when he was working as a freelance 
journalist.  
However, after several attempts, communication was established with some activists through 
personal connections and eventually, two successful contacts were made. In the women 
driving campaign, the first participant agreed to be interviewed a few days after the initial 
communication. The researcher learnt that the participant had conducted her own research 
concerning his credentials, and fortunately, a mutual close friend was able to convince her 
about the researcher’s intentions and background. Once the initial interview had been 
conducted, the interviewee then contacted a number of fellow cyberactivists, some of whom 
agreed to be interviewed.  
Not all of the interviews were used for this research as two interviewees tried to talk about 
other issues relating to women’s rights in general which they believed were just as important 
as the women driving campaign. Moreover, in many of the interviews, activists denied that 
there was any kind of organisation. Therefore, the researcher tried to use information given 
by their fellow activists to encourage them to talk about related issues. 
One of the interviewees from the women driving campaign women spent most of the 
interview focusing on issues more generally related to women’s rights rather than talking 
about this campaign specifically. Another used the opportunity to ask the researcher for 
technical advice using the Internet for campaign organisation and mobilisation. Thus, neither 
of these interviews provided content which was of direct relevance to the areas being 
examined in the case study.  
 
Interestingly, the fact that the researcher’s home university was recognised as an ‘Islamic 
University’1, coupled with his personal appearance2, made some interviewees ‘reticent’ when 
talking about certain issues in the women’s campaign. As an example, one cyberactivist who 
agreed to be interviewed emphasised during the pre-interview phone call that she knew I was 
from an Islamic University and warned me that she did not wear hijab. She advised me that I 
was only welcome to interview her if I agreed to do this without her wearing hijab. There 
were a number of instances when the researcher thought that the mention of his home 
university in Saudi Arabia and his personal appearance might have influenced what was said 
                                                
1 The researcher is an international student being sponsored by Imam Mohammad bin Saud Islamic University 
in Saudi Arabia where he works as a lecturer.   
2 The researcher has a beard, which in a Saudi context is generally interpreted as meaning that a man is more 
likely to follow a more traditional Islamic ideology and would not be expected to be supportive of women’s 
right to drive.   
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by some participants, especially concerning religion. Issues relating to religious restrictions 
were particularly sensitive to some interviewees.  
In this respect, choosing the location for the interviews proved somewhat problematic. In 
Saudi Arabia, a man is not allowed to sit in public with a woman unless she is his mother, 
wife, sister or mother-in-law. This prohibition is rigorously enforced by the Committee for 
the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (usually referred to in Western media as 
the ‘religious police’). Consequently, when choosing an interview location, the researcher 
had to ensure that it would be safe for both participants. Thus, two interviews were conducted 
in participants’ homes. One was conducted at the interviewee’s place of work. The rest took 
place in public locations such as coffee shops, restaurants and hotel lounges, places that 
‘Committee’ members are less likely to visit. Interestingly, this was not the case in Jeddah, a 
city on the western coast of Saudi Arabia, where interviews were conducted in three different 
public spaces without this being thought problematic.   
Additionally, in some cases, cyberactivists to be interviewed, then changed their minds and 
later apologised. Thus, although the researcher travelled to Buridyah and Dammam having 
secured appointments with cyberactivists from both campaigns, when he arrived, 
interviewees failed to respond to phone calls. 
Interviewing cyberactivists for the women driving campaign proved easier than for the 
teachers’ campaign. In the latter case, most of the cyberactivists who were contacted either 
politely declined to take part or failed to respond, even when they had previously been 
contacted by fellow activists. Some agreed to be interviewed but only on condition they were 
not recorded. Others eventually agreed to participate several months after they originally 
rejected the request. This may be because they heard about the research from more than one 
friend. It was particularly difficult to get cyberactivists for the teachers’ campaign to talk 
about security threats. One interview was conducted in two parts and the participant tried to 
change some of the original answers when questioned for the second time. It was important at 
that interview to remind the interviewee about the previous part of the interview as well as 
reminding him about the examples he gave, which were inconsistent with his later answers.   
It proved most difficult to interview non-Saudi international journalists. Some 39 journalists 
were initially identified by the researcher as having an interest in the women driving 
campaign, because they had written about the issue; 13 of these replied to the researcher’s 
correspondence, but only two agreed to be interviewed. Some stated they did not wish to 
participate, as they were no longer interested in this subject; others said they were not 
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permitted to speak about this subject, and the remainder said they just copied other sources, 
which means they got the news from other media outlets.  
Whilst interviewing cyberactivists in a ND context provides extremely valuable information, 
a number of considerations need to be taken into account: First, researchers must be aware of 
the specific societal context in which the cyberactivism takes place since this is as important 
as the activism itself. In the Saudi case, some of the actions taken by cyberactivists are in 
response to, or conditioned by, the societal context. Some actions taken by cyberactivists in 
this ND context may not exist in democratic countries, or even in other ND contexts. For 
example, people who are not familiar with Saudi Arabia may not understand the issue of a 
Saudi woman requiring a male guardian and why some people are in favour of this and others 
not. So, in order to prepare for interviews, understanding the context is vital, so such social 
phenomena can be discussed. Secondly, conducting interviews in this context entails risks 
both for the researcher and the interviewees. This explains the importance of the ethical 
approval by the university. Without trust, interviews would be impossible, and accurate 
answers to the researcher’s questions would not be given. Thirdly, interviewees may try to 
hide some facts if they find out that the researcher has no background concerning the case 
study. It can be argued that a researcher who is from the same society as the interviewees 




This chapter has addressed the research methodology used in this thesis. Primarily, it is 
argued that the interpretivist paradigm was the most suitable approach for conducting 
research on social phenomena in a ND context because cyberactivism in the Saudi context 
needs to be understood in the light of Saudi social and political restrictions.  
In addition, the chapter explains in detail the research methodology used in this thesis, 
including the data collection methods, the instruments employed and the rationale for their 
use. The methodology section also discussed the steps which the researcher took to ensure the 
credibility of the study.  
As with all research, there are limitations, in particular, the practical difficulties of 
conducting research interviews on sensitive issues in an ND country. Being aware of these 
limitations helped the researcher to overcome these restrictions in order to maximise the 
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benefit of the interviews. This research is one of few studies about activism in Saudi Arabia 




5. CHAPTER FIVE: SAUDI ARABIA: THE SYSTEMIC ENVIRONMENT FOR 
ACTIVISM  
5.1.  Introduction  
In order to define the research area and understand cyberactivism in the context of Saudi 
Arabia, this chapter will examine the three main areas that can be said to construct the 
systemic environment of cyberactivism. This chapter argues that the political system, the 
media and its regulation, as well as the legal restrictions on civil society institutions have all 
helped activism to flourish online rather than offline.  
 
Specifically, this chapter will focus first on politics and religion as key contours of Saudi 
Arabia activism. It will also examine the media environment, and its laws and regulations 
which limit the freedom of expression. The final part will discuss the traditional notion of 
activism and the restrictions to activism in the Saudi context prior to the Internet. It examines 
the roots and traditions of activism in a country which is often regarded as having had no 
history of collective action since it was founded. 
 
5.2. Politics and Religion in Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia is a monarchy, currently ruled by King Salman, son of King Abdulaziz, the 
founder of the modern state. The ruling monarch is also the political Head of State in his role 
as Prime Minister. However, the Basic Law of Saudi Arabia states in Article 47, that the state 
authorities are composed of a judicial, an executive and a legislative entity, suggesting that a 
separation of powers is recognised. All laws are issued by royal decree, and the reigning 
monarch also appoints ministers and high-ranking officials. Traditionally, the order of 
succession to the throne of Saudi Arabia is determined by, and within, the House of Saud 
according to agnatic seniority i.e. succession usually passes to the monarch’s younger brother 
rather than his own sons. The King then chooses the Crown Prince and the Deputy Crown 
Prince (second in line to the throne).   
 
5.2.1. Majlis shura (Saudi consultative council) 
 It is important to understand the role of the Majlis Shura because it can be claimed that it 
allows some citizens a degree of engagement in political deliberation, but not in true political 
participation. Unlike parliaments in other countries, the Shura Council, as it is often referred 
to in English, has no power and is a mainly advisory body, with currently all of its members 




The origins of the Majlis Ash-Shura date back to 1924 when King Abdulaziz established a 
short-lived Consultative National Council consisting of twelve appointed members. A council 
of this type was regularly formed, under various names and with differing remits, even 
including some elected members, until 1953. Then, for almost four decades, no consultative 
body of this type existed. According to the official Majlis Ash-Shura website, “Many of the 
jurisdictions of the Council were distributed between the Council of Ministers and other 
apparatuses of government.”(Law of The Sura Council, 1992). It was not until 1992, that the 
late King Fahad announced the establishment of the new Shura and determined its powers, its 
role and duties being summarised in Articles 15, 18 and 23 of Shura Council Law. In general 
terms, it has the power to discuss and debate laws and treaties, provide views and opinions, 
propose new laws or amend them but, according to Article 18 of the same law, all of these, 
“Shall be issued and amended by Royal Decree after being reviewed by the Shura Council.” 
 
Only the King is empowered to choose and appoint Shura Council members, as stated in the 
third article of Shura Council Law (Law of The Sura Council, 1992). The 150 Shura Council 
members are usually from different backgrounds, tribes, religious sects and regions, since it 
has different functions, which may be honorific, symbolic, representational and corporative. 
However, it is clear from the articles of Shura Council Law that its function is mainly 
advisory, and that members are to be appointed rather than elected. Due to its purely advisory 
function and non-elected membership, the Shura Council has been the subject of intense 
debate amongst the Saudi Internet community and is often considered one of the key areas 
requiring reform in the Kingdom. For instance, following a Royal Decree issued in 2013 
which appointed new Shura Council members and changed some articles of Shura Council 
law to make 20% of the Shura Council seats for women, an online campaign entitled ‘Shura 
Majlis does not represent me, and I do not care who is there’ was launched. The campaign 
that ran on the Twitter hashtag  (Shura Majlis does not represent me#) # يمجلس_ االشوررىى_ اليیمثلن
used the fact that women had been appointed to debate the idea of appointment, rather than 
election. Similarly, in 2015, when the Shura Council rejected a proposal for a national unity 
protection bill, Saudis responded with another debate, using the same hashtag. The debate 




5.2.2. Islam in Saudi political culture 
 Islam is one of the main pillars of Saudi society, since from its foundation, modern Saudi 
Arabia has been an Islamic state, and the Kingdom’s population is loyal to the Royal Family 
as part of their adherence to the practices of Islam and the institutions of Islamic law. Article 
1 in Part One, General Principles of the Basic Law of Governance, states, “Its [Saudi 
Arabia’s] religion is Islam. Its constitution is Almighty God’s Book, The Holy Qur’an, and 
the Sunnah1 of the Prophet (PBUH).” Political thought in Islam has grown alongside the 
spread of the religion and Muslim scholars have written extensively on political thought in 
Islam. 
Many protests and campaigns in general in Saudi Arabia have been either mainly motivated 
by Islamic precepts or shaped by Islamic issues but two main concepts underpin the subject 
of this activism: the relationship between ruler and ruled and religious motives for activism.  
 
5.2.3. The Relationship between ruler and ruled in Islam 
 Islamic law essentially controls all aspects of life for Muslims, with Islamic jurists having 
produced rulings and guidance designed to cover everything from governing a country to 
how a Muslim should sleep. One of the most hotly debated issues in Islam is the relationship 
between ruler and ruled. For example, in the Holy Qur’an, Muslims read:  
you who believe! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger (Muhammad), and those 
of you (Muslims) who are in authority. (And) if you differ in anything amongst 
yourselves, refer it to Allah and His Messenger, if you believe in Allah and in the 
Last Day. That is better and more suitable for final determination,(An-Nisa, 
04:59). 
However, according to the Prophet Muhammad this obedience does have limitations:  
It is obligatory upon a Muslim to listen (to the ruler) and obey whether he likes it 
or not, except when he is ordered to do a sinful thing; in such case, there is no 
obligation to listen or to obey, (Al-Bukhari and Muslim).  
Moreover, the relationship between ruler and ruled should be one of mutual duties: citizens 
must obey the ruler, but he, in turn, must do his best to serve citizens and provide for their 
needs. Given the emphasis which is placed in Islamic scriptures on obedience towards those 
in authority, some Muslim clerics, like (AlFawzan 2011), regard public demonstrations or 
open criticism of the ruler as unacceptable for Muslims. 
 
                                                




5.3. Islam as a Motivation for Activism 
Alternatively, many Qur’anic verses and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad can be 
interpreted as encouraging individuals to do many things which would now be recognised as 
a type of activism, for example, Muslims are encouraged to protect life on earth, to not waste 
water or food, nor to kill animals for fun.1 Muslims are also encouraged to rally together and 
stand up against oppression.  
Ultimately, given that Saudi Arabia is officially an Islamic state, this religion plays a major 
role in the sphere of activism, regardless of whether this is considered to be political or social 
activism. From an Islamic perspective, Muslims are expected to live their life in keeping with 
Islamic teachings and practices, believing that even if there are no rewards in this life, God 
will reward them in the hereafter. 
 
5.4. Women, Islam and tradition in Saudi Arabia 
Women’s issues are one of the most frequently debated topics at all levels of society in Saudi 
Arabia. It is no exaggeration to say that women’s issues are at the heart of most of the 
intellectual, religious, and political debates in the public sphere (Alkhedr 2010).  
It could be argued that the main cause of debates about women in Saudi society is the 
perceived lack of differences between Islamic teachings and Arab traditions, or the overlap 
between the two in people’s thoughts. A study conducted with a sample of over 200 Saudis 
from both genders, indicated what the researcher referred to as a lack of consistency in male 
attitudes towards some specific issues related to women when they refer inconsistency to 
religion and customs and traditions (AboKhalid 2004). She states that: 
It is not enough to say that Islam guaranteed women rights 14 century ago, while 
the women today are struggling with these rights. There is a need to take the lead 
and review what Islam gave women, which is a lot, and disseminate awareness of 
these rights and put them into practice. There is a need to remove what the 
illiteracy in Islamic knowledge about women’s rights (AboKhalid 2004:n.p).  
The people of Saudi Arabia, which occupies most of the Arabian Peninsula, have inherited 
the long-rooted traditions of the pre-Islam period. Like many other ancient civilizations, Arab 
traditions humiliated women and treated them harshly (Jawad 1998). Scholars such as (Jawad 
1998) have shown that Arab women in pre-Islamic era “were in subjugation either to their 
kinsmen or their husbands. They were considered a chattel to be possessed, to be bought, to 
                                                
1 A number of Sunnah quotes have been quoted as supporting this, for example, the Prophet Muhammad is said 
to have sanctioned punishment for a woman on the grounds that she had failed to provide food and water for a 
cat and did set the animal free to fend for itself, (Sahih Muslim, Book 39, Hadith, 206). 
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be sold or to be inherited. Men had absolute domination over them. They were not 
individuals themselves, they either belonged to their father or to their husband” (Jawad 
1998:01).  
The birth of Islam according to (Jawad 1998) radically changed women’s situation in the 
Arabian Peninsula in particular. Generally speaking, Islam has granted them political, social, 
and educational rights, as well as the right to work. Jawad identifies eight basic rights that 
women enjoy under Islam and summarises these as: the right to independent ownership, the 
right to marry whom she likes, and the right to divorce in the case of an unsuccessful 
marriage, the right to education, the right to keep her own identity, the right to sexual 
pleasure, the right to elect and be nominated for political offices and participation in public 
affairs (Jawad 1998: 7-11).  
However, women in Saudi Arabia do not have some of the rights mentioned above despite 
the fact that the laws of the Kingdom are derived from the Qur’an and Sunna. Some scholars 
such as (Doumato 2010) argue that the lack of women rights in Saudi Arabia is caused by the 
Saudi Ulama’s (Muslim Scholars) interpretation of Islam, which is based on a literal reading 
of the Qur’an and Sunna. 
Doumato and AboKhalid demonstrate that women in Saudi Arabia are still struggling to gain 
a number of rights, for example, freedom of movement, power to act without a male guardian, 
and women’s rights in family law generally, such as the right to custody of their children 
upon divorce.  
With regards to social and cultural participation (Doumato 2010) noted that 
“The extent to which women are free to participate in and influence community life, policies, 
and social development depends on their family’s support for such activities, their family 
connections, their education, and their personal abilities [...] Saudi women influence policies 
and social development in their roles as teachers, doctors, social workers, journalists, 
university professors, investors, and religious scholars engaging in public debates on the role 
of women. If they have the connections they can also communicate their objectives directly 
to members of the royal elite.” (Doumato 2010:448).  
 
 
5.5. Media Environment in Saudi Arabia 
It is also important to discuss the role of media in the Kingdom, in order to better understand 
the systemic environment which shapes activism there. Aspects of politics, religion and 
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media all interact with each other to influence cyberactivism which should be viewed 
primarily as a social phenomenon. 
 
It is generally accepted that media plays a vital role in providing political knowledge 
(Michael X & Keeter 1997), and in particular, in promoting civic participation. As the 
literature review in Chapter Two established, when the media provide information about 
social issues, this can act as a catalyst for political participation (Kenski, 2006). However, it 
can be argued that the media in the Arab world generally, and in Saudi Arabia in particular, 
are restricted from performing this role by the country’s media laws and the type of 
ownership system, which means the media demonstrate a high degree of loyalty to the 
political system. As Nossek and Rinnawi (2003:186) note, “Media structure and policy in 
most Arab states are determined by the political elite, where the mass media are directly 
centralised in the hands of the state regime leadership.” With regards to the Saudi context, 
(Sakr, 2006:136), points out that, “In theory, privately owned broadcast media outlets are not 
banned under Saudi law. In practice, however, the government retains a broadcasting 
monopoly.” and in all of the Gulf Co-operation Council countries, “Non-governmental 
broadcasting […] is extremely limited.” (Sakr, 2006:143).     
Thus, access to conventional media for Saudi activists wishing to engage citizens is 
extremely limited or non-existent. The following section will explore the current media 
landscape in the Kingdom along with its media laws, which to a greater or lesser extent, 
shape all media output.  
 
5.5.1. Press 
 The first newspaper in modern Saudi Arabia was Um AlQura, founded by the Saudi 
government on December 12th  1942. This is still in circulation and is the only official state 
newspaper. The newspaper typically publishes official state news such as royal decrees, 
treaties and declarations, as well as addressing political and social issues. It is also used to 
report local and international news; especially coverage concerning the Arab and Islamic 
world. Like other Saudi press historians, AlShubili (2000) has divided the history of the press 
in Saudi Arabia into two major phases outlined below. 
 
5.5.1.1. Independent press phase 
 This phase began in 1928, when press licenses were given to individuals who did not need to 
be a registered as a media organisation to get a license. According to Rugh (2004), at that 
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time, the press industry consisted of family-run enterprises and was, “A symbol of family 
pride.” (Rugh, 2004:67). Studies suggest that a great many newspapers and magazines were 
in circulation in various regions across the newly established country. AlShubili (2000), notes 
that between 1924 and 1964, some 22 newspapers and magazines were established; a  large 
number for an era when there was a small population with a high illiteracy rate and many 
distribution difficulties.  
During that era, the press shifted from political interests to cultural and literary interests, 
following the establishment of the Kingdom and political stability, and as elsewhere in the 
Arab world, the Egyptian press were influential on Saudi publishers. AlShubili (2000), 
observes that during that era, the press enjoyed relative freedom of expression, probably as a 
result of the low circulation rates of newspapers due to financial difficulties and illiteracy in 
Saudi society at that time, as well as the shift in the focus of press coverage from politics to 
socio-cultural matters.   
 
5.5.1.2. Organised press phase 
 At a press conference held by the then Crown Prince, Faisal bin Abdulaziz, on October 24th 
1958, he expressed his deep dissatisfaction with the state of journalistic practice in the 
country. He suggested that in each city all the owners of the newspapers and magazines 
published there should come together under a single name to strengthen journalism. As a 
result, the Saudi press entered the second stage of its development.  
Five years after this press conference, a decree was issued by the Council of Ministers on 
November 11th 1963, abolishing all press licences for privately-owned publications, although 
exemptions were granted to some specialist newspapers and magazines. Since then, only two 
press licences have been issued to privately-run newspaper publishers.  
Currently, some nine news organisations print several dailies and weekly magazines in Saudi 
Arabia, and a number of news agencies based abroad also print Saudi editions. The Minister 
of Information has responsibility for approving the appointment of editors-in-chief in all 
Saudi-based newspapers (Rugh, 2004), and also has the power to dismiss them (Awad, 2010). 
Rugh (2004), notes that the Saudi press, “Tend to be loyal to the regime in presenting news 
and commentary on important issues.” but emphasises that this loyalty does not necessarily 
imply a total lack of criticism of the government. Awad (2010), confirms that there is a 
strong relationship between the government and the press, and gives examples of some of the 




Awad (2010), explains how the Ministry of Culture and Information (MoCI) influences 
journalistic practices in two ways. Firstly, it sends guidelines to newspapers prohibiting them 
from publishing certain stories. Secondly, it asks newspapers to follow specific news stories, 
and give them special consideration. Clearly, such requests by the Ministry could prevent 
newspapers from covering important stories, leading them to cover less important news. 
Editors-in-chief have no other choice but to adhere to these requests or risk dismissal.       
 
5.5.1.3. The Saudi press abroad 
 Any full account of the media scene in Saudi Arabia must include foreign media 
organisations since some of the foreign-licensed media are considered to be its main players. 
Although the two newspapers discussed here, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat and Al Hayat, are based in 
London and are not aimed specifically at Saudi audiences, they are very much a part of the 
media environment there for three reasons: (1) They are both owned by Saudis; (2) One of 
them produces a Saudi edition; (3) One of them is listed on the Saudi stock market.  
 
The first of these, the Saudi Research and Marketing Group (SRMG), was founded in 1972 in 
Saudi Arabia (SRMG n.d.). The UK capital was chosen as the headquarters for the daily so 
they would be free from any editorial interference. Today, SRMG prints more than 20 
publications in many languages and on diverse subjects. In 2000, SRMG became a joint 
Saudi stock company with capital of 100 million Saudi Riyals (SRMG n.d.).  
The second non-Saudi newspaper was originally founded as Dar Al Hayat in Beirut by 
Kamal Mrowe in 1964, who was assassinated in 1966. Although Al Hayat continued 
throughout the Lebanese civil war, facing constant threats, it was finally forced to cease 
publication in 1976 (Rugh, 2004). In 1990, Prince Khalid bin Sultan, the eldest son of the 
former Crown Prince and Saudi Defence Minister, Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz, took over 
partial, and later full, ownership of the newspaper (Zayani, 2012).   
Al Hayat published its first Saudi edition in 2005, with three different versions, one for each 
region of Saudi Arabia. The editorial content in the Saudi edition of Al Hayat is the same as 
that of the international edition, but is accompanied by extra pages for local news, and 
different advertisements (Alhayat, n.d.) 
Both Al-Sharq Al-Awsat and Al Hayat are owned by Saudis and royal family members; both 
have more freedom of expression than the locally published press, but they remain under 
Saudi authority. Thus, they must also be concerned about the threat of being banned from 
publication in Saudi Arabia and of losing advertising revenue. The Saudi government appears 
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to allow them to function as, “A kind of loyal opposition […], permitting a diversity of views 
within understood boundaries.” (Eickelman & Anderson, 2003:06). This type of loyal 
opposition may, in fact, be beneficial to both parties. It suggests that the state authorities do 
not totally control the media, and that some media organisations oppose the government on 




 Radio emerged many years after the Press in Saudi Arabia, purely for financial reasons. On 
July 18th 1949, King Abdulaziz issued a royal decree authorising the Deputy Governor of 
Hijaz, his son Prince Faisal, to supervise the setting up of a new Saudi radio station, 
demonstrating his keen interest in this medium. A policy on radio was also set out in the 
decree which stated, “There is to be no editing of any foreign news; leave this as it is, without 
insulting or praising anyone with no justification.” He also asked for local domestic news to 
be broadcast in accordance with his state policy, commenting that this should, “Broadcast 
what we have always talked about, and keep silent about what we have always ignored.” 
(Ibrahim, 1992, in Alsaud, 2007). The King also asked his son to broadcast the Qur’an, 
religious talks, and programmes about Islamic and Arab history, ( Ibrahim, 1992, cited in 
Alsaud, 2007).  
 However, there were no private FM radio stations in Saudi Arabia until 1994 when MBC FM 
radio, part of the MBC Group (Middle East Broadcasting Centre), began transmitting. It is 
unclear how MBC obtained its licence, since there was no public bidding process or 
legislation allowing it to launch FM radio in the Kingdom. At the end of 2009, the MoCI said 
it would start licensing new FM radio stations in Saudi Arabia and a few months later, 
bidding started, with six media groups obtaining licences after paying 60- 80 million Saudi 
Riyal (some 10-13million pounds).  
 
5.5.3. Terrestrial state TV and satellite 
 Terrestrial television in Saudi Arabia is a state-owned monopoly and, from a historical 
perspective, television was the last of the conventional media to enter the Kingdom 
(AlShubili, 2000). Official terrestrial television broadcasting began in 1965 after Crown 




Today, the Saudi Broadcasting Corporation (SBC) broadcasts nine TV channels, eight of 
which are in Arabic and one in English. However, scholars such as Marghalani et al. (1998) 
and Barayan (2002), were already suggesting over a decade ago, that due to the restrictions 
on TV programmes, Saudis were increasingly moving to satellite TV which provided them 
with  a greater range of programmes. Barayan (2002), notes that Saudis complain that state 
TV does not seem to be interested in broadcasting events taking place in the country; a result, 
according to Barayan, of the lack of news correspondents. Interviewees in Barayan’s study 
also particularly complained about the lack of analysis in news bulletins and the length of the 
official news. The research indicated that that nearly two-thirds of the news coverage on 
Saudi TV concerned the King and government officials.  
Marghalani et al.'s (1998) study focusing on the reasons why Saudis prefer foreign TV 
channels over national ones, found that the heavy political and religious restrictions, as well 
as censorship of local media, are the major reasons for moving to foreign TV stations. 
However, moving to foreign TV stations does not mean the audience is free from Saudi 
restrictions, especially in political affairs, since Saudi Arabia probably exerts the greatest 
degree of power and control over satellite TV within the Middle East. Cochrane (2007), for 
instance has claimed that the:  
Saudi establishment has used its deep pockets to influence the region’s media and 
minds, morphing from an approach that paid off and intimidated media that ran 
negative reports on the Kingdom to become one of the Middle East’s most 
influential media owners, (2007:1).  
For example, Saudi Arabia is the largest shareholder in Arabsat (Arab Satellite 
Communication Organisation) holding 36% of the stock (Alsharq, 2013); this makes it the 
main player in this company, as well as hosting the firm’s headquarters. Despite the fact that 
Arabsat was founded by the 21 member states of the Arab League, and it runs as a business 
or satellite service provider, Saudi Arabia has the power to stop carrying any channel that 
could threaten its policy, while other members cannot do this. As an example, Arabsat has 
banned many satellite TV programmes dealing with magic, witchcraft, the Occult or 
paganism (shirk) in Saudi Arabia, on the grounds that these are incompatible with Islam. In 
contrast, Bahrain has struggled to stop Al Alam, the Iranian Arabic language channel 
programme on Arabsat, having been told by the organisation that there is no monitoring of 
channel content. Following long debate, Arabsat was finally convinced to stop broadcasting 
Al Alam (Elgomaa, n.p.). 
With regards to ownership, Saudi Arabia controls all the main Arabic language TV networks 
(MBC Group, ART, OSN, and Rotana) with the exception of the Al Jazeera Network, which 
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is the only rival to the Saudi media empire in Arab environs. It appears that members of the 
Saudi royal family, their relatives and close friends own all the Saudi TV networks, without 
exception. As result, this ownership means that their, “Editorial policy is Saudi-friendly.” 
(Kraidy, 2002:07) Moreover, private TV channels are also Saudi-backed financially and have 
a pro-Saudi editorial policy. Hence, when Saudi citizens try to express themselves and seek 
their rights via the media, they will find a space, but not what might be expected from a 
supposedly ‘independent’ media industry. The Saudi regime, like all Arab countries, usually 
allows, “A level of freedom to satellite television but still exercises substantial control.” 
(Kraidy, 2002:9). Importantly, all the previously mentioned satellite TV stations are allowed 
freedom to broadcast entertainment, social, and Islamic programmes, but not politics. As 
recently as July 2015, the Saudi authorities banned a TV presenter on the Rotana Khalijiyah 
satellite channel and the political activist Mohsin AlAwaji from media activities, and referred 
both of them to the Investigation Commission and to the General Prosecutor's Office for 
alleged abuse of the late Saudi king (Middle East Monitor, 2015). 
 
5.5.4. Media and regulation and freedom of expression 
  Media laws and restrictions are crucial to an understanding of the media landscape in Saudi 
Arabia and also in shaping activists’ tendency to use alternatives in order to mobilise and 
achieve campaign goals (Fandy, 1999). As previously noted, legislation relating to the media 
was originally established with radio broadcasting but issues relating to media are covered in 
the Basic Law of Governance. Article 39 states: 
Mass media and all other vehicles of expression shall employ civil and polite 
language, contribute towards the education of the nation and strengthen unity. It 
is prohibited to commit acts leading to disorder and division, affecting the 
security of the state and its public relations, or undermining human dignity and 
rights, (Basic Law of Governance 1992). 
In addition, Article 40 continues: 
The privacy of telegraphic and postal communications, and telephone and other 
means of communication shall be inviolate. There shall be no confiscation, delay, 
surveillance or eavesdropping, except in cases provided by the Law, (Basic Law 
of Governance 1992) 
Both these articles address important points. The first article emphasises the role of 
media in national unity and human dignity and the second article prohibits censorship. 
The so-called ‘Higher Media Council’, headed by the Minister of the Interior, was 
dissolved in 2000 Part of its remit was to devise a Saudi media policy, meaning there is 
no longer any specific authority responsible for the policy. In addition, there is also a 
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Committee of Cultural and Media Affairs in the Shura Council, which considers issues 
relating to culture and the media, and legislation regarding these areas.  
There is a variety of regulations and legislation governing the operation of media in Saudi 
Arabia and freedom of expression, the key ones being the ‘Law of Printed Materials and 
Publication’ and the ‘Digital Publishing Implementation’, as well as one article in the ‘Anti-
Cyber Crime Law’. The following section will address these laws and implementations.   
 
5.5.4.1. Law of printed materials and publication, digital publishing 
implementation and the anti-cybercrime law 
 The printed press in Saudi is subject to several specific laws and regulations, including 
articles in the Basic Law of Governance. The vast majority of media is governed by three 
pieces of legislations: the Law of Printed Materials and Publication (2000), the Digital 
Publishing Implementation (2011) and the Anti-Cyber Crimes Law (2007). The Press and 
Publishing Law (last amended in 2000) consists of 49 articles, dealing with domestic and 
international publications, as well as other topics, including the need to obtain a license from 
MoCI to practise activities connected with printing and publication, and all relevant 
conditions, procedures and fees. 
Presumably, having to obtain a license means that the MoCI can control not only who owns 
the media, but also the output as well. This could be seen clearly in the case of online media 
and foreign publications that come into the country. For example, in May 2015, the Saudi 
authorities blocked the licensed online Saudi news website, Anha,1 due to what was described 
as a ‘violation’ of the law (Alhyat, 2015). 
The law, however, covers provisions related to domestic publications and the local press. The 
law also stipulates penalties for violation of its legal provisions, the authority responsible, and 
the process for dealing with complaints. This amended law clearly shows some improvement 
‘theoretically’ in the case of printed materials and publication regulations, but practically it 
has not had much influence on the media landscape, as the newspapers in particular are not 
free from MoCI influence. AlEnizi (2003), believes that the amended law (the 2000 Law) 
includes a number of important points which promote freedom of expression. For example, 
Article 24 states, “Local papers shall not be subject to censorship except under extraordinary 
circumstances determined by the President of the Council of Ministers.” Also, Article 25 
makes the point that: 
                                                




Outside the domain of private press establishments, private bodies or individuals 
may publish papers by license from the Ministry and upon approval of the 
President of the Council of Ministers.  
Furthermore, Article 31 notes, “Publication of a paper shall not be banned except under 
extraordinary circumstances and with the approval of the President of the Council of 
Ministers.” whilst Article 38 of the amended law abolished imprisonment as a penalty, 
replacing this with fines and closure of the institution which has violated the law. So far, 
none of these laws have been tested.   
In January 2011, a new set of regulations forming part of the Press and Publishing Law from 
the MoCI entitled, ‘Digital Publishing Regulations, Digital Publishing Implementation’, 
came into effect in Saudi Arabia. These are intended to regulate a wide range of activities that 
use ‘modern technology’ to transmit information (MoCI, 2011). The legislation has a list of 
14 defined mediums such as websites, online news, and social media activities. The 
regulation also gives the Ministry the freedom to add any other medium it sees fit. Saudi-
based digital publications have been warned that they will not be able to operate in Saudi 
unless they obtain a license from the MoCI. Currently, this legislation only seems to have 
been applied to online news websites and there have not been any cases concerning blogs or 
social media related to this regulation whilst YouTube channels are still working freely 
without licence.      
Previously, in 2007, Saudi Arabia introduced the Anti-Cyber Crime Law. This law aims to 
combat cyber crime by identifying crimes and determining their punishments. It should be 
noted that while the Law of Press and Publishing abolished imprisonment as a penalty, the 
Anti-Cyber Crime Law reinstates imprisonment as a punishment for legal violations, (the 
penalties in the Digital Publication Implementing Regulation are based on this).1 This can be 
seen in Articles Three-Seven of the Anti-Cyber Crime Law, which makes provisions for 
‘violators’ to be jailed for up to 10 years.2 It could be argued that the digital publishing 
regulation is illegal according to the provisions of the Press and Publishing Law, since Article 
Two of this Law lists 19 ‘media’ activities which are covered by this piece of legislation. 
However, ‘activity [article] number 20’ states, “Any other activities suggested by the 
ministry to be added to the activities” and subject to the approval of the Prime Minster. In the 
                                                
1 Generally, there are Law of Printed Materials and Publication, and Anti-Cyber Crime Law, as well as Digital 
Publishing Implementing Regulation. Penalties stated in the Implementing Regulation refer to Anti-Cyber 
Crime Law not to the Law of Printed Materials and Publication.   
2 The Anti-Cyber Crimes Law has been widely utilised by the Specialised Criminal Court set up to deal with 
terrorism cases.  
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case of digital publishing regulation, the Prime Minster has not approved this regulation yet. 
In addition to this, Article Six in the Anti-Cyber Crime Law, which was released by the 
Royal Decree No. M/17 on March 26th 2007, states that:  
People who engage in any online activity that impinges on public order, religious 
values, public morals, and privacy, shall be subject to imprisonment for a period 
not exceeding five years and a fine not exceeding three million riyals or to either 
of these punishments, (Anti-Cyber Crime Law 2007). 
The phrase, “impinges on public order, religious values, [and] public morals”, is a broad one, 
and this could be used to limit online freedom of expression, as some might view online 
activities as ‘impinging on’ these areas. Sakr, (2006:138) noted, “The norm in GCC [Gulf 
Co-operation Council] constitutions is for media regulation to be referred to only in vague, 
general terms and for detailed provisions to be left to specific laws.” In addition, loosely 
worded legislation of this type creates grey areas in Saudi media law that tend to force people 
to practise self-censorship and ensure adherence to the regime. As Rugh argues: 
[T]he most common mechanism ensuring newspapers’ loyalty to the basic 
policies of the regime and to its top leadership is anticipatory, self-censorship 
based on sensitivity to the political environment, (2004:82). 
Consequently, it is important to examine the links between politics and media in Saudi 
Arabia before discussing either online or offline activism in this country since it plays an 
important role in shaping the context in which activism takes place. Whilst the media may be 
a useful tool for activists in democratic countries, this is certainly not the case in the context 
of ND states such as Saudi Arabia. 
 
5.6. Pre-Internet Activism: Concepts and Practices   
Studying cyberactivism in the Saudi context requires an understanding of what constitutes 
activism in the Kingdom, since this differs somewhat from what is typically meant by the 
term in the Western world. Furthermore, it is important to understand the history of activism 
in Saudi society before the introduction of the Internet in order to appreciate the dramatic 
changes that this medium has made possible.  
 
5.6.1. Defining activism in the Saudi context 
 It is argued here that activism in Saudi Arabia differs from what is commonly understood by 
this term in other countries, due to the unique complexities of the legal, religious, media and 
social restrictions posed by the Saudi context. Chapter One has demonstrated the complexity 
of activism terminologies in the general context. In the Saudi context, it is more difficult to 
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use such terms or definitions when referring to activism or collective action. Pascal (2013), 
states that activism in Saudi Arabia is  semi-formal it is,  “Neither formal mobilisation 
(visible institutions or organisation with  definite memberships and a published program), nor 
informal groups, the fortuitous union of previously unconnected people.” (Pascal 2013:70). 
The semi-formal nature of activism makes it difficult to identify and measure activities and 
activism. Bayat (2010), also acknowledges that activism differs in the Middle East in general 
and uses the phrase, “Collective action without collective actors”, coined by Alberto Melucci 
(1996, cited in Bayat, 2010:110). Bayat’s use of Melucci’s phrase highlights the fact that 
activists in the Middle East act on the ground, but without organisation, and this observation 
is particularly apt in the Saudi case. This also makes an interesting link with what Bennett 
and Segerberg (2013), referred to as ‘connective action’ online, as discussed in Chapter One. 
This may suggest that connective action may also be applied to pre-Internet collective action 
in the case of the Middle East.  
As terms, ‘activism’ and ‘social movements’ are not commonly used among activists in 
Saudi Arabia for two main reasons. Firstly, the government criminalises any collective action 
launched without state permission and it only allows collective action on a small scale for 
charitable purposes. This can be legalised only if it receives direct supervision from the 
authorities; for example, no trade unions exist in the Kingdom (Hertog, 2006). There are what 
could be called ‘semi-unions’, such as the Saudi Journalists Association, which was 
established by the MoIC, to block any attempts by independent journalists to form similar 
associations. The government sought to avoid the actual word ‘union’ when naming this 
organisation. There are very few, truly independent organisations and the civil society 
institutions are still weak because of the restrictive legal framework. The majority of Saudi 
non-governmental organisations are, in fact, managed or controlled to some extent by the 
government, (ICNL, 2013). 
Secondly, the official religious establishment in Saudi, which has been created and formed by 
the Saudi government, considers most types of social action to be anti-Islamic. The following 
passage from the Qur’an is often cited as evidence of this, “And hold fast, all of you together, 
to the Rope of Allah [i.e. the Qur’an], and be not divided among yourselves.” (Aal-Imran, 
3:103). It is believed, then, that such organisations may be divisive to society. Moreover, the 
official religious establishment prohibits open criticism of the ruler, as well as prohibiting 





5.6.2. Restrictions on activism in Saudi Arabia 
 Collective action in Saudi Arabia has traditionally been viewed suspiciously by the 
authorities, regardless of the type of action in question. For example, even teaching the 
Qur’an to children in mosques is considered to be a kind of activity requiring to be licensed 
and monitored. Predominantly, there are three legal barriers which can be said to shape and 
restrict the nature of activism in Saudi Arabia. The first of these is the Law on Associations 
and Foundations which regulates collective action. This law is often regarded as out-dated by 
some activists like Alfalih (2008), and has become an obstacle to achieving the goals of 
collective action in general. For example, it mainly focuses on charitable organisations as 
well as limiting the activities of civil society organisations (Shalaby, 2008).  
The current law has specified more complex requirements for establishing any organisation, 
for example, at least 20 people must write to the Ministry of Social Affairs in order to create 
an organisation. Moreover, all requests must be approved by the Ministry, which tightly 
controls the organisation to the extent that even the place for regular meetings must be 
approved by the Ministry. Given these problems with the current law, the government has 
agreed to adopt a new law but it does not appear to have the appetite for opening up 
participation in civil activities to the public and so is hindering the proposed new legislation. 
The law that was passed to the government by the Shura Council on December 31st 2007, is 
still to be officially issued at the time of writing.  
Moreover, according to AlFaleh (2008, n.p.), the proposed law, which was drafted by the 
Shura Council, is still out-dated and does not fulfil citizens’ expectations. He argued that if 
the proposed law is approved, citizens will still, “Face a continuing confiscation and 
kidnapping of society as a result of restrictions and trapping curbs on the effectiveness of its 
NGOs which are supposed to work in accordance to this law.” The proposed law, “Does not 
enshrine the right and freedom of individuals to establish and form NGOs directly and freely.” 
(AlFaleh, 2008, n.p.). The proposed law again requires the establishment of any civil society 
institution to be registered and given official approval. AlFaleh argues that this will not help 
civil society institutions, comparing the Saudi situation with that of countries such as 
Lebanon, which only require an announcement concerning the founding of the organisation 
without approval by official bodies. In the Saudi case, if the Ministry of Social Affairs 
refuses approval, there are no grounds for appeal against the decision.    
However, both the current and the proposed Saudi legislation on civil society 
organisations, formally prohibit any free collective action within the state. Nonetheless, 
despite all these obstacles and limitations, the government is still trying to postpone the 
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approval which, as a result, has opened the door for them to quash any collective action 
that could be viewed as being against the state.  
It is not simply that collective action is not allowed but also specific types of activity are 
often highlighted as prohibited, even though there is no specific law regulating 
demonstrations or assembly. Calling for a demonstration or any small public assembly to be 
held in the Kingdom, is still regarded as forbidden, whatever the reason. The Ministry of the 
Interior constantly reminds the public of this restriction via the mass media. For example, one 
of the Ministry’s press releases on March 5th 2011, makes clear that:  
 
In light of noticing the attempts of some people to circumvent the laws and 
relevant instructions and due processes in order to achieve illegitimate objectives 
[…], the Security Spokesman of the Ministry of Interior explained that the laws 
enforced in the Kingdom strictly prohibit all forms of demonstrations, marches 
and sit-ins as well as any call for such actions because these contradict the 
principles of Islamic Law (Sharia) and the values and norms of the Saudi society; 
they further lead to public disorder, harm to public and private interests, breach of 
the rights of others, and to wreaking havoc that result in bloodshed, violation of 
people's sanctity and loss of their possessions, and encroachment on public and 
private properties, (SPA 2011).  
The spokesman went on to stress that the State provides other means for expression:  
While the laws and values prevailing in our society, under the laws of Allah and 
the teachings of His Messenger, have sanctioned legitimate venues for expression 
and open doors for communication at all levels to serve the public good, the 
security forces are lawfully authorised to take all necessary actions against 
whoever tries to violate the law in any way, and he will be subject to the full 
force of the relevant regulations, (SPA, 2011). 
Furthermore, the discourse of the official religious establishment is always consistent with 
the government’s point of view, or vice-versa, as Saudi Arabia always emphasises religion as 
the core component of the state, which makes the Ministry of the Interior’s prohibition of 
demonstrations appear to be religiously, rather than politically, motivated. In their statements 
about demonstrations, the Council of Senior Islamic Scholars use similar discourse to that 
used by the Ministry of Interior:  
 
Since the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based on the Qur’an, Sunnah, the pledge of 
allegiance, and the necessity of unity and loyalty, then reform should not be by 
demonstrations and other means and methods that give rise to unrest and divide 
the community. This is what is affirmed by scholars of this country in the past 
and present to prohibit these methods and warn against them. The Council affirms 
prohibition of demonstrations in this country and the legal method which realizes 
the welfare without causing destruction rests on the mutual advice. This is what 
was practised by the Prophet (peace be upon him) and followed by his 
companions and their followers, (Islamopedia, 2011). 
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5.6.3. The origins of activism in Saudi Arabia 
 Despite current legal restrictions against activism in Saudi Arabia, as well as the 
stereotypical view of the country as a repressive state, which has the power to suppress any 
uprising or activism, a closer look at the history of Saudi Arabia clearly demonstrates that 
activism has always been present there in some shape or form. However, despite the various 
types of activism which have existed in the Saudi state, most published studies have focused 
on Islamic or jihadi movements while other types of movements have received very little 
attention. Thus, a number of studies exist on the Ikhwan, but it was difficult to find studies 
relating to other social movements in the country, such as the Labour Movement (1953-1956). 
The reason for this is because most of the locally, religiously inspired movements have had 
an international impact, or have been linked with other such movements worldwide. 
However, tracing the history of collective action in Saudi Arabia shows that most pre-Internet 
activism was primarily aimed at political reform, with militant activism in some cases. For 
example, the Free Princes Movement, founded in 1958 by Prince Talal, son of the founder of 
Saudi Arabia, King Abdulaziz, called for political reform and operated from Cairo in Egypt 
(Dekmejian, 2003). Similarly, in 1958 the National Liberation Organisation, also known as 
the Saudi Communist party, sought adoption of a constitution that would guarantee 
parliamentary elections, ensure press freedom and freedom of association, allow political 
parties and trade unions to be formed, give citizens the right to protest and strike, develop 
national industry and outlaw slavery (Kjorlien, 1994). A further example was the Committee 
for the Defence of Legitimate Rights, later, the Movement for Islamic Reform, which was 
founded during the First Gulf War in 1991. This movement sought to achieve comprehensive 
reforms in the spheres of politics, economics and social security, as well as in the military, 
the judiciary foreign relations, the media and religious institutions (Kapiszewski, 2006; 
Fandy, 1999). The petition signed by the members of this committee showed that almost all 
members are university academics in different disciplines, and Islamic scholars.   
We can also see regular occurrences of more extremist activism including violence. For 
example, Al-Jamma’a Al-Salafiyya Al-Muhtasiba is a group of Salafist Muslims who 
condemn Saudi rulers for not governing in accordance with Islamic rules. The founder of the 
movement, Juhayman al-Utaybi, accuses the Saudi royal family in particular of corruption as 
well as having close ties with ‘infidel’ governments and persecuting all members of the 
domestic opposition (Munson, 1989). On November 20th 1979, a group led by al-Utaybi 
seized the Holy Mosque in Makkah, and then declared that his brother-in-law was the, 
“Messianic Mehdi who had come to rid the world of injustice and corruption.” (Munson 
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1989:71). This siege lasted for two weeks and 127 army personnel were killed and 462 
injured during the operation, in addition to civilians. The leader of the attack and 102 of his 
followers were later executed (Lacroix, 2011; AbuKhalil, 1994). 
 
5.6.3.1.  Islamic movements 
 As noted above, historically, many of the key movements have been religiously inspired in 
Saudi Arabia. Islamic Movements have been studied globally within the Saudi context 
because of their influence on other movements elsewhere in the world, (see, for example, 
Kjorlien, 1994; Munson, 1989; Hegghammer, 2008; Lacroix, 2011; AbuKhalil, 1994; 
Armajani, 2011). The most famous of these is Assahwa Al-Islamia (Islamic Awakening). It 
can be argued that the most important question in this context is why Islamic movements of 
this kind would be found in a country that is often thought of as the world’s most Islamic 
nation. One possible answer could be that these movements, including Assahwa Al-Islamia, 
are not interested in opposing the secular regime, but in challenging the regime’s right to 
monopolise religion, even though its legitimacy is derived from Islam. However, researchers 
such as Lacroix (2012), argue that Assahwa is a combination of the Egyptian Islamic 
movement Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood) and Wahabbi Islamic thought. In 
this context, Alomaim argues that the uniqueness of Assahwa lies in the fact it is more 
practical than theoretical. In other words, it puts its ideology into practice, (AlOmaim, n.d.).  
Lacroix appears to be the only scholar to have focused on Assahwa in particular and he has 
treated it as though it were a European-style political party, or a movement with organisation. 
However, like other movements in Saudi Arabia, Assahwa cannot be studied in the same way 
as one might study a movement in the European context or anywhere else, where people can 
freely disclose their political or ideological affiliations. There is no doubt that Assahwa is a 
movement, but it might be agreed that it is not an organised movement, in the sense of having 
leaders and plans. Assahwa could be seen as a philosophy rather than an organised movement. 
As such, then, it can also be thought of as, “Collective action without collective actors.” 
(Melucci, 1996). 
What is important is the movement’s pivotal activist role in education, politics and 
volunteerism, as well as in many other fields in Saudi Arabia. As it is an Islamic movement, 
it does not confine its activities to one field, because Muslims believe that their religion 




5.6.3.2. The labourers’ movement 1953-1956 
 One of the earliest examples of pre-Internet activism in Saudi Arabia is the ‘Labourers’ 
Movement’, which relied on the traditional model of activism in a ND country. In 1945, 
workers in the Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Aramco) began their first strike, demanding 
higher wages and reduced working hours. The company responded to some of their demands. 
Later, in 1953, a group of company employees held a meeting to launch a body called the 
‘Workers’ Committee’, composed of seven employees and then notified the government and 
the company. The Committee, which was intended to act as the link between staff on the one 
hand, and the Saudi government and the oil company on the other hand, received no 
objections from either. Later, it presented a list of demands to the company and the 
government, in addition to distributing leaflets to tell the workers about the Committee. 
According to Matthiesen (2014), the oil company management claimed that although the 
committee was ostensibly set up to achieve worker demands, it had a different agenda, and 
would evolve to include issues of public policy or politics. At this stage, labour activists also 
accused the oil company of deliberately provoking workers to commit acts of vandalism, 
which supports the company’s claim. The government summoned the members of the 
Committee to negotiate with the Workers’ Committee on October 15th 1953, and then 
arrested all the Committee members, who were imprisoned in Al-Ahsa in what is known as 
the ‘slaves’ prison’.  
News about the imprisonment of Committee members spread swiftly among workers who 
were asked by their colleagues not to return work, in preparation for a major strike. The strike 
lasted for two weeks, until the Committee members were released from prison, but eventually 
all lost their jobs and two were expelled from Saudi Arabia. In 1955, the newly crowned 
monarch, King Saud, asked the oil company to re-hire the workers who had been fired and 
the company agreed to do this but excluded three of the Committee members. 
The examples noted above were used to represent the scale of social movements and 
campaigns before the Internet era. All these examples could be classified as political in nature. 
These examples demonstrate that, despite regulations and a political environment which 
criminalises all type activism, with the exception of charities, activists in Saudi Arabia have 
still succeeded in challenging the regulations and the political environment on occasions. Yet, 
it is important to state that regulation and the political environment may only be effective for 
limiting small campaigns. When reviewing the history of pre-Internet activism, it is clear that 
big collective actions could stand against the political and social system in the country. This 
includes the militant movements and political movements such as the ‘Committee for the 
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Defence of Legitimate Rights’. In an iron-fisted regime, activism is a very risky activity, and 
ordinary people are generally unwilling to take the risk to campaign for social issues.    
 
5.6.4. Pre-internet activism tools 
 As we saw earlier in the chapter, legal regulations and social pressure have limited the 
freedom of expression. Yet, activists in Saudi Arabia have always used alternative media to 
circumvent these controls such as fax, leaflets, posters, videotapes, and particularly, 
audiotapes. For example, (Zayani, 2012) pointed out:  
 
The use of small media to circumvent state control and disseminate anti-
establishment political messages constituted a security challenge in subsequent 
years. Prominent Saudi opposition figures made feverish use of fax machines [...] 
to diffuse antagonistic messages, voice criticism and call for reform. Because the 
fax was essential to the conduct of business, it was difficult to disrupt its use 
without disrupting the economy, (2012:312). 
 
This section will focus only on audiotapes, as they were recognised as the main alternative 
medium used in Saudi Arabia. During the 1980s and 1990s, cassettes were considered as an 
alternative medium in many Muslim countries (Hirschkind, 2006) and have been credited 
with playing a major role in Iran’s Islamic Revolution (Annabelle, 1990). Internationally, 
they were also used in the Soviet Union as a form of so-called ‘acoustic Samizdat’, to deliver 
messages that could not be delivered via the mainstream media (Mianowicz, 1994). In the 
Saudi context, even though cassettes were meant to be licensed before circulation, interviews 
with business leaders in the Islamic audiotape industry show that cassette distribution began 
in the early 1980s and grew rapidly (Fandy, 1999). According to Aldoah (1991), by 1991, 
there were as many as 70 Islamic cassette stores in Riyadh, some of which carried about 
9,500 titles, with sales averaging 60,000 cassettes per month. Islamic tapes were viewed as a 
highly profitable business, as well as being used for mobilisation purposes.  
It is clear that the spread of Islamic audiotapes could be attributed to Islamist organisations 
feeling that they had no alternative. Alkhedr (2010:670), indicates that, “Journalism remained 
immune from Islamist journalists who maintained only a marginal presence.” due, in part, to 
opposition from the press and from politicians who did not allow Islamists to form part of the 
mainstream media.  
Many audiotapes were recitals of the Qur’an and Islamic lectures which came from Kuwait 
on a weekly basis, and were then re-copied and sold on the Saudi market (interviewee C1). 
However, cassettes were also used to address subjects such as women’s issues from an 
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Islamic point of view, religious matters and political analysis which might be classed as anti-
Saudi policy, and all topics which could not be covered in the press in the Saudi context. This 
does not necessarily indicate that the issues addressed on cassettes were opposed by 
government, since most cassettes were issued with licenses for circulation. This suggests that 
these issues were not of interest to the Saudi press.  
Moreover, the subsequent development of the cassette industry also shows that it became an 
alternative medium produced in parallel with mainstream media. Cassette stores started 
producing songs for adults and children consistent with Islamic teachings, as well as video 
cartoons with the same concept. Also, other titles about medicine and physiology could be 
found in cassette stores. Furthermore, some Islamic scholars used cassettes to reply to press 
columnists, since in most cases they did not have the chance to reply in the same newspapers. 
Some journalists also used their newspaper columns to reply to issues previously circulated 
by cassette as the titles of cassette content shows (Almanie & Alsheikh, 2013).   
Friday sermons on secular, rather than religious, matters also played a crucial role in 
supplying the cassette industry with material and succeeded in engaging larger audiences 
than they would normally get in the mosques during sermons (Hirschkind, 2006). Newspaper 
columnists called for Friday sermons to focus on religious teachings only, whilst Islamists 
interpreted these calls as a kind of secularism and argued they must be about everything 
related to Muslim life. Islamists who represented the so-called Assahwa also used cassettes to 
address the public, but claimed that circulation remained relatively low among audiences, 
despite government support by buying some titles for free distribution at certain events.  
Islamists claimed that audiotapes had many advantages for them. Firstly, it was easy to use 
them, as people could easily listen to audiotapes nearly everywhere, at home or driving cars. 
Moreover, they could be quickly circulated. For example, more than 30,000 copies of one 
title of these audiotapes was sold in one store in a very short time in Saudi Arabia. In addition, 
the cassette could be used to address all levels of society. As a tool, it could reach a wide 
array of people, even those who were totally illiterate or who found it difficult to read. A 
further advantage was that compared to a book, audiotapes have the power to be more 
influential. When people listen to an audiotape they feel that someone is addressing them 
directly and skilled speakers can use their voice very effectively. Finally, a very broad range 
of titles was available, with producers trying to provide something for everyone, including 
sermons by preachers, Islamic songs, Arabic language teaching and poetry (Alodah, 1990).  
All of the advantages of audiotape mentioned by Alodah could also apply to the Internet, as a 
mobilisation medium, as discussed in Chapter Two. Moreover, it can be noted that many of 
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those Islamic scholars who are now popular online, originally gained their popularity on 
audiotape.   
 
Alodah, a well-known Islamist scholar in Saudi Arabia, has argued that two groups were 
opposed to the use of cassettes. Local newspapers and secularists used newspaper articles to 
attack the audiocassette, whilst the international press and some foreign political circles tried 
to discourage people from using cassettes by linking them with the Islamic revolution in Iran, 
arguing that the recording industry could lead to a revolution in Saudi Arabia. Alodah 
claimed that this conflict between the two sides was understandable given that each had its 
own ideological agenda which clearly contradicted that of the other (Alodah, 1990). 
Interviews by the researcher with businessmen in the cassette industry indicate that it was 
influenced negatively by the emergence of the Internet in Saudi Arabia. They claimed that 
many cassette stores closed and the larger ones began to shrink their activities. They argued 
that their works were copied and uploaded to the Internet without taking into account any 
intellectual property rights, meaning that people downloaded these from the Internet instead 
of going to the stores. Moreover, preachers who had previously used cassettes to address the 
public quickly moved to the Internet seeing it as being more efficient (interviewees C1 and 
C2).    
Activists in Saudi Arabia have often developed their tools to overcome the restrictions of 
using traditional media, in the same way that it was noted in Chapter One that activists 
always develop their own tools to reach audiences (Raboy, 1981). The fact that audiotapes 
were used widely in Saudi Arabia to engage both national and international audiences and as 
a means of bypassing traditional media, emphasises the fact that cassettes have some parallels 
with the Internet, as activists always find a way around existing restrictions.  
As noted by (Almanie & Alsheikh, 2013), those who use audiocassettes do not have access to 
or representation in the printed press in particular. (Almanie & Alsheikh, 2013) suggest that 
each party uses their own media to reply to the other party. Moreover, reinforcing traditional 
religious values does not guarantee that people can participate in traditional media. Some 
religious group claim that traditional media does not represent Islamic values in the Saudi 





5.7.  Conclusions  
This chapter outlined the political system of Saudi Arabia, and underlined the close 
relationship which exists between the Islamic religion and the political system. It also 
reviewed the media landscape and the laws and regulations which shape the systemic 
environment, especially the limitation of freedom of expression. The main goal of the chapter 
was to examine the overarching systemic environment of Saudi Arabia as a means of 
contextualising the case study campaigns reviewed later in this thesis.  
In general, the Saudi systemic environment makes activism on the ground a complex and 
risky process for those involved. It is clear that the Saudi political system does not provide a 
public space for citizens to participate politically, when even the Shura council members are 
appointed, not elected. This chapter also showed that both the political system and religious 
belief discourage any sort of activism, with some Muslim scholars claiming that this runs 
counter to the teachings of Islam. 
The traditional media in Saudi Arabia are in a similar situation to those in other ND countries. 
They are loyal to the state and even the privately owned press is still effectively under state 
control, with the Minister of Information having the power to appoint and dismiss Editors-in-
chief. Foreign media, whether press or satellite TV stations, are also subject to state control, 
with media laws placing restrictions on journalistic practices and freedom of expression. 
Legislation is often deliberately vague, meaning that citizens and journalists impose, 
“Anticipatory self-censorship” to avoid punishment (Rugh, 2004). 
The approach to the theory and practice of activism which has developed in Saudi Arabia is a 
particularly interesting, if not unique one, due to the peculiarities of the environment in which 
it exists. Addressing the socio-political environment and the media landscape, and tracing the 
history of activism, paves the way to understanding current cyberactivism in Saudi Arabia as 




6. CHAPTER SIX: THE INTERNET AND CYBERACTIVISM IN SAUDI ARABIA 
 
6.1. Introduction  
The previous chapter explored the systemic environment for activism in Saudi Arabia; the 
focus now shifts to establishing the broader context of Internet usage in Saudi Arabia. This 
chapter begins by examining the emergence and growth of the Internet in the Kingdom and 
exploring how and why Saudis use this medium. High penetration rates for Internet and, 
particularly social media, in comparison to other countries, globally indicate the potential for 
activism in cyberspace there and this chapter will demonstrate how various online campaigns 
have engaged both Saudi citizens and decision makers, and brought real change to the lives 
of ordinary people. Following this, the limitations of the Internet will be considered, 
addressing the impact of restrictions imposed by the government on freedom of expression 
and Internet usage campaigns initiated by citizens.  
 
6.2. Internet Use in Saudi Arabia  
The Internet became publically available in Saudi Arabia in January 1999, through 
commercial providers (ISPs), relatively late in comparison to many countries.  It began with 
about 134,000 users and since then, has grown rapidly, despite high prices and infrastructure 
problems. By 2015, the number of Internet users had reached 21 million, around 66% of the 
Saudi public (CITC, 2015). In addition, around 72% of the Saudi population have smart 
phones and 80% of these have an Internet subscription for their mobiles.  
 According to the most authoritative recent survey conducted by the Communications and 
Information Technology Commission, which is the information and communications 
technology sector regulator, from a sample of 3000 Saudis, aged between 12 and 65, some 91% 
claim to use the Internet (CITC, 2014). Similarly, comparative studies of Internet penetration 
in Gulf countries indicate that Saudi Arabia has relatively high penetration rates in the region. 
Table 6 shows that Saudi Arabia is ranked in fourth place amongst Internet users, and 















Bahrain 1,217,701 799,521 65.66% 3.03% 
Qatar 1,836,676 1,008,850 54.93% 3.82% 
UAE 9,036,488 5,169,280 57.20% 19.58% 
KSA 29,595,084 15,800,000 53.39% 59.85% 
Kuwait 3,823,728 2,268,470 59.33% 8.59% 
Oman 3,770,473 1,353,318 35.89% 5.13% 
 
Note. ( Madar Research and Development and Orient Planet, 2014) 
   
6.2.1. Internet users: Demographics and online behaviour 
 The CITC 2014 survey (mentioned above), provides a clear insight into Internet users 
demographics and user habits. In terms of educational levels, the survey indicated people 
with limited education, as well as those who are illiterate, use the Internet in Saudi Arabia, 
where 16% of those who described themselves as illiterate are using the Internet. It also 
shows that 82% of the people surveyed who have studied at primary school are using the 
Internet, while 99.21% of those surveyed are master degree holders and are using the Internet 
(CITC, 2014). The survey also showed gender differences in usage: 85% of Saudi women 
surveyed reported accessing the Internet via mobiles, as opposed to 79% of men.  
Generally, with regards to time spent on the Internet, the results indicated that some 28% of 
those surveyed stated that they used the Internet for between two and four hours every day, 
whilst just over a quarter (25.75%) use the Internet for more than eight hours a day; the 
youngest age cohorts (12-19 year olds) spending most time online. There was also a gender 
split on time spent on the Internet with nearly a quarter of females (24%) using the Internet 
for more than eight hours a day, while only 11% of their male counterparts spent the same 
amount of time online. 
The percentage for Internet penetration in Saudi Arabia is 59.85% and came from a survey 
conducted by Madar Research and Development and Orient Planet in 2012 as stated in the 
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table title. However, the CITC survey in 2014 was conducted with people aged between 12 
and 65 whilst no lower or upper age limits were imposed in the CITC figures for 2015.   
 
In relation to social media usage, the survey revealed that almost all Internet users make use 
of social media (91%), with 94% of these spending at least two hours daily. In this case, there 
was little marked difference between men and women, although the latter are more likely to 
use Twitter and Instagram than their male counterparts.  
 
Figure 3: Internet Usage by Saudis at Home (not including 3G/4G Internet Services), 
(Source: CITC Report 2014) 
 
Statistics also indicate very high Internet usage in terms of producing content, time spent 
online and sharing online content compared to other countries globally. For instance, one 
survey classified Saudi Arabia as the lead country in the world in terms of sharing online 
content, with over 60% of Saudis sharing most things online, including feelings, videos, 
photos, links and so forth. Figure 3 shows that the international average for sharing online 




Figure 4: Cross-country comparison of percentages of content-sharing online (Source: 
Ipsos OTX, cited in Meeker & Wu, 2013) 
 
With regard to Twitter, for example, Saudi Arabia is the country with the highest percentage 
of active users among its online population. Studies show that the annual growth of Twitter in 
Saudi Arabia during the period 2013-2014 reached 3000%, making it the number one country 
in the world in terms of penetration, with 32% of Saudis posting at least once per month on 
Twitter (Mari 2013; Peerreach n.d.; AlQahtani, 2014). Moreover, although Saudi Arabia is 
not the largest Arabic-speaking country, Saudis produce 47% of the tweets in Arabic on 
Twitter (Estimo, Jr 2015). 
A Twitter hashtag created in 2014 asked why people thought this had been so successful in 
Saudi Arabia ( _االتويیتر_في_االسعودديیةنجحلماذذاا_ #). Some of those who responded suggested the 
following reasons for its popularity:  
 
• Users can communicate without interference. 
• There is no Editor-in-chief to interfere. 
• People express themselves freely without restrictions or limitations. 
• It is the alternative to the Saudi Shura [Council].   
• Your voice can reach more people and it can make a difference.  
• You can discuss issues with different people without any social barriers.   
• You can express yourself without revealing your identity. 
• Because the press is controlled. 
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• It is the only available channel for Saudi citizens to express their views.  
• It is a means of entertainment.  
 
The posts reveal that the popularity of Twitter seems largely due to the fact that it opens up a 
space for discussion without a gatekeeper (“no Editor-in-chief to interfere”). This is 
contrasted with the traditional media and the offline public space, where many restrictions 
prevent Saudis from expressing themselves politically. In addition, some also believe that 






Figure 5: Twitter Penetration Rates per Country (Source: Mari 2013) 
 
In addition to the exceptionally popular Twitter, Saudi Arabia is also the biggest per capita 
user of YouTube in the world, with its citizens contributing more than 90 million YouTube 
views every day (Hootsuite, 2013). Other reports also indicate that Saudi Arabia is one of the 
top 10 countries in using instant messaging applications on mobiles, namely Whatsapp, 
Snapchat, and weChat (Global WebIndex, 2015). This report (Global WebIndex) 
demonstrates that 50% of Internet users in Saudi Arabia use Whatapp, 20% use Snapchat, 




Access to Internet services can be considered the key to a Saudi public space that is not be 
available in ‘real’ life. Delivering a public lecture online requires no authorisation, whilst 
offline authorisation is required. Talking freely to a member of the opposite sex is nowhere 
near as problematic online as it is offline because the Internet helps to dissolve boundaries 
which are normally strictly enforced due to established social and religious traditions. Saudis 
can watch the latest films and TV series with an ease that was previously unthinkable given 
that CDs and DVDs still need official approval before they can enter the country. Thus, the 
Internet has become a crucial part of Saudi life and a means of bypassing traditional controls. 
 
6.2.2. Internet and Traditional Media: The challenge of the new Virtual Public 
Space 
 The comparatively high take-up rates of Internet-based technologies and platforms are, in 
part, due to the absence of the socially constructed public space offline. In terms of 
newspapers, for example, only eight news dailies have been licensed in Saudi Arabia but 
currently there are 600 licensed news websites, in addition to another 1400 unlicensed ones. 
Some 90% of Saudis claimed that the Internet is an important source of news, giving it a 
higher rating than TV (Dennis et al., 2015). Low circulation numbers and financial deficit are 
evidence of the position of Saudi traditional media in the Internet era. Awad (2010), notes 
that the traditional press is struggling, with three national newspapers failing to cope 
financially because Saudis use online news websites. Traditionally, Saudi newspapers do not 
reveal their circulation figures, but it is believed that currently, the daily circulation of one of 
these newspapers barely reaches 1500 copies. Further evidence of low circulation figures can 
be found in the newspaper’s official statement, which declared that it had not paid staff 
salaries (Alarabiya 2013).  
The Internet is clearly impacting on journalistic practice in Saudi Arabia. Awad (2010), 
argued that this is reflected in various ways. In practical terms, censorship has been reduced 
following the advent of the Internet, since online news websites have published news stories 
that would not make it into the traditional press. This has broken the taboo on certain subjects, 
such as corruption, making it easier for newspapers to follow these stories without pressure 
from the Ministry, and to compete with online news websites. Nearly 72% of Saudi officials 
interviewed in the Ministry of Information agreed that, “Online coverage of some local issues 




Officials gave three reasons for this. Firstly, once a story had been published online it became 
less sensitive, allowing traditional newspapers to cover such news. Secondly, it was feared 
that newspapers might lose their readership to online news websites. Thirdly, now that Saudis 
can access online news easily, there is no point in banning newspapers from covering stories. 
One official clearly stated, “Censorship was originally exercised to isolate Saudi society from 
the outside world for fear of contact with other religious and ideological currents.” (Awad, 
2010:267). Consequently, when news stories became available to Saudis online, it made no 
sense to prevent traditional newspapers from covering these. This can be compared to the 
case of the traditional media in China. Tang and Sampson (2012:468), state that, “Strong 
public opinion online may provide a way in which storylines can be more legitimately taken 
up in state-controlled mass media.” The authors also argue that even in such controlled media, 
citizens’ online participation shapes the news agenda of the more controlled traditional media.   
Moreover, competing news websites and the Internet’s ability to rapidly disseminate stories 
has forced newspapers to speed up their own news coverage in order to stay in the market. 
Online news websites do not need to wait until the following day to publish news as 
traditional newspapers did. For a news website, publishing online is much less complex than 
it is for traditional printing. This forces newspapers to attempt to speed up their news cycle, 
meaning that they do not have time to wait for approval for some important stories.  
It is clear that the Internet has become the public space from which journalists draw 
information. It has become a recognised stylistic feature for journalists to entitle a report, 
‘Twitter users demand...’ and Twitter hashtags are frequently visible in the Saudi dailies. 
Furthermore, popular online bloggers and Twitter users have been invited to write columns in 
the dailies, hoping to attract Internet users to follow their favourite writers in the newspaper 
e.g. Abullah Alqarni on Twitter @agrni writes daily for a Makkah newspaper.  
Similarly, popular bloggers, Twitter users, vloggers and presenters of online TV shows have 
become Saudi celebrities with a similar following to actors, actresses and football players. 
They have gained their fame through their online presence and some have turned this into a 
business opportunity. Advertisements using online Saudi celebrities became popular among 
companies and dozens of examples of their ads can be seen online every day, for example 
Afnan Albatel, who is famous for showing premium products on Instagram, Afnan Albatel, 
@Afnan_Albatel, reportedly charges 4000 SR (750 pounds) per advertisement (Almghloth 
2014).    
YouTube has also become an alternative medium for watching Saudi content that is not 
limited to offerings from state or satellite TV. Rather than just watching YouTube content, 
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the younger generation of Saudis has established their own TV network on YouTube and 
turned this into a business. Thus, UTURN, a Saudi Network on YouTube, presents various 
recorded daily shows and videos about national and regional news, social issues, video games 
and technology on 21 YouTube channels. At the time of writing, UTURN had received 
21,413,940 views and had some 422,489 subscribers since establishing its network in 
November 2010. As with the press, some YouTubers have been invited onto satellite TV to 
present their show there. Mohammad baZaid, for example, moved to Rotana satellite TV to 
present a daily talk show similar to the one he presents on YouTube.1 
Some Saudi Islamic scholars who became popular during the audiocassette boom in the 
1990s have gained similar popularity online. For example, the controversial Islamic scholar, 
Muhammad AlArefe (see Chapter Five), has more than 11 million followers on Twitter. His 
YouTube channel has also gained 555,098 subscribers and generated 40,267,613 views since 
being established in December, 2010.  
Everyday issues, such as political and international issues, are discussed online. A survey by 
Dennis et al. (2015), focusing on six Arab countries, found that 53% of Saudis over 18 agree 
that they can exert more political influence by using the Internet. This percentage underlines 
the fact that Saudis believe the Internet plays a key role in political empowerment more than 
those surveyed elsewhere. 
Not only do Saudi citizens register on Twitter to discuss various issues, even the current King 
launched his own Twitter account whilst he was still Crown Prince in 2013. In addition, most 
Saudi ministers and ministries have their own Twitter account, as well as a number of civil 
service departments. Furthermore, it can be noted that discussions take place online between 
officials and citizens and this Internet debate has influenced the decision-making process in 
the Kingdom. For example, in 2015, Saudi users on Twitter captured a short video from State 
TV showing the Chief of Royal Protocol, Mohammed AlTobayshi, slapping a photographer 
who came close to the King when he was welcoming the Moroccan monarch, Mohammed VI, 
to Riyadh. Within a few minutes of this becoming available, the hashtag became a global 
trend on Twitter. By midnight, the Saudi Press Agency announced that by Royal Order No. 
197A AlTobayshi had been replaced (SPA 2015).  
This demonstrates that there is great potential for cyberactivism to emerge in Saudi Arabia, as 
a result of the restricted political system and limitations placed on civil society institutions. 
Both factors draw activists to alternative spaces and tools to demand their rights within this 
                                                
1 BaZaid’s YouTube show Quarter to Nine can be watched on: https://www.youtube.com/user/s7ch  
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ND system. The emergence of Cyberactivism in such an environment is more than 
coincidence. Rahimi (2003), emphasises that Internet activism thus: 
 
Continues to play an integral part in new Arab citizen activism, and the diversity 
and complexity of online tactics and strategies cannot be seen as detached from a 
broader spectrum of intertwining and competing cultural, political, and social 
forces that are changing global life in unpredictable ways, (Rahimi 2003:163).  
The following section will explore Internet activism in this ND system and how it has 
become a fertile environment for campaigns due to its interactivity, participation levels, high 
volume of content, high percentage of penetration.  
 
6.3. Cyber activism in Saudi Arabia  
The previous chapter outlined the development of activism in the pre-Internet era in Saudi 
Arabia, and the earlier part of this chapter demonstrated the popularity of the Internet in the 
country. Both of these factors demonstrate that the Internet has great potential to be used for 
activism. This is due to two main reasons. Firstly, activists found it is too difficult and risky 
to conduct activism on the ground because, as the previous chapter indicated, there are 
numerous political, social and legal restrictions to doing this. Secondly, Saudis online present 
a unique case in terms of the activities they carry out, in comparison to what goes on 
elsewhere in the world. Both reasons suggest strongly that activism could be flourishing 
online because it is ‘suppressed’ offline, meaning that people are not only passively reading 
online or just simply ‘logging on’. As noted earlier, Saudis tend to share almost everything 
online which brings to mind Bennett and Segerberg's (2013) argument in Chapter Two, that 
in Internet activism, people organise by means of online communication and personal action. 
This is exactly the case in Saudi Arabia, bearing in mind that Saudis prefer to act collectively 
without organisation, as Bayat (2010) argued. Thus, Internet activism suits Saudis perfectly, 
due to the political restrictions to which they are subject and due to their social ‘sharing’ 
habits online. 
The Internet has also generated a new type of activism. As previously noted, early pre-
Internet activism in Saudi Arabia was mainly of a political and militant character, with a few 
exceptions. The absence of a socially constructed public sphere and independent media, 
together with the restrictions on activism imposed by the authorities, make it difficult for 
ordinary people to demand their rights by taking collective action. This political and militant 
activism tended to be carried out by ‘intellectuals’ rather than ordinary citizens, who 
appeared to be unwilling to risk participating in such action due to tough restrictions and the 
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fear of being labelled an ‘activist’. Lacroix (2014), has argued that the Internet makes Saudis, 
especially young people, more politicised and transforms them into activists because of, 
“Their exposure to a wide range of influences through the Internet and the new media.” 
(Lacroix, 2014:07). He also claimed that the Internet and the increasing number of Saudi 
users, offered ‘constitutional reformists’1 a chance to mobilise new social groups, more 
specifically, those who were socialised with Assahwa Al Islamia (see Chapter Five), and 
those who studied abroad on scholarships. 
Despite the apparent popularity of the technology, research on online activism in Saudi 
Arabia is still very limited. However, a number of studies have addressed elements of this 
social phenomenon (Fandy, 1999; Al Nashmi et al., 2010; Alahmed, 2014) whilst others 
mention Saudi online political activism in passing (Matthiesen, 2013). Alahmed claimed that 
political activism is new in Saudi Arabia and that, “It appeared mostly after the emergence of 
new media social networks.” (Alahmed, 2014:38). His research listed many political 
organisations and campaigns such as the Saudi Civil and Political Rights Association 
(ACPRA), established in 2009 (Alahmed, 2014). There is no evidence that this organisation 
was originally formed online but it has certainly gained momentum there. Scholars such as 
Teitelbaum (2002), showed that the Internet was used by the Saudi opposition in 1994, even 
before this was officially introduced to the Kingdom. Teitelbaum points out that the Internet 
was also used by the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (see Chapter Five) to 
send emails and run the committee website.      
Unlike pre-Internet activism, social activism in Saudi Arabia has witnessed a boom which 
parallels that of the growth of the Internet, even though the country has not changed its policy 
regarding collective action and activism. This suggests that the Internet allows Saudis to 
practise a form of activism without taking part in formal collective action, which is still 
criminalised by law, thus lowering the risks associated with activism in this non-democratic 
context. According to Flanagin et al.:   
Instances of collective action that might be labelled ‘classic’ in a theoretical sense, 
such as joining interest groups or voting, are accompanied now by a variety of 
new kinds of actions. These include self-organised protests and political actions 
in the absence of an interest group or other central co-ordinators, affiliation with a 
wide array of online organisations outside of formal ‘membership’ procedures 
and incentives, and a vast scale of personal, voluntarily contributed informational 
goods for public use through the creation of Web content, (2006:30). 
                                                
1 Constitutional reformists are those Saudi activists who are calling for the introduction of constitutional 
monarchy.   
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This argument is similar to Bennett and Segerberg's (2013) model of connective action 
discussed in Chapter Two. Connective or self-organised action, which is the central theme of 
online activism, might be the key to studying this flourishing online social activism, which 
can be considered to be a democratic practice in a ND setting.  
As a result, numbers of online social campaigns in the Saudi context have appeared since the 
Internet was introduced in 1999. The following section illustrates some of the different types 
of online social campaigns which have emerged in recent years, thus providing an indication 
of the broad range of cyberactivism in Saudi Arabia. 
 
6.3.1. The Jeddah floods 
 Jeddah, in western Saudi Arabia, is the largest seaport on the Red Sea, the largest city in 
Makkah Province, and the second largest in Saudi Arabia after the capital, Riyadh. With a 
population currently standing at 3.2 million, Jeddah is an important commercial hub in Saudi 
Arabia. However, despite its importance, its current infrastructure is not robust enough to 
protect it against natural disasters. In November 2009, the western regions of Saudi Arabia 
were hit by heavy rain and floods when, “The impact of the severe convective weather 
process caused more than 90 millimetres (3½ inches) of rain to fall in Jeddah in just four 
hours.” (Al-Khalaf, 2013:150). Some 122 people were reported to have been killed, more 
than 350 went missing, and at least 3,000 vehicles were swept away or damaged in the worst 
natural disaster in Saudi history (Al-Khalaf, 2013). This catastrophe led to social activists 
seeking help and communicating openly via the Internet. This natural disaster can be said to 
have opened the doors to online campaigns against some of the government’s actions.  
Activists broadcast and published hundreds of videos and news stories on YouTube and other 
online websites to educate people about the events and to expose the lack of accuracy of the 
official media coverage. As a result, for the first time ever, the Saudi Government was forced 
to admit that there was corruption in Jeddah City Council and some of its ministries. The 
King formed a ministerial committee, headed by the Second Deputy Prime Minister and the 
then Minister of the Interior, Prince Naif bin Abdullaziz, to address the issue of the Jeddah 
floods. The Prince promised to name and shame the authorities and individuals found 
responsible. Alahmed (2014:46), considers the fact that the Saudi government took 
responsibility for this catastrophe as, “A new phenomenon, a new movement and a 
courageous development in Saudi Arabia which has never existed before in this society.” He 
attributes this to use of the Internet by Saudi citizens.     
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More importantly, this catastrophe and its aftermath paved the way for a number of other 
developments. Firstly, it inaugurated online activism as a tool for civic engagement. The 
videos posted on YouTube, and posts in different online forums, demonstrated co-operation 
between citizens online and highlighted to Saudis that the Internet could be a helpful 
development for their society (Al-Saggaf & Simmons, 2014). Secondly, Saudis became more 
open about expressing their concerns over corruption in their country. The King’s directives 
and his statements about corruption by high-level officials emboldened people to talk freely 
about all kinds of corruption within the government. More importantly, they did this with 
some real hope that exposing these problems might lead to more transparency in dealing with 
local issues.1 According to Alahmed, the Jeddah floods were a milestone in Saudi political 
participation and he goes on to claim (that):     
 
It was the first time in Saudi Arabian history that people took advantage of 
publicity in order to hold the government accountable for the disaster. All these 
processes came from social networking activities, (2014:47).  
 
Similarly, Al-Saggaf and Simmons (2014), who used the Jeddah floods as one of their case 
studies exploring social media and Internet usage in Saudi Arabia, suggested that the Internet 
empowered political communication in several ways. They claimed that it facilitated the 
voice of citizens more than traditional media could, providing a new online space for those 
who had previously had no opportunity to express themselves. Their study also concluded 
that people were able to discuss domestic issues through social media and online forums in a 
way that they could not do in traditional media. The authors found social media represented a 
useful means of understanding citizens’ attitude toward various issues in Saudi Arabia 
because online posts reflected in-depth discussions by Saudis about the everyday matters 
which affected them most:  
Social media were more useful for reading the emotional state of the people than 
they were as a vehicle for the more idealised deliberative and rational aspirations 
of the public sphere, (Al-Saggaf & Simmons, 2014:11). 
 
Al-Saggaf and Simmons (2014), also highlighted the effectiveness of the Internet in Saudi 
Arabia in bringing about social change. This could be clearly seen in various actions such as 
                                                






voluntary work done by citizens during the Jeddah floods, compensation for the flood victims 
provided by the government, the establishment of the ministerial committee and the national 
anti-corruption commission, and infrastructure work undertaken by the government to avoid 
any similar disasters in the future.  
Overall, Al-Saggaf and Simmons argue that social interaction via social media demonstrates 
evidence of unity among users, even if this, “Was more likely to come from emotional and 
religious empathy than a rational process of argument and counter-argument.” (2014:11). 
Their study argues that the Internet also allows people to express themselves emotionally, 
sharing their sadness and anger at the catastrophe. These expressions of emotion were shared 
via comments on YouTube and other social media. For example: 
 
O Allah [...] and Lord of [the] Kaaba, something makes tears fall from the eye... 
for how long are we going to suffer this terrible psychological pain and every 
time a raindrop falls on Jeddah we become tormented, worried and frightened. 
May Allah punish those behind this, (Al-Saggaf & Simmons, 2014:10). 
However, this YouTube comment seems to be more than emotion. It also recognises that this 
is not divine retribution but rather, human error.  
 
6.3.2. The boycott of municipal elections 
 The story of the boycott of the municipal elections began in 2005 when the Saudi 
government decided to introduce some elements of democracy. The Saudi Minister for 
Municipal and Rural Affairs announced that municipal elections were to be held across the 
country. More than 148,000 of the 400,000 Saudis who were eligible, voted for some 1,800 
candidates who were vying for 592 seats in 178 councils. Some citizens were eager for 
political debate, but they voted for councils that, in reality, had no clear powers. Even so, 
people were willing to accept this due to their enthusiasm for their first democratic 
experience in the country.  
However, vast numbers of citizens were very disappointed since these councils did not 
implement any changes in people’s lives;  they did not have any ‘real power’ and, in many 
cases, were considered to have simply neglected issues as seen in tweets on the Twitter 
hashtag يمجلس_ االشوررىى_ اليیمثلن # (Shura Majlis does not represent me). Additionally, without 
giving any reasons, the Ministry then decided to postpone the second set of municipal 
elections until 2011, instead of 2009. Subsequently, groups of online activists began calling 
for a ‘Campaign to Boycott the Municipal Elections’, asking citizens not to vote again, or to 
participate at all, in what was described as a ‘Black Comedy’ or a farce. Online campaigners 
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called for the boycott for three main reasons: firstly, the elections would bring no benefits for 
Saudi society; secondly, only half of the municipal councils are elected and they did not have 
any power; thirdly, women were neither allowed to vote nor stand for election (Lacroix, 2011; 
Alahmed, 2014). Thus, online activists encouraged people to boycott the elections in order to 
have them cancelled. Preliminary indications suggest that their calls for boycotts have borne 
fruit. Commenting on the low turnout at registration for the second elections, Riyadh’s Mayor, 
Prince Abdul-Aziz bin Ayyaf, was quoted as saying that he, “Completely understands 
citizens’ disappointment, but we still have the chance to make this work better.” Numbers of 
participants show that only 14% of people who registered their names have voted (AlHabeeb, 
2011).  
The traditional media, however, did not engage with the calls to boycott the elections, simply 
reporting that these had been issued. In contrast, on the Internet, bloggers such as Eman 
AlGuwefly, Ashraf Fagih1, and Ahmed Alomran2, as well as a Facebook group3 and a 
number of users on Twitter accounts were clearly advocating an election boycott by citizens. 
The Internet appeared to allow individuals to show their solidarity in challenging the 
government plans, and they succeeded in doing this online, without any other presence 
offline.  
  
6.3.3. Imprisonment without charge or trial 
 The Saudi Intelligence services do not have full executive powers but, even so, they are able 
to arrest someone and hold him/her for an unknown charge for more than six months, the 
maximum period for imprisonment without a trial. Discussing individuals who had been 
imprisoned without charge was also taboo. However, the Internet has helped to change this 
scenario. In 2007, the Secret Police arrested Saudi reformists who were calling for a 
Constitutional Monarchy and others who had written or talked about corruption in the 
Kingdom. Then, in April 2011, a group of online activists broadcast a short video called 
‘Saudi Missing’ which showed how political reformists suffer in prison, along with their 
families outside.4 Those who appeared in the film were family and friends of prisoners and 
showed their faces on the video. This film paved the way for people to talk freely online 
about this taboo subject, as well as the topic of the 4,396 people jailed on charges of terrorism 
                                                
1 Both blogs are available at: http://www.alfagih.net/site/.  
2 The blog is available at: http://saudijeans.org 
3 The group can be seen at: http://on.fb.me/1CdR0Oi 
4 A sample video can be watched at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R99d7SVgyQU 
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and other charges (National Society for Human Rights, 2012). Previously, such issues could 
not be addressed openly, but these different online campaigns about the prisoners have 
broken the taboo and made a number of Islamists, and other well-known individuals, speak 
out about these issues (Lacroix, 2014).  
 
6.4. Controlling the Internet/Official Responses to the Potential of Online Activism  
 
Since the Internet and social media show great potential for developing civil society and 
cyberactivism, Saudi state authorities have begun to follow online activities. Internet reports 
issued by organisations such as Freedom House, Internet Enemies and the Opennet Initiative 
show how heavily the Saudi government controls the Internet.  
 
 
Figure 6: Summary of Freedom of the Net Report for Saudi Arabia in 2014 (Source: 
Freedom House) 
 
Saudi officials and Islamic clerics, such as the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia and the imams of 
the Two Holy Mosques, are permanently cautious about the Internet in general, and social 
media, in particular. The Grand Mufti, Sheikh Abdulaziz AlSheikh, has twice denounced 
Twitter as, “A place of evil and a scourge, and the source of lies and falsehoods.” He attacked 
Twitter on the grounds it was used to, “Promote lies, backbiting, gossip, thinking badly of 
Muslims and insulting Islam.” AlSheikh also commented that the, “Enemies of Islam are 




Speaking to Reuters, Abdulrahman AlHadlaq, the head of the Saudi Ideological Security 
Directorate (ISD), suggested that the unit, “Known for keeping tabs on liberal activists and 
women drivers as well as Islamist extremists, is turning its focus increasingly towards those 
using the Internet to recruit fighters for jihad abroad.” (McDowall, 2014). He noted that the 
broad mandate of the ISD includes, “Peaceful political or human rights activists.” and added 
that several had been jailed in 2013, “On charges that included comments made online.” 
AlHadlaq justified the Ministry of the Interior’s policy by saying that: 
Most governments, including those in the West, monitor citizens online. The 
Saudi monitors are careful to distinguish between people who simply voice 
opinions and those who incite others to action, (McDowall, 2014). 
However, two days later, AlHadlaq said that there were mistakes in the translation in the 
Reuters’ report and that it also contained misunderstandings and exaggeration. In a further 
statement, he also gave the name of his organisation as the ‘Intellectual’, as opposed to the 
‘Ideological’ Security Directorate. AlHadlaq commented, “Following what is going on in 
social networks cannot be considered censorship, as this content is available to the public 
openly and it is not done secretly.” He emphasised that, “It is the task of such authorities to 
follow up all matters relating to their responsibilities and citizen concerns, in co-ordination 
with other relevant government authorities in this regard.” (Albarqawi, 2014).  
AlHadlaq’s statement is of key importance regarding the censorship of online activism, since 
he has claimed that ISD is not against ‘voicing opinions’ as such but rather against ‘inciting 
others to action’. The ISD’s online operation is intended to tackle those individuals who 
mobilise for action, even in the name of human rights or the issue of women driving.  
AlHadlaq notes that ISD, which is under the aegis of the Ministry of the Interior, is not the 
only authority in Saudi Arabia responsible for the Internet. He might be referring to the MoCI, 
as this is responsible for online publication. The following sections will address the ways in 
which Internet freedom has been limited in Saudi Arabia, namely by technical blocking, 
search result removals and take-down, self-censorship, and further actions.   
 
6.4.1. Technical blocking 
  Saudi Arabia is clear about the technical blocking, or so-called ‘filtering systems’ 
implemented by its Communications and Information Technology Committee (CITC) which 
came into operation when the Internet was introduced into the country. Use of a filtering 
system is included in the Council of Ministers Resolution No. 163 04/03/1997, which 
assigned provision of the Internet services in King Abdulaziz City for Science and 
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Technology, represented by the Internet Services Unit, and then by CITC after the other 
resolution in 2004 gave the responsibilities of developing Internet Filtering measures and 
requirements to CITC. According to CITC:  
Blocking is applied to those websites and materials that are incompatible with the 
Islamic religion and national regulations, and in compliance with the permanent 
Security Committee guidelines. The Committee was assigned the task of directly 
blocking websites that promote pornography and provides a means of 
circumvention without having to refer to the Committee, (CITC, 2011 n.p.).  
This filtering process is mainly conducted through two lists: commercial and local. CITC has 
a contract with an Internet company specialising in site classification. This company provides 
CITC with a daily list of websites under 90 different categories, which then blocks websites 
which fall under the categories of pornography, gambling, and drugs. In addition, the local 
list, which is updated by the Saudi public, provides CITC with website addresses that people 
think should be blocked because of their illegal content. The CITC says the local list 
comprises:  
• Pornographic sites = 93% 
• Sites that can be used to bypass filtering systems = 4% 
• Other sites (including gambling, drugs etc.) = 3%.  
 
However, CITC does not mention blocking any Saudi-based political and news websites and 
they do not provide any information about blocking political content in general, but clearly 
there are a number of news websites that have been blocked and some which continue to be 
blocked e.g. Elaph.com which has been blocked since 2010 (IFEX 2010).    
  
6.4.2. Search result removals and take-down 
 Some sources from Internet companies show that companies have been asked by CITC to 
remove some content. For example, in the first half of 2014, Facebook restricted access to 
seven pages stating, “We restricted access in Saudi Arabia to a number of pieces of content 
reported by the Communications and Information Technology Committee (CITC) under local 
laws prohibiting criticism of the royal family.” (Facebook, 2014). Google says it has received 
11 removal requests from Saudi Arabia in the period between 2009 and 2013 (Google, n.d.). 
Since the report started in 2012, Twitter data shows that Saudi Arabia has not officially asked 
for any data removal between 2012 and 2013. However, Saudi Arabia sent 220 information 
requests to Twitter in 2014 (Twitter, 2014). The report has not specified the required action 
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requested by Saudi Arabia, but according to Twitter indexing, this may include tweet removal, 
user removal and account information.   
6.4.3. Self-censorship 
 Self-censorship has a long history in Saudi Arabia in general and several scholars have 
addressed self-censorship in the context of Saudi media (Mellor, 2009; Yushi, 2012;  Zayani, 
2012). The use of this practice in Saudi Arabia was described by Jihad Khazen who has 
worked with the Saudi-owned press for many years and has been Editor-in-chief for three 
Saudi-owned dailies. He has stated: 
 
The most prevalent form of censorship is self-censorship. Sitting at my desk, I 
feel at times that I'm not so much covering the news as covering it up. Editors 
know the dos and the don'ts of their trade, so when I am shown a story, it is often 
to shift responsibility from the editor concerned to me, should the paper get 
banned the next day […] if we are banned in Saudi Arabia, we stand to lose tens 
of thousands of dollars in advertising revenue. Consequently, we are more careful 
with Saudi news; it is a matter of economics, even of survival, (1999). 
 
Self-censorship on the Internet seems to be a continuation of this effective policy in Saudi 
Arabia. Apart from terrorist groups who are arrested due to their online activities, only a 
small number of citizens have actually been jailed because of their online activities. One 
could argue that these numbers are small not because Saudi is tolerant of online expression, 
but because people are practising self-censorship, aware of the consequences of not doing so. 
This is similar to Khazen’s statement about self-censorship in the Saudi press: ‘Editors know 
the dos and the don'ts of their trade’ since in the case of the press, the punishment will be 
confiscation of the newspaper next day, or arrest of a journalist, or in some cases, both. In the 
case of the Internet, people know that they will be arrested or banned from using social media.  
 
6.4.4. Beyond Censorship and Surveillance 
In Chapter Two, it was argued that censorship and surveillance alone might not be sufficient 
to control the Internet so the government has found new methods to control the Internet. In 
Saudi Arabia, Almohea’s study indicates that there has been some use of Twitter spamming, 
similar to that mentioned by Verkamp and Gupta (2013), in China, Russia and Mexico (see 
Chapter Two). The difference in the Saudi context is that Almohea (2013), did not find 
evidence of direct state spamming of Twitter hashtags, although most spamming activity 




Similarly, the anti-radicalisation campaign, Assakina, which is described by campaigners as 
an ‘online volunteer campaign’, is working online under supervision of the Ministry of 
Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Da’wah, and Guidance in Saudi Arabia. This online campaign, 
“Seeks to publish unique translations, research and news about issues related to jihad, 
political violence and radicalisation.” (Assakina, n.d.). However, the campaign, which was 
launched in 2003 and has won international recognition, is trying to challenge some elements 
of freedom of expression, especially the relationship between the ruler and citizens. This 
campaign uses social media to campaign against some issues which are only discussed 
explicitly and relatively freely online such as the relationship between the ruler and citizens.  
A Twitter campaign, led by an individual with the user name ‘@mobta3athon’, is doing a 
similar job for the Ministry of Education. It is clear this campaign, which says it supports 
Saudi students abroad, avoids talking about any negative practices by the Ministry, even in 
relation to sponsored students. For example, in 2015 the Ministry told students that if they 
paid their travel expenses and registered for approved universities in the US, they would be 
sponsored. Later, the Ministry declined to provide funding. However, even though this issue 
was clearly related to Saudi students abroad, it was never mentioned by the campaign.      
         
6.5. Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to identify the uses that are made of the Internet by Saudi citizens and the 
state response to this growing usage. It demonstrated the central importance of the Internet in 
the lives of Saudis, with some figures putting Internet usage at over 90%, whilst citizens of 
Saudi Arabia rank amongst the top nationalities in terms of sharing content on the Internet. 
The chapter clearly shows that the Internet has become a public space for Saudis to discuss 
different issues in a relatively free environment, at least, compared to traditional media. The 
Internet space in Saudi Arabia is shared by everyone from ordinary citizens right up to the 
current King himself, and most of his ministers; his participation on Twitter reflecting the 
importance of the Internet for the government as a means to recognise citizen demands. This 
was highlighted by the AlTobayshi story and the government’s response to online debate 
about what was considered to be unacceptable behaviour towards a journalist. 
The degree of freedom permitted by the Internet has also increased freedom of expression in 
the traditional press, with Saudi officials in the Ministry of Information acknowledging this 
change has occurred in order to allow newspapers to compete with online news websites. 
They also noted that, since the Internet allows Saudis to read news from all over the world, 
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there is no longer any point in trying to ban newspapers from covering sensitive news. 
Clearly this does not mean there is no censorship, but the point here is that the level of 
freedom has been increased and there is more discussion and news coverage of some 
sensitive issues than before. Scholars such as (Teitelbaum 2002) have argued that Internet 
control in Saudi Arabia is not absolute.     
The discussion of the three campaigns: Jeddah floods; boycotting municipal elections; 
prisoners held without trial, illustrates that the Internet allows people to discuss domestic 
issues in a way that was not possible previously. The examples also indicate that the Internet 
has influenced decision makers on different occasions. The government responded to citizen 
comments regarding the Jeddah floods. The online campaign against the municipal elections 
caused many voters to boycott these whilst the third campaign showed that the ability to act 
anonymously on the Internet helped people to campaign about sensitive issues, such as 
prisoners being held without trial.    
Nevertheless, the state still uses a range of methods to restrict Internet influence in Saudi 
Arabia, and, in particular, relies on self-censorship to control citizen activity online, just as is 
the case with the press. This demonstrates that the government is not against online activities 
per se, but is clearly concerned about these being transformed into offline activities, as the 
Ideological Security Directorate, Al-Hadlaq, suggested.  
Chapters Two to Six have explored the uses of the Internet for activism, both in democratic 
and ND settings. They have also established the philosophical approaches which have 
influenced the study of the Internet, and the framework that will be used in this thesis. The 
literature review also shed light on the peculiarities of Saudi society, the context for this 
research. The methodology chapter explained the philosophical underpinnings of the research 
and described in detail the methodological issues and the research procedures for this study. 
We will return to all these points later when attempting to understand cyberactivism as social 




7. CHAPTER SEVEN: THE WOMEN DRIVING CAMPAIGN (October 26th) 
 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter explores the role and impact of new communication technologies in the so-
called ‘October 26th’ Campaign, supporting Saudi women’s right to drive. It assesses how 
such technologies are used to mobilise and organise activists and supporters, and the extent to 
which the Internet, in particular, has enabled activists to challenge the Saudi authorities. To 
do this, it draws on findings obtained from activist and journalist interviews, and online 
network analysis of two Twitter hashtags in Arabic and English.   
Although both case studies in this thesis are described as social campaigns in the Saudi 
context, there are a number of differences between them. Firstly, this campaign has its 
historical roots in the pre-Internet era. Secondly, it does not relate to any specific age group 
like the teachers’ campaign, but for obvious reasons, tends to be deliberately targeted towards 
female members. Finally, it has wider links with the international media and international 
campaigning organisations rather than the teachers’ campaign which follow in Chapter Eight. 
This analysis of the ‘October 26th Campaign’ focuses on four main areas. It begins by tracing 
the origins of the campaign and its background in the pre-Internet era. It then outlines the 
mobilising aspects of the campaign, before moving onto its organisational structure. Finally, 
it concludes by examining some of the factors which have affected the online campaign, both 
in terms of mobilisation and organisation.  
 
7.2. The Women Driving Campaign: Origins and Background 
 
7.2.1. Historical background 
Generally, the right to drive a car is recognised as a basic freedom and an uncontroversial act 
in most countries. In Saudi Arabia, however, women are not allowed to drive cars under any 
circumstances. Despite the absence of any ‘gender ban’ on driving under Saudi regulations, 
women cannot drive because there is a fatwa1 that prohibits females from driving, supported 
by two statements from the Ministry of the Interior.  
The campaign has a history dating back to November 7th 1990, when 47 Saudi women drove 
in 11 cars through the Saudi capital, Riyadh. However, there is a lack of information 
concerning the original 1990 action, partly because there was limited media coverage due to 
                                                
1 A Fatwa is an Islamic legal pronouncement, issued by an expert in religious law (mufti), pertaining to a 
specific issue, usually at the request of an individual or judge, to resolve an issue where Islamic jurisprudence 
(fiqh) is unclear, (The Islamic Supreme Council of America). 
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official restrictions. Hessa Alsheikh and Eayish Almanea, who were among those Saudi 
female activists who originally drove their cars through the city, subsequently published a 
book detailing the ‘demonstration’, telling the story of events from the campaigners’ 
viewpoint. Importantly, the activists emphasised that the Women Driving Campaign in 1990 
was intended to draw attention to women’s rights in Saudi Arabia in general. The right to 
drive was seen as symbolic of their wider objectives. In Saudi Arabia, by law, women are 
generally not allowed to travel, marry, or invest, without a male guardian, who should be 
their father, an adult son, a brother or a husband. According to Almanie and Alsheikh 
(2013:30), the right to drive was used to highlight wider rights because it was felt there was 
public backing for it, thus providing the momentum for a larger campaign. 
 
 
Figure 7: The Timeline of the Main Events for the 1990 and 2011 Campaigns 
 
However, the women who participated in the driving demonstration were subsequently 
sacked from their jobs, until a royal pardon from King Fahd, nearly three years later. The 
campaigners also faced a so-called counter-insurgency campaign, where activists, mainly 
from conservative and religious groups, circulated leaflets and audiotapes and used Friday 
sermons at mosques to condemn the action. For example, a cassette entitled, ‘For Women 
17/06/2011 the day of driving protest 
30/05/2011 Alshareef released from prison 
22/05/2011 Manal Alshareef jailed 
21/05/2011 Manal Alshareef, the woman who called for the driving protest, 
summoned for questioning 
20/05/2011 online campaign called "I'll drive my car myself" launched online 
15/11/1990 Official statement released by Ministry of the Interior banning women 
from driving based on the Fatwa 
09/11/1990 Fatwa issued by scholars prohibiting women  from driving 
07/11/1990  47 women drove their cars through Riyadh 
162 
 
Only’, (a lecture by the academic and Islamic scholar, Salman Alodah), claimed that the 
‘Women Driving Campaign’ not only sought the right for women to drive, but that it aimed 
for women’s liberation more generally. Alodah argued that the issue of women driving would 
lead to a split within the Saudi community (Alodah, 1991).   
Conflict between the two groups, pro-women driving and anti-women driving, has continued 
ever since. For instance, in 2005, more than 100 people signed a petition which was sent to 
the Saudi National Society for Human Rights in support of women’s right to drive (Alarabiya, 
2005). Yet, 500 Saudi females have also signed a petition, which was sent to the Crown 
Prince, asking him  not to allow women to drive because it may lead to ‘harassment of 
females’ in public spaces, market places, and in front of girls' schools (Alaqili, 2005). 
In 2011, a number of women tried to launch the campaign again. With support from other 
activists from a campaign called ‘My Right, My Dignity’, a female activist called Manal 
Alshirif filmed herself driving her car on May 20th 2011, with support from other activists. 
The clip showing her driving was uploaded to YouTube and she was subsequently placed 
under arrest for nine days. From May 21st onwards, a number of women followed Manal’s 
example and filmed themselves driving in Saudi Arabia and uploaded their clips to YouTube. 
Manal’s action gave the women’s right to drive campaign new momentum within Saudi 
society.   
 
7.2.2. Media coverage of the 1990 campaign 
 Media coverage of the 1990 campaign was limited. Local Saudi media, including radio 
stations, TV channels, newspapers and magazines, published the official statements about the 
action. The Ministries of the Interior, Islamic Affairs and Information warned Imams about 
giving any statements, speeches or even talking about the demonstration during Friday 
sermons (Almanie & Alsheikh 2013). The authors explain that the first news coverage of the 
1990 action appeared about one week later and took the form of a brief official statement, 
released by the Ministry of the Interior:  
 
The Ministry of the Interior would like to announce to all citizens and residents 
that based on the fatwa issued on 20/4/1411 AH [09/11/1990] from His Eminence 
Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz, the General President of the of Scholarly Research, 
and Ifta presidency, his Vice President, and a member of the presidency, women 
are prohibited from driving, and those who do so should be punished. Moreover, 
car driving by women is incompatible with Islamic behaviour enjoyed by Saudi 




There was a similarly limited amount of international news coverage in the United States, 
Canada and the United Kingdom, which started to emerge the day after the demonstration. 
Most news stories were credited to one source, Associated Press, although not all newspapers 
published exactly the same information. Some, such as The Toronto Star, focused on the 
profile of demonstrators and noted the diversity of participants, “They included 
businesswomen, housewives and a woman eight months’ pregnant.” (The Toronto Star, 7th 
November, 1990). However, others, such as The Boston Globe, suggested that support for the 
campaign was limited to a particular class of women: 
One hopes, though, that if a women's-rights movement sweeps like a desert wind 
through the Moslem world that it will benefit all women, not just the Mercedes 
elite, (The Boston Globe, 7th  November, 1990).   
Overall, the tone of the international media’s coverage was supportive and viewed the action 
as being aimed at challenging tradition more than simply focusing on the issue of women 
driving. It is worth noting that when the international media published coverage of the 
driving demonstration it mentioned other women’s issues, such as the requirement for women 
to have a male guardian when they need to travel.  
Thus, the activism in the 1990s can be seen as a short-term campaign, which focused mostly 
on the specific day of the driving protest, the fatwa and the statement issued by the Ministry 
of the Interior. This was due to the lack of media coverage that supported the women drivers, 
as well as the counter-campaign that used other forms of media to spread its message. The 
short-lived nature of the campaign can also be attributed to the unified religious response 
with no other fatwa having been issued, which then allowed women to drive.  
 
7.3. The Formation and Growth of the October 26th Campaign  
Arguably, the main component of the more recent campaign is groups not individuals. Most 
of the core activists in this campaign came from similar groups and a campaign called, ‘My 
Right, My Dignity’. This campaign was launched in 2011 to pursue several rights for women, 
one of which was driving. Because of Manal Alshareef’s prison sentence and the Arab Spring, 
the activists said they preferred to pause the campaign, as they did not want to be accused of 
exploiting the events of the Arab Spring. During the first half of 2011, particularly on March 
11th, there were calls by unknown groups on the Internet for a revolution in Saudi Arabia, 
referred to as the ‘Hanin Uprising’. For this reason, activists only re-launched their activities 
some two and a half years later. Two activists who participated in both the 2011 and the 2013 
‘October 26th’ campaigns said the imprisonment of Manal and what followed, in addition to 
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the Arab Spring, risked framing the campaign in a negative context, by linking it with the 
climate of freedom created by the Arab Spring, “We did not want to be shown riding the 
waves of freedom.” (W1). Surprisingly, this appears to show that the Arab Spring actually 
had a negative influence on the campaign, but as we shall see later, it did have other 
influences, especially in terms of campaign organisation.    
Personal contacts and direct invitation were also used to recruit activists for the ‘October 26th 
Campaign’ but some of the activists interviewed here also said they joined after seeing 
activities on the Internet. In this context, the Internet played a role in re-engaging people with 
this campaign. An interviewee who participated in the 1990’s campaign said she was happy 
to see a new generation of activists claiming their rights. She contacted some participants in 
the campaign and started working with them, without knowing any of them personally 
beforehand, only becoming aware of them via the Internet. 
The ‘October 26th Campaign’, now based online, particularly on Twitter, did not originally 
start there and was not launched by ordinary individuals like the first campaign. The group of 
activists who arranged this campaign claim that it really started when a famous KEEK1 
application user, Loujain Al Hathlool, announced it. However, it is clear that the campaign 
did not start spontaneously online; activists arranged a specific date to start the campaign. 
They also stated in interviews that they were looking for someone with a large number of 
followers on any social network to launch the campaign but well-known people, even those 
who shared apparently similar views, did not respond to them.2 Loujain Al Hathlool was the 
only one who responded and announced the campaign slogan and the date for driving, 
October 26th 2013 (W1). Al Hathlool was, at that time, well-known in the Keek app for her 
controversial thoughts and significantly, her video transferred instantly to Twitter and other 
apps such as YouTube. Thus, although the actual date set for the launch of the campaign was 
October 26th 2013, it started to gain prominence about a month earlier. Al Hathlool’s initial 
post was on September 19th, and the website domain for the campaign was registered on 
September 21st, whilst the Twitter account was created on October 2nd.  
This video in Figure 7, which had had some 3,077,046 views by the end of 2014, sparked off 
the campaign. Activists have asserted their determination to continue the campaign until the 
ban on women driving in Saudi Arabia is lifted.  
                                                
1 A ‘Keek’ is a short video update that can be up to 36 seconds in length. People can post Keeks via webcams, 
iPhones, Android or Windows 8 devices and share them (keek.com).   
2 Some of the interviewees mentioned specific names of mainly social media ‘celebrities’ but they did not want 









Figure 9: Timeline of key events pre- and post-October 26th 
 
7.3.1. Campaign Aims 
 The main goal of the ‘October 26th’ Campaign was to call for the rights of women to drive 

















agenda such as challenging the need for male guardianship and fighting for child custody 
rights and other issues. In this context, the campaign website stresses that:  
The issue of women driving has moved on beyond the superficiality of a social 
debate. The issue is not simply that of a vehicle being driven by a woman, but the 
acknowledgement and recognition of the humanity of one half of society and the 
God-given rights of women, (Oct26driving.com n.d.).  
There are, however, also interim goals or milestones and achieving these could be seen as a 
stepping stone to the main goal. These include convincing people about women’s right to 
drive, showing the government the level of public support as well as demonstrating that there 
are other Islamic points of view which allow women to drive.    
Official statements often claim that the ban reflects Saudi public opinion. Prince Niyf bin 
Abdulaziz, the former Minister of the Interior, noted that, “Women driving is a social issue, 
society is to decide.” (Alghonim, 2005). From a religious perspective, the Grand Mufti has 
claimed that the ban on women driving is to, “Protect the community from evils.” (Alharbi, 
2013). Campaigners, of course, do not accept this as an excuse for banning women from 
driving. They believe that public opinion and religious beliefs have shifted in recent years. 
Consequently, they have been keen to promote short video clips on YouTube, showing 
Muslim scholars supporting women’s right to drive in order to demonstrate that it is only 
politics which is limiting women’s right to drive (W1, W2, W3, W4 and W9). The campaign 
is, therefore, seeking to force a response from the Saudi government. As one activist stressed, 
“The government has no plan. It is a government that reacts. They will not do anything unless 
you do something, then they reply to it.” (W3).  
Activists are also trying to shatter the myths about women driving and to educate people 
about the importance of women’s right to drive, “When women find themselves driving in 
Saudi Arabia’s streets with no harassment, people will see how normal this is.” (W4). 
Campaigners have thus summarised their overall objectives as follows:  
The campaign aims to gain women’s rights in a civilised way by addressing both 
the government and citizens, and this must follow two courses of action: first, be 
brave and drive your car; second, do this in terms of human rights discourse and 
not special pleading, (W8).  
However, this official mission statement highlights a potential contradiction in the 
campaign’s strategy. On the one hand, it emphasises that demanding rights should be 
conducted by using well-mannered discourse, which may mean peacefully and in a relatively 
understated manner. The key point here is the reference to human rights discourse. This 
means stressing that women are not asking for special treatment but that they have a right to 
drive. On the other hand, it also shows that women should be brave when demanding their 
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rights and take direct action by driving. This reflects that campaigners share the same goals 
but they campaign in diverse ways.  
 
7.3.2. Campaign achievements to date 
 It is obvious that the campaign has not yet achieved its main goal: obtaining the right to 
drive. Even so, the activists are satisfied that they have reached some of the milestones. They 
claim, for instance, that they have succeeded in convincing the audience that the 
government’s main excuse for banning women from driving, public opposition, is not true. 
The only obstacle is the government. The activists claim to have demonstrated this through 
the number of women who have filmed themselves driving with their families and people’s 
reactions, via social media, being largely positive. Similarly, the activists claim that these 
videos have also succeeded in explaining to international organisations and countries, that the 
Saudi community welcomes women driving, contradictory to what Saudi officials are trying 
to say to the outside world, namely, that women cannot drive because of public opinion.  
 
7.4. Mobilisation and the Role of the Internet 
 
Clearly, one of the main uses of the Internet for campaigners is mobilisation. This section 
will examine the mobilisation elements in the campaign by adopting Tilly’s definition of 
mobilisation. According to Tilly, mobilisation is the, “Process by which a group acquires 
collective control over the resources needed for action [including] labour, power, goods, 
weapons, votes, and any number of other things, just so long as they are usable in acting on 
shared interests.” (Tilly, 1978:07).  
The ‘October 26th Campaign’ pursued mobilisation primarily through online means, both in 
terms of mobilising women generally but also by engaging different audiences, including the 
wider Saudi public, the Saudi government, journalists in the traditional media, international 
media and human rights organisations. This section examines both how Internet tools are 
used for mobilisation and communication purposes and also the extent to which the Internet 
enables activists to reach wider audiences by examining the profile of the activists and 
supporters.  
7.4.1. Activist Profiles 
Some 10 activists in total were interviewed about this campaign, only one of whom was a 
male activist. As discussed later, he was identified as the activist who influenced the 
campaign structure. Another male activist had agreed to be interviewed but later declined. 
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The interviews indicated that half of the core campaigners had never taken part in any form 
of activism before the ‘October 26th Campaign’. Furthermore, there was a very broad age 
range in the group of core activists, with interviewees suggesting that the youngest activist 
was just 17 and the oldest 70. Age is significant in the sense that women were urged to drive 
their cars only if they had a valid driving license, which in this case, had to be from abroad. 
Older women were more likely to have been overseas and it seems most of the women who 
took part in the driving events action were over 30 years old, according to the interviews. 
Nevertheless, there are some videos on YouTube uploaded by the campaign which show 
younger women driving their cars. Indeed, Figure 9 suggests that 74% of the campaign’s 
followers on Twitter are between 18 and 34 years old.1 Hence, although the activists might be 
older, social media has brought their campaign to a younger audience, many of whom could 
not take part in the action itself. 
 
7.4.2. Campaign target audience. 
 Interview data primarily shows that the Internet is used by activists to engage with four main 
groups:  
 
7.4.2.1. The Saudi government 
 There is a debate amongst activists about their primary target audience. Some believe the 
government is the most important, whilst others argue that citizens should be the priority. 
This debate touches on the fundamental question of ‘who is following who’ when it comes to 
the issue of women driving. Is the government following public mood as it claims, or do the 
public follow the government’s lead? The campaign is targeting decision makers in 
government in general and the Minister of the Interior in particular.  
 
7.4.2.2. The Saudi public 
 Campaigners are also divided on which Saudi citizens to target. Some activists look at 
women as the most important target audience because they are the ones most likely to benefit 
from any change. Others argue that men should constitute the key audience to target in the 
Saudi context because they act as the guardians of women and their support will be necessary 
to make any changes. One activist said: 
 
                                                
1 The method used to indicate the followers’ age by the data provider is unknown. Presumably they have to 
provide a date of birth to register.  
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We are trying to address men more than women. Men are the decision-makers. 
We are trying to address the ladies as well because the driving issue is their issue, 
and we want them to influence their spouses, their parents, and their children and 
educate them. But at the same time, it is men who made the decision about the 
driving issue in our society, (W8). 
 
 
Figure 10: Demographics for the Campaign’s Twitter Account (Source: Twitonomy) 
Moreover, interview data shows that the campaign not only targets Saudis, but also, people 
from around the world. One activist stressed, “Our discourse is international not local.” (W2). 
This is reflected in the use of different languages. The Twitter account shows that the 
campaign mainly uses Arabic and English. However, Spanish was also used in several tweets. 
Similarly, the campaign’s YouTube and Instagram accounts show a number of videos and 
photographs of non-Saudis in different countries supporting campaign issues in Arabic and 
English. Results from two Twitter hashtags about the campaign found that participants in 
both hashtags are based in 116 different countries, (Yuce et al., 2014). 
 
7.4.2.3. Traditional media and journalists 
 Activist interviews imply that the Internet is used to attract traditional media in order to 
engage a wider audience. It makes the campaign visible to the media and provides them with 
all the information they need about the campaign. However, most of the interviewees were 
already engaged with media in some shape or form before the campaign started. Some of 
them are newspapers columnists, some have a TV presence, while others are bloggers.  
 
However, activists acknowledge there has been a welcome shift in press freedom in Saudi 
Arabia, when compared to the national media coverage of the 1990’s campaign. One activist 
claimed that, “In 1990, the media denigrated women who drove their cars so that they would 
not look like heroines.” (W7). The local media coverage has certainly changed since the 1990 
campaign, both in terms of scale but also, in terms of tone. There are now clearly various 
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news stories in the Saudi media discussing the issue of driving from different viewpoints, as 
will be shown below. 
 
7.4.2.4. International organisations and media 
 Campaigners acknowledged the important role of international organisations and media 
outside Saudi Arabia in supporting the campaign and extending audience reach. One activist 
said:  
If I’m interviewed by AlRiyadh newspaper, no one will read it. On the other hand, 
if I’m interviewed for the CNN website, everyone will read it, even those who 
cannot read English, (W6). 
The fact that they are targeting international media partially explains the use of English 
language in the campaign. The journalists who were interviewed agreed that the Internet had 
made the campaign visible to them. Whilst they had not initially heard about the campaign 
from the Internet, they agreed it was a crucial source which had helped them make contact 
with campaigners. One journalist said, “If I need to know anything about the campaign, I 
have to go online first.” Another acknowledged that the campaigners used the Internet very 
effectively:  
 
It’s very difficult to get news out of Saudi that isn’t state controlled – at least in 
English and I thought they were creative in their use of social media, reaching out 
to people and backing it up with campaigns that people could join.   
Interestingly, social network analysis for the campaign’s English hashtag shows that two of 
four of its most active users are international journalists. International media exposure 
undoubtedly gave the campaign an international dimension by continual coverage in several 
languages across the world. What is more, the activists argue that international media not 
only provided coverage, but ‘protected them’ when journalists attended, or covered, any 
campaign action, and that the Saudi authorities took this into consideration. For example, one 
activist explained:  
I went driving with an AFP correspondent who was filming me at all times during 
the drive. When the police arrested me, I told them: ‘This is the AFP 
correspondent, and she is filming everything,’ (W7). 
Some activists assert that international media is able to put pressure on the Saudi government, 
claiming that it, “Respects international media more than its own national media.” (W4). This 
was supported by an international news agency reporter who noted, “It is obvious that 
international media has an influence on the policy makers, especially in the Middle East.” 
However, a British journalist disagreed, arguing:   
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I don’t think Saudi leaders really care about their international reputation and 
while the Women Driving Campaign probably led to some awkward questions for 
the Royals from some distinguished guests, it’s probably a bit like talking to the 
Chinese – or indeed the Saudis for that matter – about human rights.  Has to be 
done, but doesn’t change anything.  
 
Activists were mostly satisfied with the international media coverage, with one commenting, 
“It is a human rights’ issue, so no wonder the ‘October 26th’ Campaign attracted international 
media attention.” (W10). Interviews with international journalists revealed that they cover the 
issue because they think it is an interesting and unusual one. One journalist said that people 
love to read about this issue and it gets a high volume of readers. Another journalist 
commented that Western audiences find the idea that, “Women aren’t allowed to drive 
simply because they’re women, very unusual”. One of the activists argued that the reason for 
the popularity of this news coverage with Westerners may relate to the ‘Orientalist’ slant that 
the international media give to stories covering Saudi-related issues. He claims that the 
international media, “Look at them as inferiors.”1 (W8).  
In addition to international media, activists used the Internet to engage international 
organisations such as Amnesty International (Amnesty, 2013), and Human Rights Watch 
(Human Rights Watch, 2013). According to the activists, organisations of this type put more 
pressure on the Saudi government. They, “Protect the demands [lift the ban on women 
driving] and the activists.” (W2). This kind of protection can be understood in terms of the 
attempts made by these organisations to free people jailed on the issue of driving, as well as 
speaking about the issue at various global events. For example, Human Rights Watch sent a 
press release asking the Saudi government to free a journalist who had supported women 
driving.  
While some Saudi Twitter users have accused the activists of treason because they deal with 
international organisations,2 the activists obviously deny this. They argue that Saudi Arabia 
has signed agreements with organisations such as the United Nations, promising to respect 
human rights and that dealing with organisations of this kind will, “Help the Saudi 
government to meet its obligations.” However, activists have not provided any example of 
these kinds of signed agreements, but this may refer to the fact that Saudi Arabia is a 
signatory to the convention on elimination of all forms of discrimination against women 
                                                
1 This could be understood in the context of Edward Said’s work ‘Orientalism’ (1978), which was the first to 
highlight the West’s negative perceptions of the Arab world. 
2 These accusations are widely circulated on the Internet and on Twitter in particular. See for example the 
Arabic hashtag االقيیاددةة _ننفئراا # (Driving Mice). 
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(1981) which they ratified in 2000. Secondly, one of the activists explained, “We only deal 
with organisations which have offices in Saudi Arabia, such as the United Nations, which 
means they are working legally in Saudi Arabia.” (W1).  
Some activists however, raise concerns about the role of international organisations in their 
campaign. According to one activist, “They say one thing to us, and they say something else 
to the government.” (W1). The female activist said: 
 
They seem convinced by anything told to them by Saudi officials. For example, 
when they met X, he told them “we are a progressive government in an 
underdeveloped country”. The delegate seemed to be convinced by his statement. 
When I met her I asked her: “Do you follow the campaign online?” and she said 
she did. Then I said to her: “With all due respect, you should have challenged him. 
You have seen women broadcasting videos of themselves driving their cars for 
more than one month and a half. How can they be considered underdeveloped? 
(W1) 
 
7.4.3. Internet mobilisation tools 
 Several Internet applications are used by the campaign to mobilise their target audiences. 
The campaign mainly uses its website, e-petition websites, Twitter, YouTube, Google 
Hangout, Instagram, e-mail, and WhatsApp. Generally, the main driver for the campaign to 
use any application is its popularity. However, interviews point out that not all applications 
have the same level of influence. Every application has its particular uses and its own 
audience, as well as its sphere of influence. The following sections will provide an insight 
into the uses of these application revealing the peer-production processes as suggested by 
(Bennett et al. 2014b).  
 
7.4.3.1.  Campaign website 
 The campaign’s bilingual website1 was launched on September 21st 2013, just before the 
campaign started to use any other platforms. It is the campaign’s main focal point on the 
Internet and as one activist noted, “It has everything in one place.” Campaigners aim to make 
this website the starting point and main hub for online mobilisation. When the activists 
launched the website, they expected 150,000 signatures on the petition they started. This 
expectation was based on the high response that the petition received in the first week of the 
launch in September, 2013, when it received about 8,700 signatories. However, the petition 
garnered only around 17,000 signatures in total due to the fact that the website was blocked 
                                                
1 The campaign website can be found at: https://www.oct26driving.com. 
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by the Communications and Information Technology Commission, and also hacked by 
opponents of women’s right to drive (W1). Unsurprisingly, activists reported that this badly 
affected the number of signatories, the blocking more so than the hacking. After their website 
was blocked and hacked, campaigners decided to move to an e-petition website 
(https://www.change.org). Despite this, the number of signatories did not increase 
significantly.  
Analysis of the use of the websites by activists shows that they play a role in the stitching 
mechanism and, consequently, the processes of curation and dynamic integration can be seen 
in the website. Looking at the tabs on the campaign websites shows that campaigners archive 
the web content supporting the campaign, as well as making use of some content produced by 
supporters to highlight issues, what (Bennett et al. 2014b) refer to as dynamic integration.  
For example the music tab shows a YouTube song produced by a Saudi celebrity Hisham 
Fageeh entitled No Women No Drive.1 This song had been viewed 13,567,219 times by 
March 2016. Although this song is still available on YouTube, campaigners embedded it in 
the website to highlight Fageeh’s contribution among those of other supporters.  
Similarly, the campaigners highlight other messages and content produced by supporters 
online, keeping this away from the noise and ensuring it does not get lost in the crowd. This 
can be seen in tabs such as Photos, Famous Saudis on Video, and Women Driving where 
content from various social media platforms are posted on the website.  
 
                                                
1 It can be viewed on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aZMbTFNp4wI. 
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Figure 11:  A capture from the campaign’s websites showing a video produced by the 
American TV presenter Ellen DeGeneres to demonstrate her solidarity with the 
campaign. 
 
7.4.3.2.  E-mail 
 Instead of using e-mail for sending information to the public, the activists used it to mobilise 
and interact with people by asking them to send videos and images showing their support. 
These are then shared on different platforms not via mailing lists. However, the activists said 
they have not received a large number of e-mails. According to one activist, people do not 
like to use e-mail for this purpose due to fear of censorship and the difficulty of sending 
content via e-mail in comparison to other applications. Thus, activists found the application 
WhatsApp was another useful way to receive people’s content. Email is a good example of 
the type of backchannels that cannot be traced in this campaign.    
 
7.4.3.3.  Whatsapp1 
 Activists do not use WhatsApp for broadcasting messages, but to receive content from 
supporters. According to W5, the activists were not receiving many e-mails from supporters, 
but as soon as they gave a WhatsApp number, the amount received from supporters doubled 
and, “People felt encouraged to send photos and videos.” Campaigners emphasised that they 
do not save any number from which they have received content and they do not contact 
people via WhatsApp or broadcast messages on behalf of the campaign. She continued: 
  
Apart from long videos, most of the messages we receive are sent to the 
Whatsapp number. People are not afraid to send content by using Whatsapp, 
compared to sending content by email. We receive dozens of videos by Whatsapp; 
we do not choose, we publish any video we receive by Whatsapp unless the 
sender ask us to remove the video later. We also receive supporting messages, 
and messages containing insults and bad language, but not that many. We 
sometimes print screen the messages we receive and put them on Instagram or 
Twitter. (W5)    
The Instagram account for the campaign @oct26driving shows some messages received via 
Whatsapp showing women experiencing problems due to their drivers or how hard life is for 
women who cannot drive.  
                                                





Figure 12: A WhatsApp message sent to the campaign from a woman complaining that 




7.4.3.4.  Instagram1 
 A few months after the campaign was launched, activists started using Instagram to support 
the campaign because it was seen as popular among Saudi women in particular. However, 
initially, they found it was useless for supporting their campaign since, “People were not 
interested.” (W5). Interviewees could not detect any particular reason for this. The number of 
followers on the campaign account in Instagram had reached just 219 users by the end of 
2013. Interestingly, the number of posts jumped to 741 and the number of followers to 
12,500 by the end of 2014 (see Figure 10 and appendices D). This growth in activity and 
followers was accompanied by a shift towards interactive activities. By the end of 2014, the 
number of ‘likes’ had reached 29,570 and the number of comments was 13,541, with videos 
receiving more comments and likes. This indicates that the activists’ mobile strategy was to 
engage people through popular Internet applications regardless of what these are. The shift in 
Instagram activities and popularity is also indicated by the published figures on use of 
Instagram by females in Saudi (see Chapter Six).  
                                                
1 Instagram is an application for sharing photographs and short videos.   
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As is the case with the campaign website and other applications used by campaigners, 
curation and dynamic integration processes are used to produce a coherent organisation of the 




Figure 13: User activity and engagement on Instagram for the October 26th Campaign 
in November 2014 (Source: Simply Measured) 
 
It can be noted that almost all of the campaign’s account posts are personalised messages 
produced by supporters. There are different types of personalised messages including videos 
and photos supporting the campaign, messages of complaint about women being banning 
from driving cars, and photos showing the dangers posed by taxis and foreign drivers. These 
campaigns posts on Instagram receive larger numbers of comments than on Twitter.  
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Figure 14:A photograph showing women from Norway and Bahrain supporting the 
Women2Drive campaign (Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/3mX3JkkI3L) 
 
In the context of Instagram, some interviewees asserted that the campaign succeeded in 
persuading more people to support women’s demands. It is not the aim of this thesis to assess 
the extent to which the campaigns studied were successful in achieving their demands or not; 
instead, it is important to focus on user comments on social media about the campaign’s 
content to find out what people think about the campaign’s aims. Analysis of 30 posts made 
on the campaign’s Instagram account shows that the majority of these comments support the 
campaign’s aims. Moreover, most appear to have been made by females while the majority of 




7.4.3.5. Google hangout1 
 When Google Hangout was launched in May 2013, the activists immediately adopted this 
feature as it gave them the ability to broadcast live to the world. A hangout user can have 
more than one speaker per screen. The main user, who is the broadcaster in this case, can use 
those features to host more than one speaker talking. Activists used this feature to broadcast a 
                                                




monthly TV talk show called ‘Driving Cabin’, which lasted for four months, where activists 
hosted two or three people talking about a specific subject related to the women driving issue. 
It was not possible to discover the numbers of those watching the programme being streamed 
live. However, the number of views uploaded later on the campaign channel on YouTube 
was between 1600 - 2100 by the end of 2014, with one exception where the views exceeded 
10,000, possibly as a result of a celebrity appearing on the show. Overall, Google Hangout 
acts as an alternative to traditional TV broadcasting, since conventional media was not 
available to activists in most cases. Unlike the other uses of applications, Driving Cabin 
content is produced solely by core activists in the campaign.   
 
7.4.3.6. Twitter 
 Twitter is considered to be the most important and most popular application for the ‘October 
26th Campaign’. Appendices C shows the number of followers and the average number of re-
tweets, as well as other detailed information about campaign’s Twitter account. Campaign 
users try to re-tweet supporter tweets rather than posting new tweets, in order to encourage 
people to express themselves about the issue and to show that campaigns need individuals to 
participate actively. Moreover, the campaigners are trying to launch a hashtag periodically to 
keep the debate around the campaign issue alive. For example, they have launched several 
hashtags, to encourage women to drive on particular dates, including 28th December, 2013 
and 22nd February, 2014. However, opponents of the campaign tried, on some occasions, to 
make links between the chosen dates and the campaign’s ‘hidden agenda’.1 To prove that 
there is no hidden agenda behind any particular date, a hashtag has been created to call for 
driving on the fictitious November 31st. 
Figure 18 illustrates activity on the campaign’s Twitter account, showing that 52% of tweets 
are by the campaign itself. Analysis of the favourite tab (likes) shows the campaign’s 
favourite tweets as well as the number of other users’ tweets. Both can be seen as examples 
of the dynamic integration and curation processes. 
Regarding the most retweeted tweets created by campaign users, it is immeditately clear that 
personalised content is most frequently retweeted. For example, the item which was 
retweeted most shows a Saudi man teaching his elderly mother how to drive in a rural area. 
This tweet showing a short conversation between the pair, in which she expresses her support 
for the campaign’s aims has been retweeted 756 times and received 228 likes. It is likely that 
                                                
1 Campaigners have been accused of being westernised, and their opponents have tried to link the dates chosen 
to important dates in the West.   
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several factors have made this video popular on both Twitter and YouTube, namely, (a) the 
action took place in a rural area which would usually imply more conservative viewpoints. (b) 
The man’s elderly mother has her face and body fully covered which might reflect her 
conservative beliefs (c) the son is supporting his mother’s decision and (d) the video 
demonstrates his support in both words and actions. 
 
 
Figure 15: The most retweeted tweet from the campaign account showing a video 
featuring a Saudi woman being taught how to drive by her son. 
 
Among the list of the most retweeted tweets, there are other personalised actions. These 
include a short video of a fully veiled woman riding a hover scooter in the street with a 
comment saying she used this new technology to visit her neighbours without having to rely 
on her sons or a paid driver. It received 331 retweets and 116 likes.  
In this context, analysis reveals that those tweets with videos, photos, and links are usually 
gain most retweets. The only exception is a tweet created by campaigners asking people to 
follow the campaign, as a big event was about to occur in the next few hours. 
Examining the comments on the campaign tweets shows that some support the campaigns 
whilst others do not. Among the 30 tweets that received comments, none have received 
exclusively positive or negative comments, suggesting a divide between followers. Unlike the 






 YouTube is also an important application for the campaign because as one activist put it, 
“Saudis love YouTube” (W9), which is also confirmed by statistics in Chapter Six. Activists 
use YouTube to document any TV content related to the campaign issue. “YouTube is our 
archive.” one activist said. She continued, “When someone misses a TV show about the issue, 
he or she can find it on our YouTube channel; this maximises the number of viewers for a TV 
show or radio discussion.” (W7).  
In the main, activists do not publish any video or photographs received from supporters 
without first editing them to make it more viewable. Moreover, in some videos, activists have 
pixelated people’s faces for security reasons. This kind of editing might be said to indicate a 
type of hierarchical organisation but the fact is, activists tend to edit because they want to 
protect themselves as well. Publishing harmful or unsuitable content is the activists’ 
responsibility. Activist uses of YouTube suggest that this application is used mainly for 
curation purposes for archiving the video content related to the campaign. The campaign 
channels on YouTube contain 192 different videos, including material sent to the campaign 
by supporters from countries outside Saudi Arabia, including Georgia, USA, UK, Guatemala, 
and Turkey, and from Arab countries such as Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Palestine. 
These videos also show Saudi women’s daily struggles as they cope with being banning them 
from driving, in addition to women taking action and driving their cars in Saudi Arabia. In 
some videos women are seen trying to drive their cars with help from a male guardian. The 
YouTube channel also carries some interviews and news about the campaign’s aims.  
However, when campaign videos were ranked by the number of views they received videos 
of women driving their cars in Saudi Arabia were most popular. It is also noticeable that 
videos of non-Saudi women showing their solidarity gained fewer views. Moreover, seven of 
the videos on the campaign channel show women driving their cars, or talking about their 
aims without them identifying themselves as campaign members. Two of them have more 
than five videos on the channel. A CNN journalist with two videos supporting the campaign 
gained the lowest number of views: 502 for the English language video and 954 for the 
Arabic version. 
Overall, the activists are open to using any application that can help them if it is popular with 
the targeted audience. For example, they do not use Facebook, because as they claimed, this 
was popular in 2011 but not anymore (W5, W9). Another argued that freedom of speech on 
Facebook is limited in comparison to Twitter (W2). One activist said Facebook is popular 
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among a segment of youth only but not all people (W6). Campaigners therefore did not think 
that using Facebook would help them to reach the Saudi citizens they sought.  
It is easier to visualise people’s opinions toward the campaign on YouTube because of the 
like and dislike buttons. Of the 30 videos uploaded to the campaign’s channel on YouTube, 
only two have received more likes than dislikes; for the rest, the opposite is true. This 
division is reflected in the seven examples shown in Figure 16.   
                       
 
Figure 16: Seven captures from YouTube showing the number of campaigns’ videos 




7.4.4. Offline mobilisation 
 Most of the interviewed activists tend to mobilise people by any means possible and do not 
to stick to online mobilisation only. Activists strongly believe that online mobilisation needs 
to be supported by offline action, which means asking women to drive their cars in streets 
and get a reaction from the police and the public, which will add extra value to the campaign. 
One interviewee claimed (in relation to the earlier 1990 campaign): 
 
Correspondence with officials seemed to be useless. As soon as we drove our cars, 
and met them, they quickly recognised us because we are the women who drove 
their cars, (W7).  
She believes this still holds true today for the ‘October 26th Campaign’. In other words, 
driving her car gave her legitimacy and power to talk to the government, whereas they did not 
care about her previous correspondence because they did not recognise her. Other activists 
emphasised the importance of mobilising on the ground because writing letters was only a 
‘soft way’ to demand rights (W4, W10). In short, activists argue that campaigning of this 
kind is ‘the soft option’.  
Offline mobilisation, in the form of driving, puts female activists in danger as it is considered 
illegal, and police may stop and arrest female drivers and seize their vehicle. However, some 
of those interviewed showed their willingness to take this risk. One activist explained, “I 
have prepared for this before starting up my car. I have a small bag filled with clothes, 
enough for three days.” (W4). Moreover, the activists encourage women who are going to 
drive to film themselves. They argue that filming drivers adds extra value because it will be 
published online and will encourage people to take similar action. 
To maximise the benefit to the campaign of having females drive cars, the activists, set 
guidelines for those women who want to drive. Firstly, any women planning to drive must 
carry a driving license (W1). Secondly, they are told not to travel in groups (W4) to avoid the 
negative stereotype of demonstrations in the Saudi social context. Thirdly, if a woman has 
driven a car, has been arrested and then signed a pledge at the police station promising not to 
drive again, then she should not drive in order to avoid longer spells in prison. The activists 
also encourage women to drive while accompanied by a male, such as their father, brother or 
son. This is to emphasise to those Saudis who are against the campaign that men support their 
female relatives in claiming this right.1 One of the most viewed video clips on the campaign 
                                                
1 See, for example, the clip at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OIiFm3caGuc 
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account on YouTube was an older woman driving her car in a rural area accompanied by her 
son.1  
However, not all activists share the same belief about offline mobilisation. One activist 
refuses to take part in this action due to her dislike of confrontation and expressed her 
disagreement, asserting that the campaign should be based on asking for their rights only. She 
said, “I have not taken part in any driving action and I will not.” (W2). The activist express 
that by saying:  
I have a foreign driving license but I will not drive my car in Saudi now. I do not 
want make trouble for my father. He is very supportive, but I care about him. He 
is ill he got trauma I do not want him to be called to pick me up from the police 
station, and have to sign a pledge. [...] I use human rights discourse to campaign 
for this. I am trying to defend our claims, showing that the government’s excuses 
for banning women from the public sphere are not valid”.      
This indicates that the campaign encompasses a diversity of opinions around tactics and 
strategies, despite sharing the same overall goal. 
 
 
7.5. Campaign Organisation and the Role of the Internet 
 
The literature in Chapter Two indicates the impact of the Internet on collective action, 
revealing different types of activism and activists, as well as influencing the structure and 
formation of the collective action. Using Tilly’s (1978) definition of organisation, namely, 
“[The] aspect of a group’s structure which most directly affects its capacity to act on its 
interests.” (Tilly, 1978:7), the section below concentrates on organisational campaign 
structures, including campaign membership, structure and applications used for internal 
communication.  
 
7.5.1. Campaign membership 
 The interviews with activists did not reveal any formal membership criteria but reflect some 
apprehensions about monitoring, especially after one of the activists was imprisoned. 
However, there may be a type of informal membership. For example, one activist said, “We 
will accept anyone wishing to join the campaign, but acceptance needs approval from the 
other members.” Similarly, another stated, “We had a bad experience once. A female activist 
joined us, but she was behaving suspiciously, so as activists we excluded her from future 
                                                
1 This video is no longer available on the YouTube campaign channel because according to one interviewee, the 
woman asked a campaigner to remove it as she had faced negative comments or pressure in her community. 
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meetings.” (W10). These statements could refer to what might be called the ‘core activists’ 
(Ennis & Schreuer, 1987). (See Figure 11) 
 
Figure 17: Levels of Movement Support(Ennis & Schreuer, 1987) 
 
Thus, certain individual activists come to form the core of the campaign, through personal 
invitation or contact, by joining the group and by Internet engagement. Clearly, censorship 
and the monitoring of activists influenced the way individuals were admitted to the core 
group. Interviews indicate that the Internet played a key role in identifying people who share 
the same point of view and could possibly work within the campaign. However, just because 
someone showed interest online does not mean activists would add that person to the 
campaign. As the activists explained, they need to check someone’s profile first by asking 
other members of the campaign. Presumably, this works differently for non-Saudis. Hence, 
the Internet can recruit activist members but activists need personal contact and offline 
activity to become a core activist. In this case, the social and political environment (climate 
of censorship/surveillance) in Saudi Arabia still plays a vital role when recruiting new 




7.5.2. Campaign structure 
 A number of activists refused to describe their activities as a ‘movement’ and insisted on 
calling it a ‘social campaign’. This is, in part, related to the sensitivity regarding activism in 
Saudi Arabia (see Chapter Three). Similarly, the campaign’s official website, both the 
English and Arabic versions, calls it ‘a grassroots campaign’. Other activists either denied it 
had a structure or refused to discuss the structure of the campaign because it led to unwanted 
assumptions (see Chapter Five). Thus, campaigners recognised their campaign as a ‘self-
organising network’, similar to the model described by Bennett and Segerberg (2013), (see 
Chapter Two), meaning there is little, or no, formal organisational effort.  
One interviewee (W6) attempted to explain the loose structure of this campaign using the 
following illustration:  
        
Figure 18: An activist’s Impression of how the Campaign Operates 
According to her, the role of the activists is to maintain the platform, which refers to the 
Internet applications such as the Twitter or Instagram accounts, while the public shape and 
control the campaign without any planning or central leadership figures. In short, core 
activists do not make the content or control the campaign; they are Gatekeepers. 
Therefore, the task of the core activists is to encourage and energise people to participate in 
the campaign. Analysis of the Twitter account seems to support this claim (see Figure 13). 
Some 52% of tweets in the campaign account are re-tweets of others, whilst the rest are either 
replies to people or original tweets composed by the campaign account. Therefore, the 
activists who manage the campaign account on Twitter are mainly distributing other 
participants’ content, rather than producing their own.  
Core activists’ role 












Figure 19: Statistics for Campaign Users on Twitter (Source: Twitonomy)1 
 
However, it is clear that there are differences between what some activists suggested and the 
actual shape of the campaign. Some activists, mainly men participating in the campaign, have 
changed the way it operates. The interviews revealed that one male activist had divided other 
activists into groups, according to their jobs within the campaign as Figure 14 illustrates. The 
male activist’s decision to employ this mode of organisation may have been influenced by the 
hierarchical structures that carry authority in Saudi Arabia. He may have learnt this structure 
from Saudi culture, possibly indicating the cultural influence on the organisational aspect of 
social movements as argued by (Mattoni, 2013,Kavada 2013) in chapter Three.  
When asked why this male activist in particular had influenced the campaign structure some 
activists (W1 and W6) asserted that he had experience in such work. Interviews suggest that 
there are number of male activists, especially on the legal aid committee. Some are older than 
that activist. This suggests that the male activist who influenced the structure has done so on 
the basis of his personal experience of campaigning rather than as a result of cultural 
influence.       
Nevertheless, the imprisonment of an activist clearly impacted on the shape of the campaign 
and on its structure in particular. Some people left the campaign altogether whilst others 
preferred to work without any structure. One activist remembered, “They suddenly 
disappeared without notifying us... They just switched their mobiles off and disappeared.” 
(W6). Closer analysis of all the interviews indicates that the campaign structure is similar to 
Figure 14 below:  
                                                
1 The figure shows an analysis for the campaign account for the period from 20/03/2013-19/01/2015 for a total 
of 3,049 tweets which are all tweets sent during that period (see Appendix A). These statistics are based on 
Twitter data that is made available publicly through the Internet as well as Twitter API which is available from 
the analysis company (Twitonomy n.d.). Company servers retrieve all available tweets in real-time from Twitter 
for a particular user and then analyse each tweet to calculate the totals and the ratios displayed on the page 





Figure 20: Campaign Committees and their Inter-relationship 
Figure 14 reveals the structure of the campaign and shows a number of committees for media, 
marketing, platforms and legal aid. The committees work in parallel, not in a hierarchical 
order, with all core activists forming part of the General Committee. This shows the 
campaign is in reality more of a semi-structured campaign. In other words, the campaign 
works horizontally, not vertically. This means that formally, it has no official leader although 
interviews referred informally to a campaign leader (a woman who was part of the original 
1990 campaign and also works on other political and social campaigns). The face-to-face 
meetings of activists are usually held in her house although she alone cannot make any sole 
decisions without there being a vote; this also applies to decisions about who joins the 
General Committee. 
The Media Committee handles media inquiries. They are usually the ‘campaign faces’, 
hosted by TV stations, newspapers, radio and online media. The task of these activists is to 
film short video clips of Saudi celebrities and religious clerics, showing their support for the 
campaign and giving their opinions about the driving issue. The Legal Aid Committee is 
responsible for providing legal advice to activists if they are jailed or detained by the police. 
Members of the Platforms Committee disseminate the campaign message via the Internet. 
Members of this committee manage the Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram accounts and also 
receive videos and texts from the public, then edit and publish the content. They are also 
responsible for documenting the TV interviews with activists about the campaign and making 
these available on YouTube.  
The presence of some sort of informal membership and committee structure confirms that the 













in the campaign are part of the WhatsApp group. One activist referred to another supposed 
activist by saying, “She’s not part of the campaign. She’s not even on our WhatsApp group.” 
(W6).  
Overall, activists emphasise that the campaign is largely a self-organising network, and for 
the most part, deny any sort of formal structure, apart from the one noted in Figure 6.3. 
However, Figure 6.4, which has been gleaned from information provided by interviewees, 
clearly shows the campaign is formed as an ‘Organisationally Brokered Network’.  
 
Before moving to the SNA, it is important to discuss whether the mapping and analysing of 
the social network data reflect organizational structure or the structure of the circulation of 
information. I argue that the SNA can be said to reflect both the organisational structure and 
the structure of the circulation of information to differing degrees. In a digital network, both 
of these structures are interrelated because social media should not be considered as a single 
thing; rather, as argued by (Segerberg & Bennett 2011; Langlois et al. 2009; Poell 2013), it is 
an assemblage that provides a protest’s ecology as a whole  
Generally, the SNA alone might not reflect the organisational structure of a campaign 
because it might be a single factor or one space of many that is used for campaigning. For 
example, in the women driving campaign, other social media, such as YouTube and 
Instagram, are used for the same purpose. Furthermore, as (Langlois et al. 2009) observe, 
backchannels or private online spaces in social media cannot be mapped as they are hidden, 
as is the case for face-to-face meetings. Importantly, this does not mean that social media do 
not reflect organizational structure, but that it can help to identify this. The interviews in this 
campaign reveal that campaigners can invite individuals to participate in the campaign 
according to their online activities as well as other criteria as discussed previously. In this 
context, the concept of ‘communication as organisation’ suggested by (Bennett & Segerberg 
2013) could be useful in this argument, as circulation of information is an organising 
principle in personalised digitally networked action. 
Thus the circulation of information cannot be segregated from the organizational structure of 
the campaign on Twitter, as it is interrelated with it. Segerberg and Bennett 2011 note that 
“extracting single elements from more complex communication processes involving many 
actors and technologies may misrepresent the political action and dynamics of the case at 
hand” (Segerberg & Bennett 2011:200). 
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Applying Social Network Analysis (SNA) to the campaign activities on Twitter reveals two 
logics of networks, as described by Bennett and Segerberg (2013), an ‘Organisationally 
Enabled Connective Network’ and an  ‘Organisationally Brokered Collective Network'. 
Two Twitter hashtags (#oct26driving and the Arabic hashtag ااكتوبر٢۲٦قيیاددةة #) were analysed in 
order to understand the model of the campaign structure and whether online communication 
reflects connective action, according to the Bennett and Segerberg (2013) model. Twitter data 
were used to understand the campaign communication and information circulation because 
activists identified this as the main tool used by the campaign on the Internet for mobilisation.  
There were a total of 496 tweets analysed from both hashtags: English (N=246) and Arabic 
(N=250). In the analysed data, there are 78 unique accounts with 76 ties,132 Retweets in 
Arabic,118 original Tweets in Arabic, 109 original English account with 120 ties, 65 
Retweets in English and 183 original Tweets in English  
The first striking point to note is the separation of Arabic and English hashtags from each 
other (see Figure 16) with only four accounts connecting them:  
@oct26driving (official campaign account) using Arabic and English  
The campaign account plays different role in each hashtag. This can be seen in the SNA of 
@Othmanbay (a non-Saudi journalist) 
In his LinkedIn profile which is associated with the Twitter account @Othmanbay, Othman 
identified himself as a bilingual journalist working for Al-Ghad Al-Arabi TV. According to 
his profile, he had also worked for different news organisation such as Radio Netherlands 
Worldwide Arabic Service, and Associated Press' Arabic News Service (Othman n.d.) 
Analysis of Othman’s tweet in Arabic and English shows that he is posting news related to 
the campaign which is published by different news organisations in both languages (Arabic 
and English). However, none of Othman’s tweets included any news story by the journalist 
himself. Moreover, Othman also translated some Arabic YouTube videos that were uploaded 
by campaigners and posted these links in the English hashtag. Twitter data show that both 
@Othmanbay and the campaign account @oct26driving followed each other. 
@MIJamjoon (CNN journalist) 
Mohammed Jamjoom is also a bilingual Saudi journalist as his tweets and YouTube video on 
the campaign’s YouTube channel reveals. Jamjoom has two accounts @MIJamjoom and 
@JamjoomCNN, the second being linked with CNN where he used to work. However, 
Jamjoom produced a number of news stories about the campaign published on CNN such as 
(Jamjoom 2013). He also has a video uploaded by campaigners on YouTube, showing his 
support and solidarity with the campaign, and encouraging Saudi women to support it. The 
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content of Jamjoom’s tweets also shows some replies to several discussions about campaign 
issues. He also tweets other news sources which cover news from the campaign.  
@Da7eyatAlmojtam (campaign core member) 
 
Key to Figures 21, 22 and 25 
Green edges (links) The link between users, lighter green reflect amount of ties that means 
less mentions, retweet, and replies. Darker means more in degree.    
Blue Node Arabic hashtag participant. 
Red Node English hashtag participant. 
Node Size Reflect the node centrality that means larger nodes have more 
connection. 
 
                            
Figure 21: Separate Arabic and English Sectors for the two Hashtags (refer to CD 
appendices for larger view) 
 


























































































































































































































































Secondly, analysis shows that there is no overlap between the two hashtags, meaning they are 
driven by different organisational structures.  
 
Figure 22: Arabic hashtag analysis shows the centrality of the campaign user in 
communications (refer to CD appendices for larger view) 
 
 
The analysis illustrates that the Arabic hashtag was dominant and was built around a single 
Twitter account belonging to the campaign (@oct26driving), meaning that this hashtag is 
mainly dominated by the campaign account. Tweets, replies, and re-tweets were all about and 
around the official campaign account, not other individuals’ accounts, nor organisations’ 






































































































interviewees have their presence in the Arabic hashtag. They also have their ‘own network’ 
in the Arabic hashtag. In another word, they are almost isolated within the Arabic hashtag 
and they communicate directly to each other, communicating less frequently with other 
participants within the Arabic hashtag.   
When mapped, the communication on the Arabic hashtag illustrates that the campaign is an 
‘Organisationally Brokered Network’, which supports the interview findings as the core 
campaigners, not individual supporters, lead and direct the campaign.  
Figure 16 indicates that in contrast to the Arabic hashtag and interview findings, the English 
hashtag #oct26driving for the campaign is part-organisational and part-based on interpersonal 
influences. Individuals play a key role within the hashtag. This would characterise the 
English hashtag as an ‘Organisationally Enabled Network’, if the only hashtag activities are 
considered. The role of two accounts (@saudiwomen and @oct26driving) was significant but 
not decisive. However, the interviews do not reflect that, and the backchannels, which in this 
campaign are the WhatsApp groups, do not reflect that (Karpf 2014).  
Detailed analysis of the participants in the Arabic hashtag shows that not all of them 
necessarily support the campaign. One user @LN_T8ody, which could be translated from 
Arabic as “You will not drive”, is dedicated to attacking the campaign; this user posts 
inappropriate language and photos to attack advocates of women driving as well as calling 
them liberals.  
Whilst it is hard to detect the gender of participants, examining participants’ account in the 
hashtag manually suggests that most participants are female and also tweet about other 
women’s issues in Saudi Arabia, such as the male guardian issue. Furthermore, this analysis 
shows that most accounts in the Arabic hashtag are Saudis, as demonstrated by the content of 
tweets in accounts such as @life_hope22 and @dyjfh.        
 
Despite the communication mapping for the English hashtag, which shows different 
segmented communities within the hashtag not related to the campaign users, the campaign 
in general can still be classified as an ‘Organisationally Brokered Network’ for this hashtag. 
However, this is on a lower scale than the Arabic hashtag. In short, the communication within 
the Arabic hashtag relies heavily on the campaign account. In contrast, communication 
within the English hashtag reveals several other, small communities, meaning that those 
communities are interactive and mobilised separately from the campaign Twitter account. 
This reflects the diversity of the English hashtag community compared to its Arabic 
equivalent, which has a fairly small community. However, the English language community 
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within the English hashtag is much bigger since English can be used by, and is understood 
by, a wider number of Twitter users.  
Interestingly, the English hashtag shows that a number of followers are organisational 
accounts, and that these can be divided into two types: (a) news organisations and (b) human 
rights organisations. This reflects the role which international media and human rights 
organisations play in supporting the campaign’s aims, as was discussed by interviewees.  
In-depth analysis of these organisations shows that their presence in the hashtag happens 
unintentionally as it is automated. In other words, when news website readers want to share 
an article on Twitter, they click on the appropriate icon on the website. The article link will 
then be pasted in their tweet along with the news website’s Twitter account as Figure 3 
illustrates. However, this does not mean that news websites do not participate in the hashtag 
to promote their content about the campaign. Overall, then, it can be argued that the presence 
of news organisations in the English hashtag reflects news content about campaign issues 
rather than the communication structure of the campaign, as it can be the result of automated 
processes which happen unintentionally.    
 
Figure 23: Example of how news websites attach their Twitter account when a reader 
shares one of their articles on Twitter. 
 
This can be seen in accounts such as @guardian, @AP and @CNN. However, the personal 
accounts of journalists who are linked to news organizations such as @amjoomCNN might 
participate differently. AmjoomCNN has interacted with other participants, as well as 
promoting his news organization content. All but one of the news organizations represented 
in the sample are English-speaking.     
In the context of news organization accounts, it was noticed that some TV shows and films 
about cars also participated in the English hashtag @speedsisterfilm, as did 
@MotociclisteNet which is community for female motorcyclists in Italy. 
International human rights organisations also have a presence in the English hashtag, 
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including Amnesty International @amnesty, amnesty UK @amnestyUK, Human Rights 
Watch @hrw, and United Nations Women @UN_Women. It can be seen that their presence 
serves two functions, firstly, to show solidarity with activists and encourage people to 
participate, and secondly to promote their own website content. 
 
Figure 24: An example of a human rights organisation promoting its own content on the 








Figure 25: Analysis of the English hashtag (#oct26driving) shows small unconnected 
communities (refer to CD appendices for larger view) 
 
Comparing the types of participants and the content of the English hashtag with that of its 
Arabic counterpart demonstrates that there is a big difference in the presence of news 
organisations in the hashtag, which could reflect the amount of news in English as opposed to 
Arabic. Participants in the English hashtag are more diverse than those in the Arabic hashtag. 
Whilst Arabic is widely used outside Saudi Arabia, few users from elsewhere in the Arab 
world participate in the Arabic hashtag whereas the English hashtag shows participants from 
different countries such as USA, Mexico, and Australia, as well as Saudi Arabia.      
Clearly, both hashtags do not reflect only the organisational structure of the campaign, but 
also the structure of the circulation of information and it could be argued that both these 
























































































































































7.5.3. Internal communication applications 
 It was confirmed by all interviewees that Internet platforms were the incubator for most of 
the October 26th activities. However, the activists stated that this wasn’t necessarily by design. 
For example, one interviewee stated:  
When we launched our campaign we had no specific plan. We did not even have 
an account on Twitter. Our aim was to decentralise the campaign on Twitter. 
Thus, we only had to launch hashtags. But after a short period of time, a 
supporter set up a Twitter account with a campaign name (W6).  
Bearing in mind the geographical distribution of campaigners, using the Internet as a 
platform was vital for activists to communicate in a fairly safe, cheap and reliable way. 
However, the government’s obsession with monitoring was a clear consideration, especially 
when choosing an application for internal communication, although activists still use some 
applications (e.g. WhatsApp and Skype) despite them not being secure. Activists have 
mentioned Skype as one of the best applications for making voice and video calls, 
particularly for contacting other activists who are abroad for a short periods of time. E-mail is 
used chiefly for long messages (W3, W9). Activists also use the direct messages feature in 
Twitter, as it is fast and easy to use.  
 
7.6. Systemic Shaping Factors 
So far in this chapter, we have mainly dealt with the influence of technology on the campaign. 
Whilst the Internet seems to offer more freedom than the traditional offline environment in 
Saudi Arabia, it has already been noted there are a number of factors such as government 
policy or religion, which also shape activism online and offline, meaning that the Internet 
plays a different role in different contexts. Here, we examine in more detail, these broader 
factors that have shaped the campaign’s use of the Internet.  
 
7.6.1. Saudi policy, legal restrictions and campaigners 
 Activists have their own policy for coping with ‘invisible’ regulations. Organisations, such 
as ‘Human Rights Watch’ are usually criticised in the Saudi media for their reports. For 
example, the Deputy Editor of AlRiyadh newspaper said, “Their reports are discredited, […] 
and politicised.” and he also warned that they were aiming to destroy the Saudi image 
(Alshye, 2013). Similarly, activists always try to take into account religious and cultural 
traditions when campaigning for women driving and have a commitment to wear the hijab 
when filming, for example.   
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During the course of this research, a new threat emerged for the campaign. The ‘Crimes of 
Terrorism and its Financing Law’ was introduced on December 16th 2013 and came into 
force in January, 2014. Whilst this Law is theoretically intended to cover crimes of terrorism, 
the definition also includes: 
[D]isturb[ting] public order, destabilise national security or state stability, 
endanger national unIty, suspend the Basic Law of Governance or some of its 
articles, undermine state reputation or status, cause damage to state facilities or 
natural resources, attempt to coerce any of its authorities into a particular action 
or inaction or threaten to carry out acts that would lead to any of the 
aforementioned objectives or instigate such acts. (Law of terrorism Crimes and 
Financing 2013) 
The campaigners viewed this legislation as potentially the biggest threat to their activities 
since, “Anyone could be arrested under the terms of this law.” (W8). However, formal 
legislation itself is not really important, because the authorities can still arrest anyone without 
cause, or because the law is so vague. Even before this legislation was passed, campaigners 
believed they were under threat. For example, W4 commented, “Once they [the Ministry of 
the Interior] decide to arrest you, they will do it.” Other activists mentioned what could be 
described as ‘veiled threats’. W7 said she had received messages from the government via a 
friend asking her to stop her activities. According to her, messages were ‘friendly’ messages 
asking her to desist without a formal order.  
 
7.6.2. Prison and travel bans 
 The imprisonment of one of the members of the campaign changed its structure, as well as 
causing some concern for the campaigners. Thus, as we noted above, some activists withdrew 
from the campaign, without telling anyone. In some cases, the risk of imprisonment was a 
motivating factor. One activist even asserted that they had agreed that if another activist was 
jailed, they would all surrender themselves to the police, although, conversely, the threat of 
imprisonment might also be seen as having increased the activism of a minority. For W8, the 
imprisonment of a colleague had pushed them to do more as it underlined that is a right worth 
fighting for. 
The Saudi authorities have also announced that any woman caught driving her car can be 
held in custody for three days, and the vehicle impounded until the woman’s guardian comes 
to the police station and both have signed a pledge not to let her drive again. Even though 
custody is a threat to activists, it does not appear to act as a deterrent for activists, as it is only 
for short periods of time. One activist said:  
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When I first drove my car I was ready to be taken into custody. I packed my bags, 
clothes, and vitamins for three days. I knew they would do it. To release me they 
would ask me to call my male guardian to pick me up from custody. I was ready 
to say: “No. I will not call anybody”.  (W4) 
Another female activist commented: “Prison is scary, but I am sure that the government will 
not jail women” (W7). A third female activist made the following point: 
 
I think the government will reach a stage that makes it impossible for them to jail 
women, because of the international pressure. My personal viewpoint is that the 
government cannot jail women in 2013 for driving a car. Even if I were jailed, 
this would not change my beliefs. As a group, we women decided that if the 
government jails one of us we will collectively go to the police and hand 
ourselves in. This actually happened once. In one case, an activist drove her car, 
and had been arrested. Four of us went to the police station and said to them: 
“Here we are; arrest us as well”. The policemen laughed at us and said: “We will 
hand them over to you, we do not want them” (W9). 
 
Aside from detainment, the other main punishment used to deter activists is being banned 
from travelling abroad for an unspecified period of time. Some activists consider this, the 
most serious threat since most of them need to travel abroad regularly for different purposes, 
and any such ban would impact significantly on their personal lives.  
 
7.6.3. Censorship, anonymity and the Protection of Personal Data 
 The campaign website1 was blocked for the first time a few days after it had been launched 
and then on two further occasions later on in the campaign. This blocking has negatively 
affected the campaign. The blocking made the government’s position on the campaign clear 
which had a detrimental impact, since people became too scared to log onto the website, even 
after the blocking was lifted, as they thought the government might track or censor them. 
There is no direct evidence to support this but it certainly reflects campaigners’ beliefs. 
However, some activists argue that the fact that the government made its position on the 
campaign clear was useful since this sent a message to those opponents of the campaign who 
had accused it of being launched by the Saudi government. 
Both male and female interviewees in this campaign mainly use their real names on Twitter 
and other social networks as they stated and most display their real photos with their profiles. 
It is clear that interviewees were unafraid of doing so, as some asserted that governments 
already knew them, and some claimed that they had already met some Saudi officials, as 
mentioned previously. One activist said she had received a friendly message from the 
                                                




Moreover, it should be understood that remaining anonymous may harm the campaign and 
activists’ claims as it may lead the public to distrust the campaigners and their campaign. As 
discussed earlier, people tend to link anonymity with certain countries or some international 
organizations. The most important point is that the campaigners stress that they want to be 
clear that they are claiming their rights as Saudi citizens. One activist said that she refused to 
use an international number for WhatsApp as this may make the group seem suspicious (W1). 
In general, it seems that the blocking system, which is used in Saudi Arabia to block the 
websites, has not affected the campaign greatly. One activist said the blocking system used 
has proved ineffective in preventing the campaign, commenting:  
The blocking system is ancient, an outdated system. There is not just one but 
twenty types of software you can use to bypass the blocking system. When a 
child starts learning how to use the Internet, the first thing to learn is how to use 
this software. There is no need to learn programming language. You just 
download it (W3). 
One activist argues that the campaign has benefited from the website being blocked, noting:   
 
I think the website blocking has two sides. On the one hand, it makes the website 
inaccessible. On the other, it helps the campaign and gives it more publicity, even 
internationally. It makes people more convinced that the campaign is having an 
influence on people, and people said “It has been blocked because its discourse is 
effective and it is a serious campaign (W8).    
 
Similarly, W3 argued: 
 
I am sorry to say it, but the blocking system is one of the worst things that could 
happen in the whole world. You know that when you ban or block something it 
simply increases people’s desire to know more about it. Forbidden fruit is the 
sweetest. They ban books here, we bring them from elsewhere. The blocking 
system does not affect the campaign. Every time they block us we will launch 
another website (W3).  
 
The only negative effect of the blocking of the campaign website was seen during the 
collection of signatures for a petition as a number of interviewees asserted. For example W9 
observed that “blocking our website annoyed us during the signature collection, but it does 
not affect our campaign” (W9). Another campaigner said “The website blocking has slowed 
down the growth of the campaign but it does not affect the campaign”. (W7). W1 explained 
in more detail how the blocking system affected the campaign during signature collection for 




We have been influenced negatively by the blocking system. Once it destroyed 
our efforts. We launched a petition on our website, and were expecting to reach 
150,000 signature in a few days, because we already had 2,000 or 3,000. They 
suddenly blocked the website. Then we lost this huge turnout. When people 
visited the website and found it blocked they did not come back again, even when 
we used another petition website. We barely reached 16, 000 signatures (W1).  
 
Importantly, censorship and monitoring has also affected the campaign, as discussed earlier 
in the campaign membership section. The fear of being monitored made campaigners more 
cautious about inviting activists to their offline meetings, as W1 explained: 
 
One of the negative aspects of the Internet that you do not who you are taking to. 
You may be talking to an intelligence agent pretending to be an activist or 
someone just looking for girls to flirt with. We have to do our own research. If we 
do not think someone is OK then we do not respond to him or her (W1). 
 
7.6.4. Traditional media coverage 
 Whilst many campaigners are connected to the media, they do not necessarily share a 
positive view of the role of Saudi media in the campaign and some activists distinguish 
between the press generally and individual columnists. Overall, activists were satisfied with 
the national media coverage they received when the campaign was launched. Reviewing pre-
campaign press coverage from October 1st 2013 to October 24th 2013, supports this claim as a 
number of news stories and columns supported women’s right to drive. Overall, the media 
coverage was positive until the Ministry of the Interior announced its statement about the 
campaign.  
According to some activists, there was a dramatic change in the media coverage after the 
Ministry of the Interior statement, which was released on 23rd October 2013, just a few days 
before the driving protest. The statement noted: 
That campaigns, which have been circulated lately in social network and some 
media forums, calling for gatherings and prohibited protests in the name of 
"women driving/women's right to drive" [are violations] of the laws in force in 
the Kingdom. [These laws] prohibit whatever leads to disturbing social consensus 
opens the gates of disorder or follows the wishes and dreams of  those courting 
controversy […], the Interior Ministry emphasises that the relevant agencies will 
enforce the laws immediately with all firmness and power against all violators. It 
also appreciates at the same time the many [positive] comments made by citizens 
which assert the importance of preserving security and stability and keeping 
distance from whatever brings about division or discrimination in society, Allah’s 
guidance is the only true guidance, (Saudi Press Agency (SPA) 2013). 
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Activists claimed that from this point onwards, “Media coverage turned against us. Some 
reports described us as ‘traitors’.” (W1). Furthermore, according to the activists, three TV 
stations that had previously hosted them refused them any more airtime. Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, activists believe that the Saudi media is not a reliable platform for campaigning. 
An analysis of a sample of Saudi newspaper websites, including AlRiyadh, AlJazirah, 
Alwatan, Alyaum, Alsharq and Okaz over the period from 25th October to 31st December 
2013, shows that with one exception, there was no positive coverage of the campaign. Indeed, 
much of the reporting was actively hostile with headlines like: “Members of Shura Council: 
women driving is sedition, and we should not allow them to sully the country’s reputation.” 
(Bilal, 2013); “Community awareness defeats  suspicious calls about women driving cars.” 
(Alshibani, 2013) and “The women of Kingdom respond to the Ministry of the Interior 
statement and refuse to drive cars.”(Khudair, et al. 2013). The only exception is a report 
published by Okaz stating the need for female doctors to be allowed to drive (Anbar, 2013).  
In short, whilst Saudi media had an initially positive attitude towards the campaign, it appears 
that the government pressurised the traditional media to change its stance. Only one Saudi 
journalist suggested that there was overt evidence of this intervention, and W3 stated that 
journalists who used to write about the campaign had told her that Editors-in-Chief turned 
against them after October 24th, the date of the Ministry of Interior’s statement. As a result, 
activists argued that the campaign relied on online channels to communicate, organise and 
mobilise more than conventional media because of the restrictions imposed there. One 
activist stressed that, “This campaign is entirely reliant on social media for mobilising 
because there is no ‘formal’ media we can publish in.” (W2). 
 
7.6.5. Societal and Cultural Limitations 
Interview data reveals that there are a number of societal and cultural limitations which 
influence the campaign’s performance. These mainly relate to views about gender and 
religion. The issue of gender is, of course, a vital and contested factor in the campaign, 
shaping even the use of the Internet as a means of communication and mobilisation. Some 
female interviewees complained about the presence of men in the campaign. One interviewee 
argued, “We women don’t like men working with us. We don’t like the hierarchical structure, 
and men usually tend to steal women’s efforts.” (W7). Other female activists shared the same 
concern about the campaign being formally structured by men. They believe the campaign 
should remain unstructured to keep it a ‘popular campaign’. In addition, some thought that 
having a structure, “Could send unwanted signs to the government.” (W7). Such activist 
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statements reflect both the fear of being seen as a formal organisation, in a country where 
such organisations are banned, as well as potentially creating a negative image of the action 
amongst the wider population.  
However, one male activist claimed that the campaign would greatly benefit from men for 
several reasons. He emphasised that the presence of men gives the campaign what he called, 
“A human rights’ dimension.” (W8), as well as the men being able to concentrate purely on 
taking responsibility for the campaign, whereas the women might be affected by family needs 
and concerns. He argued that women in Saudi society are strongly influenced by family 
tradition and might sometimes be asked not do something by other family members, parents 
or husbands in particular. Men are largely free from such obligations. 
In addition to gender, religion plays a vital role in the campaign, since both sides use religion 
to support their point of view. Some activists said they are trying to play down the religious 
aspect of the women driving issue, as they argue this opinion is related to tradition, rather 
than religion. Even so, using religion in favour of the campaign cannot be ignored. Activists 
themselves have used religious quotations and opinions expressed by Islamic scholars, and 
the interviews show that some activists have tried to encourage well-known Islamic scholars 
to support the campaign. Furthermore, it can be gleaned from the interviews that the activists 
are looking for a ‘specific’ type of Islamic doctrine, not available in Saudi Arabia, to provide 
a ‘modern’ view on women’s issues. For example, activists have invited two female Muslim 
scholars from Morocco and Malaysia to Saudi Arabia to talk about women’s rights in Islam. 
Furthermore, some activists’ stress that the speaking online environment is not free as some 
people might rude in their comments as a result of activists’ expressing themselves. For 
example one female activist said:    
 
“When I started tweeting, I discovered some kinds of people that I did not expect 
to exist in Saudi society. I was only communicating with my own community. 
After using Twitter I got to know new segments of society. I was expecting that 
there would be people who disagreed with my way of thinking. Some people are 
intellectual and others average but I did not expect that the irrational people might 
be harmful. Originally I just tweeted straight away without thinking. Then I was 
surprised that some people are very threatening in a very frightening way. I was 
afraid for myself and my children. Some anonymous users threatened me. Some 
of them slandered my husband, my father and me, because he did not know how 
to bring me up. Once, some one told me “watch your children; we know how to 
reach them.” (W3 ) 
The same interviewee attributed part of this harassment to her profile avatar as she appears 
unveiled, which according to her it means to some people that she is not religious. She was 
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the only interviewee who expressed such feelings but there are a large number of negative 
comments on the videos that were circulated by Twitter or YouTube. 
 
 
7.7. The Future of the Campaign  
Activists are optimistic about the campaign’s future in general, and the ‘October 26th 
Campaign’ in particular. One activist describes the Internet as, “An effective weapon.” (W7). 
They predict that campaigns in general will significantly increase in the near future, and that 
it will become more difficult for the government to control them, “The cause which motivates 
campaigns, suppression of freedom of expression, still exists here, so more campaigns will 
come.” (W2, W5). Even so, the activists’ optimism is tempered by the fear of the strength of 
the recent anti-terrorism law, as noted above. One activist explained his fear of the law, “It is 
so vague, anybody could be imprisoned and every campaign could be stopped.” (W8).  
Although some activists accept that the ‘October 26th’ Campaign may have lost its earlier 
momentum, they are determined to maintain their campaigning to pursue their claims. One 
activist argued, “If the campaign loses its momentum, as expected, the main activists should 
maintain their campaign and achieve the ‘October 26th’ Campaign goals as a core group.” 
(W8), This statement tends to underline the point that the campaign is an ‘Organisationally 
Brokered Network’, since the activist was relying on the core group to continue making their 
demands, not individualised supporters.   
 
7.8. Conclusions 
“Without the Internet, the campaign would not exist.” This type of phrase was repeated in 
almost all the interviews and the activists strongly believe that it forms the backbone of the 
campaign, “I can tell you how important the role of the Internet is, when I compare the 
‘October 26th Campaign’ with the 1990s campaign, when there was no Internet.” (W7). Some 
activists argue that the Internet has also assisted them in explaining their ideas and 
persuading the audience, as well as defending themselves, which was impossible prior to the 
Internet era.  
Moreover, campaigners recognise the Internet as providing a strong alternative to more 
traditional forms of media. It allows activists to publish their news without intervention, as 
well as publishing this in a quicker way, “I was tweeting from the police station when I was 
stopped.” (W7). The activists have their own TV show ‘Driving Cabin’, as well as publishing 
all the videos they want to share with the audience directly. Similarly, they make all the 
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campaign content available at all times on the Internet. In this respect, “The Internet delivers 
the information to everyone. It has also put an end to our lack of visibility.” (W7). 
It can be seen from the videos and photographs that have been uploaded onto Twitter and 
Instagram that the supporters of the campaign have become more visible to the public and 
willing to express themselves. People online demonstrate their virtual solidarity to the 
campaign and the women’s actions in ways that would have been unthinkable previously. In 
some cases, they show their solidarity by attaching the campaign logo to their profile 
photographs on social media. Furthermore, they claim they have succeeded in spreading 
awareness of campaign issues, as well as persuading more people to support women driving, 
although this claim is difficult to measure. Certainly, analysis of the replies on the 
campaign’s Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram accounts might not support this. One activist 
argues that  
The Internet has allowed our voices to be heard in the way we wanted. Whenever 
the media covered your stories, it still did not deliver the message you wanted; it 
is the editor’s version not yours. These ways of delivering the message in the 
media are mostly distorted. But when you speak online, it means you have a 
presence in the sphere, it gives you publicity, and you have your voice repeated 
every day. Your presence in the media is not guaranteed. You may appear in the 
media for one day, and then you will be absent for months. It is not you who 
controls your presence, it is them. (W9) 
 
There is no doubt that using the Internet for campaigning for the right to drive has made 
women’s voice louder. This can be seen in various ways as mentioned earlier. For example 
this chapter includes a statement issued by the Ministry of Interior which is a direct response 
to the online campaign. Moreover, the meeting between Saudi official and some campaigners 
came after launching the campaign online. In addition, public engagement also reflects the 
momentum that the campaign has gained within Saudi society.    
However, the Internet also makes it possible for campaigners to identify their opponents, and 
determine how to challenge them. The Internet creates a space for different opinions to be 
aired. As such, this interaction helped campaigners to understand the other side’s opinions 
and what these are based on. One activist explained, “The Internet gave us the space in which 
to get to know their thoughts, to know to what extent we beat them, to know their latest 
outbursts.” (W3).  
Furthermore, the Internet has assisted campaigners in identifying other activists who share 
similar interests and solidarity, as it became the new virtual public sphere in a society which 
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has traditionally lacked civil society institutions and freedom of speech, (see Chapter Two). 
In short, the Internet makes the campaign more visible. 
Internet technologies have also eliminated geographical boundaries for the female activists. 
Tweet locations and interviews showed that activists are from different cities and the Internet 
reduces the need for face-to-face meetings. Besides that, the Internet provides an alternative 
to demonstrations which are banned under Saudi Law. Activists became reliant on the 
Internet for mobilising because the unique feature of online activism in Saudi Arabia is that 
the Internet is not just another option, it is the only option. It is clear that a number of 
activists in the ‘October 26th Campaign’ have been encouraged by Internet technologies to 
work on campaigns for the first time in their lives. Activists strongly believe that the Internet 
has helped to break down the barriers of fear. Almohareb (2010), argues that the Internet has 
not only increased levels of freedom of expression in Saudi Arabia, but has also had a knock-
on effect on increased levels of freedom of expression in the Saudi Press.  
The campaign’s origins, activist profiles and their interview responses, and the SNA analysis, 
all strongly indicate that the campaign can be categorised as an ‘Organisationally Brokered 
Network’, meaning it is a traditional collective action using a new technology. Several pieces 
of evidence support this claim. First, the campaign is based on previous campaigns such as 
‘My Right, My Dignity’, which interviewees clearly referred to as an organised campaign 
fighting for women’s rights. Secondly, there is an informal leader for the campaign and 
although she has no specific power over campaigners, interviewees point out that she is a 
respected individual which makes other activists listen to her. Thirdly, despite activists’ 
denial of any kind of organising or organisation, interviews indicate that there is a semi-
formal organisation and tasks with allocated roles and their denials  in this respect can be 




8. CHAPTER EIGHT: THE TEACHERS’ RIGHTS CAMPAIGN 
 
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter explores the second case study, concerning the teachers’ rights campaigns in 
Saudi Arabia. It is based on interviews with core activists conducted in 2013 and social 
network analysis covering the period 2009-2015. Again, the focus is on the role of the 
Internet technologies in mobilising and organising the campaign and also the ways in which 
it is shaped by the contextual environment. The Teachers’ rights campaign, which is one of 
the earliest online campaigns in the country, represents a different style of Internet activism 
compared to that in the women driving campaign (October 26th) analysed in the previous 
chapter. It offers the opportunity to assess and compare different models of online activism. 
The campaign itself encompasses a variety of models with three different online forums, each 
with their own policies and styles of behaviour due to differences in their point of view, 
although all claim the same rights throughout. 
 
8.2. Origins and Background   
The main issues which motivated the campaign date back to 1995 (1416, AH1), when 
teachers claimed that the Ministry of Education had violated the guidelines relating to 
educational careers, established by the Council of Ministers in 1982 (1402, AH), and that 
both male and female teachers were being hired at lower level career positions than those 
stated by law. Around 200,000 teachers were affected by this behaviour, preventing them 
from obtaining what they should have been entitled to in terms of salaries. Soon after the 
campaign was established, other grievances were added to the list of campaigners’ demands 
as explained below.  
According to one interviewee T7, the campaign began with one post on the Alshref online 
education forums,2  which is mainly designed for teacher discussion about educational 
materials. A teacher posted a statement saying that teachers should reclaim the rights that had 
been ‘stolen’ from them, using all legitimate means. According to activists, people noticed 
the post, and it went viral. An online news website, Alweeam,3 covered the story and this 
gave general publicity to the forum. However, this new publicity for the forum and the 
‘daring’ post worried the owner of Alshref, as it was not judged by him to be in the forum’s 
                                                
1 Dates in brackets refer to the Islamic or Hijri calendar, which is the official calendar in Saudi Arabia.  
2 www.alshref.com/  
3 http://www.alweeam.com.sa  
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interest. This led to him closing this thread and asking teachers not to discuss this issue on 
‘his’ forum. A few months later, teachers’ demands were once again being discussed on the 
original forum after the issue of demanding rights went viral. Within a few days, a new forum 
entitled ‘SA Teachers’ Network’1 was launched by a teacher who was interested in what had 
been posted at Alshref. This forum, launched in mid-2007, was dedicated to campaigning 
purposes only. The initial aim was to mobilise teachers to collect funds in order to cover a 
lawyer’s costs.  
According to activists, many teachers moved to the new forum and within three months, it 
had become well known and activists began taking legal action. According to T1, at this point 
Okaz newspaper ran a negative headline claiming that it was: ‘A new way to steal people’s 
money’. One of the campaigners went to the newspaper to meet the editor-in-chief, providing 
documentation to prove the seriousness of the campaign. The newspaper printed an apology 
to the campaigners the next day, (T1). Paradoxically, though, what teachers describe as 
‘negative coverage’ had a very positive impact on the campaign itself. While initially they 
struggled to collect less than a quarter of the costs after the negative news report, almost three 
quarters of the lawyer’s costs were rapidly raised by bank transfer, without even having to 
use online donations. It appears that people started asking about the campaign, and then went 




















Table 7: Timeline showing the Key Events in the Teachers’ Campaign 
Event Date 
First online thread post calling for teachers’ rights  09/08/2007 
First online forum dedicated to the campaign KSA Teachers launched   15/08/2007 
Negotiations started with the lawyer  8-9/2007 
Contract signed with the lawyer  11/2007 
Statement of claims filed with the Administrative Court  29/12/2007 
Saudi Teachers’ Forum launched   10/01/2008 
A six-member ministerial committee formed by royal decree to study the teachers’ 
status  
07/09/2008 
A royal decree issued to improve teachers’ pay grades by creating new jobs  26/04/2009 
Teachers met with the king 27/05/2009 
Administrative Court rejected the teachers’ case due to the royal decree 27/05/2009 
Formation of a committee to improve teachers’ pay grades announced (for the first 
time)  
16/02/2010 
Formation of a committee to improve teachers’ pay grades announced (for the second 
time). 
23/06/2010 
Formation of a committee to improve teachers’ pay grades announced (for the third 
time). 
02/03/2011 
Formation of a committee to improve teachers’ pay grades announced (for the fourth 
time). 
23/4/2011 

















8.3. Campaigns Demands/Objectives  
The teachers’ demands covering the period 2007 to 2013 were as follows: 
• Improve career progression to the grade deserved within the scale, for a specific 
number of teachers, according to the educational career guidelines approved by the 
Ministry of Civil Services, 25/04/1982 (01/07/1402, AH). This can be explained by 
Tables 8 and 9 which show the increase in teacher salaries after their campaign. Table 
10 provides details relating to the situation of teachers until the end of 2014, and the 
improved salaries once the Ministry of Education agreed to upgrade them.  
 
 
Table 8: The Difference between Teachers’ actual Salary Level and new 
Salary claimed 
Gender Class Year Employed Grade Actual Salary SR Claimed Salary SR Grade Gap 
Male 1996/1417 1996/1417 20 17 534 17 534 None 
Female1 1996/1417 1996/1417 13 14 086 17 534 7 Grades 
Male 1997/1418 1997/1418 18 16 406 17 070 1 Grades 
Female 1996/1417 1996/1417 13 14 086 17 070 7 Grades 
Male 1998/1419 1998/1419 16 15 478 16 406 2 Grades 
Female 1998/1419 1998/1419 13 14 086 16 406 6 Grades 
Male 1999/1420 1999/1420 14 14 550 15 942 1 Grade 
Female 1999/1420 1999/1420 13 14 086 15 942 4 Grades 
Note. Retrieved from: T9 
 
• Put all the teachers entering the profession in the same year at the same level. 
Teachers were given a different salary even if they were hired in the same year. They 








                                                
1 Education used to be gender segregated, with males and females having a different pay scale and career 
structure. On 24th March 2002 the General Presidency of Female Education merged with the Ministry of 
Education.    
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Table 9: Salary for Teachers who graduated in the Period 1997-2005, with 
educational Qualifications, before and after the Settlement 
Class Year Current Salary (SR) New Salary (SR) Difference  (SR) 
1997/1418 12 149.35 12 159.35 10.10 
1998/1419 11 704.95 11 715.05 10.10 
1999/1420 10 816.15 10 826.25 10.10 
2000/1421 9 614.25 10 381.85 767.60 
2001/1422 9 614.25 10 381.85 767.60 
2002/1423 9 235.50 9 452.65 217.15 
2002/1424 8 000.25 8 563.85 563.60 
2003/1425 7 682.10 8 119.45 437.35 
2004/1426 7 363.95 7 675.05 311.10 
2005/1427 7 045.80 7 675.05 629.25 
 
Note. Retrieved from: T9  
 
Table 10: Salary of Teachers who graduated in the Period 1997-2005, 
without a Teaching Qualification1, before and after the Settlement 
Class Year Current Salary (SR) New Salary (SR) Difference (SR) 
1997/1418 12 149.35 No change None 
1998 /1419 11 704.95 No change None 
1999 /1420 10 816.15 No change None 
1421/ 2000 9 614.25 9 927.35 313.10 
2001/1422 9 614.25 9 927.35 313.10 
2002/1423 9 235.50 9 927.35 691.85 
2002/1424 8 000.25 8 579.00 578.75 
2003/1425 7 682.10 8 134.60 326.25 
2004/1426 7 363.95 7 690.20 311.10 
2005/1427 7 045.80 7 672.80 200 
2006/1428 6 369.10 7 672.80 876.70 
2007/1429 6 050.95 7 672.80 1 194.85 
 
Note. Retrieved from: T9 
 
• Count the years of service from the date of starting the job for teachers who entered 
the profession under the terms of Article 1052 or an Article 105 contract. The 
‘current’ contract at that time did not count any years of teaching experience in 
                                                
1 Some Saudi universities provide bachelor degrees which also qualify graduates to teach in education, rather 
like the UK B.Ed. qualification; other universities offer standard bachelor degrees. 
2 Article 105 is similar to the so-called UK zero contract, or casual contract. This allows ministries to hire staff 
with no guarantee of work. Employee pay depends on how many hours they work. Neither sick pay nor holiday 
pay is included, and this does not count towards years in service for pension purposes. 
211 
 
private schools nor did it take into consideration qualifications for the purposes of 
upgrading teachers.     
• Place teachers on the pay scale in accordance with their years of experience. At that 
time, all teachers who were newly employed in schools were put at the same level, on 
the pay scale, regardless of any previous experience they might have had.  
• Pay the difference between these grades, with effect from the date of the re-calculated 
pay grade and apply this retroactively.  
• Change the policy on paid leave. In 2013, the Ministry of Education asked teachers to 
return to school two weeks before the actual start date of the first term.  
The legal action which was initiated by the Internet forum began in 2007 (1428, AH) 
following what teachers called the Ministry of Education’s ‘infringement’ of their rights for 
over a decade. One year after the lawsuit started against the Ministry of Education, the 
Administrative Court held several sessions to deliberate. King Abdullah issued a Royal Order 
on 18th  January, 2008 (09/01/1429, AH) requesting the formation of a ministerial committee 
to consider the case and suggest the best way forward (Alribai, 2013). Six months after 
forming the ministerial committee, which was headed by the Minister of Civil Services, a 
Royal Decree was issued to re-assign some 205,000 teachers to the appropriate pay grade. 
However, many teachers have subsequently complained about the decisions made by the 
ministerial committee, arguing that it did not comply with the terms of the Royal Decree. The 
outcome proved disappointing to many teachers and did not meet all the demands they 
originally initiated through the case. Only the pay grade issue was solved, without 
considering their appropriate career level, which still meant lower levels of monthly salaries, 
and failure to count years of service.1 In addition, they were not paid the net salary 
differences, which in some cases amounted to 300,000 SR, and were against the regulations 
of the Ministry of Civil Services. As a result, a number of teachers requested that the King 
should reconsider their case. The former Minister of Education, Abdullah Al-Obaid, 
supported the teachers and addressed the King about the possibility of reconsidering their 
case. Consequently, King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz AlSaud issued a further Royal Decree 
requesting that the ministerial committee re-open the case. The decree was issued to apply 
Article 18A to improve the teachers’ pay grades with effect from 2nd January, 2009 
(05/01/1430, AH).  
                                                
1 Article 105 is similar to a casual or a zero-hours contract. This allows ministries to hire staff with no guarantee 
of work. Employees’ pay depends on how many hours they work. Neither sick pay nor holiday pay is included 




After the Royal Decree to apply Article 18A was issued, the Administrative Court ruled that 
the lawsuit brought by the teachers against the Ministry of Education would be suspended. 
Ahmad al-Maliki, the solicitor acting for the teachers, appealed the case at the Court of 
Appeal, but the decision was made in favour of the adjudication of the Administrative Court 
and the case was closed. Teachers were still unhappy with Article 18A, claiming that it 
ignored the years of teaching experience, putting teachers with 11 years’ experience on the 
same salary point as those with just one year of experience. Teachers argued that Article 18A 
had been misapplied or misinterpreted by the ministerial committee.  
 
8.4. Scale of the Campaign  
By 2013, there were nearly half a million teachers in Saudi Arabia, in some 33,000 schools 
across the country (MOE, 2013). Around 200,000 (40%) of them were affected by the ‘unfair’ 
job classification by the two ministries (Ministry of Civil Services and Ministry of Education). 
In addition, all of them were affected by the policy relating to paid leave days. The size of the 
campaign can be gauged from the published figures for two online forums dedicated to the 
teachers’ campaign that indicate some 200,000 active members in each forum. If the vast 
majority of the registered members in the forum are teachers, as would be deemed logical 
(although membership is not limited to this group), this means about 40% of all Saudi 
teachers are members of the campaigns. There might also be a crossover of membership. The 
number of teachers who actually paid for the lawyer was, of course, far lower than this 
number. When interviewed, the activist who dealt with the fund-raising refused to release 
data, on the grounds that they have been told by the authorities not to do so. However, 
statistics extracted from the Internet Archive project,1 indicate the size and growth of the 











                                                
1 https://www.archive.org  
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Table 11: Size and Growth of the Saudi Teachers Forum on www.saudi-
teachers.com 








16/02/08 522 504 905 172 1,121 4,673 
14/06/08 2,896 No Data 2,948 39 485 20,209 
18/12/08 6,557 No Data 7,233 1,902 21,771 79,123 
07/03/09 12,593 No Data 12,916 1,902 21,771 169,346 
19/07/09 20,258 No Data 20,660 9,924 172,766 302,060 
28/08/09 21,151 No Data 24,115 11,138 188,977 357,922, 
10/02/11 72,961 No Data 52,400 20,019 304,612 779,634 
10/05/11 79,537 No Data 61,582 24,085 389,470 930,535 
04/01/12 94,444 No Data 82,784 31,984 496,683 1,259,668 
23/07/12 105,526 No Data 98,432 37,516 578,833 1,500,385 
05/12/12 113,549 No Data 106,141 40,317 609,326 1,596,913 
14/03/13 119,139 No Data 110,427 42,103 631,396 1,665,087 
15/07/13 121,863 No Data 113,161 43,138 639,496 1,710,659 
16/12/13 126,105 No Data 115,210 43,714 643,660 1,743,861 
Note. February 2008 to December 2013. Retrieved from https://www.archive.org) 
 
Table 12: Size and Growth of Saudi Teachers Forum on www.ksa-
teachers.com 
Date Members Active Members Total Threads 
Campaign 
Threads Campaign Posts Total Posts
2 
24/08/07 1,731 1,731 1,147 246 2,859 10,578 
26/12/07 9003 4806 8619 5364 76,068 105,082 
29/02/08 13,296 6,539 14,383 8,728 126,293 179,080 
24/04/08 16,503 5,345 18,408 10,511 150,511 224,648 
26/05/08 18,369 4,850 20,165 11,406 160,043 241,789 
26/09/08 21,106 2,793 24,911 14,146 193,337 290,280 
26/12/08 28,444 7,056 45,151 16,424 230,310 565,183 
18/03/09 50,275 20,913 41,322 24,458 418,111 567,220 
25/09/09 67,245 No Data 61,976 34,002 592,119 852,177 
30/12/09 78,578 No Data 70,751 37,066 639,679 958,504 
27/03/10 89,240 No Data 81,318 37,066 639,679 1,105,273 
22/07/10 96,336 No Data 92,005 44,597 740,019 1,233,671 
19/12/10 105,617 No Data 98,279 47,035 765,115 1,302,477 
25/02/11 117,417 No Data 103,984 48,831 792,516 1,409,284 
14/08/11 146,767 No Data 121,991 58,855 920,075 1,654,949 
30/01/12 207,822 No Data 141,729 66,489 1,016,322 1,905,194 
17/06/12 245,009 No Data 152,278 70,013 1,065,926 2,095,882 
12/11/12 277,203 No Data 163,731 73,274 1,087,393 2,239,795 
03/03/13 312,502 No Data 170,364 74,797 1,101,372 2,352,782 
30/07/13 331,839 No Data 175,735 75,932 1,110,374 2,453,159 
17/12/13 363,130 No Data 179,552 76,861 1,115,815 2,512,095 
Note. August 2007 to December 2013. Retrieved from https://www.archive.org 
                                                
1 In this context, ‘thread’ here refers to a new post, while ‘post’ means replies or comments on posts. ‘Campaign 





Importantly, the campaign has been divided into mainly three groups or sub-campaigns, due 
to disputes about the censorship and campaign strategies in some cases. However, notionally 
all of these share the same broad demands or objectives. More specifically, there are three 
groups.  
 
KSA teachers’ forum 
 This is arguably the core group in the teachers’ campaign. Other groups who are separated 
from this forum/group believe that the KSA Teachers’ Forum practises heavy censoring on 
the forum’s content. Initiators from the other two groups in the campaign stated explicitly 
that they left the forum because of this censorship.  
 
Saudi teachers’ forum 
 The second forum, Saudi Teachers, believes that strict self-censorship of this kind can 
dampen individuals’ desire to work towards the campaign’s goals. Moreover, they think that 
strict censorship also reflects fear and weakness in campaigning for their claim. One initiator 
who left the KSA Teachers’ forum complained about the group’s censorship policy. He then 
launched the second forum with the other activists who argue that participants should not be 
censored so strictly, and that members do not all need to share the same beliefs as the forum 
initiators. Core activists believe that the forum is open to all, and allowing people to post 
their opinions does not mean collective endorsement of these. Despite the assertions 
concerning the openness of this group, its initiators did admit practising a certain degree of 
censorship so it can be considered open only in relative terms to the KSA Teachers’ Forum.  
Overall, this forum appears to consider using the media to be the best way to reach their 
campaign goals, rather than legal action. They contend that legal action is a long, drawn-out 
process, and the media can influence decision makers more efficiently, (T4).   
 
Teachers’ voice forum 
 The third group, Teachers’ Voice Forum,1 separated from the Saudi Teachers’ Forum as they 
claim to have suffered from censorship because they were a minority calling for a more pro-
active campaign taking direct action, such as demonstrations and sit-ins. Both the KSA and 
the Saudi Teachers’ Forum are clearly opposed to this type of action, which they see as 




against the law, and fear that direct action will impact negatively on the rights they seek. 
However, the Teacher’s Voice believes it represents a key means of making officials listen to 
their claims. The initiator of the Teachers’ Voice Forum clearly stated: 
We are getting bored of suing Ministries; we are getting bored of talking to the 
media. The only way to gain our rights is to go on demonstrations and 
collectively visit the King and all the other officials who are responsible for our 
case, (T6).        
 
8.5. Campaign Mobilisation and the Role of the Internet 
 
8.5.1. Activist profiles 
 All of the interviewees for this campaign are men. Two women who worked for this 
campaign declined to be interviewed without giving any reason. Interviews demonstrated that 
the bulk of campaigners are comparatively young (most are from the 25-36 age group) and 
not surprisingly, well-educated (all those interviewed hold degree and some have 
postgraduate qualifications). This reflects the fact that the 25-36 year old age group is the one 
most affected by what they describe as the unfair job classification scheme.  
Knowledge of computer packages and Internet skills does not appear to have been a driver 
for those who initiated the campaign. For example, one key activist (T2) confirmed that he 
has very limited knowledge of the Internet in particular. He had not heard about Wikipedia, 
for instance, and he did not have a Facebook account nor was he a member of any other 
forums. He confessed, “Look, all I know about the Internet is how to log onto online banking, 
one property website, the forum, and Twitter. I don’t even use email regularly.” (T2). When 
asked why he became so popular among teachers and has the title of ‘Controller General’ in 
the forum, he thought this was the result of his role in signing the contract with the lawyer for 
the teachers at the Administrative Court. In contrast, T6 was an expert in computer 
programming and said he had become an unofficial management software consultant for the 
Ministry of Education. Other campaign initiators (T2,T3) gave themselves scores of 6 and 8 
in computer and Internet skills (where 10 equates to professional). Moreover, all the 
interviewees believe that there is no relationship between the level of computer and Internet 
skills and being active in an online campaign. This is because using the forum does not 
require members to be technologically adept, “If you can use MS Word, you can use the 





Analysing a range of campaigns relating to teachers’ rights indicates that the campaigners 
share the same goal, although the sets of objectives vary and are not of the same order of 
priority. It is clear from the interviews that there was one originator for each specific 
goal/objective. For instance, T3 can be described as the originator of the teachers’ paid 
holiday campaign, so his main objective is to change the number of days which are classed as 
paid leave. T4 and T5 admitted that one of the main problems with teachers’ campaign is the 
different prioritisation of goals among initiators.      
In addition, the involvement of teacher initiators in other campaigns indicates the influence 
that the teachers’ campaign has had on other social campaigns in Saudi Arabia. For example, 
one interviewee said he is also working with other campaigners who believe they have been 
unfairly treated by commercial companies or government department banks. A later 
interview conducted with an initiator of the ‘Man Divan’1 campaign, clearly indicates the 
major influence of the teachers’ groups on this campaign. Similarities include changing the 
lawyer and adopting an online forum instead of Twitter only. The initiators who were 
interviewed were convinced that many subsequent social campaigns have also benefited from 
the teachers’ experiences. The Internet has thus led to a ‘spill over effect’ as mentioned by a 
number of scholars such as Vasi (2006) and Della Porta and Diani (2006), meaning that, 
“Some movements depart from others, in order to pursue more specific or otherwise related 
aims.” (Della Porta & Diani, 2006:26). In the case of teachers, some activists have almost 
become professionalised campaigners, a development that would not have happened in Saudi 
Arabia without the Internet. For example T8 said:  
I heard about the Man Divan story, and I felt sure that they had been neglected 
and wronged. I sent them a message offering my help. They are young people, 
and they welcomed me. I found that their lawyer was not an expert, and they did 
not know how to use the Internet to engage with a wider group of people and 
communicate with them. First, I put them in touch with a university professor at 
law school who specialises in franchise laws, which is the main point in their case. 
They had also been using Twitter only. I found that Twitter would not help them 
to connect all the 700 people affected by this case. So, based on my experience, 
an online forum would be the best platform for this type of arranging and 
planning. (T8)        
It is interesting to note that none of the campaigners interviewed had participated in any other 
campaigns (online or offline) before the teachers’ campaign. One teacher said: 
 
                                                
1 This campaign involves some 700 young Saudis who signed a franchise contract with a Saudi men’s clothing 
company (Ajlan & Bros). These young people got a loan from the Saudi Credit and Saving Bank and paid it to 
the owner of the brand, Ajlan and Brothers Company. The people who signed the contract felt that the company 
and the bank had defrauded them. They then sued the company and won the case.  
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I did not engage with the teachers’ campaign previously. Basically what I used to 
take spontaneous individual action without consulting anybody. Like other 
teachers I read the resolution released by the Ministry of Education regarding 
teachers’ paid leave holidays, and I thought it was illegal and clearly violated 
other articles in the Civil Service Law. I went home and wrote a detailed letter to 
the Minister of Education, explaining why this resolution was illegal, listing the 
articles that were violated by the Ministry’s resolution. I then went to the 
Ministry and hand it into his office. After doing that, I took a photo of the letter 
and tweeted it. Within a few minutes the letter was everywhere, WhatsApp, 
teachers’ forums, online newspapers. People started talking about what they 
called an ‘administrative offence’. Teachers started sending complaints to the 
Ministry. Some teachers’ forums urged teachers to contact the Ministry about the 
case. Exactly one week later the Ministry withdraw the resolution. (T3)     
 
 However, prominence in the campaign has brought activists into contact with initiators from 
other campaigns wishing to create their own online campaigns. These new connections 
highlight the growth of what might be seen as an online activists’ learning network. The 
findings underscored that people are initially motivated by personal rights, and then their 
successful online efforts enthused them to work towards other online campaigns in which 
they do not necessarily have a vested interest. This clearly demonstrates a deepening effect 
which, although not created by the technology itself, certainly assisted by the ease of 
networking online. 
 
8.5.2. The Internet and the formation of the campaign 
 Although the Internet has been the bedrock of the teachers’ campaign, some of the activists 
who were interviewed argue that they found out about the campaigns through direct 
communication with the initiators, either via text messages or phone calls. They also 
mentioned that some leaflets had been distributed among teachers in their schools. One 
teacher said: 
“We started promoting the idea via text messages and calls to friends, telling 
them that a new online forum had been launched and we needed them to 
participate. The first aim was to encourage teachers, both male and female, to 
come altogether to claim their rights by hiring a lawyer. A few months after 
joining them, we started advertising on other forums for free. We would advertise 








Figure 26: One of the banners used to promote the teachers’ campaign, citing from a 
speech made by King Abdullah addressing teachers. 
 
 
 The first initiator said that he got to know most of the activists after initially posting in an 
educational forum (T6). Two interviewees confirm that by saying:  
 
 I learnt about the campaign from an online education forum called Alshareef; 
someone posted a thread with an idea to claim our rights. A teacher friend of 
mine told me to visit the forum and see the thread. I then visited and registered, 
and replied to the thread, encouraging other people to claim their rights (T7). 
Another said:  
I received a text message from a friend referring to an online forum. He told me I 
had to register to support them. Teachers wanted to claim two main rights. I was 
affected by one of them and I liked the idea. Later we left the that forum because 
some individuals wanted to control everything, and not everything that we said 
was published (T8). 
 
 However, activists also mentioned that a ‘second generation’ of activists and other 
supporters came to the campaigns and the forum via the Internet, rather than through any 
personal contacts. This was, in part, because the campaign gained momentum when initiators 
started advertising by using banner ads on other Internet forums.  
Although it is difficult to prove definitively, it seems that the teachers’ campaign is probably 
one of the very first online campaigns in Saudi Arabia. However, it seems that the online 
campaign alone was not seen as trustworthy enough by teacher communities and needed 
newspaper coverage to give it credibility, (T1). Thus, it appears that campaigners need to 
make personal contact first to gain trust and can then move online. Indeed, when some 
activists decided to launch other Internet forums, they used existing personal contacts to 
convince others to join the new forums. So, personal communication is used initially to 
encourage a number of people to promote the forum first, and then others will follow.   
 
8.5.3. Campaign target audience 
 When they started in 2007, initiators aimed to mobilise teachers across Saudi Arabia to 
obtain their rights. However, they did not initially intend to pursue this either by direct 
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negotiations with the Ministries of Education and of Civil Services, or by taking legal action. 
Some initiators said they also aimed to raise awareness among Saudis about teachers’ 
problems and to refute those who argue that teachers have everything they need and that they 
usually complain about everything, (T2). This reflects a commonly held stereotype in Saudi 
Arabia that teachers enjoy low working hours, and more than three months’ holiday a year, in 
addition to a relatively high income.  
Teachers have also targeted media through the Internet, although that was not necessarily 
their plan when they started. All the teachers interviewed valued the role of traditional media 
in supporting their campaign and drawing people’s attention to it as well as, “Keeping the 
issue fresh in the audience’s minds.” (T2). Importantly, the most crucial role that traditional 
media played in the campaign was to give it, and the campaigners, credibility among teachers 
and the general public. Activists also claimed that the media cannot be directly engaged 
without the Internet. T2 said it is, “Not possible to go to the media and say, ‘I’m going to 
organise teachers to claim their rights.’ […] We went online and then the media started 
contacting us through the forum.” Clearly, teachers would not have gained this media 
attention if they had not started an online campaign. In other words, traditional media was 
important for mobilisation but the Internet was the key to engaging traditional media. 
According to one activist, conventional media (newspapers, television and radio), as well as 
online news websites, have played a crucial role in supporting the campaign. Even so, there 
have been huge differences in the amount of news coverage that the campaigns received from 
television and radio on the one hand, and the press and electronic newspapers on the other. 
Whilst radio and television carried about five or six news stories, there were more than 120 
articles in the daily newspapers alone, and a similar number in online newspapers between 
2007 and 2011; this number continued to grow (T1). This interviewee had kept a full archive 
of all print media and online media coverage. During the interview the researcher was able to 
see all these stories indexed and filed, and was allowed to capture this data.  
The emergence of this media attention was not simply random. Some initiators mentioned 
media planning to distribute news stories in the media and on their forums. For example, T2 
and T6 indicated that there had been some discussions in the supervisory team’s private 
forum before putting out press releases.  
Some stories could not be published. For example, news about negotiations with the Ministry 
of Education was not published since this would affect the ongoing process. In addition, in 
some cases, teachers tried to keep news about the court hearings away from the media and the 
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forum because it might have affected the outcome of the case. T1 quoted a judge as saying, 
“Keep this case away from the media and Internet.” The interviewee believed that the media 
and the Internet put pressure on judges to make a case a matter of public opinion, which then 
makes it difficult for them to give a verdict quickly. Similarly, some interviewees also 
thought that news ought to be sent to the traditional media first, and then supervisors could 
publish it on the forum. This tactic may have been intended to give some newspapers scoops 
as a means of gaining a more favourable relationship.  
With a few exceptions, the nature of the media coverage has generally been very helpful to 
the campaign, even that relating to the direct action such as the demonstrations. When the 
campaign received negative coverage, interviewees argued it was not intentional and that it 
was caused by the fact that journalists had misunderstood the stories they had covered. 
Teachers began to overcome any negativity by sending press releases directly to journalists, 
so they did not have to write the story themselves. Occasionally, journalists even asked 
campaigners to write stories for them. Hence, personal contacts between journalists and 
teachers created an ethos of sharing, and a number of the teachers even worked as freelance 
journalists in newspapers, increasing the chances of coverage.  
 
8.5.4. Mobilisation applications 
 
 Despite the extensive coverage in the traditional media, online forums such as KSA- 
Teachers, Saudi-Teachers, and Teachers’ Voice, as mentioned previously, have clearly still 
played a key role in the campaign. Initiators use forums to call for action, including signing 
petitions, calling for demonstrations and sending telegrams. All calls for action are pinned at 
the top of the forums to make people aware of them. Undoubtedly, online forums were the 
most important tools provided by the Internet to launch the campaign. The distinctive 
character of the online forum gave the campaign the sense of organised collective work, 
which may also serve their needs. This means that the online forum gave activists the ability 
to conduct truly collective action when needed. This could be provided by giving 
campaigners the ability to accept the monitoring of content, and create administrative 
positions, where activists can appoint a general supervisor, sub-supervisors and so on. The 
campaigners used the online forum in 2007 because of their popularity at that time (Al 
Nashmi et al., 2010). All the interviewees clearly highlighted the vital role played by online 
forums in every aspect of the teachers’ campaign. Moreover, despite the expansion of other 
Internet applications, such as social networking tools, activists still rely heavily on Internet 
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forums for the bulk of their activities. 
Nevertheless, the growth in popularity of Twitter in Saudi Arabia cannot be ignored; 
therefore, activists adopted Twitter mainly as a means of ‘marketing’ forum posts. This 
means that if there is an important post the forum will share it via Twitter. It suggests this 
method of marketing the forum’s postings increased non-member visitors in both forums. For 
example, during week days, the average number of KSA- Teachers forum’s visitors is 5531; 
159 of them are members and 5472 are guests. These numbers can be seen in the bottom of 
every forum’s main page. All numbers here are retrieved from the forum’s archive stored at 
www.archive.org, and cover a period of 30 days. The following print screen shows an 
example of visitors and member’s number in the forum. The illustration shows there are 4185 
visitors, 3549 users are unregistered and 636 registered. 
       
Figure 27:  A print screen from the KSA-Teachers forum, showing the numbers of 
registered and unregistered visitors. 
 
Moreover, the initiators have also created another mobilisation tool: a ‘prepared statement’ 
which can be sent to the Ministry of Education website by clicking on ‘contact us’ or ‘contact 
the Minister’. The aim of sending a ‘prepared statement’ is to maximise participation by 
minimising effort required. Campaigners were unable to gauge the impact and efficiency of 
prepared statements, but T2 and T3 argued that it demonstrated to the Ministry of Education 
the volume of teachers who are engaged with this issue and the strength of feeling amongst 
them.  
As will be discussed later in this chapter, the online forum affordances gave campaigners 
some form of organisation. Unlike other types of social media such as Twitter, the design of 
online forums gives some individuals power over others, which results in a type of 
hierarchical organisation. Looking at the content of the forum shows that threads posted in 
two of the forums KSA Teachers and Saudi Teachers focus on rights for both male and 
female teachers. The threads posted show that forums are about teachers’ rights in general 
and not limited to the campaign’s legal case. For example, a number of teachers posted 
different threads asking about their personal cases regarding their education, such as a female 
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teacher seeking legal help from other teachers in one forum, when the head teacher of her 
school suddenly transformed the staff room into a storage room without notifying teachers. 
What is clear in both forums is the absence of gender segregation in threads and posts. Male 
and female teachers communicate with each other normally, although they do not work 
collectively offline as the following section will show. 
There are also a number of YouTube clips and Facebook pages which relate to the teachers’ 
claims, but interviewees said these are personal efforts put together by individual teachers 
who wanted to help. However, this had been done without core activists’ acknowledgment. It 
seems that campaigners are happy with any form of support from people, even if they are not 
core activists. This suggests that the campaign activities are not entirely promoted or 
controlled by core activists and may imply a connective logic for the campaign as discussed 
in the following section.       
 
8.6. Campaign Organisation and the Role of the Internet 
This section will focus on the campaign’s organisational features and the role which the 
Internet plays in facilitating the structure and shape of the action, and whether the Internet is 
promoting decentralised grassroots activity or not. More specifically, this section will present 
the findings about campaign membership and activists’ responsibilities, and the internal 
communications, as well as the organisational structure of the campaign.  
 
8.6.1. Campaign membership 
 One of the roles of forums is to recruit individuals to join the core activists’ area, where they 
can work systematically as a group towards campaign goals. Teachers who are posting and 
replying to people actively, or who have achieved individualised successes in the campaign 
are likely to be contacted by core activists and asked to join the supervisory team (T2,T3). 
Clearly membership of the teachers’ campaign is strongly related to the individual’s activity 
on the forum. While the activists might not know active participants in the forum personally, 
the activity level of users is a sign that they are potential core member of the campaign. This 
does not mean that all individuals who are active on the Internet generally could be core 
members of any of the campaign groups. As discussed earlier in the section about 
mobilisation applications, some individuals have produced YouTube content, but core 
activists do not know them and did not work with them. This suggests that participating in a 
forum is precisely what makes participants more visible or more likely to be a core member. 
Activists emphasized that anyone can help to support their claims. Thus, it is difficult to 
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establish criteria for membership or to distinguish who can be labeled in this way. However, 
it is easy to identify the core activists in the campaign as will be shown in this section.  
Importantly, usually anyone can register either of the two forums KSA-Teachers, and Saudi 
Teachers. However, newly registered forum members may not be able to post a thread before 
completing some activation steps, such as posting a specific number of replies to show they 
are a keen supporter. Sometimes, new members cannot post directly and their thread/reply 
must be approved by a supervisor before they are allowed to post directly. Moreover, 
sometimes during the campaign, only members of the Saudi Teachers forum can access the 
forum content. When one activist was asked the reason for this, he was not able to give a 
clear answer. However, this might be understood as a technical procedure. The forum’s 
servers have a limited capacity, meaning it can only accommodate a certain number of 
visitors. If this is exceeded it might make the forum slow down or completely fail. On some 
occasions, for example, when there is something new to report, visitor numbers rapidly 
increase, and due to the lack of financial resources, forum supervisors cannot accommodate 
all these visitors, so they only allow registered members to access forum content. Figure 27 
show on average that the number of unregistered visitors is usually higher than that of 
registered visitors. Thus, by following this procedure, forum supervisors might be able to 
ease the pressure on the servers.                
 In contrast to the women driving campaign (October 26th), (Chapter Seven), none of the 
interviewees mentioned a need to run checks on any of the members selected before they 
joined the core groups. This is due to the fact that activists believe that they are operating 
within accepted social political and legal boundaries and their demands are actually stated in 
the Civil Service Law; it is just a ‘technical issue’ or every day issue. 
The interviews indicated that activists tended to use their personal contacts in the early stages 
to build up the campaign team. The tasks and roles which need to be fulfilled by campaigners 
vary, so the work cannot always be easily organised. Creating formal roles and tasks is 
subject primarily to external factors such as Administrative Court requirements or orders 
from the Ministry of the Interior. For example when the Ministry of Education agreed to 
improve the pay scale for some ‘graduate classes’, it found that some important documents 
were missing. Thus, a number of teachers worked with the Ministry for a short time to locate 
the relevant documents and avoid delays in their case. 
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Other more permanent roles include forum supervision, which involves monitoring postings 
to ensure they are in accordance with the forum guidelines, as well as suggesting topics to be 
discussed. Some activists have a largely technical role; the first forum creator did this job 
because he is an enthusiastic teacher and a computer expert.  
Identifying active users in the forum and promoting them to a higher level of participation 
such as supervising a forum, representing the campaign in the media, or representing the 
campaigners at the Ministry of Education, all explicitly show how communication and 
organization interrelate.  
Representing the campaign in the media has been one of the initiators’ key tasks. For 
example, if a TV station contacts any member regarding the campaign, this individual is 
expected to consult with the rest of the group. Then, collectively, they can give activist 
permission to go, or decide to use another activist instead (T2). It is not clear if there are set 
criteria concerning who is allowed to formally represent the campaign, but according to T2, 
anyone can represent the campaign in newspapers as long as the activist has the relevant 
information to be able to speak clearly and knowledgeably on TV or on the radio. Overall, 
activists can take such actions individually and without having permission from the group, 
but then they do not speak on behalf of the campaign, which might suggest the campaign is 
not strongly centralised or formalised. 
Nevertheless, analysis of the interviews with activists involved in the SNA (KSA Teachers’ 
Forum) clearly shows that after an initial period of ‘stabilisation’ in the campaign, from 2013 
onwards, a more formal hierarchical structure was created. This comprises: 
• Forum Owner: This individual owns the forum and is legally responsible for it.  
• Board of Directors: This group is responsible for the forum’s plan of action, financial 
affairs, appointing the Supervisory Committee members, and discussing issues with 
the Legal Committee.  
• Legal Committee: This group is consulted on anything relating to legal matters.  
• Supervisory Committee: This group is responsible for generating forum issues and is 
empowered to authorise posts and, if needed, to delete posts or threads.  
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• Forum Moderators: These individuals are responsible for monitoring forums, removing 
posts, member registrations, and some technical issues. This formal structure seems to 
have arisen as a result of what might be termed ‘recognition’ by the Ministry of 
Education and activists now wish to appear more organised and professional when 
negotiating with the Ministry. That said, there are two levels of participation. 
Participants can take part on their own through what Bennett & Segerberg (2013), 
refer to as ‘personalised action’, supporting the campaign by posting suggestions, 
sending letters to officials and so on. The second level are the core campaigners, with 
people  at this level taking action on behalf of teachers in general, such as officially 
representing teachers on the media or when talking to officials. 
8.6.2. Internal communication 
 The interviews illustrate two levels of intercommunication among the various teachers’ 
campaign. The first type of intercommunication is between all the campaigners who are 
members of the forums via posts from members. Interviewees acknowledged the importance 
of membership debates in shaping the campaign and adding further demands.  
The second level of intercommunication is amongst core activists. In all the forums which 
were sampled, there are so-called ‘supervisor forums’. This is a sub-forum based on the main 
page of the forum, where visitors can see the names of all members, but access to this sub-
forum is restricted to the core activists. In these closed sub-forums, supervisors discuss what 
they believe to be promising ideas and actions that could help the campaign.  
These two levels of communication indicate that campaigns might be directed by the 
supporters and not only by core activists, suggesting a ‘Self-Organised Network’. To put it 
simply, supporters also have some power and they can direct the campaign or at least, can 
contribute.  
8.6.3. Campaign structure 
 The Jeddah floods in section 6 of this paper explained how the campaigns were launched 
inadvertently, initially without any leaders. Moreover, the interviews indicate that the 
teachers’ campaign have not taken one fixed structure, but have evolved their structure in 
response to internal and external factors, such as Administrative Court laws and the 
intelligence services requests (see below). Overall, the Internet was the medium in which the 
campaigns were formed and, in part, they continue to be influenced by the use of technology 
and the online forums in particular. In retrospect, though, appointing and announcing a 
lawyer for the campaign can be seen as the turning point towards a more formally shaped 
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organisational structure. According to T2, the organisational pattern of the campaign changed 
considerably after a lawyer was appointed for the campaign and started to work with the 
campaign initiators. Interviewees (T2, T3) mentioned that the adoption of the hierarchical 
structure was to gain a large number of ‘powers of attorney’ across the country, in order to 
deliver these to the lawyer so he could start suing the Ministry of Education. They argued that 
the greater the powers of attorney became, the bigger the case would be, and that would 
attract more people. What looks like an organisational hierarchy started to emerge with the 
establishment of the so-called ‘General Supervisor’. The current General Supervisor (T2) was 
appointed to this position for the campaign in the first forum because he was the only person 
who had contact with the campaign lawyer, having recommended this individual and signed 
the contract with him on behalf of the teachers. He emphasised that his main role then is to 
update campaigners with any news from the lawyer. This indicates that the Internet helps 
campaigners to gather people around a shared issue, but this crowd needs some kind of co-
ordination to achieve campaign goals.  
However, although there is a General Supervisor in the teachers’ campaign, this alone does 
not mean that it is a centralised campaign; simply that the General Supervisor has the most 
important task within the campaign. For instance, the General Supervisor cannot take 
decisions alone; these need to be discussed in a supervisory forum with all the initiators 
before they are approved. Moreover, activists who represent the campaign in the media or 
those supervising forums are subject to similar guidelines.  
The involvement of the lawyer and legal requirements as well as some security issues, put an 
end to the offline, organisational hierarchy and slightly changed the campaign strategy at the 
same time. According to the Saudi Law of the Administrative Court, citizens are not allowed 
to sue the Ministry of Education, or any governmental entity, if the people involved live in 
different regions. Instead, they need to sue the Ministry in the relevant regional branch of the 
Administrative Court. As a result, the campaign has been divided into several regional groups 
rather than being one case referring to all the teachers in the country. Moreover, in an off-the-
record interview with an initiator, T3 indicated  that he had received a phone call from the 
Ministry of the Interior asking him to stop any ‘offline’ activity (see section below). 
For these reasons, the pay-scale lawsuits in the Riyadh region and some other regions have 
not proceeded, although they continue in the Makkah region. Activists in other regions 
support the campaign on the Internet either through their posts on the forum or by other 
online activity such as YouTube.  
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Both the structure of the online forum, and the length of time that the case has continued, 
have helped to shape an organisational framework. It is clear that the forum represents the 
campaign collectively as a group of activists because there is an owner, who registered the 
domain, in addition to a number of moderators who have been given the power to censor and 
monitor the forum. The members of the forum have also agreed to abide by its conditions in 
order to post themselves and to read the posts of others. Furthermore, the forum itself is 
recognised by the campaigners as the voice of the campaign. Consequently, content must be 
monitored and, in some cases, posts are subject to pre-authorisation before posting. Given all 
these characteristics, the online campaign follows a fixed, hierarchical structure, revealing 
that this campaign is conforming to an ‘Organisationally Brokered’ pattern (Bennett & 
Segerberg, 2013; See Chapter 2); yet, the formation of the campaign as well as the social 
network analysis reveals a different pattern (see Figures 30,31, and 32).1  
To track this development of the campaign structure, a SNA has been carried out on the 
campaign’s online forum2 for the period from 2009 to the first quarter of 2015. To do that, 
data has been divided into three sets, roughly equal in size in terms of number of posts. This 
analysis was carried out in two stages. The first stage involved extracting data from the KSA 
Teachers’ Forum covering the period 2009-2015, (Table 13). 
 
Table 13: showing the number of posts, threads, edges and authors in different 
analysed years 




Number of edges 
Data 1 (2009-2011) 1914 1313 27 1441 
Data 2 (2012-2013) 1985 438 20 489 
Data 3 (2014-2015) 2561 611 289 1592 
 
Each of the three data sets was analysed separately to create a social network (showing nodes 
and edges). A node in this campaign is thread (topic) which registered members can create. 
Links occur when a same member comments on more than one thread. The results confirm 
the development of the campaign structure over the years. The first data set (covering 2009-
2011), shows poorly connected threads, indicating an unstructured or loosely structured 
campaign at that period. The second data set (2012-2013), shows well-connected nodes, 
which means that they are transforming towards collective logic whilst the third set (2014 
                                                
1 Data were sub-divided into three data sets by year to track changes over time. No data were available for the 
first 16 months of the campaign due to technical difficulties (see Chapter 4). It is also important to mention that 
the extracted data is a sample of the whole data for the forum. 
2 The analysis was carried out only on the sub-forum of the campaign not the whole forum. 
228 
 
and 2015), show that the campaign is maturing or improving its connection between nodes 
(see Figures 30,31, and 32).   
These nodes and edges reflect communication of the population on this forum, and all 
calculations are representative of it as well. In other words, this is not a sample taken from 
the threads. However, one might consider the issue of generalisation. Not all teachers in 
Saudi Arabia discuss politics online; hence, there is likely a selection effect. The results of 
the analysis suffer from this selectivity because only active teachers with Internet access are 
likely to be engaged in such activities.  
 
To summarise the meaning of this SNA, I argue that in studying discussion forums it is better 
to analyse data by focusing on threads, not people. So the graphs show nodes where each 
node is a thread. Threads are connected if the same people participated in both threads. In this 
way, we can see the development and the intensiveness of conversations across the forum. 
The following tables and graphs show that in the first period between 2009-2011, there are 
significant numbers of posts and threads but they are less connected with each other. This 
means that participants are participating in diversity of isolated threads. The second data set 
for the 2012-2013 period indicates that people are participating in less threads but more posts, 
and overall there are fewer numbers of participants. This might reflect the emergence of core 
active campaigners who take part in the forum. The third data set, which was for 2014–2015, 
shows a higher number of posts, authors, threads and edges. However, there were many 
isolated nodes, and the links were still reflected by the number of nodes, which is shown in 
the middle of the visualisation of the third data set. This indicates that people are gathering 
around specific subjects meaning that campaigners are not only large in number but are also 
better connected in this third phase.      
 
Moreover, in-depth examination of the threads that gained larger number of posts and 
communication reveal that they have no one specific character. Generally, there were a 
number of characteristics to these threads including (a) asking for demonstrations of 
solidarity; (b) pinned threads which means forum’s supervisors put them in the top of the 
forum; (c) threads that ask participants for ideas on how teachers can claim some particular 
rights; (e) updates about some existing claims; (f) In some cases authors put a link it a thread, 
but members cannot see the link before posting a reply. So the posts content will be repeated 
throughout the threads most are like “thank you so much for that”; (g) calling for actions such 
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as:  sending telegraph to the king; requests for a gathering (demonstration) on a specific date; 
or sending an email or letter to the Ministry of Education. 
 
Figure 28: : A thread asking people to post a reply to show Shura members that the 
number of affected teachers is high (557 posts). 
 
 
Figure 29: A thread calling for a gathering in front of the Royal Court in Jeddah to 
meet the King (598 posts).  
























Figure 30: Data set 1 (2009-2011) has poorly connected threads (refer to CD appendices 





Key to Figures 30 ,31 and 32 
Green edges 
(links) 
The link between two threads (topics). This happens when 
the same people post (comments) in different threads. The 
darker edge reflects that more people posted.  
Red Node Each node represents a thread (topic), which could have 
been written by any member, and members can post their 
comments on the thread.  
Node Size Reflects the number of posts in the thread. 
 
Numbers on Nodes Represent the thread ID number; the purpose is to identify 
the thread only. In the third data set, numbers have been 
























































As seen in Figure 19, data set 1 (2009-2011) has 1316 authors with 1441 edges. Moreover, 
examining data set 2 (2012-2013), it is apparent that this has fewer nodes (438) with fewer 























Figure 31: Data set 2 (2012-2013) has well connected Nodes (refer to CD appendices for 
larger view) 
In the period from 2012 to 2013, a new pattern of connections among participants emerged. 
Nodes became highly concentrated around particular threads, which may be the pinned 
threads.1 Instead of writing and replying to all posts, people’s interactions began to be 
triggered by a particular topic and then they clustered around threads. It is possible that 
campaigners created these threads to mobilise people around a specific action. Analysis also 
                                                












































shows that a few threads were popular among a wide audience. Comparing the first and the 
second set of data, it is clear that the first is poorly connected, perhaps illustrating a ‘Self-
Organising Network’ as the typology of the campaign whilst the second indicates that the 
campaign later moved towards being an ‘Organisationally Enabled Network’, combining 
conventional collective action and digital networked connective action.  
As Figure 21 illustrates, data set 3 (2014-2015) has 683 nodes with 1592 edges. Here 
connections are maintained, showing that the campaign is developing into a more 





Figure 32: Data set 3 (2014-2015) shows Maintenance of Connection (refer to CD 
appendices for larger view) 
Overall, tracking the teachers’ campaign, using interviews, and SNA, suggests that in fact 
they have the characteristics of all three typologies described by Bennett and Segerberg 















































































































































































































































































































































































































Organizationally Enabled Networks. This explicitly demonstrates the vital role of both the 
systematic environment in shaping the campaign as well as technological opportunities. The 
formation of the campaigns shows the role that the Internet plays in creating a virtual space 
for activism where ‘real world’ space is not accessible. The Internet also gave the teachers 
tools to form a campaign to demand their rights. This includes going online to organise and 
mobilise, as well as giving them a legitimate status to mobilise traditional media, when the 
systemic environment cannot offer them this status. However, the campaign is categorised as 
a ‘Self-Organising Connective Action Network’ in its early stages (Bennett & Segerberg, 
2013). In most cases, individuals did not know each other before using the Internet; there was 
no organised plan, and the campaign was shaped by individuals’ experiences. However, the 
later stages of the campaign reveal that its structure was affected by the political and legal 
environment, in particular censorship, and the Saudi judicial system. A campaign affected by 
factors of this kind is more likely to become an ‘Organisationally Enabled Connective Action 
Network’ (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013) because campaigners may try to avoid any formal 
organisation. The teachers’ campaign became loosely organised, due to the structure of the 
forum and the nature of action being conducted. Also, some changes took place to cope with 
Saudi legal regulations. I argue that the lifecycle of movement which discussed earlier in the 
framework by (Della Porta & Diani, 2006; Macionis, 2008) might provide a better 
explanation for the campaign formation and structure. This means lifecycle of movement can 
be seen in the Saudi context, but it is online rather than offline.  
 
In the context of the ‘Organisationally Brokered Network’ typology, there are four areas 
which reveal that the teachers’ campaign are now evolving through means of the Internet to 
form something akin to a traditional style trade union. These include: 
 
• Representation: The campaign has come to represent large numbers of teachers (on 
one forum, the number of registered members has reached more 250,000 members, 
which is almost half of the teacher population) and in doing so, is now seen as a 
credible representative voice by public authorities so much so that it has been 
contacted by officials and representatives of government. A number of government 
officials have met with representatives of the teachers’ campaign, suggesting that they 
now have authority to represent the views of others.  The late King Abdullah met two 
core activists to listen to their claims and promised that something would be done 
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(Alsaleh, 2009). 1 The former Minister of Education, Prince Faisal Bin Abdullah, also 
did so (Alhisini, 2009). The former Chief of the Saudi Royal Court and private 
secretary of the late King, Khalid AlTwijeri, contacted the campaign via Twitter to 
talk to them regarding their demands (Alzahrani, 2014). In addition, T8 said that the 
Undersecretary of the Ministry of Education has registered on the online forum as a 
member to speak directly to teachers.    
• Formalisation: Some parts of the campaign have crystallised into formal 
organisational structures, hierarchies and identified positions. As we have seen, the 
campaign has adopted spokesmen as a collective voice to speak on behalf of the 
campaign. Currently, one forum has a fixed organisational structure with its own 
Board of Directors, and when they meet officials, they refer to themselves as the 
Teachers’ Committee.  
• Professionalisation: The campaign has employed outside professional help (lawyers) 
to assist with campaigning and no longer simply relies on its own internal resources 
and amateur activist skills. 
• Goal expansion: The campaign expanded its remit from the original goals into 
professional development goals for the teaching profession as well as campaigning for 
teachers’ rights. For instance, more recently, sections have been added to the online 
forums to cover all teachers’ interests, including news, training events, courses and 
teaching opportunities. 
However, the four areas that were mentioned show the collective logic of the campaign, but 
clearly this logic is gained from the Internet not offline, as the offline space does not offer a 
place for such actions. Importantly, this logic evolved from a connective logic, as the 
campaign started loosely on the Internet.    
 
8.7. Systemic Shaping Factors 
Findings indicate that a number of systemic factors influenced the teachers’ campaign. These 
include security concerns, censorship and judicial legislation, as well as some societal and 
cultural limitations. This section demonstrates that the systemic environment also shapes 
Internet activism because the activists are trying to gain offline achievement (legal case) but 
their work and plans have to adhere to offline regulations, namely the Administrative Court 
laws. 
                                                
1 He literally used a phrase in Saudi Arabic which literally means “On my nose” and carries the meaning of 




8.7.1. Security and censorship 
 Security and surveillance were constantly on activists’ minds. The interviewees noted 
several instances of security surveillance. T3 recalled a phone call from the Intelligence 
Department in the Ministry of Interior asking him not to hold any type of meeting ‘offline’. 
They called him directly, knowing his real name, yet he has never published these details on 
the forum. Moreover, being banned from holding meetings needs to be understood within the 
framework of all demonstrations and similar acts in Saudi Arabia being prohibited by law. 
According to T3:  
After we decided to hold regional meetings with teachers to make a legal case for 
each region instead of just one in Jeddah I received a call from someone who 
knew all my personal information asking me not to hold any meetings of this kind. 
I never use my real name in the forum, only a pseudonym, but all the core 
members knew my real identity. 
However, it is important to state that using a pseudonym in a forum might not due to fear of 
censorship; rather it is a cultural habit. Saudis have always tended to use pseudonyms in 
forums since these became popular in the country. Even users in hobby-based forums such as 
forums for those interested in handicraft or pets owners in Saudi Arabia use pseudonyms 
when they are talking online.         
 T2 said that after years of working on the teachers’ campaign, he had been asked by the 
police to come and sign a pledge that he would not continue to work on such campaigns. 
Consequently, he started to operate individually and plans to sue the Ministry of Education as 
an individual in his own right. Perhaps the starkest threat to the campaign was that, during 
one of their so- called ‘demonstrations’, police came to the scene and arrested the teacher 
who had organised the event. He was then jailed, subjected to questioning but released after 
one day without charge, and returned to work as normal. 
It is obvious that activists practised self-censorship, because they feared the website would be 
blocked by the CITC. Although none of the teachers’ forums had experienced any blocking at 
the time of writing, they stated clearly that they are concerned about the possibility of their 
forums being blocked because this would seriously undermine the whole campaign. 
Consequently, the self-censorship practised by initiators can be described as a pro-active step 
to avoid this happening. For example, one of the forums has an unwritten policy of heavily 
censoring forum content. When activists asked what sort of content they usually 
remove/delete in the forum, a forum supervisor suggested any content which might be 
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libellous (T2). When asked to clarify what would fall into this category, it was suggested that 
this mainly consists of insults to officials or individuals. The forum supervisor justified this 
strict monitoring by explaining that content must not breach any laws which might lead to the 
forum being blocked, as then all their efforts would be in vain and they would lose the outlet 
for their voices. Importantly, at various times, this forum practised what was called pre- 
publishing monitoring. Unlike mainstream forums where people can post directly and then 
everyone can read the comment instantly, in the KSA Teachers’ Forum, supervisors must 
approve posts before they are published publicly. One activist in this forum clearly stated:  
“We monitor the forum to protect our claims. I believe that there are three main 
issues that will not be allowed here in this forum. First, any calls for 
demonstrations will not be allowed because outsiders or dubious entities might 
use such demonstrations or gatherings for their own purposes. Second, heated 
arguments are not tolerated, as this can make individuals angry and cause 
disputes. Third, not all information can be revealed. Sometimes we know new 
information about our claims, but we do not tell people straightaway as this may 
harm the claim. If anyone reveals such news at the wrong time, it is removed or 
will not be posted. In general, you cannot allow absolute freedom, as users might 
misuse the space”(T4). 
A thread in the Saudi Teachers forum, posted by the forum’s Deputy Chairman of the Board, 
states that participants are not allow to address three main issues: 
“Users are not allowed to abuse divine beings or God’s prophet and his 
companions, or to talk about content which is of a religious nature. Users are not 
allowed to abuse any government officials, or talk about politics. Racial and 
sectarian issues are strictly not allowed” (Sharahili 2007:n.p) 
 
8.7.2. Societal and Cultural Limitations   
Since the teachers’ campaign focused on demands related to ‘employment’ issues, they did 
not face the same level of social disapproval as the ‘October 26th Campaign’. However, 
interviewees indicated that gender also plays a vital role in the campaigns for teachers’ rights 
and was one of the factors which caused division amongst the campaigners (T1, T2, T6). 
Despite the fact that all teachers’ campaign seek rights for both male and female teachers, 
interviews indicate that the female teachers largely preferred to work for their rights 
separately from the male campaigners. For example, in one of the two main forums, there are 
just two female administrators from a total of 35. The male interviewees revealed negative 
views regarding the role of female teachers in the campaign at all levels. One said that the 
females fear harassment from males (T2). He also said he tried to highlight what he described 
as, “The weak role” played by women in supporting the campaign. For example, he 
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photographed the powers of attorney received from male and from female teachers, and 
displayed them together to show the discrepancy in numbers to encourage more women to 
support this initiative, but this did not work.  
Secondly, according to one activist, women may think that they can obtain their rights if they 
work separately from men, because they believe that Saudi officials will be more lenient 
towards them as women. According to T6, who went to the Saudi Royal Court to try to meet 
King Abdullah: 
It was suggested in our forum that we should meet the King to explain our case 
directly to him. When we arrived there, I discovered a lady was trying to work 
separately on behalf of female teachers only, with help from her brother, and she 
met the King alone without me; I could not meet him like this.  
In this context, female teachers did establish an online forum in order to work separately 
from men but this did not last for long and interviewees were unable to explain the reason for 
this, and those women who were contacted by the researcher declined to be interviewed. The 
Internet clearly does make it easier for men and women to talk freely, in contrast to the 
offline world, where religious and social barriers still play a vital role in strictly regulating 
relationships between the sexes. 
Campaign initiators were not in agreement with regard to women’s activism. T7 believed the 
Internet gives Saudi women an unprecedented tool to demonstrate their feelings about issues 
that affect them in a traditional society. He suggested that in the Internet era, women can play 
as vital a role as men, as this ‘method’ does not contradict the traditions of Saudi society. In 
his opinion, female teachers are more co-operative in posting than the male teachers, who are 
more likely to be interested in leadership rather than just being interactive with the issues; 
this could be related to the case of the women driving campaign where W7 expressed the 
same opinion. In the opinion of T7, men are more likely to take action on the ground, while 
women are more likely to interact online, by posting ideas and information. He argued that 
there are two main reasons for this: women’s time and emotional engagement. He indicated 
that women have more time to spend supporting the campaign, while men are outside the 
home most of the time. He also believed that women re-tweet more than men in the 
campaign’s favour: 
When a man reads an interesting tweet he can easily skip it, but when a woman 
reads a nice tweet she cannot skip it; she re-tweets it because of the emotional 
aspect of women’s character. 
Thus, he believes that rather than being inactive, female campaigners are active in their own 
238 
 
way. Although there is no direct empirical evidence to prove this, the specific social context 
of Saudi Arabia can be expected to produce such differentiated gendered attitudes. However, 
the male activist’s quote cannot be verified as fact, and unfortunately, it was not possible to 
hear from female activists about their reasons for participating in this way. Moreover, women 
might be more committed to work collectively than men in an online environment. The 
previous case of the women driving campaign is evidence of this. Moreover, working online 
might be the safest way for them to participate in the campaign. So their efforts can be clearly 
noticed online. One activist argues that women might not think it safe to participate in such a 
campaign offline so they dedicate their time to participating online. He commented: 
Women might not be able to participate in face-to-face meetings, as they do not 
who they will meet. They might meet males who just wanted to flirt with them. 
Even giving out their mobile numbers could be an issue for them. Due to social 
sensitivity far fewer women gave powers of attorney than men. I understand why. 
They might think it is socially inappropriate to appear in the court if needed.1 
Other women might not be allowed to do so by their families (T1). 
In contrast, though, other campaigners said women are active in both offline and online 
activism. T6 and T8 said that from a total of 23 people who attended a small demonstration 
(or ‘gathering’ as they prefer to call it), in front of the Ministry of Civil Services, nine of 
these were women. In this context, another campaign2 which is aimed only at women 
teachers shows that female teachers are active both online and offline. This campaign, which 
has been given a sub-forum in one of the teachers’ forums, involves women working actively 
by themselves and they successfully reached their goals in 2014 (Amer & Annashmi, 2014). 
This supports the idea that women seem to be active in both the public and the virtual domain 
when they work in a women’s only campaign, similar to the women driving campaign 
examined in the previous chapter. 
 
8.8. Future of the Campaign 
When the first campaign started about pay scales and financial rights, the activists’ sole 
motivation was to claim their personal rights through collective action. One campaigner said 
he did not join any further campaigns because, in his own words, “I got what I wanted or 
some of it.” (T5). In contrast, there are numbers of interviewees who have got what they 
                                                
1 Attending court in the Saudi context is a sensitive issue for both genders. Even if an individual is subjected to 
injustice by someone else, he or she might prefer to remain a victim rather than attending court. This might be 
related to stereotypes which view those who go to court or the police station as troublemakers.     
2 This campaign refers to 20,000 female teachers who are on zero-hours contract schemes, and are exempted 
from the Royal Decree concerning full-time jobs. This is therefore a totally different campaign, even they share 
the same forum. 
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demanded or some of it, but continue to campaign with others who are claiming their rights, 
purely to show collective solidarity. This means they have no personal interest in the 
campaign but want to work collectively to ensure everyone’s demands are met. This reveals a 
collective identity among campaigners, the motive being group, not personal, demands.    
These campaigns are not necessarily related solely to teachers’ rights. Some interviewees 
stated clearly that they are now working to reclaim other rights in general. For example, T7 
stated: 
I believe I will go on. Every day we see many problems that need to be solved; 
newspapers are not a good medium for getting your message across […] I believe 
officials are paying attention to what we do online.  
It is clear that the campaigns’ purpose has also developed from seeking only those ‘rights’ 
which concern teachers, to focusing over time on other rights and claims, particularly after 
finding that the Internet can be used to help to do more (T7). Moreover, when T3 was asked 
about when he planned to stop online campaigning, he said, “I will not stop even if I’ve got 
all my rights; there are still many missing rights to seek.” He mentioned that he has now 
moved to another job in the education field but is still campaigning for students’ rights.  
 
8.9. Conclusion  
As with the ‘October 26th Campaign’, one of the most frequently repeated phrases among 
initiators was: “Without the Internet, there is no campaign.” They firmly believed in its 
organisational and mobilising power and considered that the comparative freedom online has 
been invaluable in the Saudi context. Moreover, T3, for example, thinks that the Internet has 
put a great deal of pressure on the Ministry of Education, not because of the co-ordination 
between teachers in this case, but rather due to the dissemination of their case across the 
country, which could not have happened without the Internet.  
Nevertheless, the research also indicated that an online-only campaign, without any 
corresponding offline action, would be unlikely to succeed. For example, the teachers’ 
campaign would not be successful without the lawsuit. It suggests that campaigns should be 
hinged on an offline action, and not just online campaigning. Another teacher gave the 
example of a Twitter hashtag he used, which he believes would not have been successful 
without a statement he sent to the Ministry of Education. The teacher wrote a letter and sent it 
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to the Ministry of Education, after that he published it online where people united around this 
action.1  
The case study has also underscored the role of the systemic environment in shaping the 
campaign. It shows that this plays a vital role in the Internet and that campaigning online is, 
therefore, not free from restrictions. Systemic environment factors such as Saudi culture 
relating to gender and formal censorship played a key role in transforming the campaign from 
connective to collective action, thus challenging Bennett and Segerberg’s (2013) claims.  
 
                                                
1 A copy of the letter can be seen on: https://pbs.twimg.com/media/A_Sj5WaCAAARyQ8.jpg:large. On Twitter 
there was a hashtag about the letter (تقليیص_ إإجاززااتت_ االمعلميین#). 
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9. CHAPTER NINE: DISCUSSION  
 
9.1. Introduction 
We began this thesis by asking three questions about the role which the Internet plays in 
connecting and mobilising activists: How does this contact originate? What sorts of models 
of collective action does the Internet facilitate? How does Internet campaigning challenge the 
systemic environment and vice versa? This chapter will draw together the findings in relation 
to these key questions in three main areas: mobilisation, organisation, and the systemic 
environment.  
With regards to mobilisation, it is argued that the Internet in the Saudi context, creates a 
public sphere which is a prerequisite to activism. The Internet has widened and deepened the 
levels of activism in the country. Whilst the activist class is still small, much broader 
audiences can be reached than previously, both domestically and internationally. On the 
organisational level there are indications that campaigns in this ND country are not 
necessarily moving directly to connective action structures, suggesting that societies need to 
be socialised with collective action before moving to a connective logic. 
The research also indicates that the systemic environment strongly shapes the campaigns that 
were studied and their use of Internet tools; an influence which is reflected in three aspects: 
the technological and media environment, the political environment and at the level of 
societal and cultural change.  
 
9.2. Mobilisation Online: Wider and Deeper 
In a wider context, the Saudi case reinforces the claims in the literature concerning the role of 
the Internet in opening up a sphere for political deliberation generally and in the ND context 
in particular. More specifically, it confirms the argument put forward by Fung et al. (2013), 
and others such as: Rheingold, 1993; Chase & Mulvenon, 2002; Best & Wade, 2005; 
Diamond, 2010; Howard, 2011; Khazaeli & Stockemer, 2013;  Shirky, 2009, 2011. The 
Internet in Saudi Arabia has offered, “An alternative space outside the restricted political 
public sphere.” confirming Miazhevich's (2015:434) view of  the Internet’s role in semi-
authoritarian countries.  
In Chapter Six, it was noted that the majority of Saudi Internet users spend more than two 
hours a day online, whilst for just over a quarter of them, this figure rises to over eight hours’ 
use daily. Moreover, Saudis are active Internet users rather than passive browsers; they like 
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to share and post. Chapter Six also showed that Twitter is currently widely used for 
discussions whilst previously, before the emergence of this application, online discussion 
forums were used for the same purpose.  
This high penetration of the Internet and the virtual space has enhanced the political 
participation in this ND country, reflecting findings by Khazaeli and Stockemer (2013), who 
reported a positive relationship between the high penetration of the Internet and the quality of 
political institutions. They argued, “[The] Internet will have a more significant influence on 
governance practices in those states than in democracies.” (Khazaeli & Stockemer, 2013:466). 
Both case studies as well as others referred to, such as the Jeddah floods (Al-Saggaf & 
Simmons, 2014), (see Chapter Six), clearly show that Internet use in Saudi Arabia has 
influenced government practices and policy responses. Chapter Eight showed that a number 
of Royal Decrees have been issued as well as number of committees which have been 
established to deal with teachers’ demands. Using the Internet to demonstrate the destruction 
caused by floods in Jeddah culminated in the establishment of the National Anti-Corruption 
Commission and led to government admissions of corruption in the awarding of construction 
contracts. On another level, when a video of the Saudi Chief of Royal Protocol Mohammed 
AlTobayshi captured slapping a photographer went viral online, the Royal Decree ordering 
AlTobayshi’s replacement was swiftly announced by the Saudi Press Agency (SPA 2015).  
The relative freedom of expression on the Internet and the ability to use the Internet for 
creating media outlets, (Balkin, 2004; Yang, 2013), allowed Saudi activists to bypass the 
restrictions on activism in the public sphere, transforming the Internet into the preferred 
environment for activism. The majority of the activists who were interviewed for this study 
clearly stated that without the Internet there would be no activism in Saudi Arabia. This 
Saudi context supports Aouragh and Alexander's (2011) emphasis on the specific role played 
by the Internet in democratic and ND countries. While activists in democratic countries can 
campaign on the ground, activists in ND countries use the virtual space afforded by the 
Internet. As Aouragh and Alexander (2011) have argued, whilst in democratic countries, the 
Internet simply serves as a tool for activism, in Saudi Arabia it functions as both a tool and a 
space for activism. 
 
In practical terms, besides creating a space for activism the Internet has empowered Saudi 
activism, in both the capacities of widening and deepening, notably, its appeal amongst 
citizens who have traditionally showed little interest in social activism. 
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A number of scholars have addressed the Internet’s role as a mobilisation tool for wider 
audiences, including Gillan and Pickerill (2008); Bennett and Segerberg (2012) McLaughlin 
(2003); and Steinberg (2015), and its unique ability to facilitate what Tarrow (2005) and 
Kavada (2014) referred to as, ‘Transnational activism regardless of borders’. Both case 
studies confirm that in terms of widening activism, Internet technology undoubtedly allowed 
Saudi activists to reach a broader/more diverse audience within the Kingdom and beyond. It 
also allowed them to target groups in a way that could not have happened previously. 
Activists in the women driving campaign succeeded in reaching a diverse audience which 
included not only the Saudi government and citizens, but also national and international 
media and organisations, with individuals from 116 countries signing up to the campaign’s 
English language hashtag (#oct26driving), (Yuce et al., 2014). The October 26th campaigners 
were clearly aware of the potential reach of the Internet and its ability to reposition them as 
‘transnational activists’, with one activist stating:   
We are part of the international community, and the Internet helps us to reach this 
community [...]. Our discourse is an international discourse [...]. The Internet 
helped us to reach all people with our real message, instead of contacting a 
specific person or medium, or a specific correspondent. [By using the Internet] 
you can now speak to all humans, whoever they are. By using the Internet we can 
show the truth to people who care about human rights throughout the whole 
world, (W2). 
This wider participation can be compared to the phenomenal success of the pen seller of 
Beirut campaign which helped to transform an initially localised issue into a global news 
story. Chapter Two showed that the man who lives in Beirut has been helped by people from 
around the world, and the initiator himself, who started the campaign, lives in different 
country and has no face-to-face contact with supporters (Gunter, 2015; Simonarson, 2015).    
The Saudi context confirms the vital role of the Internet in widening mobilisation and 
participation. This thesis argues that in the Saudi case, it exceeds the traditional media in 
widening aspects of mobilisation for two main reasons. First, as discussed in Chapter Six, the 
relative freedom of expression on the Internet as compared to that offered by the traditional 
media, enabled activists to create personalised messages (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013) 
targeted at a wider audience. Chapter Seven, for example, showed that campaigners broadcast 
footage of ‘ordinary’ women driving their cars in Saudi streets, shot by the women 
themselves. These messages reach a wider audience than the usual messages or stories which 
appear in traditional media. Footage of this kind cannot be streamed in conventional media, 
and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to distribute among citizens without the Internet.  
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Second, as noted in Chapter Six, the number of Internet users in Saudi Arabia is continuing to 
grow rapidly, whilst in contrast, readership of traditional press is declining, demonstrating the 
difficulties facing the Saudi newspaper industry. At the national level, therefore, use of the 
Internet by activists is likely to increase in importance in coming years.  
In terms of deepening levels of activism, the findings of this study challenge the claims made 
by some scholars, such as Van Laer and Van Aelst (2010), and Gladwell (2010), that Internet 
activism, or what they somewhat disparagingly describe as  ‘Slacktivism’, has had little real 
effect on political participation. As argued in Chapter Two, using research to date, both 
advocates and opponents of the Internet’s role in political participation have focused on the 
outcomes in terms of offline participation only, ignoring the fact that Internet-based political 
participation can facilitate change. Online mobilisation has helped Saudi activists to achieve 
some goals offline, leading, in some cases, to offline participation, as was the case for both 
campaigns. In the October 26th campaign, women mobilised online, then filmed themselves 
driving their cars in order to mobilise more women. Similarly, in the teachers’ campaign, the 
success of online mobilisation encouraged them to take their case to the Administrative Court, 
arrange demonstrations and make their case before the King. 
Internet affordances and citizens eager to claim their rights have increased the number of 
social campaigns in Saudi Arabia.  Research into tracing the origins of Saudi online activism 
showed that, although the Internet was introduced to the public in Saudi in 1999, activism did 
not begin to emerge until 2006 or 2007, suggesting that the Internet alone is not enough to 
facilitate activism, but citizen participation and adoption of the Internet have contributed 
significantly to social activism in the state.     
 
9.3. Organisation: Grassroots Individualism or new Hierarchies?  
Prior studies have noted than organisational change often occurs in activist organisations or 
in the ‘collective’ concept in general when activists use the Internet. The literature shows 
that numerous scholars have acknowledged this change (see: Diani, 2000; Norris, 2002; 
Bennett, 2003; Bimber, 2003; Van De Donk et al., 2004; Benkler, 2006; Chadwick, 2007; 
Shirky, 2008; Castells, 2009; Castells, 2012; Van Dijk, 2012; Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). 
Bennett and Segerberg’s (2012, 2013) main argument is that online communications obviate 
the need for hierarchical organisation because, in the age of the Internet, people can act 
individually. 
One unanticipated finding in the case studies was the tension in the activist groups within 
the organisational structure between those wanting a grassroots-type model or decentralised 
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operating model, and those favouring a more institutionalised and hierarchical organisation. 
This tension was seen most clearly in the women driving campaign. Despite the fact that 
features of the Internet allow activists to act without any great need for organisation, some 
Saudi activists reject this concept of connectivity and prefer to make the campaign collective, 
following a more oligarchic pattern. Although both case study groups began in a relatively 
unstructured fashion, more formalised hierarchies have emerged over time. 
Bennett and Segerberg (2013), describe this as an, ‘Organisationally Brokered Network’, a 
form of organisation in which activists use the Internet like any other tool at their disposal, 
such as leaflets and demonstrations, while they control the campaign. They claim that the 
Internet itself does not change the dynamics of the activism or the nature of the links 
between participants.  
Whilst some activists within the October 26th campaign are trying to be less formal and less 
hierarchical by allowing any Internet users to take part in the campaign, those who advocate 
a decentralised approach seem to be powerless in comparison to those who want to be more 
institutionalised and formalised. It seems that only a few campaigners support the 
decentralised approach.    
The teachers’ campaign are transforming from, ‘Organisationally Enabled Action’ 
following the same patterns as the October 26th campaign. Interviewees asserted that the 
more recent stages of the campaign had witnessed the emergence of a clearly hierarchical 
organisation. There are now formal structures and committees, including a named 
Discussion Forum Owner, a Board of Directors, a Legal Committee, a Supervisory 
Committee and Forum Moderators.  
However, even campaigns having different origins do not necessarily move directly to 
connective action structures or logic, suggesting that there may be a wider variety of models 
than Bennett and Segerberg (2013) indicate. In the Saudi case, for example, connective action 
has eventually led to more traditional collective action structures and hierarchies. It is 
possible that societies require socialisation by means of activism before following a 
connective logic.   
 
9.3.1. An adaptive organisational model? 
 
Both of the Saudi case studies contradict Bennett and Segerberg’s (2013) assertion that 
collective action cannot be formed entirely online. The restrictions on offline collective 
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action in Saudi Arabia as a ND country appear to have forced activists to start collectively 
from the Internet and act online and offline spaces.  
The Saudi case studies reveal that campaigns can follow a collective logic or the traditional 
hierarchical organisation but using the virtual space of the Internet instead of the offline 
public space. Due to restrictions on the ground, citizen activists search for and locate like-
minded people who share the same goals, and then start traditional hierarchical organisations 
online. Both campaigns follow a similar pattern reflecting the lifecycle of social movements 
discussed by scholars such as (Della Porta & Diani, 2006; Macionis, 2008), as discussed here 
in Chapter Two. However, this lifecycle of teachers’ campaign can be seen more clearly on 
the Internet. Teachers’ campaigners started complaining individually about what they 
claimed to be ‘stolen rights’ and their complaints attracted individuals who shared the same 
concerns, leading them to tell other teachers about the campaign. In the process, a 
hierarchical organisation emerged, a lawyer was hired, and other actions took place. By the 
time this study started, both campaigns were in the phase of decline or institutionalisation as 
scholars of social movement have demonstrated. However, it is not possible to determine 
whether both campaigns have ‘declined’ or not. It was demonstrated here that both 
campaigns have achieved some degree of success in achieving their stated goals Moreover, 
there is also some evidence of ‘suppression’ as well as other reasons for decline as (Macionis, 
2008) illustrated.    
Without the Internet however, this process cannot take place. Chapter Five established that 
there was no tradition of social activism in the pre-Internet period in Saudi Arabia, and 
ordinary citizens are not familiar with activism as a practice. This is because there are some 
restrictions and limitations imposed on activism and the term itself remains a sensitive one. 
However, when moving online, individuals find themselves able to voice their concerns and 
to encounter like-minded citizens. Activism then tends to start in a typically traditional way, 
which can be labelled as ‘collective’.  
 
In short, the Internet itself did not alter the collective logic of activism in Saudi Arabia, as the 
systemic environment plays a key role in shaping activism there. More importantly, 
repression and censorship play a role in shaping online collective action, as activists found it 
safer to work in closed circles to avoid censorship or repression. In the context of a systemic 
environment it could also be said that the organising structure was influenced by a culture 
that privileges hierarchy. Literature shows that some scholars such as (Kavada, 2013) 
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addressed the effect of organising culture in the degree of hierarchy, degree of 
professionalisation, and leadership and lines of control.        
 
The Internet creates a space for activists to conduct their activism in a classic way, in the 
form of traditional collective action, where hierarchical organisation still exists, and there is 
no desire to move from collective to connective logic, as the literature suggests. This is due to 
the absence of a tradition of collective action in the country. The transformation to connective 
action may occur in the future, once the Saudis have absorbed activism as a practice, and 
have experience of collective action.  
 
9.4. The Systemic Environment 
Addressing the environment in which the cyberactivism take place is crucial when studying 
this phenomenon. Chapter Three suggests that the Internet plays different types of roles 
within different political systems. However, researchers are divided on the nature of the role 
which the Internet plays in the ND context and whether the Internet can democratise or not.   
The potential of the Internet and its role in political and social change has been over-
exaggerated. In this case, the Internet is not an exogenous agent, as technological 
determinists have argued, (see Chapter Two), and it does not have absolute power. The 
campaigns studied here did not challenge the political system as a whole, just elements within 
it. The reason for using the Internet in both campaigns was because it acted as a virtual public 
space, where campaigners can claim their individual rights.  
Nevertheless, there are a number of aspects where the Internet has influenced the systemic 
environment, notably, with regard to the traditional media. The campaigns have been 
influenced by the systemic environment. The uses of the Internet by campaigners have also 
influenced some societal and cultural aspects of the systemic environment. To address this 
systemic environment in more detail, the following sections focus on three key aspects: the 
technological and media environment, political environment and societal and cultural change. 
 
9.4.1. The technological and media environment 
 Many of the cyberactivism studies discussed in Chapters Two, Three and Five, such as Holt 
et al., 2013; Tang and Lee, 2013; Starbird and Palen, 2012; Al-Saggaf and Simmons, 2014 
have focused on the activists’ use of what could be described as popular applications such as 
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube which represent the best known social networks (The Social 
Media Hat, 2015). 
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What this study has shown however, is that activists’ choice of Internet applications has little 
to do with the technical features of an application or its generally perceived popularity 
globally; instead they choose the applications most commonly used by the social sector they 
wish to target. For example, neither of the campaigns which were studied used Facebook 
despite its general popularity and its reputation as a tool for cyberactivism. Currently, in the 
Saudi context, it does not necessarily reach the desired audiences. In contrast, women driving 
campaigners used the KEEK application to announce their campaign, which is barely known 
in many other countries. In this case, activists used KEEK not because of its technical 
features, but because of its popularity with the targeted audiences.  
 
KEEK popularity in the Saudi context is similar to ‘Path’ popularity in Indonesia. Even after 
a sharp decline in its popularity worldwide, a South Korean technology company acquired 
the Path application1, because it is flourishing in Indonesia (Kokalitcheva, 2015; Russell, 
2015). In this case, Path may play a more important role for activism in Indonesia than other 
applications and certain applications seem to particularly appeal to specific societies or 
sectors of societies. For example, statistics show that the social network Pinterest is more 
popular among females than males, with statistics indicating that 85% of Pinterest users are 
female (Smith, 2015).     
Similarly, the teachers’ campaign used discussion forums in 2007 because of their popularity 
in Saudi Arabia at the time and, interestingly, they continue to use this format. Furthermore, 
the findings demonstrate some smart uses of the Internet tools by activists, which reinforces 
the findings of the literature about the activists’ ability to adopt new tools to support their 
activism. For instance, in the women driving campaign, activists use WhatsApp in an 
interesting way. Findings indicated that women were not willing to send films of themselves 
driving via e-mail but used WhatsApp for sharing video content. This was adopted by 
campaigners because of its popularity among the targeted audience, and proved successful.  
Such differences and preferences in application uses in various contexts can be understood 
with regard to Pinch and Bijker's, (1984) findings about the Social Construction of 
Technology (SCOT) which was discussed in Chapter Two. They clearly stated that, 
“Technological artifacts are culturally constructed and interpreted.” (Pinch & Bijker, 
1984:421).  
 
                                                
1 ‘Path’ is a mobile social network similar to Facebook, but with limited capacity in the number of friends.    
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In a broader context, this thesis suggests that cyberactivism studies should focus on the uses 
to which applications are put rather than studying specific technological applications. It is 
important to take a wider view of cyberactivism rather than a segmented one based on the 
uses of a specific Internet tool. This research suggests that activists are not limited to 
particular applications, using different ones to target specific audiences, rather than focusing 
on one application because of the global popularity of its features. Hence, future studies need 
to move beyond simply examining popular tools used by campaigns and focus on activists’ 
uses of the Internet in general, in order to better understand this as a social phenomenon. 
 
9.4.2. The Inter-relationship between traditional media, celebrities and 
cyberactivism 
 The advent of the Internet has clearly impacted on traditional media environments and to 
some extent, has weakened their influence, as well as giving activists a new tool to bypass 
traditional media restrictions due to the conflict of interest as argued in Chapter Two. 
However, this study indicates that there is an inter-relationship between traditional media and 
cyberactivism, and there is also a need for celebrities to promote campaigns online. That 
means campaigns cannot rely only on their online efforts to promote and interact with a wider 
community.   
The positive influence of the virtual public space on the freedom of expression in the 
traditional media has been noted by Awad (2010), and Tang and Sampson (2012:468) 
amongst others. Both of the Saudi case studies indicate that news about online campaigns 
was also reported in the conventional press. This can be compared with the original women 
driving campaign in the pre-Internet era in 1990. At that time, the media only published 
official statements about the campaign and coverage of the story was uniformly negative, 
with no opportunity for the campaigners’ point of view to be heard. More recent Internet-
based campaigns relating to the same issue have been reported in the traditional media which 
has also begun to publish different points of view about the campaign issue. 
Notwithstanding the controlled media environment and the loyal press in Saudi Arabia, (see 
Chapter Five), findings show that the traditional media have helped online activists in both 
campaigns to reach a wider audience, and have served to validate the campaign, particularly 
that run by the teachers. Importantly, all the campaigners agreed that this engagement with 
the conventional media could not have happened without the Internet. As Chapter Six 
demonstrated, this coverage of cyberactivism and other online stories became a daily practice 
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in the Saudi traditional media. Stories that go viral online are most likely to be covered by the 
media, given that the Internet has become the Saudi public space, and journalists report on 
what is happening there.     
However, it is worth noting that in the Saudi case, positive news coverage of activism can be 
published if there is no real conflict of interest between campaigners and the government. 
The Internet has helped in the weakening of government control over traditional media. Prior 
to the advent of the Internet, the conventional Saudi media only published negative coverage 
of activism, or completely ignored it. The wider use of the Internet in the country is changing 
this, making it possible for campaign news to be covered by traditional media.  
 
More specifically, the positive media coverage of the teachers’ campaign could have referred 
to the nature of the teachers’ demands/cases as a legal case against one or two government 
departments and there is no official restriction on the media covering such stories. In contrast 
to the teachers’ campaign, the traditional media has had a volatile relationship with the 
women driving campaign. Firstly, it initially received positive support and coverage, but as 
soon as the government declared its attitude towards the campaign, the media either ignored 
their stories or covered them negatively. The influence in the latter case can be seen when 
comparing the 1990 and the 2013 campaign, where there was no media coverage or negative 
coverage.   
This influence of the Internet can be compared to the Chinese case. In 2002 and 2003, 
guidelines issued by the Central Propaganda Department in China warned journalists that 
they were not allowed to cover social disturbances, illegal organisations, demonstrations or 
similar events. Despite these warnings, news on these issues made its way into the Chinese 
media, including the state media (Steinhardt, 2015). After analysing major protest news 
published by 12 news outlets in China, Steinhardt found an increasing amount of coverage of 
protest news stories in the period 2004-2010. Steinhardt states that, “Technological change 
and the continuous pressure by a loose collation of assertive media workers and Internet users 
played vital roles in the transformation of media representations.” (Steinhardt, 2015:131).  
In creating this relationship with the traditional media, the Internet has helped activists in two 
distinct ways. First, it helped their voices to reach the media. This case is similar to protest 
coverage in traditional democracies. For example, the Student Occupations in London 2010, 
saw the use of Twitter and Facebook by protesters attracting the attention of the mainstream 
media and columnists and, “Many tweets found their way into mainstream media’s live news 
feeds, which helped amplify the students’ message to a wider audience.” (Theocharis, 
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2011:12). Secondly, even if the campaigners’ voice did not reach the media directly, 
journalists found themselves obliged to cover campaign stories because people were talking 
about them in the virtual public space. Commercial newspapers and broadcasters, under 
pressure to attract larger audiences, couldn’t ignore such popular stories. If traditional media 
is seeking to maintain its audiences, it has to cover such campaigns, otherwise, potentially 
more of their audience will migrate to the ‘freer’ atmosphere online. This claim can also be 
supported by Awad’s (2010) findings that the Internet has influenced journalistic practice and 
the level of media freedom. The majority of Saudis use the Internet and there is a high level 
of content sharing because it is viewed as a relatively free space. Awad (2010:247), argues 
that most officials in the MoCI (Saudi Ministry of Cultural and Information) agreed that, 
“Online coverage of some local issues has put them under strong pressure to allow the 
national press to follow these issues.” 
Despite the ability of activists to address targeted audiences without the traditional media, 
this study has shown that activists still need to resort to traditional methods in order to 
expand their audience, confirming Gibson and Kelly’s (2000) claim that, “Although the Net 
is an important new tool, activists still largely rely on coverage in the traditional media and 
cannot rely solely upon the emerging communications networks.” (Gibson & Kelly, 2000, 
cited in Wright, 2004). Similarly, in their study of the 15M protests in Spain, Micó and 
Casero-Ripollés (2014), noted that activists themselves had argued that, “Without the support 
of the traditional media, it is difficult to widen a protest socially.” (Micó & Casero-Ripollés, 
2014:868).  
Activists within the Saudi teachers’ campaign also voiced the opinion that support from the 
conventional media functioned as a form of validation for their online activities. Similar 
claims were made by Gamson and Wolfseld (1993), about the social movements’ needs for 
media in the pre-internet era. They argued that:    
Beyond needing the media to convey a message to their constituency, movements 
need media for validation. When demonstrators chant, "The whole world is 
watching.” it means that they matter, that they are making history. The media 
spotlight validates the fact that the movement is an important player. Receiving 
standing in the media is often a necessary condition before targets of influence 
will grant a movement recognition and deal with its claims and demands, 
(Gamson & Wolfseld 1993:116). 
Though Gamson and Wolfseld's (1993) statement was in the context of the relationship 
between social movements and traditional media, the Saudi case suggests their argument 
continues to hold true in the age of the Internet as well. Traditional media may be able to 
offer campaigns better validity than the Internet because activists report themselves online, 
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while others report them in traditional media. Also, the credibility of the Internet in Saudi 
Arabia at that time might cause this need. This claim can be supported by Alarabai (2009), 
regarding the credibility of the Arabic news websites in Saudi Arabia. The study concluded 
that while the Saudis rely on the Internet when obtaining news, they still tend to trust the 
traditional media, compared to online news website.  
In the context of traditional media, activists involved in the women driving campaign, 
highlighted the need for celebrities to draw attention to their campaign online. Although as 
activists, they could launch the campaign themselves online, they still needed the additional 
endorsement of a celebrity in order to gain wider media attention. Activists argued that this 
would guarantee a wider audience for their campaign because the power of celebrities 
extends into other media domains as well as online audiences. To gain the attention of more 
passive spectators, campaigners need the credibility of those with existing online audiences. 
These findings reflect those of Fatkin and Lansdown (2015), who studied two American 
online charitable campaigns: ‘Giving Tuesday’ and ‘SnowedOutAtlanta’. Researchers found 
that one of the two studied campaigns gained more tweets and online traction as it received 
more help from celebrities. 
Thus, the Internet provided activism with an alternative medium, and it helped activists to 
engage the traditional media. The Internet also helps make coverage of activism part of the 
daily news in the traditional media, which was impossible before the Internet in the ND 
context of Saudi Arabia. However, activism still requires traditional media to widen and 
validate Cyberactivism campaigns. Furthermore, the Internet seems to reinforce the power of 
celebrities, with online campaigns needing them to promote their campaigns online so they 
can attract a bigger audience than activists themselves can do by using the Internet alone.   
 
9.4.3. The political environment 
 The role of the Internet in democratisation has been widely discussed among scholars and 
politicians, since its emergence. Researchers such as Fung et al., 2013; Benkler, 2006; 
Rheingold, 1993; Chase & Mulvenon, 2002; Best & Wade, 2005; Diamond, 2010; Howard, 
2011; Khazaeli & Stockemer, 2013; and Shirky, 2009, 2011, have all discussed this notion 
both in terms of theory and practice in ND contexts.  
The flow of information and the relatively free virtual public space in ND countries can 
provide citizens and communities with tools to extend their power when confronted by 
authoritarian regimes. Clearly, such change cannot be brought about solely by the availability 
of a free space for political participation (in the form of discussion and action). It also 
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depends on citizens feeling the need for change and being willing to take action for change. 
In the Saudi case, the Internet allows people to enhance their political participation and 
empowers citizens’ voices within the current political system, rather than challenging the 
political system. Both of the campaigns studied indicate the importance of citizens in general 
being able to make voices heard online on different matters. Saudi activists were able to 
launch campaigns to demand their rights in a way that would not have previously been 
possible before they had the ability to exploit the Internet for activism. As many of the 
activists stressed, “Without the Internet, there would be no campaign.” Campaigners 
managed to achieve some, but not all, of their demands, indicating the change in political 
participation in the Saudi context. The Internet has become a ‘battlefield’ in Saudi Arabia, 
where activists attempt to challenge some elements of the regime, whilst it responds by trying 
to limit those online activities it judges to be potentially threatening. This suggests that 
neither the claims of the technological determinists nor those of the cyber-utopianists are 
fully borne out in the Saudi context. As mentioned earlier, findings demonstrated that there 
have been some achievements and some failures but the most important point which emerged 
in this context from those activists was that even partial successes make them more 
determined to continue to campaign for their rights.  
The Internet gives individuals the possibility for socialisation or politicisation which is 
potentially fostering the development of a semi-professional class of activists for the first 
time in the Saudi context. People have found a space where they can socialise with their 
issues and claim their rights. Both of the campaigns studied here can be considered to be 
social campaigns with reformist rather than radical aims, since activists in these campaigns 
are aiming to gain their rights within existing social and political boundaries.     
 
Furthermore, online campaigns in Saudi Arabia caused an ‘online’ spill-over effect, similar to 
that discussed by scholars such as Vasi (2006) and Della Porta and Diani (2006). Whether 
this fundamentally changes the system over time or brings about some form of 
democratisation remains to be seen. 
In the teachers’ campaign particularly, the spill-over effects cannot be ignored. Many 
campaigns have followed their strategy, and numerous parallels can be identified between the 
teachers’ campaign and other campaigns like ‘Man Divan’ in terms of their strategy, media 
engagement and bringing of a legal case. The spill-over effects have been noticed between 
campaigns in different political contexts as Earl and Kimport (2009) have found. They argue 
that the Internet was, “Positioned to accelerate the diffusion of protest practices.” (Earl & 
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Kimport, 2009:220). In the Saudi case, the Internet has undoubtedly accelerated the diffusion 
of activism, and the teachers’ campaign has established the norms for cyberactivism practice 
in the country.  
The case studies examined in this research confirm that in the Saudi context, simple models 
of democratisation via the Internet are far too crude. So far, online participation has not been 
about moving to democracy or challenging the system per se, but about claiming rights 
within the current political system in Saudi Arabia. It is not clear that this activism will 
necessarily lead to widespread political change, following the well documented Arab Spring 
model.   
In a country like Saudi Arabia, where Islam is dominant, the issue of democracy as a concept 
is viewed suspiciously by the religious establishment, represented by the General Presidency 
of Scholarly Research and Ifta. Answering a question about democracy they state: 
Democracy is a man-made system, meaning rule by the people for the people. 
Thus it is contrary to Islam, because rule is for Allah, the Most High, the 
Almighty, and it is not permissible to give legislative rights to any human being, 
no matter who he is,1 (Islam Question and Answer, n.d.). 
According to the official opinion of Muslim scholars in the state, the transition to democracy, 
or changes to the system of government in particular, represent an unwanted step. In addition 
to that, changing the political system would mean disobedience to the ruler (see Chapter 
Three). In this context, Luciani (2006:274) argued that, “Democracy's universal value is 
denied; it is viewed as a purely ‘Western’ product. They claim that the indigenous, authentic 
product is Shura, and that people do not see a need to trade local tradition for imported 
models and institutions.”  
It is true that not all Saudis accept this official religious opinion. There are other voices 
challenging official religious discourse concerning democracy, as discussed below. It is hard 
to determine which is more accepted among Saudis, but the practice and claims by both 
campaigns tend to follow the official religious opinion, even when there is a chance to extend 
their demands.      
The research for this study was conducted in the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring 
which was seen as a hugely significant series of events in terms not only of both potential 
political and social change, but also because of what it seemed to say about the role of 
internet technology in the region (Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011; Khamis & Vaughn, 2011; Shirky, 
2011; Anderson, 2011; Howard et al., 2011; Lotan et al., 2011; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012; 
                                                
1 It is important to read the full text of their reply (see bibliography) as this provides further discussion about the 
authors’ opinions of democracy in different situations.   
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Aouragh & Alexander 2011; Starbird & Palen, 2012; Saleh, 2012; Lynch, 2011; Rane & 
Salem, 2012). In 2012, there was a widespread expectation that the Arab Spring offered a 
potential model for online activists in the region and beyond and prompted, “Speculations of 
the domino effect.” in the region as Karolak (2013) expressed. Scholars such as Lacroix 
(2011), have asked whether Saudi Arabia is immune to this wave or not. He claimed that the 
same underlying factors that caused uprisings in Arab Spring countries exist in Saudi Arabia, 
including a high unemployment rate, corruption and a generational gap between the ruling 
elite and the people they rule.  However, the findings here actually indicated that Saudi 
activists felt that the Arab Spring exerted a negative influence. For example, activists in the 
women driving campaign paused their campaign because they did not want to be accused of 
exploiting Arab Spring events elsewhere, believing this might have unwanted consequences. 
Teachers were also concerned about external influences in general. In both cases, activists 
were clear about their uses of the Internet and did not want to be linked with any overtly 
‘political’ movements.  
Overall, the Internet’s role in democratisation cannot be generalised within the ND context, it 
may vary considerably according to the context. Comparing the Saudi case with the countries 
which experienced dramatic change during the Arab Spring can clearly reveal that the uses of 
the Internet for political participation is closely linked to the systemic environment in general, 
and not only the political system. There are other social differences between the Gulf 
Countries and the Arab Spring countries, like income and the political system, which suggest 
the Internet plays a country-specific role (systemic environment) which is more important 
than the political system or the classic dichotomy of ‘Democratic versus ND’.  
 
 
9.4.4. The dictator's dilemma? 
 In the context of arguments about democratisation and the Internet, this research extends our 
knowledge of the so-called ‘Dictator's Dilemma’. Kedzie (1997), Shirky (2011) and others, 
have argued that the Internet presents a challenge to both democratic and ND regimes. 
Chapter Three showed how governments have tried to control the Internet in order to reduce 
the possibilities of citizens challenging regimes. A number of methods and actions have been 
taken by different governments to block the Internet, including both offline and online 
actions.  
To some extent, the Internet is still recognised as posing a dictator's dilemma in Saudi Arabia 
where the government has taken a number of actions to block the influence of the Internet in 
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the country. However, the Internet has actually helped the state to deal with citizens’ 
demands. In other words, the way that Saudi Arabia has dealt with citizens’ demands shows 
that it is not against social activism, but it is against taking this activism out onto the streets, 
as the Head of the Saudi Ideological Security Directorate (ISD) has admitted (Chapter Six). 
Throughout the whole of the teachers’ campaign, for example, only one teacher has been 
jailed, and this was due to the fact that he took offline action by organising a demonstration. 
Similarly, in the women driving campaign, those who were stopped by the police were those 
who took offline action, such as females driving their cars. In contrast to that, both case 
studies showed that some meetings with government officials had taken place following 
online demands.  This suggests that the Internet is far from promoting democratic revolts or 
protest per se in Saudi Arabia and it is helping the Saudi government to keep activism as a 
social issue limited to the Internet, where the government can censor and monitor this more 
easily.  
Saudi policy in this scenario is very similar to the Chinese policy that was demonstrated by 
King et al. (2013) in Chapter Three. The study found that the Chinese government care only 
about the development of online discussions to collective actions. The study which analysed 
millions of online posts found that, “Looking bad does not threaten their hold on power so 
long as they manage to eliminate discussions associated with events that have collective 
action potential.” (King et al., 2013:29). In the Saudi context, governments rely on self-
censorship to tackle the issue, while the Chinese government relies on the censorship and 
content removal systems.  
The Internet also allows the authorities to identify issues and problems and respond to them 
in ways that previously would not be possible. This can be beneficial as an ‘early warning 
system’ for regimes. This, in turn, highlights the idea that not all ND countries deal with the 
Internet in the same way. For example, the Saudi government’s reaction to cyberactivism 
differs from that of the Chinese regime, because the Internet is viewed as having different 
pros and cons by each regime. Moreover, the Saudi government’s policy on cyberactivism 
focusing on social issues cannot be generalised to political cyberactivism, as it treats political 
activism in a different way. The salient example in this context is the state treatment of the 
Saudi Civil and Political Rights Association (ACPRA) members and their organisation. The 
organisation, which was established in 2009 after the Jeddah floods, aims to promote human 
rights awareness, rooting this in Islamic principles, demanding political rights such as 
establishing a parliament and political parties, documenting human rights’ violations in Saudi 
Arabia and co-operation with Saudi authorities to reduce such violations (ACPRA, 2009; 
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Alhargan, 2012). This organisation has been banned, and all its 11 founder members were 
arrested. Five of them are being detained without trial or are awaiting re-trial. Three are free, 
pending the outcome of their trials. The other three are serving prison terms of up to 15 years 
(Amnesty International, 2014). 
Hence, in relation to state responses to the Internet, this study confirms that self-censorship is 
just as important as formal technological restrictions in the ND context. Authoritarian 
regimes are far from powerless to respond and have a range of resources to try and shape 
Internet uses. Beside self-censorship, the study confirms that the existence of vague laws and 
regulations also plays a vital role in limiting online opposition, as noted by Sakr (2006). One 
teacher has clearly stated that   
A few months after launching the online forum we established a new rule. No 
thread was to be posted before we reviewed and approve it. We did this because 
there were some encroachments. For example, in one thread someone very badly 
abused the Minister of Education. Abuse of this kind will harm our claim. In 
addition, people may write about security issues or irrelevant matters. Some 
people used to swear. This would lead to the forum being block or closed down. 
We did not come for that. We came to this forum for a very specific goal; we do 
not want anyone to spoil that. (T1)   
The literature, specifically Gunitsky (2015), highlighted a number of mechanisms used by 
governments to tackle the Internet. While it is hard to say that mechanisms identified by 
Gunitsky can be seen in the Saudi case, it is also hard to deny them. Research findings 
confirm arguments concerning self-censorship by scholars like George (1998); Rod and 
Weidmann (2015); Ghobadi and Clegg (2015) as discussed in Chapter Three. In the teachers’ 
campaign, it is clear that the supervisors of the discussion forums act as gate-keepers when 
they monitor forum content and, in some cases, they do not allow comments to be published 
before they are approved by supervisors. Such a practice can clearly be considered as self-
censorship. Activists explained that they do that because they know that their forums may be 
shut down, or they will be questioned if any unwanted content appears on the forum, which 
will affect their claims. This self-censorship was the main reason for disagreements amongst 
campaigners and for the campaign to split into three separate campaigns, according to the 
level of self-censorship in each forum. Self-censorship is a pro-active step; it means activists 
are implicitly adhering to the rules and they want to claim their rights within these rules. 
Self-censorship may also explain the relatively low number of individuals imprisoned for 
Internet activities in Saudi Arabia. If individuals impose self-censorship on their online 
activities, there is less content likely to violate Saudi legislation. Indeed, the Saudi 
government’s policy for tackling the Internet threat seems to rely on self-censorship, which is 
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similar to its policy towards traditional media as argued by Rugh (2004). Self-censorship 
cannot be powerful without advanced technological power, where the government can detect 
opposition on the Internet. Brundidge and Rice (2009:325) argued that, “In some cases, 
regulations are employed to supplement technical controls, which can create a climate of self-
censorship among Internet users.” 
Vague legislation is also seen as a main threat to campaigners, in the women driving 
campaign particularly. Online participants could be jailed for a very long time under the 
recent Counter-Terrorism Law. For example, online activities could be defined as acts of 
terrorism on the grounds they may be classed as disturbing the public order of the state. This 
suggests that vague legislation could be added to the tools used by regimes to tackle 
cyberactivism. For cyberactivists, a number of vague laws can be used against them such as 
the ‘Anti-Cyber Crime Law’, where some articles are broad and are open to several 
interpretations as discussed in Chapter Five. This is also the case with the ‘Law of Terrorism 
Crimes and Financing’, where Article Three in Chapter Two states: 
 
Notwithstanding the principle of territoriality, the provisions of this Law shall 
apply to any person, Saudi or non-Saudi, who commits, aids, attempts, instigates, 
participates or conspires to commit - outs, the Kingdom - a crime provided for in 
this Law, and is not tried for, if such a crime aims to: [..] undermine the interests 
of the Kingdom, its economy or national or societal security, (Law of Terrorism 
Crimes and Financing, 2013). 
Combining both these mechanisms helps the government to control the virtual space on the 
Internet. When Internet users know that they may face such sentences, they tend to keep their 
distance from the ‘grey areas’.  
The current findings add to a growing body of literature on the issue of the ‘Dictator's 
Dilemma’ that suggest that ‘old methods’ of limiting activism and freedom of speech, like 
vague laws and self-censorship, are still a powerful means of tackling new media threats to 
the political system. Self-censorship imposed by vague legislation has been used by 
journalists in traditional media long before the advent of the Internet and the government still 
uses this for the new media. Saudi Arabia has not blocked any social media like Iran (Etehad, 
2014), and nor has it blocked social networks and created its own national versions, as is the 
case in China (Bamman et al., 2012; Feng & Guo, 2013). About 90% of blocked websites 
offer pornography and only 10% are religious and political websites (see Chapter Six). The 
two powerful tools of self-censorship and vague regulation have effectively reduced the need 
for technologically advanced blocking solutions.            
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9.4.5. Societal and cultural change 
 Without a doubt, the Internet has facilitated the communication between the opposite sexes 
in the Muslim world generally, as both Howard (2011) and Guta and Karolak (2015), have 
argued. The issue of segregation is not simply a cultural tradition limited to Saudi but 
pertains, in differing degrees, to all Islamic cultures. However, in the political participation 
context, the research highlighted two main issues in this regard. First, both case studies 
confirm that the Internet has enhanced women’s presence in Saudi society which is usually 
described as male-oriented (Nassif & Gunter, 2008).  
Both cases demonstrate women’s participation in activism. This participation contrasts with 
the pre-Internet activism in the country, where at least in the campaigns mentioned in Chapter 
Five, the only female participants were involved in the women’s pro-driving campaign in 
1990. On the Internet, Saudi women can participate politically in the same way as their male 
counterparts and make their voices heard about more general social issues as well as 
women’s issues. There is no difference between both genders in this regard.  
Second, this study found that while women are enthusiastic about, and active in, 
cyberactivism, they often still prefer to work separately from men in collective action. Saudi 
women online can interact freely with men without any religious or cultural barriers, but 
when it comes to collective work, they prefer to work with other women. So the use of the 
Internet empowers women to participate in activism but it fails to successfully amalgamate 
both genders in one collective action. In fact, analysis of the findings from the case studies 
highlights gender conflict and segregation in the campaigns which were studied. In both 
campaigns, activists showed a marked preference for working with individuals of their own 
gender. This could be related to a certain extent to societal influences in Saudi Arabia, since 
there is strictly enforced segregation between both genders in daily life. For example, women 
have their own schools, government departments and private sector companies where men 
are for the most part, not allowed to enter. However, the findings suggest another explanation 
for this conflict and preference for gendered segregation on the Internet. In the women 
driving campaign, female activists claimed that their dislike for working with men is not due 
to Saudi societal influence; one female activist asserted that they believe that women simply 
prefer to work with women.  
This explanation merits closer scrutiny. Gender segregation in Saudi society is physical, not 
communicational, since men are allowed to teach women in school via the Internet, but not to 
attend female classes in higher education schools. As the case of male teachers shows, there 
are precedents for male-female co-operation via the Internet. Interviewees gave different 
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explanations which seem to match some cases in different context. One said women do not 
like to work with men because the latter steal their efforts. Such a claim could be compatible 
with some studies which asserted that men tend to take over the leadership roles in 
movements, while the women have to take on other tasks within the movement (Johnson, 
2011).  Leadership might be understood as male activists taking the credit for others’ efforts, 
with leaders being in the limelight at the head of the campaign. This leaves other activists, 
often females, to do the day-to-day running of campaigns.  
Another female activist argued that men liked to create organisational structures for 
campaigning while the women do not. Such a claim is supported by Robnett (1996), who 
indicates that black women in the US civil rights movement, “Exercised crucial but informal 
and less publically visible leadership responsibilities.” (Robnett, 1996, cited in Johnson, 
2011:141). Others, like Taylor 1999, argue that, “Gender hierarchy is so persistent that, even 
in movements that purport to be gender-inclusive, the mobilisation, leadership patterns, 
strategies, ideologies, and even the outcomes of social movements are gendered.” (Taylor, 
1999:09). Dodson's 2015 study suggests that men and women tend to prefer to participate in 
different ways in actions, pursuing their own gendered strategies of working.   
Similarly, in the mixed gender teachers’ campaign, other reasons were cited for working 
separately. Female activists tried to work separately to gain what might be called ‘the 
sympathy vote’. In Saudi society, people are more likely to sympathise with women than men, 
even if both are in the same situation. As Johnson (2011), notes:  
In cultural contexts that associate femininity with weakness and emotionality, 
movements identified as feminine may gain short-term advantages because they 
are perceived as non-threatening but are ultimately likely to be dismissed as 
politically ineffectual by the targets they seek to influence, (Johnson 2011:140).  
Traditionally, Saudis are more likely to believe that women need help from others whilst men 
can fend for themselves and female campaigners tried to segregate themselves from men to 
make the most of this advantage. Interviewees (Chapter Eight) provided an example of this 
strategy, explaining that when a mixed group of teachers went to the Royal Court to meet the 
late King Abdullah and discuss their demands, the female representative was granted an 
audience whilst her male counterpart was not, indicating that perhaps exploiting their 
femininity was a carefully considered tactic on the part of the female campaigners.  
In a wider context, the Internet has facilitated Saudi women’s participation in social 
campaigns in a way that was not possible before this technology existed. By using the 
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Internet, females are able to work for a common cause with males whilst still being seen to 
respect cultural traditions and customs, an important consideration in the Kingdom’s 
conservative context. Moreover, Saudi female activists were also able to exploit the potential 
of the Internet to create multiple interconnected networks, allowing them to work towards the 
same end as their male counterparts but using the strategies and tactics which they preferred.  
 
9.5. Conclusion 
“Without the Internet, there is no campaign.” This was the most frequently repeated sentence 
during the interviews. Social campaigns, in particular, would not flourish without the Internet 
in Saudi Arabia. If the Internet is considered to be merely a tool in democratic countries, it is 
clearly more than this in the Saudi context, providing a virtual space for engagement. The 
Internet has created a new generation of activists who have never engaged with activism 
before. The word ‘campaign’ has entered the vocabulary of commonly used words. 
Campaigning online has put more pressure on the government and on traditional media to 
listen to their demands and to interact with campaigners’ demands. What is discussed on the 
Internet is also discussed in traditional media. Despite the risks, campaigns are growing at a 
rate that was previously unthinkable and some appear to be on the verge of becoming 
formalised.  
The social campaigns at the centre of this thesis are unique cases in the ND context. These 
campaigners are not attempting to change the political system, but simply to challenge certain 
elements of it. Activists and the public more generally, still practise self-censorship, 
particularly in light of vague legislative threats. As long as the campaigns remain online, the 
authorities see them as less dangerous.  
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10. CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSIONS 
 
10.1. Introduction  
The importance of this research lies in providing an understanding of the nature of the impact 
of the Internet in ND countries. It also looks at how this can be used to strengthen social 
campaigns and facilitate a new profile for activists in a country which does not have an 
existing tradition of collective action.  
The study was designed to examine the impact of Internet technologies on social 
campaigning in a ND context (Saudi Arabia). The research also sought to explore the 
overarching theoretical concerns regarding the extent to which a Saudi Arabian case adds to 
our understanding of the notion of activism in the digital age. In order to do this, it set out to 
answer three main research questions. Firstly, what role does the Internet play in 
mobilisation? Secondly, what sort of models of collective action are facilitated by the 
Internet? Thirdly, how does Internet campaigning challenge the systemic environment and 
vice versa? This conclusion addresses these three main areas, via a discussion of the 
empirical findings, the theoretical implications and recommendations for future research.  
10.2. The Empirical Findings 
The main empirical findings are detailed in Chapters six and seven of this thesis and 
discussed in Chapter eight. This section will synthesise the empirical findings to answer the 
study’s research questions. 
10.2.1. Individual level (Mobilisation).  
What role do Internet tools play in mobilising and connecting activists and how 
does this occur? 
 
In particular, Internet affordances created a space for activism where activists get to know 
like-minded people. Whilst activism in the offline public space in the Saudi context is 
carefully controlled by government, the Internet serves as both a space and a tool, differing 
from its role in democratic political systems, where it serves largely as a tool, rather than a 
space. Aouragh & Alexander (2011) argue that it is necessary to distinguish between the 
Internet as a space and as a tool. In the former case, the Internet can be used to express and 
articulate dissent; in the latter case it serves as a tool for organising dissent. As a space it 
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offers “a dynamic ability to shape opinion and contribute to the ‘tipping point’” (Aouragh & 
Alexander 2011) whilst its role as a tool is to allow activists to mobilise people, reaching 
wider audiences, and communicate, so functions like any other tool used for the same 
purpose such as SMS or phone calls. In the Saudi context, using the Internet as a space has 
benefited activism more. The previous chapter showed how offline space is controlled and 
constructed by the state rather than society. In such a context, activism as a social 
phenomenon might not emerge easily in a controlled public space.       
The Internet has also amplified campaigners’ voices and power. The Internet makes it 
possible to reach a wider audience, some of whom would have been impossible to reach 
otherwise. Even those who are not using the Internet, have been indirectly influenced by the 
Internet, because it has become a major source of news for society in general. 
The findings of the study indicate that a new profile of activist has emerged in Saudi Arabia 
after the growth of Internet usage throughout the state. Most of the activists interviewed had 
not engaged in any form of activism before the Internet. Not only that, but their experience in 
cyberactivism has also been shared with other people wishing to do the same. Furthermore, 
the Internet has encouraged people to campaign on social issues by lowering the costs of 
participation. Campaigning activities have become normalised to the extent that newspapers 
discuss them relatively freely. The government, on occasions, has had to respond; something 
to which it was previously unaccustomed. In short, the Internet has helped widen the range of 
participants and the attentive public, making campaigning a part of daily life in the country.  
Comparing cyberactivism with pre-Internet activism can demonstrate the differences which 
have been wrought by the Internet. Previously, it was hard to conduct any campaign due to 
public sphere restrictions and only a few social campaigns can be detected before the Internet 
was freely available. Today it is easy to launch a campaign online and to find people who 
will support it and then work with others to bring about change, largely without any 
interference from the government. Indeed, it has now become difficult to keep track of the 
numbers of campaigns that have been launched online as they grow year on year.  
 
 
10.2.2. Organisational level 
 What sort of models of collective action are facilitated by the Internet? 
Despite the claims regarding the distinctive collectiveness, or connective structures, which 
online campaigns have adopted in other parts of the world due to the characteristics of the 
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Internet, it seems that the Saudi social campaigns which have been studied do not follow the 
same connective structure. This may be understandable in the women driving campaign, due 
to its roots and the fact that some of its members have experience of working collectively. On 
the other hand, the teachers’ campaign appears to be moving towards the traditional 
structures of collective action, even though it started connectively from scratch on the 
Internet. It increasingly appears to be taking on the characteristics of a nascent trade union.  
In the Saudi case then, the Internet works as a space where people meet others who share the 
same ideas, then start working collectively, rather than connectively, to achieve their 
demands. This is because there is no tradition of activism and it is difficult for people to 
understand the concept of connective action.  
 
10.2.3. Systemic level 
How does Internet campaigning challenge the systemic environment and vice versa? 
In ND contexts, it was expected that the systemic environment would play a crucial role in 
shaping cyberactivism and Saudi Arabia is no exception here. The political and social context 
has a strong influence on the Internet, and consequently, on all aspects of cyberactivism, 
including mobilisation, organisation and actions. For activists, the main threat to 
cyberactivism in the country is the vagueness of current legislation and self-censorship. Both 
of these threats have impacted on cyberactivism and limited activism issues to mainly ones 
such as women’s rights and calls for adequate housing and salaries. These two threats have 
also put more pressure on cyberactivists, as there is no clear ‘red line’, demarcating legal, 
from illegal, behaviour. This makes cyberactivism a risky activity. 
In addition, the Saudi social system still exercises a major influence on social cyberactivism. 
Women remain dependent on a male guardian. They may not become fully engaged because 
they worry about their families; their male guardian will be involved in any security issue 
which relates to female activities. For women, being an activist is not a decision that can be 
taken alone, as any consequences are likely to affect the whole family. In the context of this 
social pressure, messages from activists aiming to mobilise people are also subject to the 
demands of the prevailing social order. Ignoring this can negatively impact a campaign.  
Interestingly, it was expected that conventional media would be opposed to social campaigns. 
However, the findings show that the media helped activists most of the time. Yet, this support 
would not have been achieved without the Internet. In the 1990s, the women’s driving 
campaign received negative coverage in conventional media. The corresponding campaign in 
2013 however, received positive coverage, until the newspapers were asked to change their 
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attitude by Saudi officials. Even then, columnists continued to maintain a positive attitude. 
Something similar has happened in the case of the teachers’ campaign, which received 
positive coverage from the media because journalists, as well as MoCI officials, understand 
that negative reporting or a news blackout is unlikely to work in the Internet era, given that 
the majority of Saudis are online and can find these campaigns easily. So the Internet has 
helped activists to change traditional media attitudes in such contexts and then use this to the 
campaign’s advantage. 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that some Saudi officials and Islamic scholars remain cautious 
about the Internet and have criticised online content and discussions. There is also no doubt 
that the government does censor and monitor the Internet as the Ideological Security 
Directorate has stated in Chapter Six. The government prefers campaigns to be kept online 
and as long activists claim their rights on the Internet without taking any ‘illegal’ offline 
action, it is unlikely that the government will disrupt them. In both of the campaigns which 
were studied, the only people who were jailed or questioned by the police were those who 
took offline action. Generally, it is easier for the government to keep its eye on cyberactivism 
than it is to tackle offline activism. Importantly, the case studies here concern activism on 
social issues, which could be considered as non-threatening, unlike wider political reform 
campaigns.       
 
10.3. Theoretical Implications 
There have been some attempts to theorise cyberactivism differently since it can be 
considered to be unlike traditional activism in regards to the power exercised by individuals 
and their ability to act individually. Bennett and Segerberg's (2013) connective action 
provided the main theoretical framework in this thesis and helped to explore the role of the 
Internet in encouraging activism in Saudi Arabia. However, the findings of this thesis call for 
a re-evaluation of some theoretical approaches when studying cyberactivism in a ND context.  
It has been argued that, when theorising cyberactivism in ND countries, there is a need to 
take the systemic environment into account, as when using the classical, social movement 
theories in similar contexts. Scholars, such as Reddy (2014), insisted that theorists who 
studied social movements in Africa and the Middle East have found that the social and 
political structures there make such classic theories, “Not neatly applicable.” (Reddy, 
2014:339). The same is true for theories of Internet activism. Although Bennett and 
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Segerberg (2013), included some ND countries when they formulated their model, it could be 
argued that this is ‘not neatly applicable’ in the Saudi case. On the basis of the research 
conducted here, theoretical approaches to cyberactivism outside Western democracies need to 
take into account the following: 
Focus on all the uses made of the Internet as a whole, and should not purely focus on popular 
Internet applications, since popularity may differ from country to country; what is popular in 
the West may not be popular elsewhere, due to differences in social context and user needs. 
This thesis underlined that activists used some applications because of their popularity among 
the targeted audience and not because of their worldwide popularity or their technological 
features.  
Although the idea of connective logic is popular in the Internet era, it might be important to 
re-examine the concept in the ND context. This is because this assumption is mainly based on 
data relating to cyberactivism in democratic countries. This concept of connective logic is not 
limited to Bennett and Segerberg (2013), but also to scholars who have argued about this 
concept or logic under the guise of different terms such as collectiveness like in (Kavada 
2010) 
10.4. Recommendations regarding Future Research 
While this research has attempted to answer the research questions concerning the impact of 
the Internet on social campaigns in ND countries, using Saudi Arabia as a case study, there 
are a number of issues which require further investigation in the area of cyberactivism, and in 
the ND context in particular. Exploring the following issues in future research would help to 
extend current knowledge about cyberactivism in both contexts:   
Is the Internet a ‘Dictator’s Dilemma’ in all cases? 
This thesis show that cyberactivism relating to social issues may not be viewed as threatening 
to the state, since the Saudi government shows its interest and responds to what people 
discuss and claim online. It could become increasingly important to study governmental 
responses to social activism, without adopting the ‘Dictator’s Dilemma’ term as a necessary 
starting point.  
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Has the relationship between activists and traditional media been changed after the 
Internet?  
Even in ND countries, conventional media have begun to realise that they no longer represent 
the only news outlet. So, ignorance of activism campaigns and negative reporting are more 
likely to affect news organisations than activists’ activities, since the activists can now seek 
out alternative news outlets for their news. Thus, if the news is not in the traditional media, 
the audience may continue to drift to other news outlets. That suggests a wider implications 
for the new cycle and newspapers especially. 
How far does gender make a difference to ways of working online in certain cultures?  
Interviews suggested that women did not want to work with men, even online. This finding 
deserves further exploration since there are none of the obvious reasons for continuing the 
gender segregation which persists in the public space offline. Similarly, some interviewees 
said that women are more active in supporting the teachers’ campaign in areas such as re-
tweeting, posting, and replying to threads, because they are more emotionally engaged.  
While the use of Internet functions and features can help activism to flourish in ND, it is 
important to emphasise that making the most of these features and functions also depends on 
the users’ skills and the context in which they are employed, as argued by (Kavada 2012). 
This thesis has demonstrated that the use of the Internet for activism in Saudi Arabia has 
widened and deepened activism in Saudi Arabia but at the same time in this context, the 
Internet can also be said to constrain some aspects of activism. 
 This thesis shows that the Internet became both a space and a tool for activism in the 
Egyptian case studied by (Aouragh & Alexander 2011). New activist profiles emerged in this 
state since many online activists had never engaged with activism before the Internet. Its 
affordances and their skills helped them to campaign online. Online activism activity in the 
campaigns studied in this thesis has also had a spillover effect. Some campaigns have 
benefited from the experience of others such as the Man Divan campaign and teachers’ 
campaign. Internet use by campaigners has also helped them to widen their targeted 
audiences and go beyond geographical boundaries, and also to attract media attention both 
locally and internationally. 
Campaigners use of the Internet in collective action does not necessary facilitate a different 
model of collective action. The two campaigns studied here show that hierarchical 
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organization still forms online, and that collective identity is clear in both campaigns. 
Political, cultural, and social contexts have influenced the organizational structure of both 
these campaigns. Furthermore, the teachers’ campaign reflects the model lifecycle of a social 
movement as discussed previously in the framework by (Della Porta & Diani, 2006; 
Macionis, 2008). In the Saudi context, this lifecycle emerged online. 
Employing the Internet has helped activists in the Saudi context to achieve some goals and to 
challenge the systemic environments in some respects. However, the political system in 
particular is not powerless, and self-censorship, and vague legislation can be viewed as some 
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Appendices A:  Adult Informed Consent from and data sheet 
 
 
Adult Informed Consent from and data sheet 
 
1. Title of the research project 
From cassette to the Internet 




2. Project objectives: 
• Identify the Internet applications that are used by cyberactivists in Saudi Arabia, and the 
method of use by studying the application/websites they are using in their activism, to s 
the reasons/way of using.  
• Trace the strategies, goals of Cyberactivism, and the obstacles facing cyberactivists in 
Saudi Arabia, in order to for better understanding of Cyberactivists’ motivations.  
• Examine the success of using the Internet in the Arab spring and its impact on Saudi 
Cyberactivists, as well as how Saudis could use the uprising in Middle East for their 
favor, be exploring the interaction between Saudi cyberactivsts and other activists around 
the world.  
3. Names of the researcher: 
Abdullah Abalkhail – University of Salford – United Kingdom 
  
4. Description of human subject involvement 
Interviewee will be asked questions about his/her online activities.  
 
5. Length of human subject participation 
The participant will be interviewed/ observed for no more than 2 hours.  
 
6. Risks & discomforts of participation 
This project is deemed as no more than minimal risk. The study team does not foresee or 
anticipate any direct risk to the subjects." 
 
 
7. Expected benefits to subjects or to others 
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"Although you may not receive direct benefit from your participation, others may ultimately 
benefit from the knowledge obtained in this study."  
 
8. Confidentiality of records/data  
You will not be identified in any reports on this study. Records will be kept confidential to 
the extent provided by University of Salford. Your name will not be in any part of the study. 
Codes will be used instate.  
  
9. Availability of further information: 
If significant new knowledge is obtained during the course of this research which may relate 
to your willingness to continue participation, you will be informed of this knowledge."  
  
10. Contact Information: 
Email: a.m.abalkhail@edu.salford.ac.uk 
 
11. Voluntary nature of participation 
Your participation in this project is voluntary. Even after you sign the informed consent 
document, you may decide to leave the study at any time without penalty or loss of benefits 
to which you may otherwise be entitled." 
Alternative forms of treatment may be available in the event you do not wish to participate in 
the proposed study. You may skip or refuse to answer any interview question.  
 
12. Documentation of the consent: 
One copy of this document will be kept together with the research records of this study. Also, 
you will be given a copy to keep. 
 
13. Consent of the subject: 
I have read of the information given above. Abdullah Abalkhail has offered to answer any 
questions I may have concerning the study. I hereby consent to participate in the study. 
 
ADULT SUBJECT OF RESEARCH  
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Printed Name                                 Consenting signature   date 
 
14. Audio/Video Recording of subjects: 
Interviewee agreed that audio and/or video recording devices will be used. Upon 
completion of the study all recorded data will be either destroyed, erased, archived, or 
kept for future studies, etc.  
 
_________________________________________ 
Signature                                 Date  
 
I do not wish to have my interview recorded, however wish to participate in the 




Signature                                 Date  
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Appendices B: Activists’ Interviews Questions 
 
• Demographic information 
• What are your motives to join the campaign? 
• What are your demands? 
• Are there any restrictions on activists? 
• Why do you use the Internet in the campaign? 
• Are you in contact with other campaigns?                                                                                  
• Do you expect that this campaign will stop? 
• Do you expect to be among other campaigns? 
• Do you think that the Internet has contributed in the appearance of the campaigns?  
• Do you have any contributions in other campaigns? 
• How do you see the influence of the applications and the Internet in general on people? 
• What determines whether or not to use the application?                                                          
• Do you plan produce a message? How? 
• Is there a targeted number? A specific audience? Do you think that the applications masses 
are different? 
• Do you think that there are other ways besides the Internet to collect more people? 
• Do you ask people to produce a message? 
• Which messages you think are better in Influencing others? 
• Do you produce a unique message to a specific application or one for all 
• Is the society's culture and religion affect in choosing the technique and tactic? 
• Do you think that different means lead to different results? Do you deliberate to change 
means and tactics? 
• What does the collected number means? 
• Are you walking on precedent footsteps? 
• Do you expect to continue? For how long? 
• Are there any connections or friendships? 
• Is there any organization in any form? 
• Is there any previous experience in other campaigns? 
• Is general, is there any belief that the Internet has changed something in reality, for example: 
women driving in the streets and so on? 
• How do you see the size of the workers in the campaign? 




















































































































































Appendices E:  Twitter Analysis of Teachers campaigns account on Twitter 




















































Appendices F: Twitter Analysis of Teachers campaigns account on Twitter 
@ksa_teachers (Source: Twitonomy paid service) 
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